Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
abi/screenshot-to-code carries serious gaps (41%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Architecture (94%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Security (78%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (12%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (55%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution); CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability).
For scale: Hobby (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
Encouragingly, the gaps are in documentation and release process — not in the code's correctness, structure or security, which are strong. They're low-risk to close, and doing so would lift the grade without re-engineering anything that already works.
Code Health
76%
Strong
Architecture
94% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
55%
Adequate · gated by M2
Readiness
12% ⚠
Critical · gated by D9, R4, R6, P1, P2, P3, P6
Security
78%
Adequate · gated by D38
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 12% · 47% weightMaturity 55% · 26% weightCode Health 76% · 14% weightSecurity 78% · 8% weightArchitecture 94% · 4% weight
Raise Readiness 12 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 41 → ~65.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (69+)
- D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) backend/agent/tools/runtime.py
- D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) backend/tests/test_prompts.py
- D4 · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) backend/tests/test_prompts.py
- D8 · Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
- D15 · Hotspot: frontend/src/components/evals/PromptReportsPage.tsx frontend/src/components/evals/PromptReportsPage.tsx
- D15 · Hotspot: frontend/src/components/unified-input/tabs/UploadTab.tsx frontend/src/components/unified-input/tabs/UploadTab.tsx
- D15 · Hotspot: frontend/src/components/evals/agent-run-tool-preview.tsx frontend/src/components/evals/agent-run-tool-preview.tsx
- D15 · Hotspot: frontend/src/components/evals/AgentRunsPage.tsx frontend/src/components/evals/AgentRunsPage.tsx
- D18 · Dimension evaluation failed
- D35 · Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ IconStrip.tsx frontend/src/App.tsx
- D35 · Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ ImportCodeSection.tsx frontend/src/App.tsx
- D35 · Change coupling: constants.ts ↔ types.ts frontend/src/constants.ts
- D35 · Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ StartPane.tsx frontend/src/App.tsx
- D35 · Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ app-store.ts frontend/src/App.tsx
- D35 · Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ SettingsTab.tsx frontend/src/App.tsx
- D35 · Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ TermsOfServiceDialog.tsx frontend/src/App.tsx
- D35 · Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ generateCode.ts frontend/src/App.tsx
- D35 · Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ utils.ts frontend/src/App.tsx
- D35 · Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ select.tsx frontend/src/App.tsx
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- R10 · Duplicated block (26 lines × 2 locations) frontend/src/components/evals/EvalNavigation.tsx
- R10 · Duplicated block (20 lines × 3 locations) frontend/src/components/evals/BestOfNEvalsPage.tsx
- R10 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2 locations) frontend/src/components/evals/AllEvalsPage.tsx
- R10 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2 locations) frontend/src/components/evals/BestOfNEvalsPage.tsx
- R10 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2 locations) frontend/src/components/settings/SettingsTab.tsx
- R2 · Complex function Sidebar (cyclomatic 69, cognitive 68) frontend/src/components/sidebar/Sidebar.tsx
- R2 · Complex function renderToolDetails (cyclomatic 69, cognitive 63) frontend/src/components/agent/AgentActivity.tsx
- R2 · Complex function runEvals (cyclomatic 41, cognitive 64) frontend/src/components/evals/RunEvalsPage.tsx
- R2 · Complex function PreviewPane (cyclomatic 32, cognitive 31) frontend/src/components/preview/PreviewPane.tsx
- R2 · Complex function RunEvalsPage (cyclomatic 32, cognitive 30) frontend/src/components/evals/RunEvalsPage.tsx
- R2 · Complex function App (cyclomatic 29, cognitive 28) frontend/src/App.tsx
- R2 · Complex function ToolPreview (cyclomatic 27, cognitive 33) frontend/src/components/evals/agent-run-tool-preview.tsx
- R2 · Complex function ThinkingIndicator (cyclomatic 26, cognitive 25) frontend/src/components/thinking/ThinkingIndicator.tsx
- R6 · Tooling
- P2 · No structured logging
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
2
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
3
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D1 · .NET / C#
Cyclomatic Complexity
7.3
D3 · .NET / C#
God Classes
10.0
D4 · .NET / C#
Code Duplication
9.2
R1 · React / TS
Type Safety
10.0
R10 · React / TS
Code Duplication
7.3
R2 · React / TS
Cyclomatic Complexity
8.0
R7 · React / TS
Dead Code
8.2
X1 · Repo
Async correctness
10.0
X3 · Repo
Exception handling
10.0
X4 · Repo
Structured logging
10.0
The Bad
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
The Bad
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 50 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 4 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 1 | Medium |
Roadmap
First, address the single missing test case in the distribution module to ensure comprehensive coverage. Next, establish a continuous integration workflow that automatically builds and runs tests on every push or pull request to catch issues early. Then, implement structured logging using a standard library like Serilog across all services to improve observability and debugging. After that, expand the test suite to cover all currently unreachable production modules. Finally, maintain a current changelog with versioned entries for each release to preserve project history.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +27.7 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +27.7 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. | +27.7 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +27.7 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub. | +26.5 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI. | +26.1 pts | Medium | Tooling |
| Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically. | +22.2 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale. | +7.2 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| backend/poetry.lock | 0.3 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml | 4.4 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| backend/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| frontend/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| frontend/src/App.tsx | 7.0 | Mixed | Change Coupling: Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ IconStrip.tsx |
| backend/tests/test_prompts.py | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) |
| backend/agent/tools/runtime.py | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) |
| frontend/src/constants.ts | 8.5 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Change coupling: constants.ts ↔ types.ts |
| backend/main.py | 9.3 | Near-clean | Static Analysis (SAST): Low: wildcard-cors |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 41 of 43 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 43 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D9D12D13D15D16D19D21D26D27D28D29D31D33D34D35D38AX5M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P6R1R10R2R3R4R6R7R8R9X1X3X4
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 78 of 83 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
17 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was openai.parse_event at 55.
What to do
- Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
39 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was openai.parse_event at 90.
What to do
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D4 · Code Duplication
3 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) backend/agent/tools/runtime.py:56
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2)backend/tests/test_prompts.py:7
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling
0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution
No test projects found.
No tests found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
Top hotspots: frontend/src/components/sidebar/Sidebar.tsx (18×69=1242); frontend/src/components/agent/AgentActivity.tsx (13×69=897); frontend/src/App.tsx (18×29=522)
Hotspot: frontend/src/components/sidebar/Sidebar.tsx frontend/src/components/sidebar/Sidebar.tsx
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor
No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D19 · Documentation Quality
The README is a single hosted-product link plus an isolated 'Getting Started' section for running the app locally (FastAPI backend + React frontend + API keys), with no architecture or per-stack documentation. A separate backend README covers only type-checking and test-running commands ('poetry run pyright', 'poetry run pytest') without any prompt-summary utility description, and there is no link to the hosted product's own docs.
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 4.0/10. — The README is a single hosted-product link plus an isolated 'Getting Started' section for running the app locally (FastAPI backend + React frontend + API keys), with no architecture or per-stack documentation. A separate backend README covers only type-checking and test-running commands ('poetry run pyright', 'poetry run pytest') without any prompt-summary utility description, and there is no link to the hosted product's own docs.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D26 · Project Cohesion
No projects to assess.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D27 · Navigability
Too little code to assess navigability.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 1 low.
Low: wildcard-corsbackend/main.py:45
Do you agree with this assessment?
D31 · IaC & Container Security
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 2 low.
High IaC: DS-0002 backend/Dockerfile
Low IaC: DS-0026 backend/Dockerfile
Do you agree with this assessment?
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: App.tsx↔IconStrip.tsx 92%; App.tsx↔ImportCodeSection.tsx 91%; constants.ts↔types.ts 90%
Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ IconStrip.tsx frontend/src/App.tsx
What to do
- Resolve the 10 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with App.tsx (9), constants.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
193 finding(s): 2 critical, 43 high, 131 medium, 17 low.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
What to do
- Resolve the 43 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with poetry.lock (31), pnpm-lock.yaml (12). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (43 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml, poetry.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 5 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with poetry.lock (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX5 · Architecture & structure
Do you agree with this assessment?
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
- Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M4 · Documentation accuracy
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability
- No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.
What to do
- Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P6 · Release Hygiene
- A changelog exists but has few versioned entries — keep it current with each release.
What to do
- Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.
- Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety
Do you agree with this assessment?
R10 · Code Duplication
- frontend/src/components/evals/EvalNavigation.tsx:14 · frontend/src/components/evals/EvalNavigation.tsx:39 — EvalNavigation.tsx:14
- frontend/src/components/evals/BestOfNEvalsPage.tsx:541 · frontend/src/components/evals/BestOfNEvalsPage.tsx:563 · frontend/src/components/evals/BestOfNEvalsPage.tsx:612 — BestOfNEvalsPage.tsx:541
- frontend/src/components/evals/AllEvalsPage.tsx:18 · frontend/src/components/evals/AllEvalsPage.tsx:37 — AllEvalsPage.tsx:18
- frontend/src/components/evals/BestOfNEvalsPage.tsx:371 · frontend/src/components/evals/BestOfNEvalsPage.tsx:788 — BestOfNEvalsPage.tsx:371
- frontend/src/components/settings/SettingsTab.tsx:153 · frontend/src/components/settings/SettingsTab.tsx:221 — SettingsTab.tsx:153
- frontend/src/components/unified-input/UnifiedInputPane.tsx:136 · frontend/src/components/unified-input/UnifiedInputPane.tsx:156 · frontend/src/components/unified-input/UnifiedInputPane.tsx:175 · frontend/src/components/unified-input/UnifiedInputPane.tsx:195 — UnifiedInputPane.tsx:136
- frontend/src/components/unified-input/tabs/ImportTab.tsx:115 · frontend/src/components/unified-input/tabs/TextTab.tsx:111 — ImportTab.tsx:115
- frontend/src/components/evals/BestOfNEvalsPage.tsx:563 · frontend/src/components/evals/BestOfNEvalsPage.tsx:612 — BestOfNEvalsPage.tsx:563
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — Sidebar.tsx:77, AgentActivity.tsx:291, RunEvalsPage.tsx:191, …
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files
- 11 file(s) over 400 lines
What to do
- Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — AgentActivity.tsx, App.tsx, BestOfNEvalsPage.tsx, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗
What to do
- Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code
- Unreachable from the 2 application, 6 tooling and 10 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (2 application, 6 tooling, 10 test roots considered) (×7) — ThinkingIndicator.tsx, ImportCodeSection.tsx, GenerateFromText.tsx, …
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Declared in frontend/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R9 · Circular Imports
Do you agree with this assessment?
X1 · Async correctness
Do you agree with this assessment?
X3 · Exception handling
Do you agree with this assessment?
X4 · Structured logging
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 76% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 94% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 55% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 12% | Critical — gated by D9, R4, R6, P1, P2, P3, P6 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 78% | Adequate — gated by D38 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 60 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
- AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D10 Test Quality — ~6307 lines of test code exist on disk but weren't loaded from the analyzed solution (excluded from the .sln, or co-located/using a test attribute not loaded here), so test quality couldn't be assessed. Include the tests in the analyzed solution to enable this check.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
- D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
- D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — only 1/3 markers (70 value object(s))
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a pnpm lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
- X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 48 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 backend/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 frontend/Dockerfile
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
D18 · Solution Shape
- Dimension evaluation failed
Warning — 29 finding(s)
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
- Hotspot: frontend/src/components/sidebar/Sidebar.tsx frontend/src/components/sidebar/Sidebar.tsx
- Hotspot: frontend/src/components/agent/AgentActivity.tsx frontend/src/components/agent/AgentActivity.tsx
- Hotspot: frontend/src/App.tsx frontend/src/App.tsx
- Hotspot: frontend/src/components/evals/RunEvalsPage.tsx frontend/src/components/evals/RunEvalsPage.tsx
- Hotspot: frontend/src/components/evals/PromptReportsPage.tsx frontend/src/components/evals/PromptReportsPage.tsx
- Hotspot: frontend/src/components/unified-input/tabs/UploadTab.tsx frontend/src/components/unified-input/tabs/UploadTab.tsx
- Hotspot: frontend/src/components/evals/EvalSessionsPage.tsx frontend/src/components/evals/EvalSessionsPage.tsx
- Hotspot: frontend/src/components/preview/PreviewPane.tsx frontend/src/components/preview/PreviewPane.tsx
- Hotspot: frontend/src/components/evals/agent-run-tool-preview.tsx frontend/src/components/evals/agent-run-tool-preview.tsx
- Hotspot: frontend/src/components/evals/AgentRunsPage.tsx frontend/src/components/evals/AgentRunsPage.tsx
D35 · Change Coupling
- Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ IconStrip.tsx frontend/src/App.tsx
- Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ ImportCodeSection.tsx frontend/src/App.tsx
- Change coupling: constants.ts ↔ types.ts frontend/src/constants.ts
- Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ StartPane.tsx frontend/src/App.tsx
- Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ app-store.ts frontend/src/App.tsx
- Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ SettingsTab.tsx frontend/src/App.tsx
- Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ TermsOfServiceDialog.tsx frontend/src/App.tsx
- Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ generateCode.ts frontend/src/App.tsx
- Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ utils.ts frontend/src/App.tsx
- Change coupling: App.tsx ↔ select.tsx frontend/src/App.tsx
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] backend/poetry.lock
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) backend/agent/tools/runtime.py:56
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) backend/tests/test_prompts.py:20
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) backend/tests/test_prompts.py:7
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
Recommendation — 5 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0026 backend/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 frontend/Dockerfile
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Low: wildcard-cors backend/main.py:45
D9 · Test Distribution
- No tests found
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 1 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet (no .NET solution) | — | dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 4 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 193 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |