SaaS double-entry accounting engine, .NET 9, multi-tenant
Public report — FinLedger, published 20 Jun 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 20-06-2026 @ 05:18 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Amirhosein2015/FinLedger

No regression
45% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
upper third — near Adequate

Small · 2,041 LoC · 14 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (29%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

84/84dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0
98findings with an exact file:lineof 173 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
84/112dimensions across the health lenses2041 LoC · 14 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

amirhosein2015/FinLedger carries serious risk (45%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Code Health (78%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (29%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Accessibility (47%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage); Raise domain coverage toward 100% (Domain vs controller coverage).

For scale: Small (~2,041 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 29% · 45% weightAccessibility 47% · 25% weightSecurity 64% · 14% weightMaturity 72% · 8% weightArchitecture 73% · 4% weightDomain Modelling 74% · 2% weightCode Health 78% · 1% weightEvent-Driven 100% · 1% weight

Raise Readiness 29 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 45 → ~59.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 8%Plumbing 56%Tests 11%Generated 25%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €980–€4,800
Cost to rebuild€980–€4,800 (0.1 person-years (16–51 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityVery high — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 45% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 47% boilerplate · 40% straight-line · 13% branching logic
Dead frontend code~44 LoC unreachable (2 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€2,900 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 29% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×1.8) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+12.3 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene
2
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
+8.7 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene
3
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
+14.2 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 29%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (2,041 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 29%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+12.0 pts/run over 4 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Evidence: trajectory: +12.0 pts/run over 4 runs

Trajectory

Where this codebase is heading — something a one-shot snapshot cannot show. 45 ▲ 2 over 4 runs.

025507510019 Junnow
OverallCode HealthArchitectureMaturityReadinessSecurityDomain ModellingAccessibility

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

arch Modules.Identity.Api Modules.Identity.Api ctx:Modules.Identity Modules.Identity Application · Domain · Infrastructure Modules.Identity.Api->ctx:Modules.Identity Modules.Ledger.Api Modules.Ledger.Api ctx:BuildingBlocks BuildingBlocks Application · Domain · Infrastructure Modules.Ledger.Api->ctx:BuildingBlocks Modules.Ledger.Api->ctx:Modules.Identity ctx:Modules.Ledger Modules.Ledger Application · Domain · Infrastructure Modules.Ledger.Api->ctx:Modules.Ledger Modules.Ledger.Tests.Integration Modules.Ledger.Tests.Integration Modules.Ledger.Tests.Unit Modules.Ledger.Tests.Unit Tests.Architecture Tests.Architecture ctx:Modules.Identity->ctx:BuildingBlocks ctx:Modules.Ledger->ctx:BuildingBlocks

At a glance — Code Health · 78% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 73% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 72% · Strong

At a glance — Readiness · 29% · Weak · gated by R4, P3, P5

At a glance — Security · 64% · Adequate · gated by D33, D38

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 74% · Adequate · gated by DM2

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Accessibility · 47% · Weak · gated by AC2

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components51High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration16High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures2High / Critical

Roadmap

Top priorities: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery; Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry); Raise domain coverage toward 100% — cover the remaining aggregates / value objects / domain services where the business invariants and costly bugs live.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+12.3 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+8.7 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+14.2 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+14.2 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Raise domain coverage toward 100% — cover the remaining aggregates / value objects / domain services where the business invariants and costly bugs live.+12.9 ptsMediumDomain vs controller coverage
Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.+12.2 ptsMediumTooling
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+11.2 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.+10.3 ptsMediumIdempotency

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 15 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 13% slop · 7% mixed · 80% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yaml0.0SlopIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
client/package-lock.json0.0SlopJS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [CVE redacted]
deploy/k8s/api-config.yaml7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
tests/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Tests.Unit/UnitTest1.cs8.0Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: Test1
src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Infrastructure/BackgroundJobs/ProcessOutboxMessagesJob.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application/Accounts/GetAccountBalances/GetAccountBalancesQuery.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: GetAccountBalancesQueryHandler
src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application/Accounts/GetAuditLogs/GetAuditLogsQuery.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: GetAuditLogsQueryHandler
src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application/Accounts/SeedDemoData/SeedDemoDataCommand.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: SeedDemoDataCommandHandler
src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application/Entries/CreateJournalEntry/CreateJournalEntryCommandHandler.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: CreateJournalEntryCommandHandler
src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application/Entries/PostJournalEntry/PostJournalEntryCommand.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: PostJournalEntryCommandHandler
src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application/Entries/ReverseJournalEntry/ReverseJournalEntryCommand.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: ReverseJournalEntryCommandHandler
src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Application/Users/AssignTenantRole/AssignTenantRoleCommand.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: AssignTenantRoleCommandHandler
src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Application/Users/Login/LoginCommand.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: LoginCommandHandler
src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Application/Users/RegisterUser/RegisterUserCommand.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: RegisterUserCommandHandler
Dockerfile9.3Near-cleanIaC & Container Security: Low IaC: DS-0026

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 84 of 84 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); none rely on LLM judgement. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 84 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D23D26D27D28D29D30D31D33D34D35D38D39AC2AC3AC6AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX7AX8AX9C1C2C3DM1DM2DM4DM5DM6DM8ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3P1P2P3P4P5P8P9R1R10R2R3R4R6R7R8R9S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 98 of 173 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019ee377-6eaa-79ea-b123-acdb045aec5f.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling: Boundary leakage is detected from type references across detected contexts — leaks that flow through primitives, serialization or shared infrastructure may not surface as a typed reference.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct, and component-wrapped fields (e.g. a <TextField>) are skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — only literal inline colours and in-repo <style>-block CSS are read; external stylesheets, CSS-in-JS, computed/runtime/theme colour, and image contrast are all out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the markup itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (1): ED5. For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

14 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Domain · ×3

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 7 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 40.3%, branch coverage 34.2%.

What to do

  1. Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

11 test methods: 10 unit, 1 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

Unit tests
Integration tests
BDD tests
E2E tests

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D10 · Test Quality7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 1 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 11 tests.

No assertions: Test1tests/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Tests.Unit/UnitTest1.cs:5
Mock framework: NSubstitute

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with UnitTest1.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky); integration: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

50 outdated, 1 vulnerable, 4 deprecated packages.

Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol
Deprecated: Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL · ×4
Outdated: StackExchange.Redis · ×50

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  3. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 41 packages use a banned license.

Licenses scanned

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Api/Program.cs, held by amirhoseinmomeni2015@gmail.com.

Knowledge silo · ×4src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Api/Program.cs
Off-boarding risk: amirhoseinmomeni2015@gmail.com

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 Knowledge silo finding(s) in Bus Factor — start with LedgerDbContext.cs, Program.cs, ReportsController.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 deducted debt markers + 12 dead symbols across 1577 LoC (0.9/KLoC) → score 8.3.

Dead code: GetAccountBalancesQueryHandler · ×9src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application/Accounts/GetAccountBalances/GetAccountBalancesQuery.cs:12
TodoCommentsrc/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Infrastructure/BackgroundJobs/ProcessOutboxMessagesJob.cs:43
Justified suppression · ×2src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Infrastructure/Persistence/LedgerDbContext.cs:118

What to do

  1. Resolve the 9 Dead code finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with AssignTenantRoleCommand.cs, CreateJournalEntryCommandHandler.cs, GetAccountBalancesQuery.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with ProcessOutboxMessagesJob.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

14 projects, 79 .cs files, 1918 hand-written lines of code (1577 production / 341 test), plus 779 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 56 inter-project edges.

FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Domain (Production)src/BuildingBlocks/FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Domain/FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Domain.csproj
FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Infrastructure (Production)src/BuildingBlocks/FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Infrastructure/FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Infrastructure.csproj
FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Domain (Production)src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Domain/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Domain.csproj
FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application (Production)src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application.csproj
FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Infrastructure (Production)src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Infrastructure/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Infrastructure.csproj

+ 9 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether domain types (IDs, enums, value objects) leak across bounded-context boundaries.

Method: Cross-context domain-type leakage via Roslyn structural classification (strongly-typed IDs / value objects) over every public surface. Exhaustive, deterministic, type-level aggregate-boundary check.

Coverage: Bounded contexts derived from NAMESPACE prefix (or graph-inferred where available); cross-boundary domain-type leakage then checked exhaustively over every public member of every type.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No domain types leak across context boundaries (3 contexts).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d23_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 14 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

99 % of calls cross a namespace and 4 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-keydeploy/k8s/api-config.yaml:18detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 0 low.

Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.11.2 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

16 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 5 medium, 8 low.

High IaC: KSV-0014 · ×3deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yamldetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 · ×5deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yamldetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×8Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with api-deployment.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 8 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with api-deployment.yaml (7), Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 5 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with api-deployment.yaml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

26 finding(s): 0 critical, 13 high, 12 medium, 1 low.

High CVE: [CVE redacted] · ×13client/package-lock.jsondetected by trivy finding
Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] · ×12client/package-lock.jsondetected by trivy finding
Low CVE: [CVE redacted]client/package-lock.jsondetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 13 High CVE finding(s) in JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (13). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 12 Medium CVE finding(s) in JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (12). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Low CVE finding(s) in JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 5 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Api/Infrastructure/Reports/TrialBalancePdfGenerator.cs.

Orphaned knowledgesrc/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Api/Infrastructure/Reports/TrialBalancePdfGenerator.cs

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with TrialBalancePdfGenerator.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.1 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

23 finding(s): 0 critical, 13 high, 9 medium, 1 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×13client/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×9client/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted]client/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 13 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (13). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Low CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D39 · IL Efficiency9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 of 743 methods have an oversized IL body.

Oversized method: Program.<Main>$ · ×2
IL measured

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC2 · Forms & labels2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, fieldsets have a legend, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×5) — LoginPage.tsx:27, LoginPage.tsx:28, CreateEntryPage.tsx:65, …
  • This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×2) — CreateEntryPage.tsx:84, DashboardPage.tsx:35

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language and title, expose a main landmark and a sane heading order, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

  • No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — index.html:2

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible, never computed or runtime colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX7 · Slice cohesion4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.

Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.

  • `CreateAccountCommandHandler` (slice 'FinLedger.Modules.Ledger') depends on `IDistributedLock` from slice 'FinLedger.BuildingBlocks'. — CreateAccountCommandHandler.cs:9

What to do

  • Keep slices independent: share cross-slice needs via an explicit contract/shared-kernel, not direct references between slices.
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 · Data Protection4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

C3 · Audit Trail10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

DM2 · Strongly-typed ids3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

  • `AccountCreatedDomainEvent.AccountId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct AccountId { Guid Value }`). — AccountCreatedDomainEvent.cs:5
  • `AuditLog.UserId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct UserId { Guid Value }`). — AuditLog.cs:8
  • `AuditLog.EntityId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct EntityId { Guid Value }`). — AuditLog.cs:11

What to do

  • Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

  • `AggregateRoot` is an aggregate/entity with 1 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Entity.cs:20

What to do

  • Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

ED3 · Event naming7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

  • `AccountCreatedDomainEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — AccountCreatedDomainEvent.cs:5

What to do

  • Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED5 · Idempotency7.4 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

  • `CreateAccount.CreateAccountCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — CreateAccountCommandHandler.cs:20
  • `SeedDemoData.SeedDemoDataCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — SeedDemoDataCommand.cs:16
  • `CreateJournalEntry.CreateJournalEntryCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) — CreateJournalEntryCommandHandler.cs:17

What to do

  • Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a README to the 14 of 14 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 2/7 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

P9 · Domain vs controller coverage6.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether test coverage concentrates on the domain (business rules) rather than the trivial web/controller layer — a focus check a generic tool can't make.

Method: Roslyn plus test-execution analysis: domain-layer versus trivial web/controller coverage ratio. Computed metric, deterministic.

What to do

  • Raise domain coverage toward 100% — cover the remaining aggregates / value objects / domain services where the business invariants and costly bugs live.
R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

R10 · Code Duplication7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • client/src/modules/ledger/pages/CreateEntryPage.tsx:91 · client/src/modules/ledger/pages/CreateEntryPage.tsx:98 — CreateEntryPage.tsx:91
  • client/src/modules/ledger/pages/CreateEntryPage.tsx:110 · client/src/modules/ledger/pages/DashboardPage.tsx:29 — CreateEntryPage.tsx:110
  • client/src/modules/identity/pages/LoginPage.tsx:16 · client/src/modules/ledger/pages/CreateEntryPage.tsx:54 — LoginPage.tsx:16

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — CreateEntryPage.tsx, DashboardPage.tsx, LoginPage.tsx, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✗ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✓

What to do

  • Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 1 application, 2 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (1 application, 2 tooling, 0 test roots considered) (×2) — models.ts, models.ts

