Public report — CleanArchitecture, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 03-08-2026 @ 17:18 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Alex289/CleanArchitecture

61% Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
middle

Small · 5,174 LoC · 14 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (54%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

68/71dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
148findings with an exact file:lineof 174 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
71/100dimensions across the health lenses5174 LoC · 14 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

alex289/CleanArchitecture is in a workable but fragile state (61%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.

It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Architecture (92%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (54%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (55%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version> (Release Hygiene); Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection /… (Data Protection).

For scale: Small (~5,174 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 54% · 46% weightSecurity 55% · 25% weightMaturity 64% · 14% weightCode Health 90% · 8% weightArchitecture 92% · 4% weightEvent-Driven 100% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 54 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 61 → ~65.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 10%Plumbing 43%Tests 33%Generated 14%
New since the last scan (100+)

125 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required. Showing the first 100; the full set is in the report.

  • D1 · SortQuery.FindTokens (cyclomatic 25) CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs
  • D2 · SortQuery.FindTokens (cognitive 48) CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: ApiUser.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/ApiUser.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: CacheKeyGenerator.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/CacheKeyGenerator.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: DistributedCacheExtensions.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/Extensions/DistributedCacheExtensions.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: ServiceCollectionExtension.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtension.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: TenantEventHandler.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/EventHandler/TenantEventHandler.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: UserEventHandler.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/EventHandler/UserEventHandler.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: FanoutEventHandler.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/EventHandler/Fanout/FanoutEventHandler.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: StoredDomainNotification.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/DomainNotifications/StoredDomainNotification.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: StoredDomainEvent.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/DomainEvents/StoredDomainEvent.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: FanoutEventConsumer.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/Consumers/FanoutEventConsumer.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: TenantUpdatedEventConsumer.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/Consumers/TenantUpdatedEventConsumer.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: CommandHandlerBase.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/Commands/CommandHandlerBase.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: PagedResult.cs CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/PagedResult.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: SortParameter.cs CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortParameter.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: SortQuery.cs CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: TenantService.cs CleanArchitecture.Application/Services/TenantService.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: UserService.cs CleanArchitecture.Application/Services/UserService.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: QueryableExtensions.cs CleanArchitecture.Application/Extensions/QueryableExtensions.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs CleanArchitecture.Application/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: FanoutDomainEvent.cs CleanArchitecture.Shared/Events/FanoutDomainEvent.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: BaseRepository.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/Repositories/BaseRepository.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: UserRepository.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/Repositories/UserRepository.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: DbContextExtension.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/Extensions/DbContextExtension.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: EventStore.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/EventSourcing/EventStore.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: EventStoreContext.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/EventSourcing/EventStoreContext.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: ApplicationDbContext.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/Database/ApplicationDbContext.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: DbContextUtility.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/Database/DbContextUtility.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: DomainNotificationStoreDbContext.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/Database/DomainNotificationStoreDbContext.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: EventStoreDbContext.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/Database/EventStoreDbContext.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: TenantConfiguration.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/Configurations/TenantConfiguration.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: UserConfiguration.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/Configurations/UserConfiguration.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: StoredDomainEventConfiguration.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/Configurations/EventSourcing/StoredDomainEventConfiguration.cs
  • D8 · Low coverage: StoredDomainNotificationConfiguration.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/Configurations/EventSourcing/StoredDomainNotificationConfiguration.cs
  • D8 · CRAP 650: SortQuery.FindTokens CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs
  • D8 · CRAP 42: SortQuery.GetSortParamFromSentence CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs
  • D8 · CRAP 42: SortQuery.GetSortParamFromFunctionalStyle CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs
  • D8 · CRAP 30: SortQuery.ParseQuery CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs
  • D8 · CRAP 30: SortQuery.GetSortParamFromSingleWord CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs
  • D13 · Leaked secret: signing-key CleanArchitecture.Api/appsettings.json
  • D17 · BareSuppressMessage CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/GlobalSuppressions.cs
  • D17 · BareSuppressMessage CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/GlobalSuppressions.cs
  • D17 · BareSuppressMessage CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/GlobalSuppressions.cs
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key CleanArchitecture.Api/appsettings.json
  • D28 · Secret: generic-api-key CleanArchitecture.Api/appsettings.Development.json
  • D29 · High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dependency-check.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dependency-check.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dependency-check.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dependency-check.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dependency-check.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml
  • D29 · Medium: unsigned-security-token CleanArchitecture.Api/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtension.cs
  • D29 · Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml
  • D29 · Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml
  • D29 · Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s-deployments/redis.yml
  • D29 · Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s-deployments/sql-server.yml
  • D31 · High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml
  • D31 · High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml
  • D31 · High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s-deployments/redis.yml
  • D31 · High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s-deployments/sql-server.yml
  • D31 · Medium IaC: KSV-0001 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml
  • D31 · Medium IaC: KSV-0012 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml
  • D31 · Medium IaC: KSV-0013 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml
  • D31 · Medium IaC: KSV-0104 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml
  • D31 · Medium IaC: KSV-0117 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml
  • D31 · Medium IaC: KSV-0125 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml
  • D31 · Medium IaC: KSV-0001 k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml
  • D31 · Medium IaC: KSV-0012 k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml
  • D31 · Medium IaC: KSV-0104 k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €5,900–€30,000
Cost to rebuild€5,900–€30,000 (0.1–0.2 person-years (98–311 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityVery high — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.8× (at 61% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 47% boilerplate · 35% straight-line · 18% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€18,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 54% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×2.0) — microservices, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, event-driven integration × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json.
+4.8 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning
2
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.
+3.5 pts · Low effort · ADR Quality
3
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
+6.9 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 54%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (5,174 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 54%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch CleanArchitecture.Api Api CleanArchitecture.Application Application CleanArchitecture.Api->CleanArchitecture.Application CleanArchitecture.Domain Domain CleanArchitecture.Api->CleanArchitecture.Domain CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure Infrastructure CleanArchitecture.Api->CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure CleanArchitecture.ServiceDefaults ServiceDefaults CleanArchitecture.Api->CleanArchitecture.ServiceDefaults CleanArchitecture.gRPC gRPC CleanArchitecture.Api->CleanArchitecture.gRPC CleanArchitecture.AppHost AppHost CleanArchitecture.AppHost->CleanArchitecture.Api CleanArchitecture.Application->CleanArchitecture.Domain CleanArchitecture.Proto Proto CleanArchitecture.Application->CleanArchitecture.Proto CleanArchitecture.Shared Shared CleanArchitecture.Domain->CleanArchitecture.Shared CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure->CleanArchitecture.Domain CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure->CleanArchitecture.Shared CleanArchitecture.gRPC->CleanArchitecture.Domain CleanArchitecture.gRPC->CleanArchitecture.Proto CleanArchitecture.gRPC->CleanArchitecture.Shared

Architecture — module dependency matrix

70 modules, 119 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

…pplication.ViewModels…on.ViewModels.Sorting…itecture.Domain.Enums…tecture.Shared.Events…cture.gRPC.Interfaces…e.Domain.DomainEvents…cture.Domain.Entities…ure.Domain.Interfaces….Domain.Notifications….Shared.Events.Tenant…tecture.gRPC.Contexts…ication.SortProviders…tion.ViewModels.Users…anArchitecture.Domain…cture.Domain.Commands…ture.Domain.Consumers…n.DomainNotifications…e.Domain.EventHandler…terfaces.Repositories…ecture.Infrastructure….Queries.Users.GetAll…ies.Users.GetUserById…on.ViewModels.Tenants…ture.Application.gRPC….Tenants.CreateTenant….Tenants.DeleteTenant….Tenants.UpdateTenant….Users.ChangePassword…ands.Users.CreateUser…ands.Users.DeleteUser…mands.Users.LoginUser…ands.Users.UpdateUser…frastructure.Database…pplication.Interfaces…ueries.Tenants.GetAll…Tenants.GetTenantById…ructure.EventSourcing…tructure.Repositories…cture.Api.Controllers….Application.Services…pplication.ViewModels1…on.ViewModels.Sorting2…itecture.Domain.Enums3…tecture.Shared.Events4…cture.gRPC.Interfaces5…e.Domain.DomainEvents6…cture.Domain.Entities7…ure.Domain.Interfaces8….Domain.Notifications9….Shared.Events.Tenant10…tecture.gRPC.Contexts11…ication.SortProviders12…tion.ViewModels.Users13…anArchitecture.Domain14…cture.Domain.Commands15…ture.Domain.Consumers16…n.DomainNotifications17…e.Domain.EventHandler18…terfaces.Repositories19…ecture.Infrastructure20….Queries.Users.GetAll21…ies.Users.GetUserById22…on.ViewModels.Tenants23…ture.Application.gRPC24….Tenants.CreateTenant25….Tenants.DeleteTenant26….Tenants.UpdateTenant27….Users.ChangePassword28…ands.Users.CreateUser29…ands.Users.DeleteUser30…mands.Users.LoginUser31…ands.Users.UpdateUser32…frastructure.Database33…pplication.Interfaces34…ueries.Tenants.GetAll35…Tenants.GetTenantById36…ructure.EventSourcing37…tructure.Repositories38…cture.Api.Controllers39….Application.Services40121132223111221113112221111111123121312231213121312231211212113122121425322111111112132224422423532+30 more modules (most-connected shown)

At a glance — Code Health · 90% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 92% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 64% · Adequate · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 54% · Adequate · gated by P5

At a glance — Security · 55% · Adequate · gated by D29, C1

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration50High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection40High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures4High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish a robust disaster recovery strategy by codifying backups and geo-recovery in your infrastructure as code, ensuring clear RTO/RPO documentation. Next, improve release hygiene by stamping a version in your build manifests to ensure all builds are traceable. Then, protect sensitive data at rest using encryption and manage keys in a vault, while also adding secret scanning to your CI pipeline to prevent committed secrets from entering the codebase. Finally, implement policy-based authorization to enforce access controls across your application.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json.+4.8 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.+3.5 ptsLowADR Quality
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+6.9 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.+6.9 ptsMediumRelease Hygiene
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).+6.5 ptsMediumData Protection
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.+5.5 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.+5.3 ptsMediumAccess Controls
Raise domain coverage toward 100% — cover the remaining aggregates / value objects / domain services where the business invariants and costly bugs live.+4.8 ptsMediumDomain vs controller coverage

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 52 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 15% slop · 20% mixed · 65% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml1.6SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml1.8SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
k8s-deployments/redis.yml2.0SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
CleanArchitecture.Api/appsettings.json2.3SlopSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: signing-key
.github/workflows/dotnet.yml2.3SlopStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/codeql.yml2.5SlopStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/dependency-check.yml2.5SlopStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
k8s-deployments/sql-server.yml3.0SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
.github/workflows/release.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs4.8MixedCyclomatic Complexity: SortQuery.FindTokens (cyclomatic 25)
CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/GlobalSuppressions.cs6.9MixedExplicit Debt: BareSuppressMessage
CleanArchitecture.Api/appsettings.Development.json7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
.github/dependabot.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown
CleanArchitecture.Api/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtension.cs7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: unsigned-security-token
CleanArchitecture.Api/bin/Debug/net10.0/appsettings.json7.9MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6
CleanArchitecture.Api/bin/Release/net10.0/appsettings.json7.9MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6
CleanArchitecture.IntegrationTests/bin/Debug/net10.0/appsettings.json7.9MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6
CleanArchitecture.IntegrationTests/bin/Release/net10.0/appsettings.json7.9MixedIaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6
CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/PagedResult.cs8.0Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: PagedResult.cs
CleanArchitecture.Domain/ApiUser.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Coverage: Low coverage: ApiUser.cs

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 68 of 71 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 71 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D36D39D40D41AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8AX9C1C2C4ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P6P7P8P9S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 148 of 174 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc8a2-b6fd-761b-a332-29c68943c02e.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (6): D19, D20, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was SortQuery.FindTokens at 25.

SortQuery.FindTokens (cyclomatic 25)CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs:145

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was SortQuery.FindTokens at 48.

SortQuery.FindTokens (cognitive 48)CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs:145

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 SortQuery.FindTokens (cognitive 48) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with SortQuery.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

14 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: CleanArchitecture.ServiceDefaults · ×3

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 9 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 54.0% — 34 file(s) below 50% · 5 method(s) over the CRAP-30 risk line.

Low coverage: ApiUser.cs · ×34CleanArchitecture.Domain/ApiUser.cs
CRAP 42: SortQuery.GetSortParamFromSentence · ×2CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs:77
CRAP 30: SortQuery.ParseQuery · ×2CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs:25
CRAP 650: SortQuery.FindTokensCleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs:145

What to do

  1. Resolve the 34 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs (2), ApiUser.cs, CacheKeyGenerator.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (34 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 CRAP 42 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with SortQuery.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 CRAP 30 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with SortQuery.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

130 test methods: 108 unit, 22 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 4 mock references across 130 tests.

Mock framework: NSubstitute · ×4

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky); integration: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 1 deprecated, 2 prerelease packages.

Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.EntityFrameworkCore · ×2
Deprecated: xunit
Outdated: Grpc.AspNetCore.Server.Reflection · ×2

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: signing-keyCleanArchitecture.Api/appsettings.json:15

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 59 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No source file's living knowledge is concentrated in a single author.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 4518 LoC (0.2/KLoC) → score 9.5.

BareSuppressMessage · ×3CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/GlobalSuppressions.cs:9

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

14 projects, 208 source files, 7745 hand-written lines of code (4518 production / 3227 test), plus 1411 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 38 inter-project edges.

Shell project: CleanArchitecture.ProtoCleanArchitecture.Proto/CleanArchitecture.Proto.csproj

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The single README is a solid project description covering purpose, structure, dependencies, and running steps. It names each of the four layers (Domain, Application, Infrastructure, API) and lists the technologies used (MediatR, Entity Framework Core, FluentValidation, gRPC). The document also mentions CI/GitHub workflows but clips before detailing how to run the tests or use Aspire/docker/Kubernetes, so those sections are not flagged as missing. It is clear and complete for a single-file README but lacks any architecture/design documentation (the outline lists Architecture/Docs markdown files) and no XML doc coverage.

XML-doc coverage: CleanArchitecture.Api · ×9CleanArchitecture.Api/CleanArchitecture.Api.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 4.0/10. — The single README is a solid project description covering purpose, structure, dependencies, and running steps. It names each of the four layers (Domain, Application, Infrastructure, API) and lists the technologies used (MediatR, Entity Framework Core, FluentValidation, gRPC). The document also mentions CI/GitHub workflows but clips before detailing how to run the tests or use Aspire/docker/Kubernetes, so those sections are not flagged as missing. It is clear and complete for a single-file README but lacks any architecture/design documentation (the outline lists Architecture/Docs markdown files) and no XML doc coverage.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

Inconsistent pluralization for entity types in the same namespace hierarchy. 'User' is singular, while 'Tenant' is also singular, but 'Tenants' is used in command/query names (e.g., CreateTenant vs CreateUser). More critically, the repository interface naming is inconsistent: 'IUserRepository' vs 'IRepository<TEntity>' (generic base).
Inconsistent naming for ViewModels. 'UserViewModel' follows the pattern {Entity}ViewModel, but 'TenantViewModel' also follows it. However, 'CreateUserViewModel' and 'UpdateUserViewModel' are used for commands/inputs, while 'TenantViewModel' is used for output. The inconsistency lies in the fact that some entities have specific ViewModels (User, Tenant) while others might not, or the naming convention for DTOs vs ViewModels is mixed.
Inconsistent naming for Command classes. 'CreateUserCommand' and 'CreateTenantCommand' are consistent. However, 'UpdateUserCommand' and 'UpdateTenantCommand' are also consistent. The issue is that some commands are named with the action (Create, Update, Delete) while others might be named differently (e.g., 'RegisterUserCommand' vs 'CreateUserCommand'). In this list, 'CreateUser' and 'CreateTenant' are consistent. But look at 'DeleteUser' vs 'DeleteTenant'. The inconsistency is in the namespace/structure: 'CleanArchitecture.Domain.Commands.Users' vs 'CleanArchitecture.Domain.Commands.Tenants'. This is actually consistent. Let's look deeper. 'LoginUserCommand' vs 'LoginTenantCommand'? No, there is no LoginTenantCommand. There is 'CreateTenant' and 'UpdateTenant'. The inconsistency is that 'User' has 'Create', 'Update', 'Delete', 'Login', 'ChangePassword' commands, while 'Tenant' has 'Create', 'Update', 'Delete' commands. The concept of 'Login' is missing for Tenant, but that's a feature gap, not a naming inconsistency. However, 'User' has 'ChangePassword' command, 'Tenant' does not. This is a feature gap. Let's look at 'IUser' vs 'ITenant' interfaces. 'IUser' exists. 'ITenant' is not listed but 'ITenantService' is. The interface for User is 'IUser', for Tenant it is 'ITenantService' or 'ITenantRepository'? No, 'ITenant' is not listed. 'IUser' is an interface. 'ITenant' is not. This is an inconsistency in interface naming for domain entities.
Inconsistent naming for User-related interfaces and classes. 'IUser' is an interface, but there is no 'ITenant' interface listed, only 'ITenantService' and 'ITenantRepository' (implied or missing). The domain entity is 'User', the interface is 'IUser'. For Tenant, the entity is 'Tenant', but the interface is 'ITenantService' (application layer) or 'ITenantRepository' (infrastructure). The domain layer should have 'ITenant' if it has 'IUser'.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent pluralization for entity types in the same namespace… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for ViewModels. 'UserViewModel' follows the pattern… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for Command classes. 'CreateUserCommand' and… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 valuable / 1 redundant across 42 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant commentCleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/PagedResult.cs:23

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with PagedResult.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 14 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

95 % of calls cross a namespace and 8 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×2CleanArchitecture.Api/appsettings.json:15detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.json, appsettings.Development.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

40 finding(s): 0 critical, 35 high, 5 medium, 0 low.

High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×35.github/dependabot.yml:3detected by semgrep finding
Medium: unsigned-security-token · ×5CleanArchitecture.Api/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtension.cs:82detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 35 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release.yml (14), dotnet.yml (10), codeql.yml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (35 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 5 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ServiceCollectionExtension.cs, clean-architecture.yml, rabbitmq.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable NuGet packages (direct or transitive).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security4.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 4.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

60 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 34 medium, 22 low.

High IaC: KSV-0014 · ×4k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.ymldetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 · ×34k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.ymldetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: KSV-0003 · ×12k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.ymldetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 34 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with clean-architecture.yml (8), sql-server.yml (7), redis.yml (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (34 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with clean-architecture.yml, rabbitmq.yml, redis.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 12 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with clean-architecture.yml (6), rabbitmq.yml (4), redis.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 of 16 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is CleanArchitecture.Domain/Commands/Users/LoginUser/LoginUserCommandHandler.cs.

Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 362 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md.

D40 · Network Egress Confinement6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads restrict network EGRESS with a NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy), limiting where a compromised pod can send data or reach a command-and-control server. Presence of committed egress-restricting policy, not runtime enforcement.

Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn — language-agnostic): Kubernetes workloads gate applicability; credits a NetworkPolicy / Cilium policy that restricts egress (policyTypes: [Egress] / egress rules). Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10, never a deduction — baseline misconfigs stay with D31). Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/2 network-egress controls present (network policy, egress restriction).

No network policy

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No network policy finding(s) in Network Egress Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d40_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads confine the kernel boundary — a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) plus an AppArmor/SELinux mandatory-access-control layer — shrinking the syscall attack surface a container escape would use. Presence of committed confinement config, not runtime enforcement.

Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) and an AppArmor/SELinux MAC layer. Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10); NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/2 syscall-confinement controls present (seccomp, AppArmor/SELinux).

No seccomp profile
No AppArmor/SELinux confinement

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No AppArmor/SELinux confinement finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d41_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition7.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

  • No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

  • Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
C2 · Access Controls7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.

What to do

  • Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.
C4 · Data Retention6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).

Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.

  • A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob), a documented retention period / data-expiry.

What to do

  • Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.
ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

ED3 · Event naming9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

  • `DomainNotification` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — DomainNotification.cs:6
  • `FanoutDomainEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — FanoutDomainEvent.cs:5

What to do

  • Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a README to the 14 of 14 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 4/8 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 8, 2 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

  • Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
P3 · Security & performance tooling7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

P9 · Domain vs controller coverage7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether test coverage concentrates on the domain (business rules) rather than the trivial web/controller layer — a focus check a generic tool can't make.

Method: Roslyn plus test-execution analysis: domain-layer versus trivial web/controller coverage ratio. Computed metric, deterministic.

