cqrs-examples-customers-and-orders

Executive summary

Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.

aledeulo/cqrs-examples-customers-and-orders carries serious gaps (46%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Code Health (100%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Architecture (100%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (32%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Security (41%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: 2 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped… (Release Hygiene).

For scale: Hobby (~1,685 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 100% ★ Exemplary Architecture 100% ★ Exemplary Maturity 52% Adequate · gated by M2, M4 Readiness 32% Adequate · gated by D13, P3 Security 41% Weak · gated by D29, D31, D36 Domain Modelling 87% ★ Exemplary

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 32% · 46% weightSecurity 41% · 25% weightMaturity 52% · 14% weightDomain Modelling 87% · 8% weightCode Health 100% · 4% weightArchitecture 100% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 32 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 46 → ~55.

Code composition — where the lines go

Tests 100%

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €730–€3,600

Cost to rebuild	€730–€3,600 (0.1 person-years (12–38 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	Standard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 46% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Hobby · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€2,200 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 32% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with application-mssql.properties (2).

+12.7 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

+12.7 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling

Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.

+11.0 pts · Medium effort · Release Hygiene

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with application-mssql.properties (2). The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with application-mssql.properties (2).

Architecture — module dependency matrix

28 modules, 42 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

At a glance — Code Health · 100% · Exemplary

The Good

D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 10.0

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

The Good

D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 52% · Adequate · gated by M2, M4

The Good

D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 8.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0

The Ugly

M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 3.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 32% · Adequate · gated by D13, P3

The Good

P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 8.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 7.0

The Bad

P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0

The Ugly

D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0

At a glance — Security · 41% · Weak · gated by D29, D31, D36

The Good

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0

The Bad

D40 · .NET / C# Network Egress Confinement 6.0 D41 · .NET / C# Kernel & Syscall Confinement 6.0 D42 · .NET / C# Runtime Threat Enforcement 6.0

The Ugly

D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 0.9 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 0.0 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 87% · Exemplary

The Good

DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 10.0 DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 6.5 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 10.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A03:2021 — Injection	34	High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	33	High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures	2	High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by resolving the two leaked secrets in application-mssql.properties to immediately reduce exposure. Next, integrate a SAST step into the CI pipeline to fail the build on security regressions, ensuring code quality is enforced automatically. To improve release hygiene, maintain a changelog that records what is shipped in each release. Finally, document disaster recovery procedures with clear RTO/RPO targets and add an approval gate before production promotion to ensure safe deployments.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with application-mssql.properties (2).	+12.7 pts	Low	Secret Scanning
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.	+12.7 pts	Medium	Security & performance tooling
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.	+11.0 pts	Medium	Release Hygiene
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).	+8.2 pts	Medium	DR & Backup
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.	+6.8 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).	+6.0 pts	Medium	Architecture documentation
Reconcile the README with reality: README claims GitLab CI/CD but the repository contains no CI configuration; README claims project integrations and merge request approvals exist but there is no integration or settings directory.	+6.0 pts	Medium	Documentation accuracy
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.	+3.8 pts	Medium	Documentation (README)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 30 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 7% slop · 46% mixed · 47% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
deployment/kubernetes/ingress/local-nginx-ingress.yaml	0.9	Slop	IaC & Container Security: Critical IaC: KSV-0041
deployment/kubernetes/ingress/nginx-ingress.yaml	2.0	Slop	IaC & Container Security: Critical IaC: KSV-0041
aws-fargate-terraform/codepipeline.tf	2.3	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: aws-ecr-mutable-image-tags
aws-fargate-terraform/network.tf	3.5	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: AWS-0164
aws-fargate-terraform/kafka.tf	5.1	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: AWS-0073
deployment/kubernetes/application-services/customer-service.yaml	5.1	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deployment/kubernetes/application-services/order-history-service.yaml	5.1	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deployment/kubernetes/application-services/order-service.yaml	5.1	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/cdc-service.yaml	5.1	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/kafka.yaml	5.1	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/mongodb.yaml	5.1	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/mysql.yaml	5.1	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/zipkin.yaml	5.1	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/zookeeper.yaml	5.1	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
aws-fargate-terraform/main.tf	5.1	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: AWS-0080
deployment/terraform_azure/aks.tf	5.8	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: Critical IaC: AZU-0041
aws-fargate-terraform/documentdb.tf	6.5	Near-clean	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: AWS-0021
aws-fargate-terraform/alb.tf	6.9	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: insecure-load-balancer-tls-version
order-service/src/main/resources/application-mssql.properties	7.2	Near-clean	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential
customer-service/src/main/resources/application-mssql.properties	7.2	Near-clean	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 28 of 30 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 30 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D13D15D19D21D28D29D31D35D36D40D41D42DM1DM4DM5DM6DM8M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5P6

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 69 of 86 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fcf51-b2ba-7bb3-a41d-df2989a7b304.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement: Runtime enforcement is read from committed policy files — a Tetragon/Falco/Kyverno stack installed cluster-wide (Helm release, platform add-on) with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a committed policy is declared intent, not proof the engine is running and blocking in the live cluster.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential · ×2order-service/src/main/resources/application-mssql.properties:3

What to do

Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with application-mssql.properties (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The project is well documented with four README files covering getting started, adding files, integrating tools, collaborating, testing and deploying, plus a dedicated architecture/usage doc for Eventuate Tram customers/orders. The deployment docs cover Terraform on Azure, k8s deployments, public IP retrieval, local Skaffold setup, and cleanup, all clipped by the scanner but present in the outline. The README itself is a useful study-README with GitLab-specific steps rather than an actual application guide.

What to do

Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — The project is well documented with four README files covering getting started, adding files, integrating tools, collaborating, testing and deploying, plus a dedicated architecture/usage doc for Eventuate Tram customers/orders. The deployment docs cover Terraform on Azure, k8s deployments, public IP retrieval, local Skaffold setup, and cleanup, all clipped by the scanner but present in the outline. The README itself is a useful study-README with GitLab-specific steps rather than an actual application guide.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.9 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

34 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 26 medium, 2 low.

High: aws-ecr-mutable-image-tags · ×6aws-fargate-terraform/codepipeline.tf:7detected by semgrep finding

Medium: insecure-load-balancer-tls-version · ×26aws-fargate-terraform/alb.tf:18detected by semgrep finding

Low: aws-documentdb-auditing-disabled · ×2aws-fargate-terraform/documentdb.tf:1detected by semgrep finding

What to do

Resolve the 26 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with network.tf (3), local-nginx-ingress.yaml (3), alb.tf (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (26 warning-level).
Resolve the 6 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with codepipeline.tf (3), application.properties (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with documentdb.tf, main.tf. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D31 · IaC & Container Security0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

275 finding(s): 9 critical, 46 high, 132 medium, 88 low.

High IaC: AWS-0030 · ×28aws-fargate-terraform/codepipeline.tfdetected by trivy finding

Critical IaC: AWS-0104 · ×5aws-fargate-terraform/sg.tfdetected by trivy finding

What to do

Resolve the 28 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with codepipeline.tf (7), local-nginx-ingress.yaml (3), main.tf (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (28 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with local-nginx-ingress.yaml (2), sg.tf, nginx-ingress.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/3 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM).

No build provenance

No artifact signing

No SBOM

What to do

Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D40 · Network Egress Confinement6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads restrict network EGRESS with a NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy), limiting where a compromised pod can send data or reach a command-and-control server. Presence of committed egress-restricting policy, not runtime enforcement.

Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn — language-agnostic): Kubernetes workloads gate applicability; credits a NetworkPolicy / Cilium policy that restricts egress (policyTypes: [Egress] / egress rules). Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10, never a deduction — baseline misconfigs stay with D31). Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/2 network-egress controls present (network policy, egress restriction).

No network policy

What to do

Resolve the 1 No network policy finding(s) in Network Egress Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d40_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads confine the kernel boundary — a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) plus an AppArmor/SELinux mandatory-access-control layer — shrinking the syscall attack surface a container escape would use. Presence of committed confinement config, not runtime enforcement.

Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) and an AppArmor/SELinux MAC layer. Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10); NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/2 syscall-confinement controls present (seccomp, AppArmor/SELinux).

No seccomp profile

No AppArmor/SELinux confinement

What to do

Resolve the 1 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No AppArmor/SELinux confinement finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d41_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the Kubernetes deployment wires runtime threat enforcement — a detection engine (Tetragon/Falco) and/or an admission-control policy gate (Kyverno / OPA Gatekeeper / PodSecurity). Presence of committed policy, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a runtime threat-detection engine (Tetragon TracingPolicy / Falco) and an admission-control policy (Kyverno / OPA Gatekeeper / PodSecurity). Reward-leaning; NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/2 runtime-enforcement controls present (threat detection, admission control).

No runtime threat detection

No admission-control policy

What to do

Resolve the 1 No runtime threat detection finding(s) in Runtime Threat Enforcement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No admission-control policy finding(s) in Runtime Threat Enforcement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d42_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model6.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

`Customer` is an aggregate/entity with 6 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Customer.java:16

What to do

Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.

