Public report — goose, published 7 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
143findings with an exact file:lineof 152 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
45/102dimensions across the health lenses — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
aaif-goose/goose carries serious gaps (44%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (33%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (46%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution); ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene).
For scale: Hobby (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
50
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
50
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
14
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
7
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, address the single missing test case to ensure test coverage is complete. Next, implement structured logging using ILogger or Serilog across all projects to improve observability and health monitoring. Then, clean up the dependency tree by removing unused packages, explicitly declaring imports, and moving type-only dependencies to development-only scopes. After that, enhance deployment safety by adding readiness and liveness probes and automating rollbacks for failed releases. Finally, update all outdated dependencies to their latest versions to reduce technical debt and security risks.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 44 of 45 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 45 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 143 of 152 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
13 finding(s): 0 critical, 13 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: private-key · ×6crates/goose/src/providers/api_client.rs:169detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 6 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with api_client.rs (3), gcpauth.rs (2), authors.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×29.github/dependabot.yml:6detected by semgrep finding
Medium: wildcard-postmessage-configuration · ×21crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/assets/mcp-app-bridge.js:35detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 29 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release.yml (4), dependabot.yml (3), pnpm-workspace.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (29 issue-level).
Resolve the 21 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with map_template.html (3), mcp-app-bridge.js (3), sankey_template.html (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (21 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×9.devcontainer/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×5.devcontainer/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 9 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).
Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×49documentation/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]ui/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 49 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (32), package-lock.json (9), bun.lock (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (49 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
What to do
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — ToolCallWithResponse.tsx:592, CustomProviderForm.tsx:239, ChatInput.tsx:194, …
What to do
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files6.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
38 file(s) over 400 lines
What to do
Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — main.ts, autoUpdater.ts, index.ts, …
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.
What to do
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
1 file(s) (~260 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package.
Unreachable from the 17 application, 9 tooling and 79 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (17 application, 9 tooling, 79 test roots considered) (×6) — preload.ts, index.ts, codebase-search.ts, …
What to do
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — collapsible.tsx:3, dropdown-menu.tsx:4, TooltipWrapper.tsx:4
Declared in oidc-proxy/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.
Declared in services/ask-ai-bot/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.
Declared in ui/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.
Every import is type-only — move it to devDependencies. — McpAppRenderer.tsx:25
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 58 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
D10 Test Quality — ~52 lines of test code exist on disk but weren't loaded from the analyzed solution (excluded from the .sln, or co-located/using a test attribute not loaded here), so test quality couldn't be assessed. Include the tests in the analyzed solution to enable this check.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Issue — 95 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×49
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] documentation/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 1.1.16: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.17 (in 2 lockfiles)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] documentation/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 1.1.16: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.18 (in 2 lockfiles)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] documentation/package-lock.json— fast-uri 3.1.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.5 (in 2 lockfiles)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] documentation/package-lock.json— js-yaml 3.14.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.15.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] documentation/package-lock.json— js-yaml 3.14.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.15.1 (in 2 lockfiles)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] documentation/package-lock.json— minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.4 (in 2 lockfiles)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] documentation/package-lock.json— minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.3 (in 2 lockfiles)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] documentation/package-lock.json— minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.1.3 (in 2 lockfiles)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] documentation/package-lock.json— serialize-javascript 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.0.3
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] scripts/provider-error-proxy/uv.lock— aiohttp 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.14.3
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] services/ask-ai-bot/bun.lock— @isaacs/brace-expansion 5.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.0.1
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] services/ask-ai-bot/bun.lock— lodash 4.17.23: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.18.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] services/ask-ai-bot/bun.lock— undici 6.21.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.24.0
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] services/ask-ai-bot/bun.lock— undici 6.21.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.24.0
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] services/ask-ai-bot/bun.lock— undici 6.21.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.24.0
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] services/ask-ai-bot/bun.lock— undici 6.21.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.27.0 (in 2 lockfiles)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] services/ask-ai-bot/bun.lock— ws 8.19.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 8.21.0
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] ui/pnpm-lock.yaml— @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.8.13
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] ui/pnpm-lock.yaml— @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.8.13
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] ui/pnpm-lock.yaml— @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.8.13
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] ui/pnpm-lock.yaml— @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.8.12
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] ui/pnpm-lock.yaml— @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.11: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.8.13
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] ui/pnpm-lock.yaml— brace-expansion 1.1.12: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.1.16
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] ui/pnpm-lock.yaml— builder-util-runtime 9.5.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 9.7.0
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] ui/pnpm-lock.yaml— defu 6.1.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.1.5
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:6— This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:18— This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:30— This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
High: gha-curl-pipe-shell .github/workflows/build-cli-linux.yml:144— A `run:` step pipes the output of `curl` or `wget` directly into a shell interpreter. This is the "curl | bash" install pattern — if the remote server is compromised or the URL is hijacked, an attacker can execute arbitrary code in your CI runner. Consider downloading the file first, verifying its checksum or signature, and then executing it.
High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/build-notify.yml:29— Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/bundle-windows.yml:127— Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/cargo-deny.yml:25— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/code-review.yml:48— Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
High: gha-curl-pipe-shell .github/workflows/docs-update-cli-ref.yml:81— A `run:` step pipes the output of `curl` or `wget` directly into a shell interpreter. This is the "curl | bash" install pattern — if the remote server is compromised or the URL is hijacked, an attacker can execute arbitrary code in your CI runner. Consider downloading the file first, verifying its checksum or signature, and then executing it.
High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/goose-issue-solver.yml:177— Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-smoke-test.yml:96— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-smoke-test.yml:130— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/pr-smoke-test.yml:227— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: gha-curl-pipe-shell .github/workflows/python-sdk-wheels.yml:55— A `run:` step pipes the output of `curl` or `wget` directly into a shell interpreter. This is the "curl | bash" install pattern — if the remote server is compromised or the URL is hijacked, an attacker can execute arbitrary code in your CI runner. Consider downloading the file first, verifying its checksum or signature, and then executing it.
High: pull-request-target-code-checkout .github/workflows/recipe-security-scanner.yml:129— This GitHub Actions workflow file uses `pull_request_target` and checks out code from the incoming pull request. When using `pull_request_target`, the Action runs in the context of the target repository, which includes access to all repository secrets. Normally, this is safe because the Action only runs code from the target repository, not the incoming PR. However, by checking out the incoming PR code, you're now using the incoming code for the rest of the action. You may be inadvertently executing arbitrary code from the incoming PR with access to repository secrets, which would let an attacker steal repository secrets. This normally happens by running build scripts (e.g., `npm build` and `make`) or dependency installation scripts (e.g., `python setup.py install`). Audit your workflow file to make sure no code from the incoming PR is executed. Please see https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ for additional mitigations.
High: pull-request-target-code-checkout .github/workflows/recipe-security-scanner.yml:136— This GitHub Actions workflow file uses `pull_request_target` and checks out code from the incoming pull request. When using `pull_request_target`, the Action runs in the context of the target repository, which includes access to all repository secrets. Normally, this is safe because the Action only runs code from the target repository, not the incoming PR. However, by checking out the incoming PR code, you're now using the incoming code for the rest of the action. You may be inadvertently executing arbitrary code from the incoming PR with access to repository secrets, which would let an attacker steal repository secrets. This normally happens by running build scripts (e.g., `npm build` and `make`) or dependency installation scripts (e.g., `python setup.py install`). Audit your workflow file to make sure no code from the incoming PR is executed. Please see https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ for additional mitigations.
High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/release.yml:58— This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/release.yml:73— This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/release.yml:94— This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
High: secrets-inherit .github/workflows/release.yml:107— This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/scorecard.yml:76— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
High: npm-missing-minimum-release-age documentation/.npmrc:1— This .npmrc does not set a minimum release age or sets it too low. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add `min-release-age = 7` to wait 7 days before resolving newly published package versions. Added in: v11.10 Reference: https://github.blog/changelog/2026-02-18-npm-bulk-trusted-publishing-config-and-script-security-now-generally-available/
High: detect-child-process ui/desktop/scripts/unregister-deeplink-protocols.js:41— Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `appPath`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed.
High: detect-child-process ui/desktop/scripts/unregister-deeplink-protocols.js:59— Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `bundleId`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed.
High: detect-child-process ui/desktop/src/gooseServe.ts:401— Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `{
dir,
serverSecret,
tls = false,
env: additionalEnv = {},
loginShellPath,
isPackaged,
resourcesPath,
logger = defaultLogger,
diagnosticsDir,
readinessFetch = fetch,
}: StartGooseServeOptions`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed.
Medium: wildcard-postmessage-configuration crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/assets/mcp-app-bridge.js:35— The target origin of the window.postMessage() API is set to "*". This could allow for information disclosure due to the possibility of any origin allowed to receive the message.
Medium: wildcard-postmessage-configuration crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/assets/mcp-app-bridge.js:43— The target origin of the window.postMessage() API is set to "*". This could allow for information disclosure due to the possibility of any origin allowed to receive the message.
Medium: wildcard-postmessage-configuration crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/assets/mcp-app-bridge.js:181— The target origin of the window.postMessage() API is set to "*". This could allow for information disclosure due to the possibility of any origin allowed to receive the message.
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/chart_template.html:8— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/chart_template.html:75— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/chord_template.html:8— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/chord_template.html:41— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/donut_template.html:8— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/donut_template.html:81— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/map_template.html:93— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/map_template.html:94— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/map_template.html:95— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/mermaid_template.html:8— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/mermaid_template.html:41— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/radar_template.html:8— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/radar_template.html:47— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/sankey_template.html:8— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/sankey_template.html:9— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/sankey_template.html:44— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/treemap_template.html:8— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Medium: var-in-script-tag crates/goose-mcp/src/autovisualiser/templates/treemap_template.html:50— Detected a template variable used in a script tag. Although template variables are HTML escaped, HTML escaping does not always prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks when used directly in JavaScript. If you need this data on the rendered page, consider placing it in the HTML portion (outside of a script tag). Alternatively, use a JavaScript-specific encoder, such as the one available in OWASP ESAPI. For Django, you may also consider using the 'json_script' template tag and retrieving the data in your script by using the element ID (e.g., `document.getElementById`).
Hotspot: ui/desktop/src/main.ts ui/desktop/src/main.ts— ui/desktop/src/main.ts changed 36 times in last 90 days, max complexity 44. 12 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: ui/desktop/src/components/BaseChat.tsx ui/desktop/src/components/BaseChat.tsx— ui/desktop/src/components/BaseChat.tsx changed 26 times in last 90 days, max complexity 43. 4 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: ui/desktop/src/components/ChatInput.tsx ui/desktop/src/components/ChatInput.tsx— ui/desktop/src/components/ChatInput.tsx changed 16 times in last 90 days, max complexity 50. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: ui/desktop/src/components/ToolCallWithResponse.tsx ui/desktop/src/components/ToolCallWithResponse.tsx— ui/desktop/src/components/ToolCallWithResponse.tsx changed 6 times in last 90 days, max complexity 56.
Hotspot: ui/desktop/src/components/settings/models/subcomponents/SwitchModelModal.tsx ui/desktop/src/components/settings/models/subcomponents/SwitchModelModal.tsx— ui/desktop/src/components/settings/models/subcomponents/SwitchModelModal.tsx changed 7 times in last 90 days, max complexity 36. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: ui/desktop/src/acp/acpConnection.ts ui/desktop/src/acp/acpConnection.ts— ui/desktop/src/acp/acpConnection.ts changed 10 times in last 90 days, max complexity 19. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: ui/desktop/src/components/GooseMessage.tsx ui/desktop/src/components/GooseMessage.tsx— ui/desktop/src/components/GooseMessage.tsx changed 5 times in last 90 days, max complexity 33. 1 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: ui/desktop/src/components/McpApps/McpAppRenderer.tsx ui/desktop/src/components/McpApps/McpAppRenderer.tsx— ui/desktop/src/components/McpApps/McpAppRenderer.tsx changed 5 times in last 90 days, max complexity 29. 1 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: ui/desktop/src/hooks/useChatSession.ts ui/desktop/src/hooks/useChatSession.ts— ui/desktop/src/hooks/useChatSession.ts changed 6 times in last 90 days, max complexity 19. 1 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
Hotspot: ui/desktop/src/components/settings/providers/modal/subcomponents/forms/CustomProviderForm.tsx ui/desktop/src/components/settings/providers/modal/subcomponents/forms/CustomProviderForm.tsx— ui/desktop/src/components/settings/providers/modal/subcomponents/forms/CustomProviderForm.tsx changed 2 times in last 90 days, max complexity 50.
Change coupling: main.ts ↔ preload.ts ui/desktop/src/main.ts— `ui/desktop/src/main.ts` and `ui/desktop/src/preload.ts` change together 88% of the time (64 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: ExternalBackendSection.tsx ↔ main.ts ui/desktop/src/components/settings/app/ExternalBackendSection.tsx— `ui/desktop/src/components/settings/app/ExternalBackendSection.tsx` and `ui/desktop/src/main.ts` change together 64% of the time (7 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: chatSessionController.ts ↔ BaseChat.tsx ui/desktop/src/acp/chatSessionController.ts— `ui/desktop/src/acp/chatSessionController.ts` and `ui/desktop/src/components/BaseChat.tsx` change together 60% of the time (6 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: autoUpdater.ts ↔ githubUpdater.ts ui/desktop/src/utils/autoUpdater.ts— `ui/desktop/src/utils/autoUpdater.ts` and `ui/desktop/src/utils/githubUpdater.ts` change together 58% of the time (7 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ sessionLinks.ts ui/desktop/src/App.tsx— `ui/desktop/src/App.tsx` and `ui/desktop/src/sessionLinks.ts` change together 58% of the time (7 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: main.ts ↔ sessionLinks.ts ui/desktop/src/main.ts— `ui/desktop/src/main.ts` and `ui/desktop/src/sessionLinks.ts` change together 58% of the time (7 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: SessionListView.tsx ↔ SessionsView.tsx ui/desktop/src/components/sessions/SessionListView.tsx— `ui/desktop/src/components/sessions/SessionListView.tsx` and `ui/desktop/src/components/sessions/SessionsView.tsx` change together 57% of the time (13 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: docusaurus.config.ts ↔ index.tsx documentation/docusaurus.config.ts— `documentation/docusaurus.config.ts` and `documentation/src/pages/index.tsx` change together 54% of the time (7 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ SessionsView.tsx ui/desktop/src/App.tsx— `ui/desktop/src/App.tsx` and `ui/desktop/src/components/sessions/SessionsView.tsx` change together 52% of the time (12 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: ScheduleDetailView.tsx ↔ SchedulesView.tsx ui/desktop/src/components/schedule/ScheduleDetailView.tsx— `ui/desktop/src/components/schedule/ScheduleDetailView.tsx` and `ui/desktop/src/components/schedule/SchedulesView.tsx` change together 50% of the time (10 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1129.
Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the repo's own test suite did not build (a C#/MSBuild compiler error in the test code), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. Fix the test build, or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, and real coverage will be measured.
Low IaC: DS-0026 .devcontainer/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 documentation/docs/docker/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 recipe-scanner/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
Low IaC: DS-0026 services/ask-ai-bot/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — No test projects found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
No tests found — No test projects found in the repository.
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
Run 019fdb8c-9878-7e08-953f-ed53dfbc301c · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 95 · Warnings: 47 · Recommendations: 9 · Info: 1 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 07-08-2026 @ 09:27 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.