What to do

  • Raise domain coverage toward 100% — cover the remaining aggregates / value objects / domain services where the business invariants and costly bugs live.
S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation7.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 19/36 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×17) — TenantController.cs:33, TenantController.cs:51, TenantController.cs:60, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~0.6 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 17 suppression(s) across the 28162 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health90%StrongSolid.
Architecture92%ExemplarySolid.
Maturity64%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness54%Adequate — gated by P5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security55%Adequate — gated by D29, C1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Not included — 29 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 12 domain event(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 42 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×35
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:3 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is. This configuration file has 3 such entries; one cooldown decision clears them all — reported once.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:28 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:31 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:36 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/init@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/init@v4.37.3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v4.37.3 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/init` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/init` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`. Note that `v4.37.3` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:41 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/autobuild@v4.37.3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v4.37.3 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/autobuild` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/autobuild` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`. Note that `v4.37.3` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql.yml:44 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/analyze@v4.37.3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v4.37.3 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/analyze` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/analyze` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`. Note that `v4.37.3` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dependency-check.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dependency-check.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dependency-check.yml:39 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dependency-check.yml:42 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: dependency-check/Dependency-Check_Action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `dependency-check/Dependency-Check_Action@main`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/dependency-check/Dependency-Check_Action/commits/main --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dependency-check.yml:53 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml:24 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml:27 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml:47 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml:50 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-qemu-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-qemu-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml:53 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml:56 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml:62 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml:70 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/metadata-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/metadata-action@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/metadata-action/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml:77 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/dotnet.yml:85 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: peter-evans/dockerhub-description@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `peter-evans/dockerhub-description@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/peter-evans/dockerhub-description/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:15 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:21 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: thenativeweb/get-next-version@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `thenativeweb/get-next-version@main`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/thenativeweb/get-next-version/commits/main --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:50 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: requarks/changelog-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `requarks/changelog-action@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/requarks/changelog-action/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:58 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: ncipollo/release-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `ncipollo/release-action@v1.21.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/ncipollo/release-action/commits/v1.21.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v1.21.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
  • + 10 more in this group — see findings.md.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×4
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s-deployments/redis.yml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s-deployments/sql-server.yml — Root file system is not read-only
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×2
  • Secret: generic-api-key CleanArchitecture.Api/appsettings.json:15 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key CleanArchitecture.Api/appsettings.Development.json:14 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • Leaked secret: signing-key CleanArchitecture.Api/appsettings.json:15 — signing-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Warning — 91 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×34
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0001 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml — Can elevate its own privileges
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0012 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml — Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0013 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml — Image tag ":latest" used
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0104 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml — Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0117 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml — Prevent binding to privileged ports
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0125 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml — Restrict container images to trusted registries
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0001 k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml — Can elevate its own privileges
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0012 k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml — Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0104 k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml — Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0001 k8s-deployments/redis.yml — Can elevate its own privileges
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0012 k8s-deployments/redis.yml — Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0013 k8s-deployments/redis.yml — Image tag ":latest" used
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0104 k8s-deployments/redis.yml — Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0001 k8s-deployments/sql-server.yml — Can elevate its own privileges
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0012 k8s-deployments/sql-server.yml — Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0013 k8s-deployments/sql-server.yml — Image tag ":latest" used
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0104 k8s-deployments/sql-server.yml — Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0125 k8s-deployments/sql-server.yml — Restrict container images to trusted registries
  • Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 k8s-deployments/sql-server.yml:1 — The default namespace should not be used
  • Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 k8s-deployments/sql-server.yml:14 — Minimize the admission of containers with capabilities assigned
  • Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 k8s-deployments/redis.yml:1 — The default namespace should not be used
  • Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 k8s-deployments/redis.yml:14 — Minimize the admission of containers with capabilities assigned
  • Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml:1 — The default namespace should not be used
  • Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml:19 — Minimize the admission of containers with capabilities assigned
  • Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml:1 — The default namespace should not be used
  • + 9 more in this group — see findings.md.
D8 · Code Coverage · Low coverage · ×34
  • Low coverage: ApiUser.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/ApiUser.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/52).
  • Low coverage: CacheKeyGenerator.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/CacheKeyGenerator.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/6).
  • Low coverage: DistributedCacheExtensions.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/Extensions/DistributedCacheExtensions.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/17).
  • Low coverage: ServiceCollectionExtension.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtension.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/26).
  • Low coverage: TenantEventHandler.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/EventHandler/TenantEventHandler.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/17).
  • Low coverage: UserEventHandler.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/EventHandler/UserEventHandler.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/22).
  • Low coverage: FanoutEventHandler.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/EventHandler/Fanout/FanoutEventHandler.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/16).
  • Low coverage: StoredDomainNotification.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/DomainNotifications/StoredDomainNotification.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/20).
  • Low coverage: StoredDomainEvent.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/DomainEvents/StoredDomainEvent.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/14).
  • Low coverage: FanoutEventConsumer.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/Consumers/FanoutEventConsumer.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/8).
  • Low coverage: TenantUpdatedEventConsumer.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/Consumers/TenantUpdatedEventConsumer.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/8).
  • Low coverage: CommandHandlerBase.cs CleanArchitecture.Domain/Commands/CommandHandlerBase.cs — 47.9% line coverage (23/48).
  • Low coverage: PagedResult.cs CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/PagedResult.cs — 47.8% line coverage (11/23).
  • Low coverage: SortParameter.cs CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortParameter.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/6).
  • Low coverage: SortQuery.cs CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/167).
  • Low coverage: TenantService.cs CleanArchitecture.Application/Services/TenantService.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/34).
  • Low coverage: UserService.cs CleanArchitecture.Application/Services/UserService.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/43).
  • Low coverage: QueryableExtensions.cs CleanArchitecture.Application/Extensions/QueryableExtensions.cs — 22.2% line coverage (8/36).
  • Low coverage: ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs CleanArchitecture.Application/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/18).
  • Low coverage: FanoutDomainEvent.cs CleanArchitecture.Shared/Events/FanoutDomainEvent.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/7).
  • Low coverage: BaseRepository.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/Repositories/BaseRepository.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/59).
  • Low coverage: UserRepository.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/Repositories/UserRepository.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/6).
  • Low coverage: DbContextExtension.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/Extensions/DbContextExtension.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/8).
  • Low coverage: ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/24).
  • Low coverage: EventStore.cs CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/EventSourcing/EventStore.cs — 0.0% line coverage (0/29).
  • + 9 more in this group — see findings.md.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×5
  • Medium: unsigned-security-token CleanArchitecture.Api/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtension.cs:82 — Accepting unsigned security tokens as valid security tokens allows an attacker to remove its signature and potentially forge an identity. As a fix, set RequireSignedTokens to be true.
  • Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml:35 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
  • Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml:34 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
  • Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s-deployments/redis.yml:29 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
  • Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s-deployments/sql-server.yml:29 — In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
D17 · Explicit Debt · BareSuppressMessage · ×3
  • BareSuppressMessage CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/GlobalSuppressions.cs:9 — SuppressMessage — the suppression records no reason: either it carries no justification argument at all, or one that states nothing a reader can weigh ("OK", "By design"). A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited. Write what makes this site legitimately different — the invariant that holds, the framework contract that forces the shape — or remove the suppression and fix what it hides.
  • BareSuppressMessage CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/GlobalSuppressions.cs:12 — SuppressMessage — the suppression records no reason: either it carries no justification argument at all, or one that states nothing a reader can weigh ("OK", "By design"). A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited. Write what makes this site legitimately different — the invariant that holds, the framework contract that forces the shape — or remove the suppression and fix what it hides.
  • BareSuppressMessage CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/GlobalSuppressions.cs:15 — SuppressMessage — the suppression records no reason: either it carries no justification argument at all, or one that states nothing a reader can weigh ("OK", "By design"). A suppression is a decision somebody made, and without the reason the next reader cannot tell a considered exception from an unexamined one, so it is never revisited. Write what makes this site legitimately different — the invariant that holds, the framework contract that forces the shape — or remove the suppression and fix what it hides.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×3
  • Off the main sequence: CleanArchitecture.ServiceDefaults — CleanArchitecture.ServiceDefaults: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 1 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: CleanArchitecture.Proto — CleanArchitecture.Proto: abstractness 0.11, instability 0.00, distance 0.89 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 3 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: CleanArchitecture.Shared — CleanArchitecture.Shared: abstractness 0.17, instability 0.00, distance 0.83 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Prerelease dependency · ×2
  • Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.EntityFrameworkCore — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.EntityFrameworkCore resolves to 1.0.0-beta.12, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
  • Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.GrpcNetClient — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.GrpcNetClient resolves to 1.9.0-beta.1, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
D8 · Code Coverage · CRAP 42 · ×2
  • CRAP 42: SortQuery.GetSortParamFromSentence CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs:77 — Cyclomatic 6 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
  • CRAP 42: SortQuery.GetSortParamFromFunctionalStyle CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs:121 — Cyclomatic 6 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
D8 · Code Coverage · CRAP 30 · ×2
  • CRAP 30: SortQuery.ParseQuery CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs:25 — Cyclomatic 5 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
  • CRAP 30: SortQuery.GetSortParamFromSingleWord CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs:103 — Cyclomatic 5 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · SortQuery.FindTokens (cyclomatic 25) · ×1
  • SortQuery.FindTokens (cyclomatic 25) CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs:145 — SortQuery.FindTokens has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×1
  • Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.9.3 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; migrate the reference to it.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SortQuery.FindTokens (cognitive 48) · ×1
  • SortQuery.FindTokens (cognitive 48) CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs:145 — SortQuery.FindTokens has cognitive complexity 48 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 34 floating ref(s) across 4 workflow file(s), 2 of them mutable BRANCH refs — pin those first. Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block · ×1
  • PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block — 1 workflow(s) triggered by pull_request declare no `permissions:` block (dotnet.yml) and so run with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, while 2 sibling workflows in the same repository are already scoped. Pull-request runs build the least-trusted code in the repository; give each of these workflows its own least-privilege block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of the workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D8 · Code Coverage · CRAP 650 · ×1
  • CRAP 650: SortQuery.FindTokens CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Sorting/SortQuery.cs:145 — Cyclomatic 25 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
Recommendation — 25 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×12
  • Low IaC: KSV-0003 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml — Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
  • Low IaC: KSV-0011 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml — CPU not limited
  • Low IaC: KSV-0015 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml — CPU requests not specified
  • Low IaC: KSV-0016 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml — Memory requests not specified
  • Low IaC: KSV-0018 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml — Memory not limited
  • Low IaC: KSV-0110 k8s-deployments/clean-architecture.yml — Workloads in the default namespace
  • Low IaC: KSV-0003 k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml — Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
  • Low IaC: KSV-0011 k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml — CPU not limited
  • Low IaC: KSV-0018 k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml — Memory not limited
  • Low IaC: KSV-0110 k8s-deployments/rabbitmq.yml — Workloads in the default namespace
  • Low IaC: KSV-0003 k8s-deployments/redis.yml — Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
  • Low IaC: KSV-0011 k8s-deployments/redis.yml — CPU not limited
D18 · Solution Shape · Shell project · ×1
  • Shell project: CleanArchitecture.Proto CleanArchitecture.Proto/CleanArchitecture.Proto.csproj — `CleanArchitecture.Proto` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent pluralization for entity types in the same namespace hierarchy. 'User' is singular, while 'Tenant' is also singular, but 'Tenants' is used in command/query names (e.g., CreateTenant vs CreateUser). More critically, the repository interface naming is inconsistent · ×1
  • Inconsistent pluralization for entity types in the same namespace hierarchy. 'User' is singular, while 'Tenant' is also singular, but 'Tenants' is used in command/query names (e.g., CreateTenant vs CreateUser). More critically, the repository interface naming is inconsistent: 'IUserRepository' vs 'IRepository<TEntity>' (generic base). — Standardize on singular nouns for domain entities and their corresponding repositories/interfaces. Ensure all specific repositories follow the pattern 'I{EntityName}Repository' or use a consistent generic base. (symbols: CleanArchitecture.Domain.Entities.User, CleanArchitecture.Domain.Entities.Tenant)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent naming for ViewModels. 'UserViewModel' follows the pattern {Entity}ViewModel, but 'TenantViewModel' also follows it. However, 'CreateUserViewModel' and 'UpdateUserViewModel' are used for commands/inputs, while 'TenantViewModel' is used for output. The inconsistency lies in the fact that some entities have specific ViewModels (User, Tenant) while others might not, or the naming convention for DTOs vs ViewModels is mixed. · ×1
  • Inconsistent naming for ViewModels. 'UserViewModel' follows the pattern {Entity}ViewModel, but 'TenantViewModel' also follows it. However, 'CreateUserViewModel' and 'UpdateUserViewModel' are used for commands/inputs, while 'TenantViewModel' is used for output. The inconsistency lies in the fact that some entities have specific ViewModels (User, Tenant) while others might not, or the naming convention for DTOs vs ViewModels is mixed. — Ensure all domain entities have a corresponding {EntityName}ViewModel if they are exposed to the API/gRPC layer. If 'Tenant' is an entity, it should have a 'TenantViewModel' (which it does), but 'User' also has 'UserViewModel'. The inconsistency is subtle: 'User' and 'Tenant' are treated as first-class citizens with ViewModels, while other entities might not be. Check if all entities have a ViewModel. (symbols: CleanArchitecture.Application.ViewModels.Users.UserViewModel, CleanArchitecture.Application.ViewModels.Tenants.TenantViewModel)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent naming for Command classes. 'CreateUserCommand' and 'CreateTenantCommand' are consistent. However, 'UpdateUserCommand' and 'UpdateTenantCommand' are also consistent. The issue is that some commands are named with the action (Create, Update, Delete) while others might be named differently (e.g., 'RegisterUserCommand' vs 'CreateUserCommand'). In this list, 'CreateUser' and 'CreateTenant' are consistent. But look at 'DeleteUser' vs 'DeleteTenant'. The inconsistency is in the namespace/structure · ×1
  • Inconsistent naming for Command classes. 'CreateUserCommand' and 'CreateTenantCommand' are consistent. However, 'UpdateUserCommand' and 'UpdateTenantCommand' are also consistent. The issue is that some commands are named with the action (Create, Update, Delete) while others might be named differently (e.g., 'RegisterUserCommand' vs 'CreateUserCommand'). In this list, 'CreateUser' and 'CreateTenant' are consistent. But look at 'DeleteUser' vs 'DeleteTenant'. The inconsistency is in the namespace/structure: 'CleanArchitecture.Domain.Commands.Users' vs 'CleanArchitecture.Domain.Commands.Tenants'. This is actually consistent. Let's look deeper. 'LoginUserCommand' vs 'LoginTenantCommand'? No, there is no LoginTenantCommand. There is 'CreateTenant' and 'UpdateTenant'. The inconsistency is that 'User' has 'Create', 'Update', 'Delete', 'Login', 'ChangePassword' commands, while 'Tenant' has 'Create', 'Update', 'Delete' commands. The concept of 'Login' is missing for Tenant, but that's a feature gap, not a naming inconsistency. However, 'User' has 'ChangePassword' command, 'Tenant' does not. This is a feature gap. Let's look at 'IUser' vs 'ITenant' interfaces. 'IUser' exists. 'ITenant' is not listed but 'ITenantService' is. The interface for User is 'IUser', for Tenant it is 'ITenantService' or 'ITenantRepository'? No, 'ITenant' is not listed. 'IUser' is an interface. 'ITenant' is not. This is an inconsistency in interface naming for domain entities. — (symbols: CleanArchitecture.Domain.Commands.Users.CreateUser.CreateUserCommand, CleanArchitecture.Domain.Commands.Tenants.CreateTenant.CreateTenantCommand)
D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent naming for User-related interfaces and classes. 'IUser' is an interface, but there is no 'ITenant' interface listed, only 'ITenantService' and 'ITenantRepository' (implied or missing). The domain entity is 'User', the interface is 'IUser'. For Tenant, the entity is 'Tenant', but the interface is 'ITenantService' (application layer) or 'ITenantRepository' (infrastructure). The domain layer should have 'ITenant' if it has 'IUser'. · ×1
  • Inconsistent naming for User-related interfaces and classes. 'IUser' is an interface, but there is no 'ITenant' interface listed, only 'ITenantService' and 'ITenantRepository' (implied or missing). The domain entity is 'User', the interface is 'IUser'. For Tenant, the entity is 'Tenant', but the interface is 'ITenantService' (application layer) or 'ITenantRepository' (infrastructure). The domain layer should have 'ITenant' if it has 'IUser'. — Add 'ITenant' interface in the domain layer to match 'IUser'. (symbols: CleanArchitecture.Domain.Interfaces.IUser, CleanArchitecture.Domain.Entities.User)
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 4518 LoC across 14 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1
  • redundant comment CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/PagedResult.cs:23 — "Used by json deserializer" — delete - 'used by' restates the ctor's role
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
  • Further orphaned files (smaller) — 3 of 16 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: CleanArchitecture.Domain/Commands/Users/LoginUser/LoginUserCommandHandler.cs, CleanArchitecture.Api/Extensions/ServiceCollectionExtension.cs, CleanArchitecture.Domain/ApiUser.cs. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
D40 · Network Egress Confinement · No network policy · ×1
  • No network policy — No Kubernetes NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy) found. Without one, every pod can talk to every other pod and reach out to the internet by default. Add a default-deny policy and open only the flows you need.
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement · No seccomp profile · ×1
  • No seccomp profile — Workloads do not set a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault or a Localhost profile). Seccomp blocks the syscalls a container never needs, shrinking the kernel attack surface a container escape would use.
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement · No AppArmor/SELinux confinement · ×1
  • No AppArmor/SELinux confinement — Workloads declare no AppArmor or SELinux profile. A mandatory-access-control profile confines what a compromised container can touch on the host, complementing seccomp's syscall filter.
Info — 16 finding(s)
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×9
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanArchitecture.Api CleanArchitecture.Api/CleanArchitecture.Api.csproj — CleanArchitecture.Api: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/41).
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanArchitecture.Application CleanArchitecture.Application/CleanArchitecture.Application.csproj — CleanArchitecture.Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/111).
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanArchitecture.Domain CleanArchitecture.Domain/CleanArchitecture.Domain.csproj — CleanArchitecture.Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/247).
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure/CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure.csproj — CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure: 12 % XML-doc coverage (9/72).
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanArchitecture.gRPC CleanArchitecture.gRPC/CleanArchitecture.gRPC.csproj — CleanArchitecture.gRPC: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/19).
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanArchitecture.Proto CleanArchitecture.Proto/CleanArchitecture.Proto.csproj — CleanArchitecture.Proto: 100 % XML-doc coverage (0/0).
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanArchitecture.Shared CleanArchitecture.Shared/CleanArchitecture.Shared.csproj — CleanArchitecture.Shared: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/30).
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanArchitecture.AppHost CleanArchitecture.AppHost/CleanArchitecture.AppHost.csproj — CleanArchitecture.AppHost: 100 % XML-doc coverage (0/0).
  • XML-doc coverage: CleanArchitecture.ServiceDefaults CleanArchitecture.ServiceDefaults/CleanArchitecture.ServiceDefaults.csproj — CleanArchitecture.ServiceDefaults: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/7).
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×4
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — CleanArchitecture.Application.Tests references NSubstitute.
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — CleanArchitecture.Domain.Tests references NSubstitute.
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — CleanArchitecture.Infrastructure.Tests references NSubstitute.
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — CleanArchitecture.gRPC.Tests references NSubstitute.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×2
  • Outdated: Grpc.AspNetCore.Server.Reflection — Grpc.AspNetCore.Server.Reflection 2.80.0 → 2.83.0 available (referenced by CleanArchitecture.Api).
  • Outdated: Grpc.AspNetCore — Grpc.AspNetCore 2.80.0 → 2.83.0 available (referenced by CleanArchitecture.Proto).
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .2artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .40artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list CleanArchitecture.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json0artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .60artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.0

Run 019fc8a2-b6fd-761b-a332-29c68943c02e · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 33 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Name — 21 field(s)
  • CreateUserViewModel.FirstName CleanArchitecture.Application/viewmodels/Users/CreateUserViewModel.cs:7
  • CreateUserViewModel.LastName CleanArchitecture.Application/viewmodels/Users/CreateUserViewModel.cs:8
  • UpdateUserViewModel.FirstName CleanArchitecture.Application/viewmodels/Users/UpdateUserViewModel.cs:9
  • UpdateUserViewModel.LastName CleanArchitecture.Application/viewmodels/Users/UpdateUserViewModel.cs:10
  • UserViewModel.FirstName CleanArchitecture.Application/viewmodels/Users/UserViewModel.cs:12
  • UserViewModel.LastName CleanArchitecture.Application/viewmodels/Users/UserViewModel.cs:13
  • CreateUserCommand.FirstName CleanArchitecture.Domain/Commands/Users/CreateUser/CreateUserCommand.cs:12
  • CreateUserCommand.LastName CleanArchitecture.Domain/Commands/Users/CreateUser/CreateUserCommand.cs:13
  • UpdateUserCommand.FirstName CleanArchitecture.Domain/Commands/Users/UpdateUser/UpdateUserCommand.cs:13
  • UpdateUserCommand.LastName CleanArchitecture.Domain/Commands/Users/UpdateUser/UpdateUserCommand.cs:14
  • User.FirstName CleanArchitecture.Domain/Constants/MaxLengths.cs:8
  • User.LastName CleanArchitecture.Domain/Constants/MaxLengths.cs:9
  • User.FirstName CleanArchitecture.Domain/Entities/User.cs:9
  • User.LastName CleanArchitecture.Domain/Entities/User.cs:10
  • User.FullName CleanArchitecture.Domain/Entities/User.cs:16
  • User.EmptyFirstName CleanArchitecture.Domain/Errors/DomainErrorCodes.cs:9
  • User.EmptyLastName CleanArchitecture.Domain/Errors/DomainErrorCodes.cs:10
  • User.FirstNameExceedsMaxLength CleanArchitecture.Domain/Errors/DomainErrorCodes.cs:12
  • User.LastNameExceedsMaxLength CleanArchitecture.Domain/Errors/DomainErrorCodes.cs:13
  • UserViewModel.FirstName CleanArchitecture.Shared/Users/UserViewModel.cs:8
  • UserViewModel.LastName CleanArchitecture.Shared/Users/UserViewModel.cs:9
Email — 12 field(s)
  • LoginUserViewModel.Email CleanArchitecture.Application/ViewModels/Users/LoginUserViewModel.cs:3
  • CreateUserViewModel.Email CleanArchitecture.Application/viewmodels/Users/CreateUserViewModel.cs:6
  • UpdateUserViewModel.Email CleanArchitecture.Application/viewmodels/Users/UpdateUserViewModel.cs:8
  • UserViewModel.Email CleanArchitecture.Application/viewmodels/Users/UserViewModel.cs:11
  • CreateUserCommand.Email CleanArchitecture.Domain/Commands/Users/CreateUser/CreateUserCommand.cs:11
  • LoginUserCommand.Email CleanArchitecture.Domain/Commands/Users/LoginUser/LoginUserCommand.cs:11
  • UpdateUserCommand.Email CleanArchitecture.Domain/Commands/Users/UpdateUser/UpdateUserCommand.cs:12
  • User.Email CleanArchitecture.Domain/Constants/MaxLengths.cs:7
  • User.Email CleanArchitecture.Domain/Entities/User.cs:8
  • User.EmailExceedsMaxLength CleanArchitecture.Domain/Errors/DomainErrorCodes.cs:11
  • User.InvalidEmail CleanArchitecture.Domain/Errors/DomainErrorCodes.cs:14
  • UserViewModel.Email CleanArchitecture.Shared/Users/UserViewModel.cs:7

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md