Public report — BookStore, published 3 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
79findings with an exact file:lineof 127 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
60/98dimensions across the health lenses20037 LoC · 12 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
aalmada/BookStore is in a workable but fragile state (60%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.
The area that most needs attention is Accessibility (55%) — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost. Readiness (58%) is the next concern — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> /… (Forms & labels); Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark,… (Page structure); accessibility in the test suite you already have (A11y enforcement).
For scale: Medium (~20,037 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.7 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.7 person-years of build effort (about ~€97,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Accessibility at 55% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.4) — microservices, transaction-script/CRUD, high decision density × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.7 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Accessibility at 55%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Accessibility first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
78 modules, 79 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
20
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, ensure every form control and button has a proper programmatic label to fix critical accessibility gaps. Next, correct the page structure by adding required landmarks, titles, and heading hierarchy to improve navigation. Then, implement automated accessibility checks in your test suite and CI pipeline to prevent future regressions. Finally, make retry-prone mutations idempotent to avoid duplicate writes, and resolve the single deprecated dependency finding.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 57 of 60 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 60 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 79 of 127 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (5): D20, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
8 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was BookEndpoints.SearchBooks at 49. A further 1 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being QueryInvalidationService.GetInvalidationKeys at 24 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 BookEndpoints.SearchBooks (cyclomatic 49) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with BookEndpoints.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 PasskeyEndpoints.MapPasskeyEndpoints (cyclomatic 43) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with PasskeyEndpoints.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 ProblemDetailsExtensions.ToError (cyclomatic 25) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with ProblemDetailsExtensions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 11 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 PasskeyEndpoints.MapPasskeyEndpoints (cognitive 62) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with PasskeyEndpoints.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 BookEndpoints.SearchBooks (cognitive 55) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with BookEndpoints.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 PartialDateJsonConverter.Read (cognitive 34) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with PartialDateJsonConverter.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution4.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
588 test methods: 345 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 243 e2e.
What to do
Improve Test Distribution — currently 4.6/10. — 588 test methods: 345 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 243 e2e.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
0 skipped, 3 zero-assertion, 2 mock references across 588 tests.
No assertions: Apply_BookRestored_WhenPublisherMatches_ShouldIncrement · ×3tests/BookStore.ApiService.UnitTests/Projections/PublisherStatisticsProjectionTests.cs:183
Mock framework: NSubstitute · ×2
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
76 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/DatabaseSeeder.cs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
1 of 12 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Split BookStore.ApiService
What to do
Resolve the 1 Split BookStore.ApiService finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D27 · Navigability3.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
94 % of calls cross a namespace and 9 % go through an interface, but 42 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
Scattered collaborators
What to do
Resolve the 1 Scattered collaborators finding(s) in Navigability. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×20.github/dependabot.yml:5detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 20 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (7), codeql.yml (4), docs.yml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC2 · Forms & labels5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×2) — viewer.html:604, viewer.html:604
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×3) — eval_review.html:2, viewer.html:2, viewer.html:2
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
`IBooksClient` declares 23 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IBooksClient.cs:9
What to do
Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C1 · Data Protection6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
What to do
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C4 · Data Retention9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).
Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.
A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a documented retention period / data-expiry.
What to do
Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED5 · Idempotency3.0 / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory
Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.
Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.
Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.
`Services.UnverifiedAccountCleanupService.ExecuteAsync` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — UnverifiedAccountCleanupService.cs:18
What to do
Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
A placeholder string ("This account has no password. Add a pass…") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — PasskeyEndpoints.cs:521
A placeholder string ("changeme") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — ApplicationServicesExtensions.cs:25
What to do
Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
`AfterSaveChangesAsync` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — MartenCommitListener.cs:36
`BeforeSaveChanges` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — MartenCommitListener.cs:335
`AfterSaveChanges` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — MartenCommitListener.cs:336
What to do
Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
278 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.
What to do
Add a README to the 10 of 12 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.7 pts.
Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README advertises Kubernetes, but no Kubernetes manifest or chart exists
README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Kubernetes, but no Kubernetes manifest or chart exists; README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
Only 4/6 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 6, 3 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
What to do
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
No benchmark suite was found. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.
Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 15 use(s) across 20,230 production line(s) (~0.7/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)
What to do
Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 137/190 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×15) — CurrencyService.cs:16, CurrencyService.cs:33, JwtAuthenticationStateProvider.cs:123, …
No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. (×10) — AuthorHandlers.cs:16, BookCoverHandlers.cs:14, BookHandlers.cs:26, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. — SaleHandlers.cs:60
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
~0.8 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 86 suppression(s) across the 102908 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 10 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (18%; ≈20% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 45 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 38 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a transaction-script/CRUD architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 11 value object(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 1 event handler(s); a message-bus package
ES1 Event Sourcing — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): an event-store package (Marten/EventStore); 4 projection(s)
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X8 JS interop contract — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:5— This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is. This configuration file has 2 such entries; one cooldown decision clears them all — reported once.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:24— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:27— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:32— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:69— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: irongut/CodeCoverageSummary@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `irongut/CodeCoverageSummary@v1.3.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/irongut/CodeCoverageSummary/commits/v1.3.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v1.3.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:82— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: marocchino/sticky-pull-request-comment@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `marocchino/sticky-pull-request-comment@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/marocchino/sticky-pull-request-comment/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:96— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:99— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:27— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:30— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/init@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/init@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/init` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/init` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:35— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:46— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/analyze@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/analyze` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/analyze` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml:25— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml:28— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml:55— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-pages-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-pages-artifact@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-pages-artifact/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docs.yml:68— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/deploy-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/deploy-pages@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/deploy-pages/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nightly-integration.yml:20— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nightly-integration.yml:23— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nightly-integration.yml:33— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nightly-integration.yml:55— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
NoWarnInCsproj tests/BookStore.ApiService.Analyzers.UnitTests/BookStore.ApiService.Analyzers.UnitTests.csproj:9— NU1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/BookStore.ApiService/BookStore.ApiService.csproj:17— EXTEXP0018 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props:4— EXTEXP0018 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/BookStore.ApiService.Analyzers/BookStore.ApiService.Analyzers.csproj:7— RS2008 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/BookStore.ApiService.Analyzers/BookStore.ApiService.Analyzers.csproj:7— RS1038 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props:4— NU1608 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
EmptyCatchBlock src/BookStore.ApiService/Handlers/Sales/SaleHandlers.cs:60— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Narrow the catch to the exception you actually expect, record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or — where swallowing really is correct, as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — write down WHY in a comment on the catch. The comment has to give the reason: a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place. Any of the three makes the decision reviewable; all three clear this row.
No assertions: Apply_BookRestored_WhenPublisherMatches_ShouldIncrement tests/BookStore.ApiService.UnitTests/Projections/PublisherStatisticsProjectionTests.cs:183— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: ResendVerification_ForNonExistentUser_ShouldReturnGenericSuccess tests/BookStore.AppHost.Tests/EmailVerificationTests.cs:76— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
No assertions: GenerateFakePassword_OutputSamples tests/BookStore.AppHost.Tests/PasswordGeneratorTests.cs:24— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
BarePragmaDisable src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/Admin/AdminBookEndpoints.cs:178— #pragma warning disable CS8603 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/MartenConcurrencyExceptionMiddleware.cs:38— #pragma warning disable CA1848 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
BarePragmaDisable src/BookStore.Web/Infrastructure/LoggingHubFilter.cs:53— #pragma warning disable CA1848 — the disable has no matching restore, so it does not end with the construct that needed it: it runs to the end of the file and silences the rule for everything written below, including code added years later. Close it with the matching restore directive immediately after the construct it covers, or fix the cause and drop the directive entirely.
Change coupling clique: AuthorEndpoints.cs, BookEndpoints.cs, CategoryEndpoints.cs src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/AuthorEndpoints.cs— 3 files — `src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/AuthorEndpoints.cs`, `src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/BookEndpoints.cs`, `src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/CategoryEndpoints.cs` — all change together with no explicit dependency: a fully-connected co-change clique, not 3 separate couplings. They share one concern (thin parallel siblings over a common abstraction), so extract the shared part into ONE unit and the whole clique's coupling clears at once — you do not need to break each pair individually.
Change coupling clique: AuthorHandlers.cs, CategoryHandlers.cs, PublisherHandlers.cs src/BookStore.ApiService/Handlers/Authors/AuthorHandlers.cs— 3 files — `src/BookStore.ApiService/Handlers/Authors/AuthorHandlers.cs`, `src/BookStore.ApiService/Handlers/Categories/CategoryHandlers.cs`, `src/BookStore.ApiService/Handlers/Publishers/PublisherHandlers.cs` — all change together with no explicit dependency: a fully-connected co-change clique, not 3 separate couplings. They share one concern (thin parallel siblings over a common abstraction), so extract the shared part into ONE unit and the whole clique's coupling clears at once — you do not need to break each pair individually.
Change coupling clique: AuthorAggregate.cs, BookAggregate.cs, CategoryAggregate.cs, PublisherAggregate.cs src/BookStore.ApiService/Aggregates/AuthorAggregate.cs— 4 files — `src/BookStore.ApiService/Aggregates/AuthorAggregate.cs`, `src/BookStore.ApiService/Aggregates/BookAggregate.cs`, `src/BookStore.ApiService/Aggregates/CategoryAggregate.cs`, `src/BookStore.ApiService/Aggregates/PublisherAggregate.cs` — all change together with no explicit dependency: a fully-connected co-change clique, not 6 separate couplings. They share one concern (thin parallel siblings over a common abstraction), so extract the shared part into ONE unit and the whole clique's coupling clears at once — you do not need to break each pair individually.
Change coupling: AdminCategoryEndpoints.cs ↔ AdminPublisherEndpoints.cs src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/Admin/AdminCategoryEndpoints.cs— `src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/Admin/AdminCategoryEndpoints.cs` and `src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/Admin/AdminPublisherEndpoints.cs` change together 57% of the time (8 of the 14 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: AdminBookEndpoints.cs ↔ AdminPublisherEndpoints.cs src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/Admin/AdminBookEndpoints.cs— `src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/Admin/AdminBookEndpoints.cs` and `src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/Admin/AdminPublisherEndpoints.cs` change together 57% of the time (8 of the 14 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: AdminAuthorEndpoints.cs ↔ AdminPublisherEndpoints.cs src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/Admin/AdminAuthorEndpoints.cs— `src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/Admin/AdminAuthorEndpoints.cs` and `src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/Admin/AdminPublisherEndpoints.cs` change together 57% of the time (8 of the 14 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
ClassTooLong: BookEndpoints src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/BookEndpoints.cs:0— ClassTooLong — 499 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 12 methods. The type holds no instance state, so there is no shared data to group its members by. To reduce it, split it by area instead: give each cohesive family of members its own smaller type, so no one type has to be read whole to change one of them.
ClassTooLong: DatabaseSeeder src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/DatabaseSeeder.cs:0— ClassTooLong — 441 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 11 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/BookStore.Web/Services/TenantService.cs:89— src/BookStore.Web/Services/TenantService.cs:89-105 | src/BookStore.Web/Services/TenantService.cs:120-135 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/BookStore.Web/Services/TenantService.cs:89` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/ETagHelper.cs:73— src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/ETagHelper.cs:73-88 | src/BookStore.Client/ETagHelper.cs:21-36 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/ETagHelper.cs:73` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Off the main sequence: BookStore.Shared — BookStore.Shared: abstractness 0.02, instability 0.00, distance 0.98 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.
Off the main sequence: BookStore.ServiceDefaults — BookStore.ServiceDefaults: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.25, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 3 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
BookEndpoints.SearchBooks (cyclomatic 49) src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/BookEndpoints.cs:103— BookEndpoints.SearchBooks has cyclomatic complexity 49 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 9 of the 49 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 12 function literals inside it that branch (lines 143, 276, 124, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
PasskeyEndpoints.MapPasskeyEndpoints (cyclomatic 43) src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/PasskeyEndpoints.cs:22— PasskeyEndpoints.MapPasskeyEndpoints has cyclomatic complexity 43 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 43 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to 4 function literals inside it that branch (lines 104, 330, 28, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
ProblemDetailsExtensions.ToError (cyclomatic 25) src/BookStore.Web/Infrastructure/ProblemDetailsExtensions.cs:9— ProblemDetailsExtensions.ToError has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
PartialDateJsonConverter.Read (cyclomatic 25) src/BookStore.Shared/Infrastructure/Json/PartialDateJsonConverter.cs:13— PartialDateJsonConverter.Read has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
BookEndpoints.GetBook (cyclomatic 23) src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/BookEndpoints.cs:531— BookEndpoints.GetBook has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15). Of this number, 12 points are the body's own statements and 11 belong to 4 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
BookEndpoints.GetFavoriteBooks (cyclomatic 21) src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/BookEndpoints.cs:376— BookEndpoints.GetFavoriteBooks has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). Of this number, 13 points are the body's own statements and 8 belong to 4 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
DeviceNameParser.Parse (cyclomatic 21) src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/DeviceNameParser.cs:11— DeviceNameParser.Parse has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
ApplicationServicesExtensions.AddIdentityServices (cyclomatic 19) src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/Extensions/ApplicationServicesExtensions.cs:157— ApplicationServicesExtensions.AddIdentityServices has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 19 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to 6 function literals inside it that branch (lines 279, 201, 260, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not measured · ×1
Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results — Test reliability NOT MEASURED: the test run produced no results for any test tier, so no test ever ran and flakiness could not be exercised. The cause could not be attributed, so it is excluded from the score rather than read as an absence of tests.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].docPath | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1025.
PasskeyEndpoints.MapPasskeyEndpoints (cognitive 62) src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/PasskeyEndpoints.cs:22— PasskeyEndpoints.MapPasskeyEndpoints has cognitive complexity 62 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 0 of the 62 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 4 function literals inside it that branch (lines 330, 104, 28, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
BookEndpoints.SearchBooks (cognitive 55) src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/BookEndpoints.cs:103— BookEndpoints.SearchBooks has cognitive complexity 55 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 11 of the 55 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 12 function literals inside it that branch (lines 143, 276, 124, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
PartialDateJsonConverter.Read (cognitive 34) src/BookStore.Shared/Infrastructure/Json/PartialDateJsonConverter.cs:13— PartialDateJsonConverter.Read has cognitive complexity 34 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
BookEndpoints.GetBook (cognitive 33) src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/BookEndpoints.cs:531— BookEndpoints.GetBook has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15). Of this number, 21 points are the body's own statements and 12 belong to 4 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
AuthorStatisticsGrouper.Group (cognitive 29) src/BookStore.ApiService/Projections/AuthorStatisticsProjection.cs:96— AuthorStatisticsGrouper.Group has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.
CategoryStatisticsGrouper.Group (cognitive 29) src/BookStore.ApiService/Projections/CategoryStatisticsProjection.cs:83— CategoryStatisticsGrouper.Group has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.
PublisherStatisticsGrouper.Group (cognitive 22) src/BookStore.ApiService/Projections/PublisherStatisticsProjection.cs:84— PublisherStatisticsGrouper.Group has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
BookStoreEventsService.ListenToStreamAsync (cognitive 21) src/BookStore.Client/BookStoreEventsService.cs:67— BookStoreEventsService.ListenToStreamAsync has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
DeviceNameParser.Parse (cognitive 19) src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/DeviceNameParser.cs:11— DeviceNameParser.Parse has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
ApplicationServicesExtensions.AddIdentityServices (cognitive 19) src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/Extensions/ApplicationServicesExtensions.cs:157— ApplicationServicesExtensions.AddIdentityServices has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 0 of the 19 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 6 function literals inside it that branch (lines 279, 201, 260, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
AdminUserEndpoints.GetUsers (cognitive 18) src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/Admin/AdminUserEndpoints.cs:35— AdminUserEndpoints.GetUsers has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Of this number, 15 points are the body's own statements and 3 belong to 3 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
DatabaseSeeder.SeedSalesAsync (cognitive 18) src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/DatabaseSeeder.cs:596— DatabaseSeeder.SeedSalesAsync has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ProblemDetailsExtensions.ToError (cognitive 17) src/BookStore.Web/Infrastructure/ProblemDetailsExtensions.cs:9— ProblemDetailsExtensions.ToError has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition.
CommandMustBeRecordAnalyzer.AnalyzeTypeDeclaration (cognitive 17) src/BookStore.ApiService.Analyzers/Analyzers/CommandMustBeRecordAnalyzer.cs:53— CommandMustBeRecordAnalyzer.AnalyzeTypeDeclaration has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
AggregateRulesAnalyzer.AnalyzeClass (cognitive 16) src/BookStore.ApiService.Analyzers/Analyzers/AggregateRulesAnalyzer.cs:44— AggregateRulesAnalyzer.AnalyzeClass has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
BookHandlers.Handle (cognitive 16) src/BookStore.ApiService/Handlers/Books/BookHandlers.cs:121— BookHandlers.Handle has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition.
TooManyMethods: MartenUserStore src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/Identity/MartenUserStore.cs:0— TooManyMethods — 166 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 47 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
FileTooLong: Endpoints/BookEndpoints.cs src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/BookEndpoints.cs:0— FileTooLong — 524 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 19 floating ref(s) across 4 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
Duplicated block (18 lines × 2) src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/LocalizationHelper.cs:43— src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/LocalizationHelper.cs:43-60 | src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/LocalizationHelper.cs:63-80 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/LocalizationHelper.cs:43` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/BookStore.Web/Components/Pages/Register.razor:414— src/BookStore.Web/Components/Pages/Register.razor:414-428 | src/BookStore.Web/Components/Pages/Login.razor:376-390 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/BookStore.Web/Components/Pages/Register.razor:414` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/Notifications/NotificationService.cs:53— src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/Notifications/NotificationService.cs:53-66 | src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/Notifications/RedisNotificationService.cs:124-137 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/Notifications/NotificationService.cs:53` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/BookStore.Web/Components/Pages/Register.razor:437— src/BookStore.Web/Components/Pages/Register.razor:437-449 | src/BookStore.Web/Components/Pages/Login.razor:399-411 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/BookStore.Web/Components/Pages/Register.razor:437` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) src/BookStore.ApiService/Projections/AuthorStatisticsProjection.cs:100— src/BookStore.ApiService/Projections/AuthorStatisticsProjection.cs:100-112 | src/BookStore.ApiService/Projections/CategoryStatisticsProjection.cs:87-98 | src/BookStore.ApiService/Projections/PublisherStatisticsProjection.cs:88-99 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/BookStore.ApiService/Projections/AuthorStatisticsProjection.cs:100` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/BookStore.ApiService/Aggregates/BookAggregate.cs:375— src/BookStore.ApiService/Aggregates/BookAggregate.cs:375-386 | src/BookStore.ApiService/Aggregates/SaleAggregate.cs:26-37 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) src/BookStore.ApiService.Analyzers/Analyzers/AggregateRulesAnalyzer.cs:55— src/BookStore.ApiService.Analyzers/Analyzers/AggregateRulesAnalyzer.cs:55-65 | src/BookStore.ApiService.Analyzers/Analyzers/CommandMustBeRecordAnalyzer.cs:83-94 | src/BookStore.ApiService.Analyzers/Analyzers/EventMustBeRecordAnalyzer.cs:100-111 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/BookStore.ApiService.Analyzers/Analyzers/AggregateRulesAnalyzer.cs:55` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Low cohesion: MartenUserStore (LCOM4 16) src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/Identity/MartenUserStore.cs:16— MartenUserStore's methods form 16 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
Coverage not measured — The test suite couldn't be built/run in-image and no coverage report is committed, so line coverage was not measured — and it is EXCLUDED from the score rather than scored on a LoC-ratio proxy. No coverage collector was found in your CI either, so there is no existing report to hand us: add a coverage collector to your test run and commit (or publish) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output anywhere in the repo, or make the suite runnable in-image, and real coverage will be measured.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 76 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/DatabaseSeeder.cs, src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/BookEndpoints.cs, src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/PasskeyEndpoints.cs, src/BookStore.ApiService/Endpoints/JwtAuthenticationEndpoints.cs, src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/Extensions/ApplicationServicesExtensions.cs, src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/MartenCommitListener.cs, src/BookStore.ApiService/Aggregates/BookAggregate.cs, src/BookStore.ApiService/Infrastructure/Identity/MartenUserStore.cs (+68 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 20k LoC across 12 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
redundant comment src/BookStore.ApiService/Models/ApplicationUser.cs:108— "SHA-256 hash of the raw refresh token returned to the client." — trim - the digest already says this
Split BookStore.ApiService — A 14k-LoC API service that is spread over 29 unrelated namespaces is a sprawling grab-bag. Suggested: by namespace: BookEndpoints, OrderProcessing, Inventory, Payments
Scattered collaborators — 94 % of calls cross a namespace and only 42 % of collaborators are co-located — group each feature's code into a vertical slice so a call's collaborators sit together.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
—
Run 019fc86a-7b73-7db2-b388-4336ae4477d3 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 44 field(s) across 4 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 28 · Warnings: 57 · Recommendations: 10 · Info: 32 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 16:17 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.