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Declared in client/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 13/26 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×13) — LedgerDbContext.cs:101, AccountsController.cs:21, EntriesController.cs:25, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~1.1 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 10 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria — partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health78%StrongSolid.
Architecture73%StrongSolid.
Maturity72%StrongSolid.
Readiness29%Weak — gated by R4, P3, P5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security64%Adequate — gated by D33, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling74%Adequate — gated by DM2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Accessibility47%Weak — gated by AC2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 23 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Not applicable
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — Not applicable
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — Not applicable
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — No checkable ADRs to assess
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
  • DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • M4 Documentation accuracy — LLM not available — accuracy is the Tier-2 layer and needs a reachable model.
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • R5 Dependency Freshness — npm is not installed — dependency freshness not measured; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 32 finding(s)
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×13
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • High CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — form-data: [CVE redacted]
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×13
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — flatted: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — flatted: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — minimatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — minimatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — minimatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — minimatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — minimatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — minimatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — picomatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — rollup: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — vite: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — vite: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — vite: [GHSA redacted]
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×3
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yaml — Default security context configured
D10 · Test Quality · No assertions · ×1
  • No assertions: Test1 tests/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Tests.Unit/UnitTest1.cs:5 — Test method has no assertions — it may not test anything.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×1
  • Vulnerable: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.11.2 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×1
  • Secret: generic-api-key deploy/k8s/api-config.yaml:18 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Warning — 50 finding(s)
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×12
  • Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — follow-redirects: [GHSA redacted]
D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×9
  • Dead code: GetAccountBalancesQueryHandler src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application/Accounts/GetAccountBalances/GetAccountBalancesQuery.cs:12 — NamedType GetAccountBalancesQueryHandler — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: GetAuditLogsQueryHandler src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application/Accounts/GetAuditLogs/GetAuditLogsQuery.cs:10 — NamedType GetAuditLogsQueryHandler — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: SeedDemoDataCommandHandler src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application/Accounts/SeedDemoData/SeedDemoDataCommand.cs:11 — NamedType SeedDemoDataCommandHandler — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: CreateJournalEntryCommandHandler src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application/Entries/CreateJournalEntry/CreateJournalEntryCommandHandler.cs:8 — NamedType CreateJournalEntryCommandHandler — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: PostJournalEntryCommandHandler src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application/Entries/PostJournalEntry/PostJournalEntryCommand.cs:10 — NamedType PostJournalEntryCommandHandler — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: ReverseJournalEntryCommandHandler src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application/Entries/ReverseJournalEntry/ReverseJournalEntryCommand.cs:10 — NamedType ReverseJournalEntryCommandHandler — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: AssignTenantRoleCommandHandler src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Application/Users/AssignTenantRole/AssignTenantRoleCommand.cs:10 — NamedType AssignTenantRoleCommandHandler — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: LoginCommandHandler src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Application/Users/Login/LoginCommand.cs:9 — NamedType LoginCommandHandler — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: RegisterUserCommandHandler src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Application/Users/RegisterUser/RegisterUserCommand.cs:10 — NamedType RegisterUserCommandHandler — no references found in solution.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×9
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — ajv: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — brace-expansion: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — brace-expansion: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — follow-redirects: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — js-yaml: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — picomatch: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — postcss: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — vite: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — vite: [GHSA redacted]
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×5
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0001 deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yaml — Can elevate its own privileges
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0012 deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yaml — Runs as root user
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0013 deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yaml — Image tag ":latest" used
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0104 deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yaml — Seccomp policies disabled
  • Medium IaC: KSV-0125 deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yaml — Restrict container images to trusted registries
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×4
  • Deprecated: Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL — Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL 9.0.0 — CriticalBugs
  • Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.9.2 — Legacy xunit.v3 >= 0.0.0
  • Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.9.2 — Legacy xunit.v3 >= 0.0.0
  • Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.9.3 — Legacy xunit.v3 >= 0.0.0
D16 · Bus Factor · Knowledge silo · ×4
  • Knowledge silo src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Api/Program.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by amirhoseinmomeni2015@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Infrastructure/Persistence/LedgerDbContext.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by amirhoseinmomeni2015@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Api/Infrastructure/Reports/TrialBalancePdfGenerator.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by amirhoseinmomeni2015@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Api/Controllers/ReportsController.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by amirhoseinmomeni2015@gmail.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×3
  • Off the main sequence: FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Domain — FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Domain: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.14, distance 0.86 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Domain — FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Domain: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.14, distance 0.86 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Infrastructure — FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Infrastructure: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.20, distance 0.80 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×2
  • Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.11.2 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.11.2 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Api 1.11.2 — OpenTelemetry.Api 1.11.2 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×1
  • TodoComment src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Infrastructure/BackgroundJobs/ProcessOutboxMessagesJob.cs:43 — // TODO: Here we would publish to RabbitMQ using MassTransit — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned knowledge · ×1
  • Orphaned knowledge src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Api/Infrastructure/Reports/TrialBalancePdfGenerator.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Recommendation — 18 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×8
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: KSV-0003 deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yaml — Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all
  • Low IaC: KSV-0004 deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yaml — Default capabilities: some containers do not drop any
  • Low IaC: KSV-0020 deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yaml — Runs with UID <= 10000
  • Low IaC: KSV-0021 deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yaml — Runs with GID <= 10000
  • Low IaC: KSV-0030 deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yaml — Runtime/Default Seccomp profile not set
  • Low IaC: KSV-0106 deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yaml — Container capabilities must only include NET_BIND_SERVICE
  • Low IaC: KSV-0110 deploy/k8s/api-deployment.yaml — Workloads in the default namespace
D39 · IL Efficiency · Oversized method · ×2
  • Oversized method: Program.<Main>$ — Program.<Main>$ compiles to 378 IL instructions — too large to inline; consider splitting the hot path.
  • Oversized method: FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Infrastructure.BackgroundJobs.ProcessOutboxMessagesJob/<ExecuteAsync>d__3.MoveNext — FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Infrastructure.BackgroundJobs.ProcessOutboxMessagesJob/<ExecuteAsync>d__3.MoveNext compiles to 281 IL instructions — too large to inline; consider splitting the hot path.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: amirhoseinmomeni2015@gmail.com — If amirhoseinmomeni2015@gmail.com becomes unavailable, 4 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner — the largest single-person knowledge concentration (weighted toward the domain core). Pair, review, or document these before any departure.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) · Not applicable · ×1
  • Not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×1
  • Low CVE: [CVE redacted] client/package-lock.json — axios: [CVE redacted]
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Not applicable · ×1
  • Not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy · Not applicable · ×1
  • Not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×1
  • Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] client/package-lock.json — @babel/core: [GHSA redacted]
D7 · Architectural Integrity · No checkable ADRs to assess · ×1
  • No checkable ADRs to assess — No architecture decision records were found and the project graph is acyclic, so architectural integrity could not be assessed. Add ADRs (with `enforcement: analyzer|test`) to make the architecture's rules checkable.
Info — 73 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×50
  • Outdated: StackExchange.Redis — StackExchange.Redis 2.10.1 → 3.0.0 available.
  • Outdated: Dapper — Dapper 2.1.35 → 2.1.79 available.
  • Outdated: FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions — FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions 11.11.0 → 12.1.1 available.
  • Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 12.4.1 → 14.1.0 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 9.0.0 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Relational — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Relational 9.0.0 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Dapper — Dapper 2.1.66 → 2.1.79 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 9.0.0 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting — Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting 9.0.0 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL — Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL 9.0.0 → 10.0.2 available.
  • Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Http — Asp.Versioning.Http 8.1.0 → 10.0.0 available.
  • Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Mvc.ApiExplorer — Asp.Versioning.Mvc.ApiExplorer 8.1.0 → 10.0.0 available.
  • Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 12.4.1 → 14.1.0 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 9.0.0 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi — Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi 9.0.0 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 9.0.0 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Diagnostics.HealthChecks — Microsoft.Extensions.Diagnostics.HealthChecks 9.0.0 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.11.2 → 1.16.0 available.
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Hosting — OpenTelemetry.Extensions.Hosting 1.11.2 → 1.16.0 available.
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore 1.11.0 → 1.15.2 available.
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.EntityFrameworkCore — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.EntityFrameworkCore 1.11.0-beta.1 → Not available.
  • Outdated: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.StackExchangeRedis — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.StackExchangeRedis 1.11.0-beta.1 → Not available.
