Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
abinth11/TutorTrek carries serious gaps (40%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Architecture (85%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (20%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Accessibility (40%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage); 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage (Code Coverage).
For scale: Medium (~22,066 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Raise Readiness 20 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 40 → ~55.
New since the last scan (29+)
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 client/Dockerfile
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 server/Dockerfile
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- R10 · Duplicated block (21 lines × 2 locations) client/src/components/pages/student-management/blocked-students.tsx
- R10 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 8 locations) client/src/components/pages/add-course/add-course-form.tsx
- R10 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2 locations) client/src/components/pages/add-course/course-description-form.tsx
- R10 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 6 locations) client/src/components/pages/add-lesson/add-lessons-form.tsx
- R10 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2 locations) client/src/components/pages/admin/admin-login-page.tsx
- R10 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 4 locations) client/src/components/pages/instructors/instructor-login-page.tsx
- R4 · Test Coverage
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €6,200–€31,000
| Cost to rebuild | €6,200–€31,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 40% quality) |
| Size & shape | Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
| Dead frontend code | ~916 LoC unreachable (15 file(s)) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€19,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 20% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Domain Modelling
At a glance — Accessibility
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 50 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 4 | Medium |
Roadmap
First, establish a continuous integration workflow to build and test every push or pull request. Next, expand test coverage by adding tests for all currently unreached production modules. Then, address the single gap in automated code coverage and ensure all test distribution issues are resolved. Finally, integrate eslint into package.json scripts and run linting within the CI pipeline.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. | +15.4 pts | Low | Code Coverage |
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +15.4 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +17.2 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +17.2 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Add eslint as package.json scripts and run them in CI. | +12.5 pts | Medium | Tooling |
| Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion. | +9.1 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href. | +7.8 pts | Medium | Keyboard semantics |
| Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI. | +7.8 pts | Medium | A11y enforcement |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| client/yarn.lock | 4.4 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| server/yarn.lock | 4.4 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| server/src/app/usecases/management/instructorManagement.ts | 7.0 | Mixed | Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: instructorManagement.ts ↔ adminRepoMongoDb.ts |
| server/src/app/usecases/lessons/addLesson.ts | 7.0 | Mixed | Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: addLesson.ts ↔ course.ts |
| client/Dockerfile | 7.2 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 |
| server/Dockerfile | 7.2 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 |
| server/src/app/repositories/adminDbRepository.ts | 8.0 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: adminDbRepository.ts ↔ instructorManagement.ts |
| server/src/app/usecases/course/listCourse.ts | 8.0 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: listCourse.ts ↔ courseReposMongoDb.ts |
| server/src/adapters/controllers/adminController.ts | 8.0 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: adminController.ts ↔ instructorManagement.ts |
| server/src/adapters/controllers/courseController.ts | 8.0 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: courseController.ts ↔ course.ts |
| server/src/frameworks/webserver/routes/course.ts | 8.0 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: course.ts ↔ courseInterface.ts |
| server/src/app/usecases/auth/instructorAuth.ts | 8.0 | Near-clean | Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: instructorAuth.ts ↔ auth.ts |
| readme.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Documentation Quality: The 'Features' section lists features but does not explain how each one is implemented (e.g. teacher dashboard, course upload) or where to find implementation details. |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 36 of 38 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 38 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 68 of 75 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D8 · Code Coverage
No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D9 · Test Distribution
No test suite found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
1 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is server/src/adapters/controllers/courseController.ts.
D19 · Documentation Quality
The project's documentation is comprehensive and well-structured: a single README covers the platform's purpose, technology stack, installation, usage, features, architecture, and technologies; two client/README.md files cover Create React App bootstrapping (available scripts, eject note) plus an outline of API docs, configuration, styling, caching, authentication, and third-party libraries. The visible content is clear and complete for a monorepo project.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 The 'Features' section lists features but does not explain how each one… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with readme.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
D28 · Secrets (history)
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
D31 · IaC & Container Security
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 2 low.
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
87 of 88 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is client/src/components/pages/instructors/instructor-register-page.tsx.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with instructor-register-page.tsx, edit-course.tsx, edit-lesson.tsx. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: adminDbRepository.ts↔instructorManagement.ts 91%; App.tsx↔tailwind.config.js 91%; listCourse.ts↔courseReposMongoDb.ts 90%
What to do
- Resolve the 10 Boundary-crossing change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with instructorManagement.ts (2), addLesson.ts (2), adminDbRepository.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
82 finding(s): 8 critical, 43 high, 21 medium, 10 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 37 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (37). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (37 issue-level).
- Resolve the 8 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
- Resolve the 5 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
- Video with no captions <track> offers no captions. This player's source is set at runtime, so there is no caption file to author here: give the player a way to carry captions — accept a track/captions URL alongside the media and render a <track kind="captions"> when one is supplied — and capture that asset wherever the media enters the product (upload, import or generation). (×2) — course-media-form.tsx:78, add-lessons-form.tsx:216
- An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×2) — add-lessons-form.tsx:248, my-course-card.tsx:22
What to do
- Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels
- This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label htmlFor>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×7) — search-bar.tsx:34, discussion-list.tsx:273, discussion-page.tsx:122, …
- A button with no text and no aria-label has no accessible name. Add visible text or an aria-label (an icon-only button still needs one). — view-course-shimmer.tsx:54
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure
- An empty heading appears in the document outline announced with no text. Give the heading text, or remove it if it's decorative. (×14) — list-course.tsx:85, instructor-register-page.tsx:75, shimmer-list-all-instructors.tsx:9, …
- Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×5) — view-course.tsx:149, view-instructor.tsx:82, dash-home.tsx:24, …
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics
- A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabIndex={0} + a key handler. (×10) — admin-side-nav.tsx:46, admin-side-nav.tsx:55, quizzes-page.tsx:118, …
What to do
- Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- This element's Tailwind text/background colour utilities fall below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Pick a darker or lighter shade. (×3) — view-course-shimmer.tsx:13, view-course-shimmer.tsx:18, view-course-shimmer.tsx:19
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add a README to the 1 of 2 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure
- No test surface was found — there are no tests here to separate from production code, so the folder question hasn't been reached yet.
What to do
- Start a test surface where your build system looks for one (tests/, test/, spec/, or your ecosystem's test source set) — the separation follows from putting the first tests in the right place.
M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.
P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.
What to do
- Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
R1 · Type Safety
R10 · Code Duplication
- client/src/components/pages/instructor-management/view-blocked-instructors.tsx:168 · client/src/components/pages/instructor-management/view-instructors.tsx:180 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — view-blocked-instructors.tsx:168
- client/src/components/pages/course-pages/discussion-list.tsx:291 · client/src/components/pages/course-pages/discussion-page.tsx:141 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — discussion-list.tsx:291
- client/src/components/pages/student-management/blocked-students.tsx:127 · client/src/components/pages/student-management/view-students.tsx:127 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — blocked-students.tsx:127
- client/src/components/pages/add-course/add-course-form.tsx:101 · client/src/components/pages/add-course/add-course-form.tsx:192 · client/src/components/pages/add-course/course-description-form.tsx:51 · client/src/components/pages/add-course/course-description-form.tsx:98 · +4 more site(s) not listed — the 3 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — add-course-form.tsx:101
- client/src/components/pages/add-course/course-description-form.tsx:203 · client/src/components/pages/add-course/edit-course.tsx:275 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — course-description-form.tsx:203
- client/src/components/pages/add-lesson/add-lessons-form.tsx:101 · client/src/components/pages/add-lesson/add-lessons-form.tsx:124 · client/src/components/pages/add-lesson/edit-lesson.tsx:144 · client/src/components/pages/add-lesson/edit-lesson.tsx:167 · +2 more site(s) not listed — the 4 copies are spread across 3 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — add-lessons-form.tsx:101
- client/src/components/pages/admin/admin-login-page.tsx:51 · client/src/components/pages/categories/edit-category.tsx:63 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — admin-login-page.tsx:51
- client/src/components/pages/instructors/instructor-login-page.tsx:57 · client/src/components/pages/students/student-login-page.tsx:61 · client/src/components/pages/students/student-registration-page.tsx:105 · client/src/components/pages/students/student-registration-page.tsx:154 — the 3 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — instructor-login-page.tsx:57
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — profile-form.tsx:13, chage-password-form.tsx:14, password-form.tsx:8, …
R3 · Large Files
What to do
- Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
R4 · Test Coverage
- 0% of 281 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✓
What to do
- Add eslint as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code
- Unreachable from the 4 application, 2 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (4 application, 2 tooling, 0 test roots considered) (×7) — course-description-form.tsx, quizes-component.tsx, course-media-form.tsx, …
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
R9 · Circular Imports
- client/src/api/endpoints/auth/token-refresh.ts → client/src/api/services/auth/token-refresh-service.ts → client/src/api/middlewares/protected-interceptor.ts → client/src/api/endpoints/auth/token-refresh.ts — token-refresh.ts
What to do
- Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC4 · Keyboard semantics | 2.1.1, 2.4.3 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 81% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 85% | Strong | Solid. |
| Maturity | 57% | Adequate — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 20% | Critical — gated by D8, D9, R4, P1, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 77% | Adequate — gated by D38 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Accessibility | 40% | Weak — gated by AC4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 74 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ts, .tsx) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D4 Code Duplication — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) was not read by duplication detection, so code duplication was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's duplication. Not scored: no source of those file kinds was exposed to the token comparison by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
- DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 61 finding(s)
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: adminDbRepository.ts ↔ instructorManagement.ts server/src/app/repositories/adminDbRepository.ts
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: listCourse.ts ↔ courseReposMongoDb.ts server/src/app/usecases/course/listCourse.ts
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: adminController.ts ↔ instructorManagement.ts server/src/adapters/controllers/adminController.ts
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: instructorManagement.ts ↔ adminRepoMongoDb.ts server/src/app/usecases/management/instructorManagement.ts
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: courseController.ts ↔ course.ts server/src/adapters/controllers/courseController.ts
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: instructorManagement.ts ↔ admin.ts server/src/app/usecases/management/instructorManagement.ts
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: addLesson.ts ↔ course.ts server/src/app/usecases/lessons/addLesson.ts
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: course.ts ↔ courseInterface.ts server/src/frameworks/webserver/routes/course.ts
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: addLesson.ts ↔ courseReposMongoDb.ts server/src/app/usecases/lessons/addLesson.ts
- Boundary-crossing change coupling: instructorAuth.ts ↔ auth.ts server/src/app/usecases/auth/instructorAuth.ts
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] server/yarn.lock
- High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] client/yarn.lock
- No automated tests
Warning — 2 finding(s)
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 client/Dockerfile:1
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_2 server/Dockerfile:1
Recommendation — 10 finding(s)
- Largest orphaned file client/src/components/pages/instructors/instructor-register-page.tsx
- Largest orphaned file client/src/components/pages/add-course/edit-course.tsx
- Largest orphaned file client/src/components/pages/add-lesson/edit-lesson.tsx
- Low IaC: DS-0026 client/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 server/Dockerfile
- Test reliability not included
- Small-team knowledge concentration
- The 'Features' section lists features but does not explain how each one is implemented (e.g. teacher dashboard, course upload) or where to find implementation details. readme.md
- Dormant codebase
- No tests found
Info — 2 finding(s)
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 1 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 4 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 82 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |