Public report — eventhub, published 29 Jun 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
70findings with an exact file:lineof 172 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
71/105dimensions across the health lenses21469 LoC · 37 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.
abpframework/eventhub carries serious risk (32%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Architecture (89%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Maturity (79%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (19%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Accessibility (32%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage); missing tooling (eslint (Tooling); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene).
For scale: Medium (~21,469 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (89%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Code composition — where the lines goPlumbing-heavy — business logic is 9% of hand-written app code; most lines are wiring, declarations and straight-line glue. Fine for an integration/CRUD service; worth a look if this is meant to be logic-rich.
Business logic 3%Plumbing 28%Tests 3%Generated 65%
This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€22,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 19% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — service/app, CQRS × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 19%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+15.6 pts/run over 4 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Evidence: trajectory: +15.6 pts/run over 4 runs
Trajectory
Where this codebase is heading — something a one-shot snapshot cannot show. 32, unchanged across 4 runs.
Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.
At a glance — Code Health · 37% · Weak · gated by R1, X4, X5
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
32
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
5
High / Critical
Roadmap
Begin by establishing a baseline of reliability by adding tests for all production modules and configuring linting and type-checking in CI. Next, clean up the dependency tree by removing unused packages and ensuring type-only dependencies are correctly scoped. Then, restrict the public API surface to protect consumers from internal changes. Finally, implement HTTP resilience policies to prevent external service failures from impacting the application.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 69 of 71 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 71 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 70 of 172 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D21 Naming Consistency — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations: 2 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling: Boundary leakage is detected from type references across detected contexts — leaks that flow through primitives, serialization or shared infrastructure may not surface as a typed reference.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D22, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 9 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
68 test methods: 68 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
Resolve the 82 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (82 issue-level).
Enforce License Compliance in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
1 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/EventHub.DbMigrator/Data/EventHubSampleDataSeedContributor.cs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
37 projects, 371 .cs files, 15881 hand-written lines of code (13939 production / 1942 test), plus 45197 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 66 inter-project edges (build status unknown — did not finish).
Monorepo: only 1 of 2 solutions was scored
Thin analysable surface across projects
Build status unknown
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D22 · Internal API Consistency / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.
3 API inconsistencies across a 400-member sample of 115 exposed types.
Inconsistent naming for single-entity retrieval operations. The `EventAppService` uses `GetByUrlCodeAsync` and `GetLocationAsync` (which returns a Detail DTO), while the Admin `EventAppService` uses `GetAsync`. This mixes URL-based and ID-based retrieval naming conventions.
Duplicate method name `GetCountriesLookupAsync` exists in both `EventHub.Events.IEventAppService` and `EventHub.Admin.Events.IEventAppService`. While they are in different namespaces, the lack of namespace qualification in the signature list suggests potential confusion if these interfaces are imported or aliased.
Inconsistent naming for list retrieval. Most services use `GetListAsync`, but some might use `GetAllAsync` or `QueryAsync` in other parts of the codebase (though not explicitly shown here, the pattern `GetListAsync` is used for filtering). However, `GetByUrlCodeAsync` is an outlier in the Event service.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for single-entity retrieval operations. The… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicate method name `GetCountriesLookupAsync` exists in both… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for list retrieval. Most services use… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether domain types (IDs, enums, value objects) leak across bounded-context boundaries.
Method: Cross-context domain-type leakage via Roslyn structural classification (strongly-typed IDs / value objects) over every public surface. Exhaustive, deterministic, type-level aggregate-boundary check.
Coverage: Bounded contexts derived from NAMESPACE prefix (or graph-inferred where available); cross-boundary domain-type leakage then checked exhaustively over every public member of every type.
No domain types leak across context boundaries (21 contexts).
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d23_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
5 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×4src/EventHub.HttpApi.Host/appsettings.json:17detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 4 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.json (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×15etc/azure/Dockerfile.basedetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0001 · ×2src/EventHub.Admin.Web/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×15etc/azure/Dockerfile.basedetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 15 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (7), Dockerfile.azure (7), Dockerfile.base. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 issue-level).
Resolve the 15 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (7), Dockerfile.azure (7), Dockerfile.base. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile, Dockerfile.azure. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
62 of 66 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/EventHub.Application/Events/EventAppService.cs.
Dormant codebase
What to do
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives2.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×23) — Default.cshtml:68, Default.cshtml:19, Default.cshtml:65, …
What to do
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×5) — Index.razor:24, _eventSection.cshtml:57, _sessionSection.cshtml:127, …
This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×9) — EventManagement.razor:151, EventManagement.razor:161, EventManagement.razor:191, …
A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label. (×11) — Index.razor:150, Index.razor:151, Index.razor:152, …
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×12) — Index.razor:25, Index.razor:34, Index.razor:99, …
The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). — index.html:2
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×4) — index.html:2, Account.cshtml:0, Application.cshtml:0, …
user-scalable=no/0 or a maximum-scale below 2 stops low-vision users zooming to 200%. Remove the zoom restriction from the viewport meta. — index.html:6
An iframe with no title (or an empty one) is announced only as "frame". Add a non-empty title describing its content, or an aria-label. — LoggedOut.cshtml:31
The lang value isn't a well-formed BCP-47 language tag (use e.g. "en" or "en-US", not "english"/"en_US"), so assistive tech may apply the wrong language. Use a valid language subtag. (×3) — Account.cshtml:0, Application.cshtml:0, Empty.cshtml:0
A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. (×3) — Account.cshtml:0, Application.cshtml:0, Empty.cshtml:0
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×3) — Default.cshtml:55, Pricing.cshtml:41, Pricing.cshtml:49
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
aria-hidden="true" here hides the subtree from assistive tech, but a focusable descendant stays in the tab order — a keyboard user can land on a control screen readers can't see. Add inert, take the descendants out of the tab order (tabindex="-1"), or drop aria-hidden. (×4) — _sessionSection.cshtml:95, _sessionSection.cshtml:140, _trackSection.cshtml:55, …
What to do
Use valid, non-abstract roles, supply the ARIA state each role requires, and never put aria-hidden on a focusable element.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
A CSS rule's foreground/background colour pair falls below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×25) — style.css:0, global-styles.css:0, sweetalert2.css:0, …
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
`IEventAppService` declares 16 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IEventAppService.cs:10
What to do
Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.
Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C1 · Data Protection3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
What to do
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.
An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent write-side hook), [Audited] per-entity coverage.
What to do
Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
`AddScripts` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — EventHubBundleContributor.cs:7
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×2) — EventHubSettingDefinitionProvider.cs:10, EventHubIdentityServerModule.cs:123
`OnGet` has an empty body — confirm it's an intentional no-op and not an unfinished method. (×4) — Index.cshtml.cs:7, Index.cshtml.cs:5, PrivacyPolicy.cshtml.cs:7, …
What to do
Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 37 of 37 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P10 · Library API & versioning2.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.
Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries. Exhaustive, deterministic.
385/394 types (98%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.
No <Version>/<VersionPrefix>/GitVersion/MinVer detected. A published library needs explicit semantic versioning so consumers can reason about breaking changes.
What to do
Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
Stamp a semantic version (csproj <Version> or GitVersion/MinVer) and follow semver for breaking changes.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability5.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.
Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.
The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.
What to do
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a BenchmarkDotNet suite, an allocation MemoryDiagnoser, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
No BenchmarkDotNet suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
Add a BenchmarkDotNet project for the hot paths (with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations), and run it in CI to catch regressions.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's GC — Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.
No Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask or buffer-writer usage was found. If this library sits on a hot path, these reduce the GC pressure it puts on its host — a bonus, not a requirement.
What to do
On hot paths, prefer Span<T>/ReadOnlySpan<T>, ArrayPool<T>, stackalloc and ValueTask to cut allocations a consumer would otherwise inherit.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
Only 0/649 awaits use ConfigureAwait(false). A library that captures the caller's context can stall or deadlock its host — the classic way a dependency drags an app down.
What to do
In library code, append .ConfigureAwait(false) to every await (or set <ConfigureAwait>false</ConfigureAwait> / use the analyzer CA2007) so the library never captures the host's context.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
0 typed · 17 plain JS
What to do
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R10 · Code Duplication4.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. — Index.js:1
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
What to do
Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — create-or-edit-event-area.js, Index.js, Index.js, …
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
test ✗ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗
What to do
Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
1 file(s) (~37 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package.
2 file(s) (~21 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — EventHub.IdentityServer
16 file(s) (~1239 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — EventHub.Web
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×2) — gulpfile.js:3, gulpfile.js:3
Declared in src/EventHub.IdentityServer/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
MD5/SHA1 is broken for security purposes (collision-vulnerable). Use SHA-256+ for content integrity; for password storage, use a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt). — GravatarTagHelper.cs:122
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
Replace MD5/SHA1 with SHA-256+ for content hashing; switch to a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt) for password storage.
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 12/243 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) — EventHubDataSeedContributor.cs:25, EventHubDataSeedContributor.cs:30, EventHubDbMigrationService.cs:32, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. (×11) — EventHubDbMigrationService.cs:52, EventHubDbMigrationService.cs:58, EventHubDbMigrationService.cs:68, …
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
1/22 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
~0.0 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 35 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a vertical-slice + CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D11 Test Reliability — No tests discovered
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency Hygiene not included (time budget)
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — Scanner failed to run — not a clean result
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Code Coverage not included (time budget)
DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — only 1/3 markers (a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer)
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 2 event handler(s); 2 CQRS handler(s)
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
P3 Security & performance tooling — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarks are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: EventAppService.cs ↔ EventController.cs src/EventHub.Application/Events/EventAppService.cs— `src/EventHub.Application/Events/EventAppService.cs` (context EventHub) and `src/EventHub.HttpApi/Controllers/Events/EventController.cs` (context EventHub.HttpApi) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 69% of the time (9 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: EventHubIdentityServerModule.cs ↔ EventHubMenuContributor.cs src/EventHub.IdentityServer/EventHubIdentityServerModule.cs— `src/EventHub.IdentityServer/EventHubIdentityServerModule.cs` (context EventHub.IdentityServer) and `src/EventHub.Web/Menus/EventHubMenuContributor.cs` (context EventHub) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 55% of the time (6 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: EventHubHttpApiHostModule.cs ↔ EventHubMenuContributor.cs src/EventHub.HttpApi.Host/EventHubHttpApiHostModule.cs— `src/EventHub.HttpApi.Host/EventHubHttpApiHostModule.cs` (context EventHub.HttpApi) and `src/EventHub.Web/Menus/EventHubMenuContributor.cs` (context EventHub) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 55% of the time (6 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: EventHubAdminHttpApiHostModule.cs ↔ EventHubMenuContributor.cs src/EventHub.Admin.HttpApi.Host/EventHubAdminHttpApiHostModule.cs— `src/EventHub.Admin.HttpApi.Host/EventHubAdminHttpApiHostModule.cs` (context EventHub.Admin.HttpApi) and `src/EventHub.Web/Menus/EventHubMenuContributor.cs` (context EventHub) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 55% of the time (6 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: CreateEventDto.cs ↔ New.cshtml.cs src/EventHub.Application.Contracts/Events/CreateEventDto.cs— `src/EventHub.Application.Contracts/Events/CreateEventDto.cs` (context EventHub.Application) and `src/EventHub.Web/Pages/Events/New.cshtml.cs` (context EventHub) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 50% of the time (7 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: IOrganizationAppService.cs ↔ EventHubApplicationAutoMapperProfile.cs src/EventHub.Admin.Application.Contracts/Organizations/IOrganizationAppService.cs— `src/EventHub.Admin.Application.Contracts/Organizations/IOrganizationAppService.cs` (context EventHub.Admin.Application) and `src/EventHub.Admin.Application/EventHubApplicationAutoMapperProfile.cs` (context EventHub.Admin) live in DIFFERENT modules yet change together 50% of the time (5 shared commits) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
D10 · Test Quality· No assertions (empty test) · ×2
No assertions (empty test): Method1Async modules/payment/test/Payment.Domain.Tests/Samples/SampleManager_Tests.cs:15— Test method has an empty body — it asserts nothing and exercises no code.
No assertions (empty test): Method1Async modules/payment/test/Payment.TestBase/Samples/SampleRepository_Tests.cs:21— Test method has an empty body — it asserts nothing and exercises no code.
Off the main sequence: Payment.Domain.Shared — Payment.Domain.Shared: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: EventHub.Domain.Shared — EventHub.Domain.Shared: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.20, distance 0.80 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: EventHub.EntityFrameworkCore — EventHub.EntityFrameworkCore: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.22, distance 0.78 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: EventHub.Web.Shared — EventHub.Web.Shared: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.25, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Change coupling: EventReminderNotifier.cs ↔ EventTimingChangeNotifier.cs src/EventHub.BackgroundServices/Events/EventReminderNotifier.cs— `src/EventHub.BackgroundServices/Events/EventReminderNotifier.cs` and `src/EventHub.BackgroundServices/Events/EventTimingChangeNotifier.cs` change together 70% of the time (7 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Change coupling: EventAppService.cs ↔ Track.cs src/EventHub.Application/Events/EventAppService.cs— `src/EventHub.Application/Events/EventAppService.cs` and `src/EventHub.Domain/Events/Track.cs` change together 60% of the time (6 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Low cohesion: Session (LCOM4 5) src/EventHub.Domain/Events/Session.cs:10— Session's methods form 5 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
Low cohesion: Organization (LCOM4 4) src/EventHub.Domain/Organizations/Organization.cs:9— Organization's methods form 4 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.
No assertions: Should_Create_A_Valid_Event test/EventHub.Domain.Tests/Events/Event_Tests.cs:10— Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
TodoComment modules/payment/src/Payment.Application/PaymentRequests/PaymentRequestAppService.cs:134— //// TODO: Find way to parse with System.Text.Json instead of Newtonsoft — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
Monorepo: only 1 of 2 solutions was scored — This repository contains 2 .NET solutions, but a scan analyzes ONE. Every score, lens, and finding here reflects only `EventHub.sln` — the other 1 (`modules/payment/Payment.sln`) were not analyzed and are not represented in the headline. To cover them, scan each solution as its own target and group them in a Solution or Product for a portfolio roll-up. If a secondary solution is an archived or vendored tree, declare it — `.gitattributes` (`path/** linguist-vendored`) or `.editorconfig` (`[path/**] generated_code = true`) — to exclude it from discovery the same way generated code is.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1110.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· Inconsistent naming for single-entity retrieval operations. The `EventAppService` uses `GetByUrlCodeAsync` and `GetLocationAsync` (which returns a Detail DTO), while the Admin `EventAppService` uses `GetAsync`. This mixes URL-based and ID-based retrieval naming conventions. · ×1
Inconsistent naming for single-entity retrieval operations. The `EventAppService` uses `GetByUrlCodeAsync` and `GetLocationAsync` (which returns a Detail DTO), while the Admin `EventAppService` uses `GetAsync`. This mixes URL-based and ID-based retrieval naming conventions. — Standardize on `GetByIdAsync` or `GetAsync` for ID-based lookups and `GetByUrlCodeAsync` or `GetByCodeAsync` for code-based lookups. Ensure the return type is consistent (e.g., always returning a Detail DTO or a generic `TResult`). Consider renaming `GetLocationAsync` to `GetByIdAsync` if it returns full details. (signatures: Task<EventDetailDto> IEventAppService.GetByUrlCodeAsync(string urlCode) | Task<EventDetailDto> IEventAppService.GetLocationAsync(Guid id) | Task<EventDetailDto> IEventAppService.GetAsync(Guid id))
D22 · Internal API Consistency· Duplicate method name `GetCountriesLookupAsync` exists in both `EventHub.Events.IEventAppService` and `EventHub.Admin.Events.IEventAppService`. While they are in different namespaces, the lack of namespace qualification in the signature list suggests potential confusion if these interfaces are imported or aliased. · ×1
Duplicate method name `GetCountriesLookupAsync` exists in both `EventHub.Events.IEventAppService` and `EventHub.Admin.Events.IEventAppService`. While they are in different namespaces, the lack of namespace qualification in the signature list suggests potential confusion if these interfaces are imported or aliased. — While technically distinct due to namespaces, the identical method signature across different modules suggests a lack of global naming convention for 'Lookup' operations. Consider if `GetCountriesAsync` would be more consistent with `GetListAsync` patterns. (signatures: Task<List<CountryLookupDto>> IEventAppService.GetCountriesLookupAsync() | Task<List<CountryLookupDto>> IEventAppService.GetCountriesLookupAsync())
D22 · Internal API Consistency· Inconsistent naming for list retrieval. Most services use `GetListAsync`, but some might use `GetAllAsync` or `QueryAsync` in other parts of the codebase (though not explicitly shown here, the pattern `GetListAsync` is used for filtering). However, `GetByUrlCodeAsync` is an outlier in the Event service. · ×1
Inconsistent naming for list retrieval. Most services use `GetListAsync`, but some might use `GetAllAsync` or `QueryAsync` in other parts of the codebase (though not explicitly shown here, the pattern `GetListAsync` is used for filtering). However, `GetByUrlCodeAsync` is an outlier in the Event service. — Ensure all list retrieval operations follow the `GetListAsync` pattern with a filter/input DTO. The `GetByUrlCodeAsync` in the Event service is a specific exception that should be clearly documented or renamed to `GetByCodeAsync` for consistency with other 'GetBy' patterns if they exist. (signatures: Task<PagedResultDto<EventInListDto>> IEventAppService.GetListAsync(EventListFilterDto input) | Task<PagedResultDto<OrganizationInListDto>> IOrganizationAppService.GetListAsync(OrganizationListFilterDto input) | Task<PagedResultDto<OrganizationInListDto>> IOrganizationAppService.GetListAsync(OrganizationListFilterDto input))
No tests discovered — Test reliability not scored — the test tier(s) built and ran but no tests were discovered, so reliability couldn't be exercised.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency Hygiene not included (time budget) · ×1
Dependency Hygiene not included (time budget) — Dependency Hygiene couldn't be assessed within its 5-minute budget on a solution this large — not included in this run.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 1 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner (largest: src/EventHub.DbMigrator/Data/EventHubSampleDataSeedContributor.cs). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Thin analysable surface across projects — 5 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `EventHub.Admin.HttpApi` with 22 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 93 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.5 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
redundant comment src/EventHub.Domain/Settings/EventHubSettings.cs:7— "Add your own setting names here." — Delete - the SettingNames block already says this.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
Dormant codebase — 62 of 66 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 62 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Scanner failed to run · ×1
Scanner failed to run — not a clean result — osv-scanner exited 127 with no findings — the advisory database was likely unreachable. The scanner exited non-zero and produced no findings (typically the advisory DB was unreachable), so this is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass.
D8 · Code Coverage· Code Coverage not included (time budget) · ×1
Code Coverage not included (time budget) — Code Coverage couldn't be assessed within its 5-minute budget on a solution this large — not included in this run.
Build status unknown — The build did not finish within its budget on this run; structural metrics are reported, build/warning status is unknown.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
Run 019f1540-4103-7c7e-833d-751c8fb75dcc · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 31 field(s) across 3 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 110 · Warnings: 36 · Recommendations: 24 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 29-06-2026 @ 21:19 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.