AspNetCore-DDD — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

andox/AspNetCore-DDD carries serious risk (46%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Architecture (82%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Security (42%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (43%) is the next concern — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Strengthen data-at-rest protection (Data Protection); security response headers (Content-Security-Policy (Web-Security Posture); Make retry-prone mutations idempotent (Idempotency).

For scale: Small (~3,553 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 49% Weak · gated by X3, X5 Architecture 82% Strong Maturity 46% Weak · gated by D34, M2 Readiness 43% Weak · gated by D8, D12, P9 Security 42% Weak · gated by D30, C1 Event-Driven 100% ★ Exemplary

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Security 42% · 46% weightReadiness 43% · 25% weightMaturity 46% · 14% weightCode Health 49% · 8% weightArchitecture 82% · 4% weightEvent-Driven 100% · 2% weight

No single dominant problem — the weakest areas are close, so progress on any of them moves the score.

Code composition — where the lines go

Business logic 12%Plumbing 75%Tests 2%Generated 11%

New since the last scan (1+)

1 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-06-21) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

SC1 · NuGet dependencies are not locked

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €1,300–€6,200

Cost to rebuild	€1,300–€6,200 (0.1 person-years (21–66 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	High — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 46% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · 49% boilerplate · 37% straight-line · 14% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€3,800 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 42% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.5) — service/app, CQRS, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.

+3.8 pts · Low effort · ADR Quality

Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.

+3.8 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene

Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with Startup.cs.

+3.6 pts · Low effort · Knowledge Freshness

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 42%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (3,553 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 42%

→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Root cause: tests don't protect the risk · High · Root cause

Coverage is low and what exists is mis-aimed (concentrated on the trivial layer and/or weak on assertions) — the test suite isn't protecting the code that actually carries risk. More of the same tests won't help; the gap is WHERE and HOW you test.

Evidence: D8 coverage: 2.7/10 · P9 domain-vs-controller: inverted to controllers

→ Shift testing onto the domain/decision logic; gate on domain coverage, not overall %.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.

Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory

The headline is improving steadily (+15.2 pts/run over 3 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.

Evidence: trajectory: +15.2 pts/run over 3 runs

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

At a glance — Code Health · 49% · Weak · gated by X3, X5

The Good

D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.9 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 9.1 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 9.3 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 9.9 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 9.9 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 8.7 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0

The Ugly

X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 4.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 2.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 2.0

At a glance — Architecture · 82% · Strong

The Good

D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 9.2 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 9.3 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.6 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 9.8 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0

The Ugly

AX10 · Repo Code composition 4.0

At a glance — Maturity · 46% · Weak · gated by D34, M2

The Good

D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0

The Ugly

D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 43% · Weak · gated by D8, D12, P9

The Good

D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D11 · .NET / C# Test Reliability 10.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P7 · Repo Outbound HTTP resilience 10.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0

The Bad

P2 · Repo Observability 5.4 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0

The Ugly

D8 · .NET / C# Code Coverage 2.7 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 3.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 3.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 4.0 P9 · Repo Domain vs controller coverage 1.0

At a glance — Security · 42% · Weak · gated by D30, C1

The Good

D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 10.0 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 9.6 C2 · Repo Access Controls 8.0

The Bad

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 6.0

The Ugly

D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0 C1 · Repo Data Protection 1.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 4.5

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary

The Good

ED1 · Repo Handler temporal coupling 10.0 ED2 · Repo Event/command shape 10.0 ED3 · Repo Event naming 8.0 ED4 · Repo Outbox / dual-write 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	24	High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures	5	High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	2	High / Critical

Roadmap

Top priorities: Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps; Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them; Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.	+3.8 pts	Low	ADR Quality
Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.	+3.8 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with Startup.cs.	+3.6 pts	Low	Knowledge Freshness
Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.	+3.0 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.	+5.1 pts	Medium	Data Protection
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.	+4.9 pts	Medium	Web-Security Posture
Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.	+4.5 pts	Medium	Idempotency
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.	+4.5 pts	Medium	Security & performance tooling

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 10 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 50% mixed · 50% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
src/DDD.Services.Api/appsettings.Development.json	5.1	Mixed	Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
Dockerfile	6.5	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
Src/DDD.Domain/Services/HttpService.cs	6.6	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
Src/DDD.Infra.Data/Context/ApplicationDbContext.cs	6.9	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
src/DDD.Services.Api/Startup.cs	7.2	Mixed	Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
Src/DDD.Application/AutoMapper/AutoMapperConfig.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
Src/DDD.Services.Api/Configurations/AutoMapperSetup.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
Src/DDD.Services.Api/StartupExtensions/DatabaseExtension.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
Src/DDD.Application/EventSourcedNormalizers/CustomerHistory.cs	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)
Src/DDD.Domain/Specifications/BaseSpecification.cs	8.5	Near-clean	Cohesion (LCOM4): Low cohesion: BaseSpecification (LCOM4 6)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 58 of 58 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); none rely on LLM judgement. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 58 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D17D18D20D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D39AX1AX10AX2AX3AX5AX6AX8C1C2ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3P1P2P3P4P7P8P9S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 29 of 119 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.301	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.301	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	—	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019f0835-abae-720c-a07d-16ea0e6d40bb.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (2): D20, ED5. For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

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D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

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D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

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D4 · Code Duplication9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)Src/DDD.Application/EventSourcedNormalizers/CustomerHistory.cs:60

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D5 · Coupling9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Layer violation: Application → Infrastructure · ×2

Off the main sequence: DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 18 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: BaseSpecification (LCOM4 6)Src/DDD.Domain/Specifications/BaseSpecification.cs:8

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D8 · Code Coverage2.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 10.3%, branch coverage 8.1%.

What to do

Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 test methods: 1 unit, 1 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

Unit tests

Integration tests

BDD tests

E2E tests

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 2 mock references across 2 tests.

Mock framework: Moq · ×2

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky); integration: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D12 · Dependency Hygiene3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

29 outdated, 3 vulnerable, 4 deprecated packages.

Vulnerable: AutoMapper · ×3

Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore · ×4

Outdated: AutoMapper · ×29

What to do

Resolve the 4 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 23 packages use a banned license.

Licenses scanned

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D17 · Explicit Debt9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 deducted debt markers + 2 dead symbols across 3085 LoC (0.4/KLoC) → score 9.1.

CommentedOutCode · ×5Src/DDD.Application/AutoMapper/AutoMapperConfig.cs:7

TodoComment · ×5Src/DDD.Domain/Services/HttpService.cs:34

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D18 · Solution Shape9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 projects, 129 .cs files, 3178 hand-written lines of code (3085 production / 93 test), plus 468 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 39 inter-project edges.

DDD.Application (Production)Src/DDD.Application/DDD.Application.csproj

DDD.Domain.Core (Production)Src/DDD.Domain.Core/DDD.Domain.Core.csproj

DDD.Domain (Production)Src/DDD.Domain/DDD.Domain.csproj

DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus (Production)Src/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus.csproj

DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity (Production)Src/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.csproj

+ 5 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 10 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D27 · Navigability9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

90 % of calls cross a namespace and 7 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×4src/DDD.Services.Api/appsettings.Development.json:10detected by gitleaks finding

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

Resolve the 4 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.Development.json (3), Startup.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

24 vulnerable package(s): 4 critical, 11 high, 9 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: AutoMapper 9.0.0 · ×11detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

Critical CVE: Refit 5.1.67 · ×4detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

Medium CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 1.0.19269.1 · ×9detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

Resolve the 11 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
Resolve the 9 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 1 low.

High IaC: DS-0002Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

Low IaC: DS-0026Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 1 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is Src/DDD.Services.Api/Startup.cs.

Orphaned knowledgeSrc/DDD.Services.Api/Startup.cs

What to do

Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with Startup.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D39 · IL Efficiency9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 of 792 methods have an oversized IL body.

Oversized method: DDD.Application.EventSourcedNormalizers.CustomerHistory.CustomerHistoryDeserializer · ×4

IL measured

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX10 · Code composition4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX6 · Interface segregation9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

`ISpecification` declares 18 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — ISpecification.cs:7

What to do

Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C1 · Data Protection1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

What to do

Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C2 · Access Controls8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

[AllowAnonymous] (7) outweighs [Authorize] (5) — review whether the open surface is intended.

What to do

Review the [AllowAnonymous] surface — keep anonymous endpoints deliberate and documented so the open surface stays intentional.

Do you agree with this assessment?

ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

Do you agree with this assessment?

ED2 · Event/command shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.

Do you agree with this assessment?

ED3 · Event naming8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

`Event` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — Event.cs:6
`DomainNotification` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — DomainNotification.cs:6

What to do

Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.

Do you agree with this assessment?

ED4 · Outbox / dual-write10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

Do you agree with this assessment?

ED5 · Idempotency3.0 / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

`CommandHandlers.CustomerCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no visible idempotency guard. Under a client retry or at-least-once redelivery a re-run could double-apply it — confirm it's safe to re-run, or add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. (Configure an LLM to auto-classify this.) (×2) — CustomerCommandHandler.cs:31, CustomerCommandHandler.cs:57

What to do

Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.

Do you agree with this assessment?

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — MailService.cs:13

What to do

Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.

Do you agree with this assessment?

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

`SendMail` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — MailService.cs:11
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×28) — AutoMapperConfig.cs:11, AutoMapperConfig.cs:12, ApplicationDbContext.cs:31, …

What to do

Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a README to the 10 of 10 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P2 · Observability5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Only 1/8 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (ActivitySource / AddMetrics) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P3 · Security & performance tooling4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P9 · Domain vs controller coverage1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether test coverage concentrates on the domain (business rules) rather than the trivial web/controller layer — a focus check a generic tool can't make.

Method: Roslyn plus test-execution analysis: domain-layer versus trivial web/controller coverage ratio. Computed metric, deterministic.

Domain coverage is 0% but the web/controller layer is at 45% — the trivial layer is better tested than the business rules. Coverage effort should concentrate where the invariants and decisions live (the domain), not on thin controllers/endpoints.

What to do

Shift coverage toward the domain: aim to cover aggregates/domain services above the web layer, since that's where the costly bugs are.

Do you agree with this assessment?

S1 · Web-Security Posture4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)

What to do

Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X2 · Cancellation propagation4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 0/11 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×11) — HttpService.cs:12, HttpService.cs:30, HttpService.cs:43, …

What to do

Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X3 · Exception handling2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

`throw ex;` resets the exception's stack trace to this line, hiding where it really came from. Use a bare `throw;` to preserve the original stack. (×4) — HttpService.cs:26, HttpService.cs:39, HttpService.cs:57, …

What to do

Rethrow loses stack trace (`throw ex;`)

Do you agree with this assessment?

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X5 · Nullable reference types2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

0/8 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.

What to do

Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	49%	Weak — gated by X3, X5	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	82%	Strong	Solid.
Maturity	46%	Weak — gated by D34, M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	43%	Weak — gated by D8, D12, P9	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	42%	Weak — gated by D30, C1	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.

Not included — 39 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data (event-sourced storage — lifecycle is stream archival / event TTL, not row CASCADE) — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM dimension skipped
D21 Naming Consistency — LLM dimension skipped
D22 Internal API Consistency — LLM dimension skipped
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — small single-context codebase (3,085 production LoC) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size
D24 Comment Value — LLM dimension skipped
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Not applicable
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not applicable
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — Not applicable
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — Not applicable
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not applicable
D7 Architectural Integrity — No checkable ADRs to assess
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 3 domain event(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — only 1/3 markers (an append-only event-store seam (IEventStore/Append-of-events))
M4 Documentation accuracy — LLM not available — accuracy is the Tier-2 layer and needs a reachable model.
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 25 finding(s)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×11

High CVE: AutoMapper 9.0.0 — AutoMapper 9.0.0 (direct) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http 2.1.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http 2.1.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 1.0.19269.1 — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 1.0.19269.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 12.0.3 — Newtonsoft.Json 12.0.3 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 10 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 11.0.2 — Newtonsoft.Json 11.0.2 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Core 2.0.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Core 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.0.0 — SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.7.0 — System.Data.SqlClient 4.7.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×4

Secret: generic-api-key src/DDD.Services.Api/appsettings.Development.json:10 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key src/DDD.Services.Api/appsettings.Development.json:9 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key src/DDD.Services.Api/Startup.cs:24 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key Src/DDD.Services.Api/appsettings.Development.json:10 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×4

Critical CVE: Refit 5.1.67 — Refit 5.1.67 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 8 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.7.0 — System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.7.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0 — System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.5.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Critical CVE: System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.4.0 — System.Text.Encodings.Web 4.4.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×3

Vulnerable: AutoMapper — AutoMapper 9.0.0 — High severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Vulnerable: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 3.1.0 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Vulnerable: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.6.0 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D5 · Coupling · Layer violation · ×2

Layer violation: Application → Infrastructure — DDD.Application (Application) references DDD.Infra.Data (Infrastructure) — dependencies must point inward (Web → Application → Domain; Infrastructure implements inner interfaces, nothing depends outward on it).
Layer violation: Domain → Infrastructure — DDD.Domain (Domain) references DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus (Infrastructure) — dependencies must point inward (Web → Application → Domain; Infrastructure implements inner interfaces, nothing depends outward on it).

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1

High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'

Warning — 28 finding(s)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×9

Medium CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 1.0.19269.1 — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 1.0.19269.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.5.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.5.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 3.1.0 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 3.1.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.6.0 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.6.0 (direct) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 5.6.0 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 5.6.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: KubernetesClient 1.6.10 — KubernetesClient 1.6.10 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.Rest.ClientRuntime 2.3.10 — Microsoft.Rest.ClientRuntime 2.3.10 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 5.0.0-rc4 — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.SwaggerUI 5.0.0-rc4 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.7.0 — System.Data.SqlClient 4.7.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×5

CommentedOutCode Src/DDD.Application/AutoMapper/AutoMapperConfig.cs:7 — 8 consecutive commented-code lines
CommentedOutCode Src/DDD.Infra.Data/Context/ApplicationDbContext.cs:29 — 5 consecutive commented-code lines
CommentedOutCode Src/DDD.Infra.Data/Context/ApplicationDbContext.cs:35 — 5 consecutive commented-code lines
CommentedOutCode Src/DDD.Services.Api/Configurations/AutoMapperSetup.cs:16 — 9 consecutive commented-code lines
CommentedOutCode Src/DDD.Services.Api/StartupExtensions/DatabaseExtension.cs:20 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines

D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×5

TodoComment Src/DDD.Domain/Services/HttpService.cs:34 — // TODO: Handle queryParams, headers — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment Src/DDD.Domain/Services/HttpService.cs:82 — // TODO: Handle queryParams — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment Src/DDD.Domain/Services/HttpService.cs:101 — // TODO: Handle queryParams — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment Src/DDD.Domain/Services/HttpService.cs:118 — // TODO: Handle queryParams — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment Src/DDD.Infra.Data/Context/ApplicationDbContext.cs:91 — // TODO: Get real current user id — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×4

Deprecated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 8.5.1 — Legacy
Deprecated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.6.0 — Legacy
Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.4.1 — Legacy xunit.v3 >= 0.0.0
Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.4.0 — Legacy xunit.v3 >= 0.0.0

D16 · Bus Factor · single-maintainer · ×1

single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk (1 author(s) across 83 commit(s) sampled).

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned knowledge · ×1

Orphaned knowledge Src/DDD.Services.Api/Startup.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) Src/DDD.Application/EventSourcedNormalizers/CustomerHistory.cs:60 — Src/DDD.Application/EventSourcedNormalizers/CustomerHistory.cs:60-69 | Src/DDD.Application/EventSourcedNormalizers/CustomerHistory.cs:70-79

D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1

Off the main sequence: DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus — DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.11, distance 0.89 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×1

Low cohesion: BaseSpecification (LCOM4 6) Src/DDD.Domain/Specifications/BaseSpecification.cs:8 — BaseSpecification's methods form 6 groups that share no state and don't call each other — a sign it may have several responsibilities. Review whether it splits into focused classes.

Recommendation — 19 finding(s)

D39 · IL Efficiency · Oversized method · ×4

Oversized method: DDD.Application.EventSourcedNormalizers.CustomerHistory.CustomerHistoryDeserializer — DDD.Application.EventSourcedNormalizers.CustomerHistory.CustomerHistoryDeserializer compiles to 604 IL instructions — too large to inline; consider splitting the hot path.
Oversized method: DDD.Services.Api.Controllers.AccountController/<GenerateToken>d__12.MoveNext — DDD.Services.Api.Controllers.AccountController/<GenerateToken>d__12.MoveNext compiles to 443 IL instructions — too large to inline; consider splitting the hot path.
Oversized method: DDD.Services.Api.Controllers.AccountController/<Refresh>d__10.MoveNext — DDD.Services.Api.Controllers.AccountController/<Refresh>d__10.MoveNext compiles to 312 IL instructions — too large to inline; consider splitting the hot path.
Oversized method: DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Data.Migrations.CreateIdentitySchema/<>c.<Up>b__0_4 — DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.Data.Migrations.CreateIdentitySchema/<>c.<Up>b__0_4 compiles to 291 IL instructions — too large to inline; consider splitting the hot path.

D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM dimension skipped · ×1

LLM dimension skipped — This dimension requires a reachable LLM provider; configure/start one to evaluate it.

D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1

No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.

D21 · Naming Consistency · LLM dimension skipped · ×1

LLM dimension skipped — This dimension requires a reachable LLM provider; configure/start one to evaluate it.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · LLM dimension skipped · ×1

LLM dimension skipped — This dimension requires a reachable LLM provider; configure/start one to evaluate it.

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · small single-context codebase (3,085 production LoC) · ×1

small single-context codebase (3,085 production LoC) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size — small single-context codebase (3,085 production LoC) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.

D24 · Comment Value · LLM dimension skipped · ×1

LLM dimension skipped — This dimension requires a reachable LLM provider; configure/start one to evaluate it.

D25 · ADR Conformance · no ADRs to check · ×1

no ADRs to check — No ADRs found, so conformance can't be assessed.

D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1

Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined

D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) · Not applicable · ×1

Not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities · Not applicable · ×1

Not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Not applicable · ×1

Not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy · Not applicable · ×1

Not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Not applicable · ×1

Not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.

D7 · Architectural Integrity · No checkable ADRs to assess · ×1

No checkable ADRs to assess — No architecture decision records were found and the project graph is acyclic, so architectural integrity could not be assessed. Add ADRs (with `enforcement: analyzer|test`) to make the architecture's rules checkable.

Info — 47 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×29

Outdated: AutoMapper — AutoMapper 9.0.0 → 16.1.1 available.
Outdated: FluentValidation.AspNetCore — FluentValidation.AspNetCore 8.5.1 → 11.3.1 available.
Outdated: MediatR — MediatR 7.0.0 → 14.1.0 available.
Outdated: Refit.HttpClientFactory — Refit.HttpClientFactory 5.1.67 → 12.0.0 available.
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 3.1.0 → 10.0.9 available.
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore 3.1.0 → 10.0.9 available.
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 3.1.0 → 10.0.9 available.
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer 3.1.0 → 10.0.9 available.
Outdated: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 5.6.0 → 8.19.1 available.
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 3.1.0 → 10.0.9 available.
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer 3.1.0 → 10.0.9 available.
Outdated: AspNetCore.HealthChecks.SqlServer — AspNetCore.HealthChecks.SqlServer 3.0.0 → 9.0.0 available.
Outdated: AspNetCore.HealthChecks.UI — AspNetCore.HealthChecks.UI 3.0.11 → 9.0.0 available.
Outdated: AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection — AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 7.0.0 → 12.0.1 available.
Outdated: MediatR.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection — MediatR.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 7.0.0 → 11.1.0 available.
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Diagnostics.HealthChecks.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.Extensions.Diagnostics.HealthChecks.EntityFrameworkCore 3.1.2 → 10.0.9 available.
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Http.Polly — Microsoft.Extensions.Http.Polly 3.1.5 → 10.0.9 available.
Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 5.0.0-rc4 → 10.2.3 available.
Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 16.6.1 → 18.7.0 available.
Outdated: moq — moq 4.14.1 → 4.20.72 available.
Outdated: xunit — xunit 2.4.1 → 2.9.3 available.
Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio — xunit.runner.visualstudio 2.4.1 → 3.1.5 available.
Outdated: coverlet.collector — coverlet.collector 1.2.0 → 10.0.1 available.
Outdated: FluentAssertions — FluentAssertions 5.10.3 → 8.10.0 available.
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Testing — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Testing 3.1.4 → 10.0.9 available.
+ 4 more in this group — see findings.md.

D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×2

Mock framework: Moq — DDD.Application.UnitTests references Moq.
Mock framework: Moq — DDD.Services.Api.IntegrationTests references Moq.

D14 · License Compliance · Licenses scanned · ×1

Licenses scanned — 23 packages scanned; 2 distinct SPDX licenses.

D18 · Solution Shape · DDD.Application (Production) · ×1

DDD.Application (Production) Src/DDD.Application/DDD.Application.csproj — 8 .cs files, 292 LoC (250 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · DDD.Domain.Core (Production) · ×1

DDD.Domain.Core (Production) Src/DDD.Domain.Core/DDD.Domain.Core.csproj — 12 .cs files, 267 LoC (214 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · DDD.Domain (Production) · ×1

DDD.Domain (Production) Src/DDD.Domain/DDD.Domain.csproj — 39 .cs files, 978 LoC (821 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus (Production) · ×1

DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus (Production) Src/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Bus.csproj — 1 .cs files, 34 LoC (28 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity (Production) · ×1

DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity (Production) Src/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity.csproj — 33 .cs files, 1044 LoC (806 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC (Production) · ×1

DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC (Production) Src/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.IoC.csproj — 1 .cs files, 77 LoC (53 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · DDD.Infra.Data (Production) · ×1

DDD.Infra.Data (Production) Src/DDD.Infra.Data/DDD.Infra.Data.csproj — 15 .cs files, 586 LoC (470 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · DDD.Services.Api (Production) · ×1

DDD.Services.Api (Production) Src/DDD.Services.Api/DDD.Services.Api.csproj — 15 .cs files, 961 LoC (753 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · DDD.Application.UnitTests (Test) · ×1

DDD.Application.UnitTests (Test) Tests/DDD.Application.UnitTests/DDD.Application.UnitTests.csproj — 2 .cs files, 47 LoC (38 significant)

D18 · Solution Shape · DDD.Services.Api.IntegrationTests (Test) · ×1

DDD.Services.Api.IntegrationTests (Test) Tests/DDD.Services.Api.IntegrationTests/DDD.Services.Api.IntegrationTests.csproj — 3 .cs files, 59 LoC (47 significant)

D39 · IL Efficiency · IL measured · ×1

IL measured — 792 methods; 4 oversized (> 250 IL); 82 boxing ops.

D9 · Test Distribution · Unit tests · ×1

Unit tests — 1 unit test method(s).

D9 · Test Distribution · Integration tests · ×1

Integration tests — 1 integration test method(s).

D9 · Test Distribution · BDD tests · ×1

BDD tests — 0 BDD test method(s).

D9 · Test Distribution · E2E tests · ×1

E2E tests — 0 end-to-end test method(s).

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	4	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	0	—
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet list DDD.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json	24	artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	2	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.	0	—

Run 019f0835-abae-720c-a07d-16ea0e6d40bb · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 21 field(s) across 3 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 14 field(s)

CustomerHistoryData.Email Src/DDD.Application/EventSourcedNormalizers/CustomerHistoryData.cs:8
CustomerViewModel.Email Src/DDD.Application/ViewModels/CustomerViewModel.cs:21
CustomerCommand.Email Src/DDD.Domain/Commands/CustomerCommand.cs:12
CustomerRegisteredEvent.Email Src/DDD.Domain/Events/CustomerRegisteredEvent.cs:20
CustomerUpdatedEvent.Email Src/DDD.Domain/Events/CustomerUpdatedEvent.cs:20
Customer.Email Src/DDD.Domain/Models/Customer.cs:21
MailAddress.Email Src/DDD.Domain/Services/Mail/MailAddress.cs:6
ExternalLoginViewModel.Email Src/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Models/AccountViewModels/ExternalLoginViewModel.cs:9
ForgotPasswordViewModel.Email Src/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Models/AccountViewModels/ForgotPasswordViewModel.cs:9
LoginViewModel.Email Src/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Models/AccountViewModels/LoginViewModel.cs:9
RegisterViewModel.Email Src/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Models/AccountViewModels/RegisterViewModel.cs:10
ResetPasswordViewModel.Email Src/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Models/AccountViewModels/ResetPasswordViewModel.cs:9
IndexViewModel.IsEmailConfirmed Src/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Models/ManageViewModels/IndexViewModel.cs:9
IndexViewModel.Email Src/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Models/ManageViewModels/IndexViewModel.cs:13

Date of birth — 6 field(s)

CustomerHistoryData.BirthDate Src/DDD.Application/EventSourcedNormalizers/CustomerHistoryData.cs:9
CustomerViewModel.BirthDate Src/DDD.Application/ViewModels/CustomerViewModel.cs:27
CustomerCommand.BirthDate Src/DDD.Domain/Commands/CustomerCommand.cs:14
CustomerRegisteredEvent.BirthDate Src/DDD.Domain/Events/CustomerRegisteredEvent.cs:22
CustomerUpdatedEvent.BirthDate Src/DDD.Domain/Events/CustomerUpdatedEvent.cs:22
Customer.BirthDate Src/DDD.Domain/Models/Customer.cs:23

Phone — 1 field(s)

IndexViewModel.PhoneNumber Src/DDD.Infra.CrossCutting.Identity/Models/ManageViewModels/IndexViewModel.cs:17

Andox/AspNetCore-DDD

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — module dependency graph

At a glance — Code Health · 49% · Weak · gated by X3, X5

At a glance — Architecture · 82% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 46% · Weak · gated by D34, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 43% · Weak · gated by D8, D12, P9

At a glance — Security · 42% · Weak · gated by D30, C1

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Downloadable artifacts