  • Outdated: QuestPDF — QuestPDF 2024.12.1 → 2026.6.0 available.
  • Outdated: Serilog.AspNetCore — Serilog.AspNetCore 9.0.0 → 10.0.0 available.
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 7.2.0 → 10.2.2 available.
  • + 25 more in this group — see findings.md.
D17 · Explicit Debt · Justified suppression · ×2
  • Justified suppression src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Infrastructure/Persistence/LedgerDbContext.cs:118 — empty catch (Npgsql.PostgresException) when (…) — narrow/filtered/commented, treated as intentional
  • Justified suppression src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Infrastructure/Persistence/LedgerDbContext.cs:122 — empty catch (Exception) — narrow/filtered/commented, treated as intentional
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×1
  • Mock framework: NSubstitute — FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Tests.Unit references NSubstitute.
D14 · License Compliance · Licenses scanned · ×1
  • Licenses scanned — 41 packages scanned; 4 distinct SPDX licenses.
D18 · Solution Shape · FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Domain (Production) · ×1
  • FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Domain (Production) src/BuildingBlocks/FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Domain/FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Domain.csproj — 4 .cs files, 49 LoC (34 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Infrastructure (Production) · ×1
  • FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Infrastructure (Production) src/BuildingBlocks/FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Infrastructure/FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Infrastructure.csproj — 2 .cs files, 43 LoC (30 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Domain (Production) · ×1
  • FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Domain (Production) src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Domain/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Domain.csproj — 6 .cs files, 217 LoC (149 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application (Production) · ×1
  • FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application (Production) src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Application.csproj — 12 .cs files, 335 LoC (229 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Infrastructure (Production) · ×1
  • FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Infrastructure (Production) src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Infrastructure/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Infrastructure.csproj — 11 .cs files, 1005 LoC (772 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Api (Production) · ×1
  • FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Api (Production) src/Modules/Ledger/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Api/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Api.csproj — 11 .cs files, 621 LoC (468 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Application (Production) · ×1
  • FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Application (Production) src/BuildingBlocks/FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Application/FinLedger.BuildingBlocks.Application.csproj — 4 .cs files, 49 LoC (32 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Tests.Unit (Test) · ×1
  • FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Tests.Unit (Test) tests/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Tests.Unit/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Tests.Unit.csproj — 4 .cs files, 183 LoC (120 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · FinLedger.Tests.Architecture (Test) · ×1
  • FinLedger.Tests.Architecture (Test) tests/FinLedger.Tests.Architecture/FinLedger.Tests.Architecture.csproj — 2 .cs files, 62 LoC (46 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Tests.Integration (Test) · ×1
  • FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Tests.Integration (Test) tests/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Tests.Integration/FinLedger.Modules.Ledger.Tests.Integration.csproj — 5 .cs files, 180 LoC (131 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Domain (Production) · ×1
  • FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Domain (Production) src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Domain/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Domain.csproj — 2 .cs files, 63 LoC (48 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Application (Production) · ×1
  • FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Application (Production) src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Application/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Application.csproj — 6 .cs files, 106 LoC (79 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Infrastructure (Production) · ×1
  • FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Infrastructure (Production) src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Infrastructure/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Infrastructure.csproj — 8 .cs files, 394 LoC (300 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Api (Production) · ×1
  • FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Api (Production) src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Api/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Api.csproj — 2 .cs files, 77 LoC (45 significant)
D39 · IL Efficiency · IL measured · ×1
  • IL measured — 743 methods; 2 oversized (> 250 IL); 54 boxing ops.
D9 · Test Distribution · Unit tests · ×1
  • Unit tests — 10 unit test method(s).
D9 · Test Distribution · Integration tests · ×1
  • Integration tests — 1 integration test method(s).
D9 · Test Distribution · BDD tests · ×1
  • BDD tests — 0 BDD test method(s).
D9 · Test Distribution · E2E tests · ×1
  • E2E tests — 0 end-to-end test method(s).

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .1artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list FinLedger.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json2artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .16artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** .26artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenanceprovenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .23artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019ee377-6eaa-79ea-b123-acdb045aec5f · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 7 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Name — 4 field(s)
  • RegisterUserCommand.FirstName src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Application/Users/RegisterUser/RegisterUserCommand.cs:8
  • RegisterUserCommand.LastName src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Application/Users/RegisterUser/RegisterUserCommand.cs:8
  • User.FirstName src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Domain/Users/User.cs:9
  • User.LastName src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Domain/Users/User.cs:10
Email — 3 field(s)
  • LoginCommand.Email src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Application/Users/Login/LoginCommand.cs:7
  • RegisterUserCommand.Email src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Application/Users/RegisterUser/RegisterUserCommand.cs:8
  • User.Email src/Modules/Identity/FinLedger.Modules.Identity.Domain/Users/User.cs:7

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md