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DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

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DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

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M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 16 of 16 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

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M2 · Architecture documentation3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).

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M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy2.0 / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

README claims GitLab CI/CD but the repository contains no CI configuration
README claims project integrations and merge request approvals exist but there is no integration or settings directory

What to do

Reconcile the README with reality: README claims GitLab CI/CD but the repository contains no CI configuration; README claims project integrations and merge request approvals exist but there is no integration or settings directory.

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P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P5 · DR & Backup7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

What to do

Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).

Do you agree with this assessment?

P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Architecture	100%	Exemplary	Solid.
Maturity	52%	Adequate — gated by M2, M4	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	32%	Adequate — gated by D13, P3	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	41%	Weak — gated by D29, D31, D36	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling	87%	Exemplary	Solid.

Not included — 71 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~441 lines of test source are present (.java) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Gradle version catalogue and a Maven POM), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.java) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Gradle version catalogue and a Maven POM — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — Scanner failed to run — not a clean result
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .java, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.java) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report` or the Gradle `jacocoTestReport` task) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 41 finding(s)

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×28

High IaC: AWS-0030 aws-fargate-terraform/codepipeline.tf — ECR repository has image scans disabled.
High IaC: AWS-0031 aws-fargate-terraform/codepipeline.tf — ECR images tags shouldn't be mutable.
High IaC: AWS-0086 aws-fargate-terraform/codepipeline.tf — S3 Access block should block public ACL
High IaC: AWS-0087 aws-fargate-terraform/codepipeline.tf — S3 Access block should block public policy
High IaC: AWS-0091 aws-fargate-terraform/codepipeline.tf — S3 Access Block should Ignore Public ACL
High IaC: AWS-0093 aws-fargate-terraform/codepipeline.tf — S3 Access block should restrict public bucket to limit access
High IaC: AWS-0132 aws-fargate-terraform/codepipeline.tf — S3 encryption should use Customer Managed Keys
High IaC: AWS-0021 aws-fargate-terraform/documentdb.tf — DocumentDB storage must be encrypted
High IaC: AWS-0073 aws-fargate-terraform/kafka.tf — A MSK cluster allows unencrypted data in transit.
High IaC: AWS-0080 aws-fargate-terraform/main.tf — RDS encryption has not been enabled at a DB Instance level.
High IaC: AWS-0180 aws-fargate-terraform/main.tf — RDS Publicly Accessible
High IaC: AWS-0164 aws-fargate-terraform/network.tf — Instances in a subnet should not receive a public IP address by default.
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployment/kubernetes/application-services/customer-service.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployment/kubernetes/application-services/order-history-service.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployment/kubernetes/application-services/order-service.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/cdc-service.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/kafka.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/mongodb.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/mysql.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/zipkin.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/zookeeper.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0009 deployment/kubernetes/ingress/local-nginx-ingress.yaml — Access to host network
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployment/kubernetes/ingress/local-nginx-ingress.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0056 deployment/kubernetes/ingress/local-nginx-ingress.yaml — Manage Kubernetes networking
High IaC: KSV-0014 deployment/kubernetes/ingress/nginx-ingress.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
+ 3 more in this group — see findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×6

High: aws-ecr-mutable-image-tags aws-fargate-terraform/codepipeline.tf:7 — The ECR repository allows tag mutability. Image tags could be overwritten with compromised images. ECR images should be set to IMMUTABLE to prevent code injection through image mutation. This can be done by setting `image_tag_mutability` to IMMUTABLE. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: aws-ecr-mutable-image-tags aws-fargate-terraform/codepipeline.tf:11 — The ECR repository allows tag mutability. Image tags could be overwritten with compromised images. ECR images should be set to IMMUTABLE to prevent code injection through image mutation. This can be done by setting `image_tag_mutability` to IMMUTABLE. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: aws-ecr-mutable-image-tags aws-fargate-terraform/codepipeline.tf:15 — The ECR repository allows tag mutability. Image tags could be overwritten with compromised images. ECR images should be set to IMMUTABLE to prevent code injection through image mutation. This can be done by setting `image_tag_mutability` to IMMUTABLE. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: spring-actuator-fully-enabled customer-service/src/main/resources/application.properties:21 — Spring Boot Actuator is fully enabled. This exposes sensitive endpoints such as /actuator/env, /actuator/logfile, /actuator/heapdump and others. Unless you have Spring Security enabled or another means to protect these endpoints, this functionality is available without authentication, causing a significant security risk. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
High: spring-actuator-fully-enabled order-history-service/src/main/resources/application.properties:10 — Spring Boot Actuator is fully enabled. This exposes sensitive endpoints such as /actuator/env, /actuator/logfile, /actuator/heapdump and others. Unless you have Spring Security enabled or another means to protect these endpoints, this functionality is available without authentication, causing a significant security risk. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.
High: spring-actuator-fully-enabled order-service/src/main/resources/application.properties:17 — Spring Boot Actuator is fully enabled. This exposes sensitive endpoints such as /actuator/env, /actuator/logfile, /actuator/heapdump and others. Unless you have Spring Security enabled or another means to protect these endpoints, this functionality is available without authentication, causing a significant security risk. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Critical IaC · ×5

Critical IaC: AWS-0104 aws-fargate-terraform/sg.tf — A security group rule should not allow unrestricted egress to any IP address.
Critical IaC: KSV-0041 deployment/kubernetes/ingress/local-nginx-ingress.yaml — Manage secrets
Critical IaC: KSV-0114 deployment/kubernetes/ingress/local-nginx-ingress.yaml — Manage webhookconfigurations
Critical IaC: KSV-0041 deployment/kubernetes/ingress/nginx-ingress.yaml — Manage secrets
Critical IaC: AZU-0041 deployment/terraform_azure/aks.tf — Ensure AKS has an API Server Authorized IP Ranges enabled

D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×2

Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential order-service/src/main/resources/application-mssql.properties:3 — hardcoded-credential detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential customer-service/src/main/resources/application-mssql.properties:3 — hardcoded-credential detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.

Warning — 26 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×26

Medium: insecure-load-balancer-tls-version aws-fargate-terraform/alb.tf:18 — Detected an AWS load balancer with an insecure TLS version. TLS versions less than 1.2 are considered insecure because they can be broken. To fix this, set your `ssl_policy` to `"ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-Res-2021-06"`, or include a default action to redirect to HTTPS.
Medium: insecure-load-balancer-tls-version aws-fargate-terraform/alb.tf:65 — Detected an AWS load balancer with an insecure TLS version. TLS versions less than 1.2 are considered insecure because they can be broken. To fix this, set your `ssl_policy` to `"ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-Res-2021-06"`, or include a default action to redirect to HTTPS.
Medium: aws-codebuild-project-unencrypted aws-fargate-terraform/codepipeline.tf:59 — The AWS CodeBuild Project is unencrypted. The AWS KMS encryption key protects projects in the CodeBuild. To create your own, create a aws_kms_key resource or use the ARN string of a key in your account.
Medium: aws-cloudwatch-log-group-no-retention aws-fargate-terraform/ecs.tf:132 — The AWS CloudWatch Log Group has no retention. Missing retention in log groups can cause losing important event information.
Medium: aws-cloudwatch-log-group-no-retention aws-fargate-terraform/ecs_customer_service.tf:72 — The AWS CloudWatch Log Group has no retention. Missing retention in log groups can cause losing important event information.
Medium: aws-cloudwatch-log-group-no-retention aws-fargate-terraform/ecs_order_service.tf:72 — The AWS CloudWatch Log Group has no retention. Missing retention in log groups can cause losing important event information.
Medium: aws-cloudwatch-log-group-no-retention aws-fargate-terraform/ecs_orderhistory_service.tf:73 — The AWS CloudWatch Log Group has no retention. Missing retention in log groups can cause losing important event information.
Medium: aws-kms-no-rotation aws-fargate-terraform/kafka.tf:47 — The AWS KMS has no rotation. Missing rotation can cause leaked key to be used by attackers. To fix this, set a `enable_key_rotation`.
Medium: aws-subnet-has-public-ip-address aws-fargate-terraform/network.tf:12 — Resources in the AWS subnet are assigned a public IP address. Resources should not be exposed on the public internet, but should have access limited to consumers required for the function of your application. Set `map_public_ip_on_launch` to false so that resources are not publicly-accessible. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: aws-subnet-has-public-ip-address aws-fargate-terraform/network.tf:23 — Resources in the AWS subnet are assigned a public IP address. Resources should not be exposed on the public internet, but should have access limited to consumers required for the function of your application. Set `map_public_ip_on_launch` to false so that resources are not publicly-accessible. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: aws-subnet-has-public-ip-address aws-fargate-terraform/network.tf:34 — Resources in the AWS subnet are assigned a public IP address. Resources should not be exposed on the public internet, but should have access limited to consumers required for the function of your application. Set `map_public_ip_on_launch` to false so that resources are not publicly-accessible. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployment/kubernetes/application-services/customer-service.yaml:35 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployment/kubernetes/application-services/order-history-service.yaml:29 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployment/kubernetes/application-services/order-service.yaml:35 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/cdc-service.yaml:35 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/kafka.yaml:34 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/mongodb.yaml:32 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/mysql.yaml:34 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/zipkin.yaml:35 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployment/kubernetes/infrastructure-services/zookeeper.yaml:34 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-true deployment/kubernetes/ingress/local-nginx-ingress.yaml:354 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. In the container `controller` this parameter is set to `true` which makes this container much more vulnerable to privelege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployment/kubernetes/ingress/local-nginx-ingress.yaml:527 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext deployment/kubernetes/ingress/local-nginx-ingress.yaml:570 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-true deployment/kubernetes/ingress/nginx-ingress.yaml:315 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. In the container `nginx-ingress-controller` this parameter is set to `true` which makes this container much more vulnerable to privelege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation deployment/kubernetes/ingress/nginx-ingress.yaml:391 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
+ 1 more in this group — see findings.md.

Recommendation — 15 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Low · ×2

Low: aws-documentdb-auditing-disabled aws-fargate-terraform/documentdb.tf:1 — Auditing is not enabled for DocumentDB. To ensure that you are able to accurately audit the usage of your DocumentDB cluster, you should enable auditing and export logs to CloudWatch. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: aws-db-instance-no-logging aws-fargate-terraform/main.tf:8 — Database instance has no logging. Missing logs can cause missing important event information.

D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1

Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.java) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.

D16 · Bus Factor · early-stage repository · ×1

early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (2 author(s) across 4 commit(s) sampled).

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1

early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (4 commit(s) sampled).

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1

No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. Emit one from whichever pipeline releases the artifact — `cosign attest` (keyless or with your release key) records the build inputs against the artifact digest and needs nothing forge-specific; publish the attestation as a release asset alongside it.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1

No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them) so consumers can verify what you built.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1

No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (the `cyclonedx-maven-plugin` bound to the package phase, the `cyclonedx-gradle-plugin` on the build, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Scanner failed to run · ×1

Scanner failed to run — not a clean result — osv-scanner exited 128 with no findings — the advisory database was likely unreachable. The scanner exited non-zero and produced no findings (typically the advisory DB was unreachable), so this is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass.

D40 · Network Egress Confinement · No network policy · ×1

No network policy — No Kubernetes NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy) found. Without one, every pod can talk to every other pod and reach out to the internet by default. Add a default-deny policy and open only the flows you need.

D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement · No seccomp profile · ×1

No seccomp profile — Workloads do not set a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault or a Localhost profile). Seccomp blocks the syscalls a container never needs, shrinking the kernel attack surface a container escape would use.

D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement · No AppArmor/SELinux confinement · ×1

No AppArmor/SELinux confinement — Workloads declare no AppArmor or SELinux profile. A mandatory-access-control profile confines what a compromised container can touch on the host, complementing seccomp's syscall filter.

D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement · No runtime threat detection · ×1

No runtime threat detection — No runtime threat-detection engine (Tetragon TracingPolicy / Falco) is committed. These observe process, file and network activity in-kernel and can alert or kill on malicious behaviour a static scan cannot catch.

D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement · No admission-control policy · ×1

No admission-control policy — No policy-enforcement gate (Kyverno / OPA Gatekeeper / PodSecurity admission) is committed. Admission control keeps workloads that violate your security baseline from ever reaching the cluster.

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1

Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.java) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report` or the Gradle `jacocoTestReport` task) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.

Info — 4 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1

Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifests (a Gradle version catalogue and a Maven POM) were found, but this pass cannot parse them for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · git history depth insufficient · ×1

git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — install a full clone for reliable trend signal.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

D35 · Change Coupling · git history depth insufficient · ×1

git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — a full clone gives reliable change-coupling.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	34	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	none (no readable dependency manifest)	—	none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment	0	—
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	275	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive .	0	—

Run 019fcf51-b2ba-7bb3-a41d-df2989a7b304 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Aledeulo/cqrs-Examples-Customers-And-Orders

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — module dependency matrix

At a glance — Code Health · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 52% · Adequate · gated by M2, M4

At a glance — Readiness · 32% · Adequate · gated by D13, P3

At a glance — Security · 41% · Weak · gated by D29, D31, D36

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 87% · Exemplary

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts