Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
alesimoes/hexagonal-clean-architecture carries serious risk (39%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Architecture (85%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (20%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (48%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage (Code Coverage).
For scale: Small (~2,592 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (85%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
65%
Adequate · gated by X5
Architecture
85%
Strong
Maturity
73%
Strong
Readiness
20% ⚠
Critical · gated by D8, D9, P1, P2, P3
Security
48%
Weak · gated by C1, C2
Domain Modelling
53%
Adequate · gated by DM1, DM2
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 20% · 46% weightSecurity 48% · 25% weightDomain Modelling 53% · 14% weightCode Health 65% · 8% weightMaturity 73% · 4% weightArchitecture 85% · 2% weight
Raise Readiness 20 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 39 → ~56.
Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 6%Plumbing 79%Generated 15%
New since the last scan (16+)
- D5 · Off the main sequence: ANM.Example.Application.Abstractions
- D30 · Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0
- D30 · High CVE: MongoDB.Driver 2.10.2
- D30 · High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 1.0.19269.1
- D30 · High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0
- D30 · High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0
- D30 · High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 11.0.2
- D30 · Medium CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 1.0.19269.1
- D30 · Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.23.0
- D30 · Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.23.0
- D30 · Medium CVE: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 5.0.0
- P2 · No structured logging
- C1 · No data-protection/encryption
- DM1 · Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate: User.Wallet source/ANM.Example.Domain/Users/User.cs
- DM1 · Aggregate holds a reference to another aggregate: Wallet.User source/ANM.Example.Domain/Wallets/Wallet.cs
- SC1 · NuGet dependencies are not locked
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €680–€3,300
| Cost to rebuild | €680–€3,300 |
| Domain complexity | High |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 39% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · 57% boilerplate · 36% straight-line · 7% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€2,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 20% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
2
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
3
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 20%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency graph
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D1 · .NET / C#
Cyclomatic Complexity
10.0
D2 · .NET / C#
Cognitive Complexity
10.0
D3 · .NET / C#
God Classes
10.0
D4 · .NET / C#
Code Duplication
10.0
D17 · .NET / C#
Explicit Debt
10.0
D18 · .NET / C#
Solution Shape
8.5
GD1 · Repo
Unfinished & placeholder code
10.0
IC1 · Repo
Incompleteness & stubs
10.0
X1 · Repo
Async correctness
10.0
X3 · Repo
Exception handling
10.0
X4 · Repo
Structured logging
10.0
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
D5 · .NET / C#
Coupling
10.0
D6 · .NET / C#
Cohesion (LCOM4)
10.0
D26 · .NET / C#
Project Cohesion
10.0
D27 · .NET / C#
Navigability
9.4
D35 · .NET / C#
Change Coupling
10.0
AX1 · Repo
Captive dependencies
10.0
AX3 · Repo
Project dependency cycles
10.0
AX4 · Repo
Dependency direction
10.0
AX5 · Repo
Architecture & structure
10.0
AX6 · Repo
Interface segregation
10.0
The Bad
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
The Bad
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Domain Modelling
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 10 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, establish a continuous integration workflow to automatically build and test every change. Next, implement structured logging and health checks to improve system observability. Then, address the lack of automated tests by resolving the identified coverage gaps and ensuring tests are properly distributed. Finally, enhance deployment reliability by adding health checks to services and ensuring image tags remain immutable for easy rollback.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. | +16.5 pts | Low | Code Coverage |
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +16.5 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +17.7 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. | +17.7 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding. | +16.5 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.). | +4.3 pts | Medium | Data Protection |
| Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable. | +4.3 pts | Medium | Access Controls |
| Resolve the 5 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. | +1.8 pts | Low | Dependency Vulnerabilities |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| source/ANM.Example.API/Startup.cs | 9.3 | Near-clean | Comment Value: misleading comment |
| README.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Documentation Quality: The README is a single file with no dedicated architecture or domain documentation (no .csproj/Domain/Repositories/API XML docs), so it cannot be trusted for implementation details such as how to implement Use Cases/Input Port/Output Port/Repository/Application Exceptions/DOMAIN Layer (DDD)/Value Objects/Entities/Events (Event Sourcing)/Domain Service/Domain Exceptions. |
| source/ANM.Example.API/Filters/SwaggerDocumentFilter.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: misleading comment |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 52 of 55 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 55 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D35AX1AX10AX3AX4AX5AX6C1C2DM1DM2DM4DM5DM6DM8GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P8S1X1X2X3X4X5
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 13 of 38 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
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D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D5 · Coupling
9 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
Off the main sequence: ANM.Example.Application.Abstractions
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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 16 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
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D8 · Code Coverage
No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.
No automated tests
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D9 · Test Distribution
No test suite found.
No tests found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D14 · License Compliance
0 of 14 packages use a banned license.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
git history depth insufficient
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D17 · Explicit Debt
0 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 2347 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0.
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D18 · Solution Shape
9 projects, 111 source files, 2347 hand-written lines of code (2347 production / 0 test), plus 461 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 25 inter-project edges.
Thin analysable surface across projects
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Thin analysable surface across projects finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D19 · Documentation Quality
The README is a single cohesive document covering the motivation and an example of implementing a Web API with EF Core/MongoDB while briefly introducing Clean/Hexagonal architecture. It explains ports, adapters, application layer connection through ports, and outlines sections like Use Cases/Input Port/Output Port/Repository/Application Exceptions/DOMAIN Layer (DDD)/Value Objects/Entities/Events (Event Sourcing)/Domain Service/Domain Exceptions/References. However it is clipped mid-sentence inside the 'Application Layer' section, so the remaining outline sections are present but not shown in the visible text; this leaves gaps about how to implement each of those components and whether the example API actually demonstrates them.
The README is a single file with no dedicated architecture or domain documentation (no .csproj/Domain/Repositories/API XML docs), so it cannot be trusted for implementation details such as how to implement Use Cases/Input Port/Output Port/Repository/Application Exceptions/DOMAIN Layer (DDD)/Value Objects/Entities/Events (Event Sourcing)/Domain Service/Domain Exceptions.README.md
XML-doc coverage: ANM.Example.Application source/ANM.Example.Application/ANM.Example.Application.csproj
What to do
- Resolve the 1 The README is a single file with no dedicated architecture or domain… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
No ADRs found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D21 · Naming Consistency
3 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
Typo in domain event name: 'Bougth' instead of 'Bought'. This typo is also present in the corresponding handler class name.
Inconsistency in interface naming: the service interface is named IWalletService, but the implementation is WalletService. While this is a common pattern, the lack of 'Service' suffix on the interface (compared to the implementation) is a minor inconsistency in the codebase's own naming conventions for abstractions.
Inconsistent naming for output models in the GetTransactions use case. One is named TransactionOutput (likely a mistake or legacy name) while the other is GetTransactionsOutput. This suggests a confusion between the output of the use case and the output of a specific transaction within it.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Typo in domain event name finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Inconsistency in interface naming finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for output models in the GetTransactions use case.… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D24 · Comment Value
2 valuable / 1 redundant across 14 sampled comments; 3 shown with locations.
misleading comment source/ANM.Example.API/Filters/SwaggerDocumentFilter.cs:31
redundant commentsource/ANM.Example.API/Startup.cs:36
What to do
- Resolve the 2 misleading comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with SwaggerDocumentFilter.cs, Startup.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Startup.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 9 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
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D27 · Navigability
97 % of calls cross a namespace and 12 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
10 vulnerable package(s): 1 critical, 5 high, 4 medium, 0 low.
High CVE: MongoDB.Driver 2.10.2
Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0
Medium CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 1.0.19269.1
What to do
- Resolve the 5 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
- Resolve the 4 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
git history depth insufficient
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX1 · Captive dependencies
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AX10 · Code composition
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AX3 · Project dependency cycles
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AX4 · Dependency direction
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AX5 · Architecture & structure
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AX6 · Interface segregation
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C1 · Data Protection
- No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.
What to do
- Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
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C2 · Access Controls
- Authorization machinery exists but no [Authorize] usage and no imperative guard calls were found at handlers.
What to do
- Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.
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DM1 · Aggregate boundaries
- `User` references the aggregate root `Wallet` directly (via `Wallet`) — hold its `WalletId` instead. — User.cs:15
- `Wallet` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `User`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Wallet.cs:20
What to do
- Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.
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DM2 · Strongly-typed ids
- `User.UserId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Int32`, in whatever form your language spells that. — User.cs:10
- `Wallet.WalletId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Int32`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Wallet.cs:18
- `Wallet.UserId` is a raw `Int32` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Int32`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Wallet.cs:19
What to do
- Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model
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DM5 · Encapsulated state
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DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
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DM8 · Value-object opportunities
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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×5) — Startup.cs:51, Startup.cs:52, TransactionConfiguration.cs:14, …
What to do
- Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add a README to the 9 of 9 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Do you agree with this assessment?
M3 · Folder & project structure
- No test surface was found — there are no tests here to separate from production code, so the folder question hasn't been reached yet.
What to do
- Start a test surface where your build system looks for one (tests/, test/, spec/, or your ecosystem's test source set) — the separation follows from putting the first tests in the right place.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M4 · Documentation accuracy
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability
- No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.
What to do
- Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P8 · Schema migrations
Do you agree with this assessment?
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
- Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X1 · Async correctness
Do you agree with this assessment?
X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 0/6 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×6) — TransactionDbContext.cs:25, StockController.cs:25, UserController.cs:26, …
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X3 · Exception handling
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X4 · Structured logging
Do you agree with this assessment?
X5 · Nullable reference types
- 0/2 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
What to do
- Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 65% | Adequate — gated by X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 85% | Strong | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 73% | Strong | Solid. |
| Readiness | 20% | Critical — gated by D8, D9, P1, P2, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 48% | Weak — gated by C1, C2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 53% | Adequate — gated by DM1, DM2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 49 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
- C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
- D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
- DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (1 aggregate(s) with Apply/When folds)
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 7 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: MongoDB.Driver 2.10.2
- High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 1.0.19269.1
- High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0
- High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0
- High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 11.0.2
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0
D8 · Code Coverage
- No automated tests
Warning — 5 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 1.0.19269.1
- Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.23.0
- Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.23.0
- Medium CVE: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 5.0.0
D5 · Coupling
- Off the main sequence: ANM.Example.Application.Abstractions
Recommendation — 14 finding(s)
D24 · Comment Value
- misleading comment source/ANM.Example.API/Filters/SwaggerDocumentFilter.cs:31
- misleading comment source/ANM.Example.API/Startup.cs:51
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D16 · Bus Factor
- early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
D18 · Solution Shape
- Thin analysable surface across projects
D19 · Documentation Quality
- The README is a single file with no dedicated architecture or domain documentation (no .csproj/Domain/Repositories/API XML docs), so it cannot be trusted for implementation details such as how to implement Use Cases/Input Port/Output Port/Repository/Application Exceptions/DOMAIN Layer (DDD)/Value Objects/Entities/Events (Event Sourcing)/Domain Service/Domain Exceptions. README.md
D20 · ADR Quality
- No ADRs found
D21 · Naming Consistency
- Typo in domain event name: 'Bougth' instead of 'Bought'. This typo is also present in the corresponding handler class name.
D21 · Naming Consistency
- Inconsistency in interface naming: the service interface is named IWalletService, but the implementation is WalletService. While this is a common pattern, the lack of 'Service' suffix on the interface (compared to the implementation) is a minor inconsistency in the codebase's own naming conventions for abstractions.
D21 · Naming Consistency
- Inconsistent naming for output models in the GetTransactions use case. One is named TransactionOutput (likely a mistake or legacy name) while the other is GetTransactionsOutput. This suggests a confusion between the output of the use case and the output of a specific transaction within it.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling
- Bounded contexts not declared
D24 · Comment Value
- redundant comment source/ANM.Example.API/Startup.cs:36
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
D9 · Test Distribution
- No tests found
Info — 12 finding(s)
D19 · Documentation Quality
- XML-doc coverage: ANM.Example.Application source/ANM.Example.Application/ANM.Example.Application.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: ANM.Example.Domain source/ANM.Example.Domain/ANM.Example.Domain.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: ANM.Example.Repositories source/ANM.Example.Repositories/ANM.Example.Repositories.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: ANM.Example.API source/ANM.Example.API/ANM.Example.API.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: ANM.Core.Application.Abstractions source/ANM.Core.Application.Abstraction/ANM.Core.Application.Abstractions.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: ANM.Example.Application.Abstractions source/ANM.Example.Application.Abstractions/ANM.Example.Application.Abstractions.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: ANM.Example.EventPublisher source/ANM.Example.EventPublisher/ANM.Example.EventPublisher.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: ANM.Core.Domain.Abstractions source/ANM.Core.Domain.Abstractions/ANM.Core.Domain.Abstractions.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: ANM.Example.Infrastructure.EventHandler source/ANM.Example.Infrastructure.EventHandler/ANM.Example.Infrastructure.EventHandler.csproj
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
- git history depth insufficient
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
D35 · Change Coupling
- git history depth insufficient
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet list source/ANM.Example.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json | 10 | artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Email — 4 field(s)
- CreateUserRequest.Email source/ANM.Example.API/UseCases/CreateUser/CreateUserRequest.cs:12
- CreateUserInput.Email source/ANM.Example.Application/UseCases/CreateUser/CreateUserInput.cs:29
- User.Email source/ANM.Example.Domain/Users/User.cs:13
- Email._email source/ANM.Example.Domain/ValueObjects/Email.cs:8