Public report — ECC, published 6 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
94findings with an exact file:lineof 103 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
43/114dimensions across the health lenses108988 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
affaan-m/ECC is sound in substance but carries real gaps (64%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Event Sourcing (100%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Code Health (52%) — changes there are slower and more error-prone. Readiness (63%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript (Type Safety); Break down the listed branch-heavy functions (Cyclomatic Complexity); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling).
For scale: Large (~108,988 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~1.7 person-years (~1–4 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
0.9× (at 64% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Large · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
Dead frontend code
~296 LoC unreachable (1 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)
This codebase represents roughly ~1.7 person-years of build effort (about ~€240,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Code Health at 52% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — domain model × a 0.9× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
The top-ranked fix costs roughly 3–10 engineer-days once. Not doing it costs about 120.6–723.8 engineer-days every year, paid as drag on the ~1,206,329 lines this team changes annually — a bill that arrives whether or not anyone books it. On those figures the fix breaks even in roughly 1–2 months and is free after that. Method, stated so this is not read as a quotation: debt from the ranked task's effort band; interest = annual changed lines (measured, annualised from the 90-day window) ÷ an ASSUMED 150–400 lines per engineer-day × the 4–9% drag implied by the code-quality signals; breaking point = debt ÷ annual interest. A modelled planning range built from measured inputs and one named assumption — not a quotation, a valuation, or a certified figure.
Evidence: D15 churn: 297,451 line(s) changed over a 90-day window ⇒ ~1,206,329/year · D1/D2/D4 code quality: averaging 6.4/10 ⇒ a 4–9% drag on each change · top-ranked remediation: Medium effort ⇒ about 3–10 engineer-day(s)
→ Do the top-ranked fix now if this code will still be yours in 2 months.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Large asset (~1.7 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Code Health at 52%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Code Health first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
A velocity tax on every change · Medium · Economics
The code-quality signals (complexity, duplication, cohesion) average 6.4/10, which acts as a tax on every change in the weaker areas: modifications there plausibly cost on the order of 4–9% more than in clean code, and the tax compounds as the codebase grows. (A modelled estimate, not a measured fact.)
Evidence: D1/D2/D4 code quality: averaging 6.4/10 across the code-quality signals actually measured
→ Pay it down where churn is highest — the hotspots — not everywhere; that's where the tax is actually paid.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
66 modules, 46 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
At a glance — Code Health · 52% · Adequate · gated by D2, R1
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
11
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
1
Medium
Roadmap
First, migrate all remaining JavaScript files to TypeScript to enforce type safety across the codebase. Next, reduce cyclomatic complexity in high-branch functions to improve maintainability and reliability. Then, integrate automated security scanning into the CI pipeline to prevent security regressions from reaching production. Finally, clean up the dependency tree by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring all imports to ensure a lean and secure foundation.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: cargo-audit / cargo-deny (or clippy) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted]
ecc2/src/config/mod.rs
8.5
Near-clean
God Classes: FileTooLong: config/mod.rs
ecc2/src/session/mod.rs
8.5
Near-clean
God Classes: FileTooLong: session/mod.rs
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 40 of 43 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 43 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 94 of 103 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
DM4 Rich vs anemic domain model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D20, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
21 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ecc_tui::main at 168. A further 2 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being Dashboard::empty_timeline_message at 24 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
+ 6 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 5 Dashboard finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with dashboard.rs (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 manager finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with manager.rs (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 ecc_tui finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with main.rs (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 8 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 12 Dashboard finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with dashboard.rs (12). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
Resolve the 9 ecc_tui finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with main.rs (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
Resolve the 7 manager finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with manager.rs (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.
Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.
No mechanizable ADR was identified, so enforcement is not measured (scan coverage 100 %). Dependency cycles not checked (no project-reference graph; where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there).
What to do
Enforce Architectural Integrity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Top hotspots: ecc2/src/main.rs (2×168=336); ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs (3×54=162); .opencode/plugins/ecc-hooks.ts (6×26=156)
Hotspot: ecc2/src/main.rs · ×5ecc2/src/main.rs
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor5.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
22 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Further sole-owners (lower concentration) finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
This project is an exceptionally well-structured ECC operating system with comprehensive documentation: a single English README plus 1481 markdown architecture/design docs covering every major topic (ECC native workflows, rules, plugins, legacy command shims, hooks, the 2.0 control-plane scaffold, and Trae integration), plus many per-project READMEs that are clipped by the scanner but carry full outlines. The documentation is clear, complete, and well-organized for a systems project. The ECC documentation is comprehensive and well-structured across READMEs, architecture docs, and plugin manifests. The main focus is on the Everything Claude Code (ECC) configuration for OpenClaw, Kiro, Hermes, Kimi, and CodeBuddy projects, with a dedicated Codex-native .codex-plugin directory explaining how to install ECC plugins as marketplace-backed manifests. Each project's README covers what is installed, manual install commands, health-checking notes, and an inventory table of components (agents, skills, steering files, scripts). The Kiro README also includes a detailed Quick Start with component-by-component installation steps, a Component Inventory table, What's Included sections for agents (with format distinction between IDE and CLI), and cross-project guidance on self-hosted model compute. A dedicated plugin-mode gotchas doc explains the strict constraints enforced by the Codex plugin validator and how to handle custom endpoints. The Visa Document Translator README is concise but clear with features, supported documents, usage, requirements, and a work-flow breakdown. All visible sections are present in the outline; no missing content was flagged. The GAN-style harness examples and Everything Claude Code documentation are both exemplary — the former is a clear, well-structured quick-start guide with full three-agent run steps, while the latter is an exhaustive multi-language README that explains every part of the system (installation, plugin install paths, commands, rules, MCP config) and links to guides for each topic. Both documents are complete and well organized.
The Quick Start assumes `cd .kiro` to install into a project root but does not mention how to install into an existing subdirectory (e.g. `/path/to/your/project`) from the command line, which is critical for users who already have a Kiro project..kiro/README.md
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×9.github/dependabot.yml:3detected by semgrep finding
Low: dynamic-urllib-use-detected · ×2integrations/aura/adapter.py:137detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 9 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with mcp-health-check.js (3), dependabot.yml, .yarnrc.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with adapter.py, ollama.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
5 of 45 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is skills/skill-comply/scripts/report.py.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
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DM4 · Rich vs anemic domain model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain entities own their behaviour (invariant-enforcing commands) rather than being data-only structs driven by a foreign service.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.
Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether a domain type's identity-bearing field stays immutable — a `pub` mutable field under a hand-rolled Hash/PartialEq breaks the value-identity invariant.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.
Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (diesel/sea-orm/sqlx) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
Other · Event Sourcing — Whether the recovery-replay fold is deterministic — state derived purely from each event's own fields, no clock/random/IO on the replay path.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan (event-sourcing gated): Apply/When folds checked for forbidden tokens (DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random, IO), stripped of comments/strings. Deterministic, hard fact per fold.
Other · Event Sourcing — Whether domain events stay immutable (private fields, set once) rather than carrying mutable state.
Method: Roslyn scan (event-sourcing gated): persisted events checked for public setters; immutability verified per property/field. Deterministic, hard fact.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a README to the 1 of 3 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.7 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README advertises Terraform / IaC, but no Terraform configuration exists
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Terraform / IaC, but no Terraform configuration exists.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add cargo-audit / cargo-deny (or clippy) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: cargo-audit / cargo-deny (or clippy) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
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R1 · Type Safety0.1 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
4 typed · 417 plain JS — the untyped files are scripts/auto-update.js, scripts/build-opencode.js, scripts/catalog.js, scripts/ci/catalog.js, scripts/ci/check-unicode-safety.js, scripts/ci/generate-command-registry.js (+411 more).
What to do
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
scripts/lib/session-adapters/codex-worktree.js:336 · scripts/lib/session-adapters/opencode.js:300 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — codex-worktree.js:336
scripts/lib/install-targets/claude-home.js:68 · scripts/lib/install-targets/claude-project.js:68 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — claude-home.js:68
scripts/lib/shell-substitution.js:108 · scripts/lib/shell-substitution.js:240 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — shell-substitution.js:108
scripts/lib/install-lifecycle.js:653 · scripts/lib/install-lifecycle.js:691 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — install-lifecycle.js:653
scripts/preview-pack-smoke.js:343 · scripts/release-approval-gate.js:555 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — preview-pack-smoke.js:343
scripts/discussion-audit.js:28 · scripts/operator-readiness-dashboard.js:29 · scripts/platform-audit.js:37 · scripts/release-video-suite.js:326 — the 4 copies are spread across 4 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — discussion-audit.js:28
scripts/hooks/pre-bash-git-push-reminder.js:12 · scripts/hooks/pre-bash-tmux-reminder.js:17 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — pre-bash-git-push-reminder.js:12
scripts/lib/install-lifecycle.js:1610 · scripts/lib/install-lifecycle.js:1752 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — install-lifecycle.js:1610
What to do
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — hooks.test.js:339, utils.test.js:29, session-manager.test.js:42, …
What to do
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×2) — shared.mjs, orch-review.workflow.js
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.
What to do
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
Unreachable from the 181 application, 141 tooling and 198 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (181 application, 141 tooling, 198 test roots considered) — orch-review.workflow.js
Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. — shared.mjs:20
What to do
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — charts-bar-chart.tsx:1, text-animations-word-highlight.tsx:2, charts-bar-chart.tsx:2
Declared in the root package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 71 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (21 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (21 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (21 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (21 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (21 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (21 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC7 A11y enforcement — Frontend below the scale floor (21 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~2799 lines of test source are present (.py, .js, .rs) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), package.json and a Cargo manifest), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.py, .rs, .swift, .ts, .tsx) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — none of 2 ADRs are conformance-checkable — unverifiable.
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), package.json and a Cargo manifest — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .py, .rs, .swift, .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.py, .js, .rs) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored — an aggregate and a value object cannot be told apart from source alone here (every struct holding a struct reads alike), and a child COLLECTION (legitimate membership) is indistinguishable from a single embedded aggregate. Reported as guidance rather than measured
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no in-repo typed-id idiom — primitive-obsession recorded as advisory DM8, DM2 not gated
DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored — a domain type leaking across a crate boundary cannot be told apart from source alone from a legitimate shared-kernel crate. Reported as guidance rather than measured
DM7 Repository granularity — not scored — detecting 'a repository per CHILD entity' needs the aggregate-root structure, which is not resolvable from source alone here. Reported as guidance rather than measured
ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and this analysis resolves a call's owner only where the receiver's type is written down in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and a call made through an inferred or generic receiver has no resolvable owner in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:3— This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is. This configuration file has 5 such entries; one cooldown decision clears them all — reported once.
High: yarn-missing-minimal-age-gate .yarnrc.yml:1— This .yarnrc.yml does not set a minimal age gate or sets it too low. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add `npmMinimalAgeGate: "7d"` to wait 7 days before resolving newly published package versions. Added in: 4.10 Reference: https://yarnpkg.com/configuration/yarnrc#npmMinimalAgeGate. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
High: detect-child-process scripts/hooks/mcp-health-check.js:399— Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `idx`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: detect-child-process scripts/hooks/mcp-health-check.js:406— Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `idx`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: detect-child-process scripts/hooks/mcp-health-check.js:563— Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `serverName`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: detect-child-process scripts/hooks/post-edit-format.js:62— Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `rawInput`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: detect-child-process scripts/hooks/pre-bash-commit-quality.js:264— Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `command`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: detect-child-process scripts/hooks/stop-format-typecheck.js:92— Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `projectRoot`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: detect-child-process scripts/lib/utils.js:458— Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `cmd`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Dashboard::selected_session_metrics_text (cognitive 136) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:6094— Dashboard::selected_session_metrics_text has cognitive complexity 136 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 90, loops 45, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 79). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Dashboard::board_text (cognitive 67) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:6535— Dashboard::board_text has cognitive complexity 67 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 56, loops 11 (nesting depth added 33). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Dashboard::render_output (cognitive 32) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:828— Dashboard::render_output has cognitive complexity 32 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 29, match/switch 2, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 13). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Dashboard::submit_spawn_prompt (cognitive 26) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:3608— Dashboard::submit_spawn_prompt has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17, match/switch 7, loops 2 (nesting depth added 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Dashboard::sync_session_state_notifications (cognitive 24) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:4190— Dashboard::sync_session_state_notifications has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, loops 7, match/switch 4 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Dashboard::output_title (cognitive 22) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:983— Dashboard::output_title has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Dashboard::session_graph_recall_lines (cognitive 20) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:5409— Dashboard::session_graph_recall_lines has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18, boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Dashboard::sync_selected_lineage (cognitive 18) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:4912— Dashboard::sync_selected_lineage has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 13, if/else 3, loops 2 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
Dashboard::metrics_line_count_before_delegates (cognitive 17) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:5974— Dashboard::metrics_line_count_before_delegates has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17 (nesting depth added 2). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition.
Dashboard::render_status_bar (cognitive 16) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:1420— Dashboard::render_status_bar has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 1). To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
Dashboard::sync_runtime_metrics (cognitive 16) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:4012— Dashboard::sync_runtime_metrics has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, match/switch 3 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Dashboard::board_overlap_risks (cognitive 16) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:6746— Dashboard::board_overlap_risks has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10, loops 6 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ecc_tui::main (cognitive 336) ecc2/src/main.rs:1426— ecc_tui::main has cognitive complexity 336 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 282, loops 36, match/switch 13, boolean chains 5 (nesting depth added 165). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
ecc_tui::build_legacy_migration_plan_report (cognitive 25) ecc2/src/main.rs:7270— ecc_tui::build_legacy_migration_plan_report has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18, boolean chains 3, match/switch 3, loops 1 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ecc_tui::build_legacy_remote_add_command (cognitive 24) ecc2/src/main.rs:7026— ecc_tui::build_legacy_remote_add_command has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20, match/switch 4 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ecc_tui::parse_markdown_memory_sections (cognitive 23) ecc2/src/main.rs:3695— ecc_tui::parse_markdown_memory_sections has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 22, loops 1 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ecc_tui::format_merge_queue_human (cognitive 23) ecc2/src/main.rs:8215— ecc_tui::format_merge_queue_human has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 16, if/else 7 (nesting depth added 14). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.
ecc_tui::import_legacy_remote_dispatch (cognitive 22) ecc2/src/main.rs:7111— ecc_tui::import_legacy_remote_dispatch has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, match/switch 9, loops 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ecc_tui::parse_dotenv_memory_entries (cognitive 17) ecc2/src/main.rs:3629— ecc_tui::parse_dotenv_memory_entries has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, boolean chains 3, loops 1 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ecc_tui::import_legacy_schedules (cognitive 17) ecc2/src/main.rs:6009— ecc_tui::import_legacy_schedules has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, match/switch 4, loops 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ecc_tui::handle_remote_dispatch_connection (cognitive 16) ecc2/src/main.rs:4010— ecc_tui::handle_remote_dispatch_connection has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8, match/switch 8 (nesting depth added 7). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
manager::enforce_conflict_resolution (cognitive 44) ecc2/src/session/manager.rs:1255— manager::enforce_conflict_resolution has cognitive complexity 44 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 37, loops 6, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 27). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
manager::build_agent_command (cognitive 40) ecc2/src/session/manager.rs:3071— manager::build_agent_command has cognitive complexity 40 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 33, loops 6, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 22). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
manager::build_configured_harness_command (cognitive 36) ecc2/src/session/manager.rs:3190— manager::build_configured_harness_command has cognitive complexity 36 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 31, loops 5 (nesting depth added 16). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
manager::rebalance_team_backlog (cognitive 26) ecc2/src/session/manager.rs:1051— manager::rebalance_team_backlog has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19, boolean chains 4, loops 3 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
manager::process_merge_queue (cognitive 21) ecc2/src/session/manager.rs:1866— manager::process_merge_queue has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10, match/switch 6, loops 5 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
manager::render_task_with_profile_projection (cognitive 21) ecc2/src/session/manager.rs:3468— manager::render_task_with_profile_projection has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18, boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition.
manager::build_merge_queue (cognitive 16) ecc2/src/session/manager.rs:2110— manager::build_merge_queue has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, loops 4 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
FileTooLong: tui/dashboard.rs ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:0— FileTooLong — 6758 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/main.rs ecc2/src/main.rs:0— FileTooLong — 6415 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: session/store.rs ecc2/src/session/store.rs:0— FileTooLong — 4409 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: session/manager.rs ecc2/src/session/manager.rs:0— FileTooLong — 3174 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: worktree/mod.rs ecc2/src/worktree/mod.rs:0— FileTooLong — 1167 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: config/mod.rs ecc2/src/config/mod.rs:0— FileTooLong — 672 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: session/mod.rs ecc2/src/session/mod.rs:0— FileTooLong — 540 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
Dashboard::selected_session_metrics_text (cyclomatic 54) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:6094— Dashboard::selected_session_metrics_text has cyclomatic complexity 54 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Dashboard::board_text (cyclomatic 29) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:6535— Dashboard::board_text has cyclomatic complexity 29 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Dashboard::render_output (cyclomatic 18) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:828— Dashboard::render_output has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Dashboard::sync_session_state_notifications (cyclomatic 16) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:4190— Dashboard::sync_session_state_notifications has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Dashboard::metrics_line_count_before_delegates (cyclomatic 16) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:5974— Dashboard::metrics_line_count_before_delegates has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
Hotspot: ecc2/src/main.rs ecc2/src/main.rs— ecc2/src/main.rs changed 2 times in last 90 days, max complexity 168. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs— ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs changed 3 times in last 90 days, max complexity 54. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: .opencode/plugins/ecc-hooks.ts .opencode/plugins/ecc-hooks.ts— .opencode/plugins/ecc-hooks.ts changed 6 times in last 90 days, max complexity 26. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits, and the other 4 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, cover the area it touches with tests, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time.
Hotspot: ecc2/src/session/store.rs ecc2/src/session/store.rs— ecc2/src/session/store.rs changed 2 times in last 90 days, max complexity 41. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: ecc2/src/session/manager.rs ecc2/src/session/manager.rs— ecc2/src/session/manager.rs changed 3 times in last 90 days, max complexity 22. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits, so the churn is repair rather than feature work. Before the next change lands here, cover the area it touches with tests, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time.
TooManyFunctions: crate ecc2/src/main.rs:1394— TooManyFunctions — 153 free functions. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: crate::session::manager ecc2/src/session/manager.rs:26— TooManyFunctions — 108 free functions. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: crate::tui::dashboard ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:481— TooManyFunctions — 94 free functions. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: crate::worktree ecc2/src/worktree/mod.rs:96— TooManyFunctions — 60 free functions. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyFunctions: crate::session::store ecc2/src/session/store.rs:4441— TooManyFunctions — 40 free functions. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
manager::build_agent_command (cyclomatic 22) ecc2/src/session/manager.rs:3071— manager::build_agent_command has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
manager::build_configured_harness_command (cyclomatic 21) ecc2/src/session/manager.rs:3190— manager::build_configured_harness_command has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
manager::render_task_with_profile_projection (cyclomatic 18) ecc2/src/session/manager.rs:3468— manager::render_task_with_profile_projection has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
manager::enforce_conflict_resolution (cyclomatic 17) ecc2/src/session/manager.rs:1255— manager::enforce_conflict_resolution has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
ecc_tui::main (cyclomatic 168) ecc2/src/main.rs:1426— ecc_tui::main has cyclomatic complexity 168 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
ecc_tui::build_legacy_migration_plan_report (cyclomatic 22) ecc2/src/main.rs:7270— ecc_tui::build_legacy_migration_plan_report has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
ecc_tui::build_legacy_remote_add_command (cyclomatic 20) ecc2/src/main.rs:7026— ecc_tui::build_legacy_remote_add_command has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
StateStore::ensure_session_columns (cyclomatic 41) ecc2/src/session/store.rs:526— StateStore::ensure_session_columns has cyclomatic complexity 41 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
StateStore::evaluate_promote_and_health_check (cyclomatic 17) ecc2/src/session/store.rs:5452— StateStore::evaluate_promote_and_health_check has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
StateStore::ensure_session_columns (cognitive 40) ecc2/src/session/store.rs:526— StateStore::ensure_session_columns has cognitive complexity 40 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 40. To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
StateStore::sync_tool_activity_metrics (cognitive 23) ecc2/src/session/store.rs:1932— StateStore::sync_tool_activity_metrics has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16, loops 6, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
worktree::base_checkout_path (cognitive 27) ecc2/src/worktree/mod.rs:1571— worktree::base_checkout_path has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 22, boolean chains 4, loops 1 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
worktree::detect_shared_dependency_strategies (cognitive 17) ecc2/src/worktree/mod.rs:1222— worktree::detect_shared_dependency_strategies has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, boolean chains 5 (nesting depth added 3). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
dashboard::summarize_completion_decisions (cognitive 24) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:8857— dashboard::summarize_completion_decisions has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 18, loops 4, boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
dashboard::build_worktree_diff_columns (cognitive 16) ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:8147— dashboard::build_worktree_diff_columns has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15, loops 1 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
TooManyMethods: Dashboard ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs:82— TooManyMethods — 215 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: StateStore ecc2/src/session/store.rs:27— TooManyMethods — 110 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
app::run (cyclomatic 79) ecc2/src/tui/app.rs:15— app::run has cyclomatic complexity 79 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
doUninstall (cyclomatic 27) .codebuddy/uninstall.js:119— doUninstall has cyclomatic complexity 27 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity· main (cyclomatic 25) · ×1
main (cyclomatic 25) skills/ck/hooks/session-start.mjs:83— main has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
doInstall (cyclomatic 24) .codebuddy/install.js:146— doInstall has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
renderContextMd (cyclomatic 17) skills/ck/commands/shared.mjs:198— renderContextMd has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
worktree::base_checkout_path (cyclomatic 16) ecc2/src/worktree/mod.rs:1571— worktree::base_checkout_path has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
renderBriefingBox (cyclomatic 16) skills/ck/commands/shared.mjs:273— renderBriefingBox has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
doInstall (cognitive 50) .codebuddy/install.js:146— doInstall has cognitive complexity 50 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
doUninstall (cognitive 42) .codebuddy/uninstall.js:119— doUninstall has cognitive complexity 42 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity· main (cognitive 39) · ×1
main (cognitive 39) skills/ck/hooks/session-start.mjs:83— main has cognitive complexity 39 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
app::run (cognitive 38) ecc2/src/tui/app.rs:15— app::run has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 22, match/switch 14, boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 27). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
store::derive_board_conflict_signals (cognitive 20) ecc2/src/session/store.rs:4748— store::derive_board_conflict_signals has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10, loops 10 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
renderContextMd (cognitive 20) skills/ck/commands/shared.mjs:198— renderContextMd has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
renderBriefingBox (cognitive 16) skills/ck/commands/shared.mjs:273— renderBriefingBox has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×1
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock— undici 6.27.0: [GHSA redacted] — undici is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin undici to 6.28.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against undici 6.27.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Low: dynamic-urllib-use-detected integrations/aura/adapter.py:137— Detected a dynamic value being used with urllib. urllib supports 'file://' schemes, so a dynamic value controlled by a malicious actor may allow them to read arbitrary files. Audit uses of urllib calls to ensure user data cannot control the URLs, or consider using the 'requests' library instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: dynamic-urllib-use-detected src/llm/providers/ollama.py:73— Detected a dynamic value being used with urllib. urllib supports 'file://' schemes, so a dynamic value controlled by a malicious actor may allow them to read arbitrary files. Audit uses of urllib calls to ensure user data cannot control the URLs, or consider using the 'requests' library instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.py, .js, .rs) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 16 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: ecc2/src/tui/dashboard.rs, ecc2/src/main.rs, ecc2/src/session/store.rs, ecc2/src/session/manager.rs, ecc2/src/worktree/mod.rs, ecc2/src/config/mod.rs, ecc2/src/session/daemon.rs, ecc2/src/session/mod.rs (+8 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D16 · Bus Factor· Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 6 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (22 single-owned of 45 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). They are anonymized user #2 (1 file(s)), anonymized user #3 (1 file(s)), anonymized user #4 (1 file(s)), anonymized user #5 (1 file(s)), anonymized user #6 (1 file(s)), anonymized user #7 (1 file(s)) — spread or document their files in the same way, at lower priority than the named off-boarding risks above.
D19 · Documentation Quality· The Quick Start assumes `cd .kiro` to install into a project root but does not mention how to install into an existing subdirectory (e.g. `/path/to/your/project`) from the command line, which is critical for users who already have a Kiro project. · ×1
The Quick Start assumes `cd .kiro` to install into a project root but does not mention how to install into an existing subdirectory (e.g. `/path/to/your/project`) from the command line, which is critical for users who already have a Kiro project. .kiro/README.md— Add a brief note under Quick Start that installs can also be run from the top-level directory without changing directories.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 5 of 45 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: skills/skill-comply/scripts/report.py, skills/skill-comply/scripts/run.py, src/llm/providers/ollama.py (and 2 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, `npm publish --provenance` under GitHub OIDC for npm packages, PEP 740 attestations via `pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish` under PyPI Trusted Publishing (OIDC) for wheels/sdists) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`npm sbom --sbom-format cyclonedx` (npm 9+) or `@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm` over the lockfile, `cyclonedx-py` over the resolved Python environment/lockfile, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.py, .js, .rs) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`, or lcov — `c8 --reporter=lcovonly <your existing test command>` (c8 is already a devDependency here), or lcov — `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifests (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), package.json and a Cargo manifest) were found, but this pass cannot parse them for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable. Your package.json IS read in this same run: the frontend dependency lens (R8) parses it for unused declarations, undeclared imports and misplaced production dependencies — what is missing here is the outdated/deprecated/unmaintained signal for those npm packages, not the manifest.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
—
Run 019fd80a-1e6f-757a-b5be-73b2855fc9f7 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 9 · Warnings: 82 · Recommendations: 10 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 06-08-2026 @ 17:06 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.