Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
Zie619/n8n-workflows carries serious gaps (35%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Architecture (97%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Maturity (75%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (15%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (39%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 2 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).
For scale: — (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly — (—). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (97%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Raise Readiness 15 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 35 → ~52.
New since the last scan (99+)
- D4 · Duplicated block (21 lines × 3) workflow_db.py
- D4 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) workflow_db.py
- D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/enhanced_api.py
- D8 · No automated tests
- D18 · Dimension evaluation failed
- D28 · Secret: linkedin-client-id workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Code/0397_Code_Schedule_Import_Scheduled.json
- D28 · Secret: private-key workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Code/0924_Code_Respondtowebhook_Process_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: jwt workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Code/1862_Code_Respondtowebhook_Automation_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: gitlab-pat workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Gitlab/1895_Gitlab_Code_Automation_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Manual/1115_Manual_Wekan_Automation_Triggered.json
- D28 · Secret: gcp-api-key workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Telegram/0742_Telegram_Splitout_Create_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Wait/1312_Wait_Schedule_Create_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: linkedin-client-id workflows_backup/Code/0397_Code_Schedule_Import_Scheduled.json
- D28 · Secret: private-key workflows_backup/Code/0924_Code_Respondtowebhook_Process_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: jwt workflows_backup/Code/1862_Code_Respondtowebhook_Automation_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Error/1777_Error_Postgres_Send_Triggered.json
- D28 · Secret: gitlab-pat workflows_backup/Gitlab/1895_Gitlab_Code_Automation_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Googletaskstool/1103_Googletaskstool_Telegram_Automation_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Http/0440_HTTP_Stickynote_Create_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Http/0450_HTTP_Stickynote_Create_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Http/0707_HTTP_Stripe_Create_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Http/1111_HTTP_Schedule_Automation_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Manual/0541_Manual_Stickynote_Update_Triggered.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Manual/1115_Manual_Wekan_Automation_Triggered.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Manual/1475_Manual_Stickynote_Automation_Triggered.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Mautic/1526_Mautic_Webhook_Automation_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Splitout/0730_Splitout_Noop_Send_Triggered.json
- D28 · Secret: algolia-api-key workflows_backup/Splitout/0840_Splitout_HTTP_Send_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: jwt workflows_backup/Stickynote/1986_Stickynote_Jira_Create_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: gcp-api-key workflows_backup/Telegram/0742_Telegram_Splitout_Create_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Wait/1312_Wait_Schedule_Create_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Webhook/0376_Webhook_Code_Create_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: linkedin-client-id workflows/Code/0397_Code_Schedule_Import_Scheduled.json
- D28 · Secret: private-key workflows/Code/0924_Code_Respondtowebhook_Process_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: jwt workflows/Code/1862_Code_Respondtowebhook_Automation_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows/Error/1777_Error_Postgres_Send_Triggered.json
- D28 · Secret: gitlab-pat workflows/Gitlab/1895_Gitlab_Code_Automation_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows/Googletaskstool/1103_Googletaskstool_Telegram_Automation_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows/Http/0440_HTTP_Stickynote_Create_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows/Http/0450_HTTP_Stickynote_Create_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows/Http/0707_HTTP_Stripe_Create_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows/Http/1111_HTTP_Schedule_Automation_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows/Manual/0541_Manual_Stickynote_Update_Triggered.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows/Manual/1115_Manual_Wekan_Automation_Triggered.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows/Manual/1475_Manual_Stickynote_Automation_Triggered.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows/Mautic/1526_Mautic_Webhook_Automation_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows/Splitout/0730_Splitout_Noop_Send_Triggered.json
- D28 · Secret: algolia-api-key workflows/Splitout/0840_Splitout_HTTP_Send_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: jwt workflows/Stickynote/1986_Stickynote_Jira_Create_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: gcp-api-key workflows/Telegram/0742_Telegram_Splitout_Create_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows/Wait/1312_Wait_Schedule_Create_Webhook.json
- D28 · Secret: generic-api-key workflows/Webhook/0376_Webhook_Code_Create_Webhook.json
- D29 · Medium: express-path-join-resolve-traversal src/server.js
- D29 · Medium: express-res-sendfile src/server.js
- D29 · Medium: express-path-join-resolve-traversal src/server.js
- D31 · Critical IaC: DS-0010 .devcontainer/Dockerfile
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2025-183 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-120 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-175 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-177 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-178 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-179 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-1433 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-1434 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-1851 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-1852 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-3036 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-3037 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-3038 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-3039 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-3040 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-3041 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-1872 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-1873 requirements.txt
- D38 · Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-2275 requirements.txt
- R10 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) src/server.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) src/server.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) src/server.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2 locations) src/server.js
- R10 · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2 locations) medcards-ai/tailwind.config.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2 locations) src/index-workflows.js
- R4 · No test reaches this file src/database.js
- R4 · No test reaches this file src/server.js
- R4 · No test reaches this file medcards-ai/src/types/database.ts
- R4 · No test reaches this file src/index-workflows.js
- R4 · No test reaches this file src/init-db.js
- R6 · Tooling
- R7 · Dead file (~314 LoC) medcards-ai/src/types/database.ts
- P2 · No structured logging
Top priorities
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 50 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 38 | High / Critical |
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 38 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 22 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Begin by resolving the two leaked secrets in the Telegram and webhook automation files to secure the application. Next, implement structured logging using ILogger or Serilog across all services to improve observability and monitoring. Then, increase test coverage by adding tests for all unreached production modules to ensure reliability. Finally, clean up the dependency tree by removing unused packages, explicitly declaring imports, and moving type-only or test-only packages to devDependencies.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with 0742_Telegram_Splitout_Create_Webhook.json, 1862_Code_Respondtowebhook_Automation_Webhook.json. | +19.7 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. | +16.4 pts | Low | Code Coverage |
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +16.4 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. | +19.7 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +19.7 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies. | +19.7 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
| Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI. | +14.1 pts | Medium | Tooling |
| Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript. | +5.5 pts | Medium | Type Safety |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| requirements.txt | 0.0 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| k8s/deployment.yaml | 1.8 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| helm/workflows-docs/templates/deployment.yaml | 2.0 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| workflows/Telegram/0742_Telegram_Splitout_Create_Webhook.json | 4.4 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: gcp-api-key |
| workflows/Code/1862_Code_Respondtowebhook_Automation_Webhook.json | 4.4 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: jwt |
| .github/workflows/ci-cd.yml | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/workflows/docker.yml | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml | 4.6 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .github/workflows/pages-deploy.yml | 4.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| workflow_db.py | 5.7 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: insecure-hash-algorithm-md5 |
| .github/workflows/update-readme.yml | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag |
| .devcontainer/Dockerfile | 6.2 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Critical IaC: DS-0010 |
| src/server.js | 6.3 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: express-path-join-resolve-traversal |
| workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Code/0397_Code_Schedule_Import_Scheduled.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: linkedin-client-id |
| workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Code/0924_Code_Respondtowebhook_Process_Webhook.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: private-key |
| workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Code/1862_Code_Respondtowebhook_Automation_Webhook.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: jwt |
| workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Gitlab/1895_Gitlab_Code_Automation_Webhook.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: gitlab-pat |
| workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Manual/1115_Manual_Wekan_Automation_Triggered.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Telegram/0742_Telegram_Splitout_Create_Webhook.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: gcp-api-key |
| workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Wait/1312_Wait_Schedule_Create_Webhook.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 44 of 46 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 46 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 151 of 161 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
3 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was WorkflowDatabase.analyze_nodes at 30.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
9 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was WorkflowDatabase.analyze_nodes at 44.
What to do
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
3 duplicated block group(s) detected.
D5 · Coupling
0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D8 · Code Coverage
No automated tests — the solution has no test code.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D9 · Test Distribution
No test projects found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
D13 · Secret Scanning
2 secret(s) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with 0742_Telegram_Splitout_Create_Webhook.json, 1862_Code_Respondtowebhook_Automation_Webhook.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.
D19 · Documentation Quality
The documentation is clear and complete for a workflow templates repository: an online browse link, What's New section, Quick Access guide, By The Numbers table, Features subsection, and a detailed Template Categories outline covering Communication & Messaging through AI & Automation. A dedicated MEDCARDS.AI README with Product Vision, architecture (Next.js 14 + Supabase + Claude Sonnet stack), project structure, and deployment time is strong for its niche purpose. Both repositories share the same clip discipline and full-outline convention.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 The main README lacks a dedicated 'Usage Instructions' or 'How to… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
D26 · Project Cohesion
No projects to assess.
D27 · Navigability
Too little code to assess navigability.
D28 · Secrets (history)
93 finding(s): 0 critical, 93 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What to do
- Resolve the 47 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with 0397_Code_Schedule_Import_Scheduled.json (3), 0742_Telegram_Splitout_Create_Webhook.json (3), 0924_Code_Respondtowebhook_Process_Webhook.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (47 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
38 finding(s): 0 critical, 31 high, 5 medium, 2 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 31 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci-cd.yml (13), docker.yml (7), deploy-pages.yml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (31 issue-level).
- Resolve the 5 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with server.js (3), deployment.yaml, workflow_db.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with Dockerfile, enhanced_api.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
D31 · IaC & Container Security
22 finding(s): 1 critical, 2 high, 8 medium, 11 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 8 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy
A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
38 finding(s): 0 critical, 8 high, 26 medium, 4 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 26 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with requirements.txt (26). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (26 warning-level).
- Resolve the 8 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with requirements.txt (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
- Resolve the 4 Low CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with requirements.txt (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 recommendation-level).
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX5 · Architecture & structure
M1 · Documentation (README)
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
- Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P2 · Observability
- No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
P5 · DR & Backup
R1 · Type Safety
- 1 typed · 6 plain JS
What to do
- Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication
- src/server.js:77 · src/server.js:294 — server.js:77
- src/server.js:123 · src/server.js:159 — server.js:123
- src/server.js:233 · src/server.js:250 — server.js:233
- src/server.js:156 · src/server.js:247 — server.js:156
- medcards-ai/tailwind.config.ts:113 · medcards-ai/tailwind.config.ts:121 — tailwind.config.ts:113
- src/index-workflows.js:25 · src/index-workflows.js:59 — index-workflows.js:25
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. — database.js:171
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files
- 1 file(s) over 400 lines
What to do
- Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×5) — database.js, server.js, database.ts, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling
- test ✗ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✓
What to do
- Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code
- 4 file(s) (~1181 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package.
- Unreachable from the 0 application, 3 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (0 application, 3 tooling, 0 test roots considered) — database.ts
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — index-workflows.js:3, server.js:3, server.js:2
- Declared in medcards-ai/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports
X1 · Async correctness
X3 · Exception handling
X4 · Structured logging
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 49% | Weak — gated by R1, R7 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 97% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 75% | Strong | Solid. |
| Readiness | 15% | Critical — gated by D8, D9, D13, R4, R8, P2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 39% | Weak — gated by D28, D29, D36, D38 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 57 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
- AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D10 Test Quality — No tests in the analyzed solution to assess for quality.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
- D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
- D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — only 1/3 markers (20 value object(s))
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
- X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 93 finding(s)
- Secret: linkedin-client-id workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Code/0397_Code_Schedule_Import_Scheduled.json:517
- Secret: private-key workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Code/0924_Code_Respondtowebhook_Process_Webhook.json:206
- Secret: jwt workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Code/1862_Code_Respondtowebhook_Automation_Webhook.json:409
- Secret: gitlab-pat workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Gitlab/1895_Gitlab_Code_Automation_Webhook.json:35
- Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Manual/1115_Manual_Wekan_Automation_Triggered.json:85
- Secret: gcp-api-key workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Telegram/0742_Telegram_Splitout_Create_Webhook.json:518
- Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup_20251103_112516/Wait/1312_Wait_Schedule_Create_Webhook.json:2352
- Secret: linkedin-client-id workflows_backup/Code/0397_Code_Schedule_Import_Scheduled.json:497
- Secret: private-key workflows_backup/Code/0924_Code_Respondtowebhook_Process_Webhook.json:190
- Secret: jwt workflows_backup/Code/1862_Code_Respondtowebhook_Automation_Webhook.json:153
- Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Error/1777_Error_Postgres_Send_Triggered.json:297
- Secret: gitlab-pat workflows_backup/Gitlab/1895_Gitlab_Code_Automation_Webhook.json:58
- Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Googletaskstool/1103_Googletaskstool_Telegram_Automation_Webhook.json:937
- Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Http/0440_HTTP_Stickynote_Create_Webhook.json:219
- Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Http/0450_HTTP_Stickynote_Create_Webhook.json:242
- Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Http/0707_HTTP_Stripe_Create_Webhook.json:251
- Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Http/1111_HTTP_Schedule_Automation_Webhook.json:104
- Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Manual/0541_Manual_Stickynote_Update_Triggered.json:31
- Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Manual/1115_Manual_Wekan_Automation_Triggered.json:77
- Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Manual/1475_Manual_Stickynote_Automation_Triggered.json:30
- Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Mautic/1526_Mautic_Webhook_Automation_Webhook.json:181
- Secret: generic-api-key workflows_backup/Splitout/0730_Splitout_Noop_Send_Triggered.json:61
- Secret: algolia-api-key workflows_backup/Splitout/0840_Splitout_HTTP_Send_Webhook.json:65
- Secret: jwt workflows_backup/Stickynote/1986_Stickynote_Jira_Create_Webhook.json:271
- Secret: gcp-api-key workflows_backup/Telegram/0742_Telegram_Splitout_Create_Webhook.json:487
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci-cd.yml:25
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci-cd.yml:28
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci-cd.yml:33
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci-cd.yml:95
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci-cd.yml:98
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci-cd.yml:113
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci-cd.yml:130
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci-cd.yml:133
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci-cd.yml:136
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci-cd.yml:144
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci-cd.yml:155
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci-cd.yml:174
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci-cd.yml:191
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml:25
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml:28
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml:52
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml:55
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-pages.yml:69
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker.yml:26
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker.yml:29
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker.yml:32
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker.yml:121
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker.yml:124
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker.yml:129
- High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker.yml:132
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- Leaked secret: gcp-api-key workflows/Telegram/0742_Telegram_Splitout_Create_Webhook.json:518
- Leaked secret: jwt workflows/Code/1862_Code_Respondtowebhook_Automation_Webhook.json:176
- High IaC: KSV-0014 helm/workflows-docs/templates/deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/deployment.yaml
- Dimension evaluation failed
- Critical IaC: DS-0010 .devcontainer/Dockerfile
- No automated tests
Warning — 43 finding(s)
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2025-183 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-120 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-175 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-177 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-178 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-179 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2024-38 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-1433 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-1434 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-1851 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-1852 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-3036 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-3037 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-3038 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-3039 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-3040 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-3041 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-1872 requirements.txt
- Medium CVE: PYSEC-2026-1873 requirements.txt
- Medium IaC: KSV-0001 helm/workflows-docs/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0013 helm/workflows-docs/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0104 helm/workflows-docs/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0125 helm/workflows-docs/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0001 k8s/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0013 k8s/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0104 k8s/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0125 k8s/deployment.yaml
- Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/deployment.yaml:32
- Medium: express-path-join-resolve-traversal src/server.js:148
- Medium: express-res-sendfile src/server.js:156
- Medium: express-path-join-resolve-traversal src/server.js:156
- Medium: insecure-hash-algorithm-md5 workflow_db.py:112
- Unpinned build actions
- Duplicated block (21 lines × 3) workflow_db.py:8
- Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) workflow_db.py:72
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/enhanced_api.py:17
Recommendation — 24 finding(s)
- Low IaC: DS-0026 .devcontainer/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: KSV-0020 helm/workflows-docs/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0021 helm/workflows-docs/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0030 helm/workflows-docs/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0110 helm/workflows-docs/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0003 k8s/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0004 k8s/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0020 k8s/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0021 k8s/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0030 k8s/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0106 k8s/deployment.yaml
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt
- Low: no-sudo-in-dockerfile .devcontainer/Dockerfile:49
- Low: wildcard-cors src/enhanced_api.py:70
- Test reliability not included
- The main README lacks a dedicated 'Usage Instructions' or 'How to Contribute' section despite the Template Categories outline naming them; this leaves an unshown gap for new contributors. README.md
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
- No build provenance
- No artifact signing
- No SBOM
- No tests found
Info — 1 finding(s)
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 93 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 38 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet (no .NET solution) | — | dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 22 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 38 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |