Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
advent-of-craft/2024 carries serious risk (50%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Event Sourcing (100%) — its event log is trustworthy to replay. Architecture (97%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (38%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Maturity (45%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Make types internal by default (Library API & versioning); eslint as package.json scripts and run them in CI (Tooling).
For scale: Small (~2,622 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Event Sourcing foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
76%
Adequate · gated by X5
Architecture
97% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
45%
Weak · gated by D34
Readiness
38%
Weak · gated by P1, P3, P10
Security
78%
Adequate · gated by D38
Domain Modelling
89%
Strong
Event Sourcing
100% ★
Exemplary
Accessibility
59%
Adequate
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 38% · 45% weightMaturity 45% · 25% weightAccessibility 59% · 14% weightCode Health 76% · 8% weightSecurity 78% · 4% weightDomain Modelling 89% · 2% weightArchitecture 97% · 1% weightEvent Sourcing 100% · 1% weight
Raise Readiness 38 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 50 → ~58.
Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 3%Plumbing 17%Tests 79%
New since the last scan (19+)
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day11/package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/php/day20/composer.lock
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day11/package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day18/package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day02/package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day18/package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day19/package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day11/package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day13/package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day20/package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day18/package-lock.json
- R10 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) exercise/ts/day09/src/child.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) exercise/ts/day24/src/domain/StockReducedEvent.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2 locations) exercise/ts/day16/src/taskAssignmentSystem.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2 locations) exercise/ts/day22/src/eid/serialNumber.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2 locations) exercise/ts/day09/src/giftRequest.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2 locations) exercise/ts/day18/features/step_definitions/rockPapersScissorsSteps.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2 locations) exercise/ts/day16/src/taskAssignmentSystem.ts
- DM4 · Anemic entity: Event exercise/php/day24/src/Delivery/Domain/Core/Event.php
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €5,800–€29,000
| Cost to rebuild | €5,800–€29,000 |
| Domain complexity | High |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 50% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · 56% boilerplate · 27% straight-line · 17% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€17,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 38% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
2
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.
3
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 38%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph
Architecture — module dependency matrix
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D17 · .NET / C#
Explicit Debt
10.0
GD1 · Repo
Unfinished & placeholder code
10.0
IC1 · Repo
Incompleteness & stubs
10.0
R1 · React / TS
Type Safety
9.9
R10 · React / TS
Code Duplication
8.6
R2 · React / TS
Cyclomatic Complexity
10.0
R3 · React / TS
Large Files
10.0
R7 · React / TS
Dead Code
10.0
X1 · Repo
Async correctness
10.0
X3 · Repo
Exception handling
10.0
X4 · Repo
Structured logging
10.0
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
The Bad
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
D8 · .NET / C#
Code Coverage
10.0
D9 · .NET / C#
Test Distribution
10.0
D10 · .NET / C#
Test Quality
9.4
D11 · .NET / C#
Test Reliability
10.0
D13 · .NET / C#
Secret Scanning
10.0
D14 · .NET / C#
License Compliance
10.0
P11 · Repo
BDD / executable specs
10.0
R4 · React / TS
Test Coverage
8.3
R5 · React / TS
Dependency Freshness
10.0
R8 · React / TS
Dependency Hygiene
9.5
The Bad
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
At a glance — Domain Modelling
The Good
At a glance — Event Sourcing
The Good
At a glance — Accessibility
The Ugly
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 38 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, establish a continuous integration pipeline to automatically build and test code on every push or pull request. Next, restrict the library's public API by making types internal by default to protect consumers from breaking changes. Then, integrate eslint into package.json scripts and enforce linting in the CI process. After that, address the single orphaned file identified in the knowledge freshness review. Finally, document significant architectural decisions in a dedicated ADR format to ensure long-term clarity.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +6.7 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. | +6.0 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +9.7 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers. | +9.7 pts | Medium | Library API & versioning |
| Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Reindeer.cs, ReindeerService.cs. | +4.6 pts | Low | Comment Value |
| Add eslint as package.json scripts and run them in CI. | +8.2 pts | Medium | Tooling |
| Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form). | +6.6 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs. | +6.3 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| exercise/ts/day18/package-lock.json | 0.1 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| exercise/ts/day00/package-lock.json | 1.8 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| exercise/ts/day11/package-lock.json | 3.0 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| exercise/ts/day20/package-lock.json | 3.4 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| exercise/php/day20/composer.lock | 5.1 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| exercise/C#/day04/Routine.Tests/RoutineTests.cs | 7.0 | Mixed | Test Quality: No assertions (empty test): StartRoutine_With_FakeItEasy |
| exercise/php/day00/composer.lock | 7.2 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| exercise/python/day11/requirements.txt | 7.2 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| exercise/ts/day02/package-lock.json | 7.2 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| exercise/ts/day19/package-lock.json | 7.2 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| exercise/ts/day13/package-lock.json | 7.2 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| exercise/ts/day23/package-lock.json | 9.3 | Near-clean | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| exercise/php/day18/composer.lock | 9.3 | Near-clean | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| solution/day20/Reindeer.Web/Service/Reindeer.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: redundant comment |
| solution/day20/Reindeer.Web/Service/ReindeerService.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: redundant comment |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 59 of 61 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 61 dimensions across the health lenses
D5D8D9D10D11D13D14D17D20D21D24D26D28D29D30D33D34D35D38AC1AC2AC3AC6AC7AX10AX3AX5AX8DM1DM4DM5DM6DM7DM8ES1ES2ES3GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P10P11P3R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9X1X3X4X5
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 40 of 49 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D5 · Coupling
2 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D8 · Code Coverage
Line coverage 97.0%, branch coverage 91.7%.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution
4 test methods: 4 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 2 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 95 tests.
No assertions (empty test): StartRoutine_With_FakeItEasy exercise/C#/day04/Routine.Tests/RoutineTests.cs:7
Do you agree with this assessment?
D11 · Test Reliability
0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). other: measured (0 flaky).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 21 packages use a banned license.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 102 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
No ADRs found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 44 sampled symbols.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D24 · Comment Value
1 valuable / 2 redundant across 5 sampled comments; 2 shown with locations.
redundant comment solution/day20/Reindeer.Web/Service/Reindeer.cs:9
What to do
- Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Reindeer.cs, ReindeerService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 2 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
2 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low.
High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.1.0
What to do
- Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
4 of 4 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is solution/day24/src/Delivery/Delete.cs.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
36 finding(s): 0 critical, 14 high, 12 medium, 10 low.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day00/package-lock.json
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day02/package-lock.json
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day02/package-lock.json
What to do
- Resolve the 14 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (11), composer.lock (2), requirements.txt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level).
- Resolve the 12 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (11), composer.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
- Resolve the 10 Low CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (9), composer.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC3 · Page structure
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×9) — timecapsule_template.html:2, timecapsule_template.html:2, timecapsule_template.html:2, …
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- This stylesheet animates but never checks prefers-reduced-motion, so motion-sensitive users can't opt out. Wrap motion in @media (prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference). (×9) — timecapsule_template.html:7, timecapsule_template.html:7, timecapsule_template.html:7, …
- `body` sets color: #f99682 on background-color: #26606d — 3.3:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×9) — timecapsule_template.html:7, timecapsule_template.html:7, timecapsule_template.html:7, …
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (an accessibility check that can read your UI — no component framework was detected and your pages are rendered by server-side templates, which neither the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins nor the HTML-template linters can parse; run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, or assert the accessibility invariants over that rendered HTML in the test suite you already have) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start by running that check over your rendered pages in CI.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add an accessibility check that can read your UI — no component framework was detected and your pages are rendered by server-side templates, which neither the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins nor the HTML-template linters can parse; run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, or assert the accessibility invariants over that rendered HTML in the test suite you already have, then assert with jest-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX5 · Architecture & structure
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX8 · Test isolation
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM1 · Aggregate boundaries
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model
- `Event` is an aggregate/entity with 3 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Event.php:7
What to do
- Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM5 · Encapsulated state
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM7 · Repository granularity
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM8 · Value-object opportunities
Do you agree with this assessment?
ES1 · Fold determinism
Do you agree with this assessment?
ES2 · Immutable events
Do you agree with this assessment?
ES3 · PII in the event store
Do you agree with this assessment?
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
Do you agree with this assessment?
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
Do you agree with this assessment?
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 4 of 4 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Do you agree with this assessment?
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M4 · Documentation accuracy
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P10 · Library API & versioning
- 17/17 types (100%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.
- No <Version>/<VersionPrefix>/GitVersion/MinVer detected. A published library needs explicit semantic versioning so consumers can reason about breaking changes.
What to do
- Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
- Stamp a semantic version (csproj <Version> or GitVersion/MinVer) and follow semver for breaking changes.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P11 · BDD / executable specs
Do you agree with this assessment?
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.
What to do
- Run what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety
What to do
- Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R10 · Code Duplication
- exercise/ts/day09/src/child.ts:5 · solution/day09/src/child.ts:5 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — child.ts:5
- exercise/ts/day24/src/domain/StockReducedEvent.ts:1 · exercise/ts/day24/src/domain/ToyCreatedEvent.ts:1 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — StockReducedEvent.ts:1
- exercise/ts/day16/src/taskAssignmentSystem.ts:13 · solution/day16/src/taskAssignmentSystem.ts:27 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — taskAssignmentSystem.ts:13
- exercise/ts/day22/src/eid/serialNumber.ts:13 · exercise/ts/day22/src/eid/year.ts:13 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — serialNumber.ts:13
- exercise/ts/day09/src/giftRequest.ts:2 · solution/day09/src/giftRequest.ts:2 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — giftRequest.ts:2
- exercise/ts/day18/features/step_definitions/rockPapersScissorsSteps.ts:2 · solution/day18/features/step_definitions/rockPapersScissorsSteps.ts:2 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — rockPapersScissorsSteps.ts:2
- exercise/ts/day20/src/index.ts:12 · exercise/ts/day20/src/index.ts:26 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — index.ts:12
- exercise/ts/day16/src/taskAssignmentSystem.ts:33 · solution/day16/src/taskAssignmentSystem.ts:43 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — taskAssignmentSystem.ts:33
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×2) — main.ts:13, rockPaperScissors.ts:9
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×8) — main.ts, capsule.ts, tourCalculator.ts, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Do you agree with this assessment?
R5 · Dependency Freshness
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✓
What to do
- Add eslint as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code
- 4 file(s) (~84 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — day00
- 5 file(s) (~82 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — day01
- 3 file(s) (~87 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — day02
Do you agree with this assessment?
R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Declared in exercise/ts/day20/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R9 · Circular Imports
Do you agree with this assessment?
X1 · Async correctness
Do you agree with this assessment?
X3 · Exception handling
Do you agree with this assessment?
X4 · Structured logging
Do you agree with this assessment?
X5 · Nullable reference types
- 0/2 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
What to do
- Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 76% | Adequate — gated by X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 97% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 45% | Weak — gated by D34 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 38% | Weak — gated by P1, P3, P10 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 78% | Adequate — gated by D38 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 89% | Strong | Solid. |
| Event Sourcing | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Accessibility | 59% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
Not included — 58 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a vertical-slice architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — vertical-slice architecture detected, but individual slices could not be resolved from namespaces or project layout
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .kt, .php, .py, .scala, .ts) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — no packages were read
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .cs, .kt, .php, .py, .scala — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a C#/VB .NET solution, but this repository's production source is mostly .java, .kt, .php, .py, .scala, .ts, which the C#/VB workspace does not load — the projects that loaded are an immaterial minority, so solution shape was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .kt, .php, .py, .scala, .ts) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 14500 LoC the codebase is tiny despite two projects, so its small size makes it a single-purpose concern requiring no boundaries.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .kt, .php, .py, .scala, .ts) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D4 Code Duplication — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .kt, .php, .py, .scala, .ts) was not read by duplication detection, so code duplication was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's duplication. Not scored: no source of those file kinds was exposed to the token comparison by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .java, .kt, .php, .py, .scala, .ts, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present but no domain-layer files were identified (no /Domain//Aggregates/ paths)
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 18 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day00/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day11/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day00/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day18/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/php/day20/composer.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day00/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day00/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day11/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day18/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day20/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/php/day00/composer.lock
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day00/package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/python/day11/requirements.txt
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day18/package-lock.json
D10 · Test Quality
- No assertions (empty test): StartRoutine_With_FakeItEasy exercise/C#/day04/Routine.Tests/RoutineTests.cs:7
- No assertions (empty test): StartRoutine_With_Manual_Test_Doubles exercise/C#/day04/Routine.Tests/RoutineTests.cs:13
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.1.0
- High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates 4.1.0
Warning — 14 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day02/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day18/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day00/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day19/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day11/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day13/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/php/day20/composer.lock
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day20/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day20/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day18/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day18/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day18/package-lock.json
D16 · Bus Factor
- single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D19 · Documentation Quality
- LLM evaluation failed
Recommendation — 15 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day02/package-lock.json
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day18/package-lock.json
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day00/package-lock.json
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day19/package-lock.json
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day23/package-lock.json
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day11/package-lock.json
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day13/package-lock.json
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day20/package-lock.json
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/ts/day18/package-lock.json
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] exercise/php/day18/composer.lock
D24 · Comment Value
- redundant comment solution/day20/Reindeer.Web/Service/Reindeer.cs:9
- redundant comment solution/day20/Reindeer.Web/Service/ReindeerService.cs:7
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
- complexity unreadable for .cs, .kt, .php, .py, .scala — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D20 · ADR Quality
- No ADRs found
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — no packages were read
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | — |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet list exercise/C#/day24/Delivery.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json | 2 | artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 36 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |