Public report — antlr4, published 6 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
69findings with an exact file:lineof 78 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
34/107dimensions across the health lenses28476 LoC · 3 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
antlr/antlr4 is sound in substance but carries real gaps (60%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Architecture (94%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.
The area that most needs attention is Code Health (56%) — changes there are slower and more error-prone. Readiness (60%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript (Type Safety); Break down the listed branch-heavy functions (Cyclomatic Complexity); each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it (Large Files).
For scale: Medium (~28,476 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.6 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (94%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.6 person-years of build effort (about ~€89,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Code Health at 56% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.1) — standard service × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with ParserATNSimulator.cs, Parser.cs, ATNDeserializer.cs.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.6 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Code Health at 56%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Code Health first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
100 modules, 208 dependencies — 2 dependency cycles, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
At a glance — Code Health · 56% · Adequate · gated by R1
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
20
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
17
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
4
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, migrate all remaining JavaScript files to TypeScript to enforce type safety. Next, reduce cyclomatic complexity by breaking down branch-heavy functions to improve maintainability. Then, split the nine largest files into smaller, focused modules to improve code organization. Additionally, introduce a static application security testing step in the CI pipeline to catch security regressions early. Finally, implement a draft release process to allow manual intervention and prevent bad builds from reaching users.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with ParserATNSimulator.cs, Parser.cs, ATNDeserializer.cs.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 32 of 34 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 34 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 69 of 78 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 4 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
1 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is runtime/CSharp/src/IVocabulary.cs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
Clear, complete, well-structured documentation for ANTLR v4 covering the tool's purpose, versioning philosophy, Docker image, target languages (Java, C++, Dart, Go, Swift, Python3), build/run instructions, and a dedicated Unicode/UnicodeCodePoints chapter. The READMEs are strong but the full set is scanned out of order; each visible document is accurate and complete given its body. Clear and comprehensive documentation for the ANTLR4 TypeScript runtime (how to create a lexer/parser, get the runtime from npm, run generated code), parse-tree matching with XPath, tool command-line options, target-agnostic grammars, Swift runtime, Python3 grammar example including requirements.txt, build scripts, and release notes. The architecture/design docs are also present but not shown in this summary. This is a clear and comprehensive reference for semantic predicates in ANTLR: it defines what predicates are (boolean expressions written in the target language appearing on the left edge of alternatives), explains how they affect prediction (ignoring false-guarded alternatives, preferring the first viable one), gives an illustrative ambiguous-capture example with C++-like array-reference syntax, and ends with a clipped clip marker. The document is well structured around its subject and carries the full outline for each named section.
The demo application's build steps (place ANTLR jar, update LOCATION var) are non-trivial and the generated files live in a subfolder that is not referenced anywhere in the README.runtime/Cpp/demo/README.md
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What to do
Improve Secrets (history) — currently 8.0/10. — 2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×19.github/workflows/hosted.yml:50detected by semgrep finding
Medium: use-of-md5antlr4-maven-plugin/src/main/java/org/antlr/mojo/antlr4/MojoUtils.java:29detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 19 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with hosted.yml (18), GrammarDependencies.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (19 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with MojoUtils.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
95 of 96 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is runtime/CSharp/src/Atn/ParserATNSimulator.cs.
Largest orphaned file · ×3runtime/CSharp/src/Atn/ParserATNSimulator.cs
Dormant codebase
What to do
Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with ParserATNSimulator.cs, Parser.cs, ATNDeserializer.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×8runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×7runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted]runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 8 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).
Resolve the 7 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (6), go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
52 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 6 of 8 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.5 pts.
Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety0.1 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
2 typed · 146 plain JS — the untyped files are runtime/JavaScript/spec/BitSetSpec.js, runtime/JavaScript/spec/HashMapSpec.js, runtime/JavaScript/spec/HashSetSpec.js, runtime/JavaScript/spec/IntervalSetSpec.js, runtime/JavaScript/spec/helpers/Reporter.js, runtime/JavaScript/spec/imports/NodeCommonJSImportSpec.cjs (+140 more).
What to do
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/action/LexerMoreAction.js:5 · runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/action/LexerPopModeAction.js:5 · runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/action/LexerSkipAction.js:5 — the 3 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — LexerMoreAction.js:5
runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/action/LexerChannelAction.js:29 · runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/action/LexerModeAction.js:27 · runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/action/LexerPushModeAction.js:27 · runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/action/LexerTypeAction.js:24 · +1 more site(s) not listed — the 5 copies are spread across 5 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — LexerChannelAction.js:29
runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/atn/SemanticContext.js:132 · runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/atn/SemanticContext.js:233 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — SemanticContext.js:132
runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/action/LexerModeAction.js:5 · runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/action/LexerPushModeAction.js:5 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — LexerModeAction.js:5
runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/atn/LexerActionExecutor.js:121 · runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/atn/PrecedencePredicate.js:27 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — LexerActionExecutor.js:121
runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/atn/ParserATNSimulator.js:1447 · runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/atn/ParserATNSimulator.js:1482 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — ParserATNSimulator.js:1447
runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/atn/SemanticContext.js:109 · runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/atn/SemanticContext.js:211 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — SemanticContext.js:109
runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/misc/HashMap.js:75 · runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/misc/HashSet.js:74 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — HashMap.js:75
What to do
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — TokenStreamRewriter.js:215, PredictionContextUtils.js:131, ParserATNSimulator.js:698, …
What to do
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
What to do
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×3) — InterpreterRuleContext.js, titleCase.js, TokenSource.js
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
213 file(s) (~14796 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package's entry point(s) resolved, but the walk stopped one hop in: runtime/JavaScript/src/antlr4/index.d.cts imports './state', which is not in the scanned tree. That is usually a generated or build-output module, so reachability cannot see past it and no dead-code claim is made about this package. Nothing is necessarily wrong here. — JavaScript
Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. — TokenSource.js:5
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Declared in runtime/JavaScript/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 73 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .dart, .go, .py, .swift) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~30373 lines of test source are present (.java, .py, .swift) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — no packages were read
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved and a Maven POM), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .cs, .dart, .go, .py, .swift — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .dart, .go, .py, .swift) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.cs, .dart, .go, .java, .py, .swift) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .dart, .go, .py, .swift) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .dart, .go, .java, .py, .swift, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
D9 Test Distribution — Tests outside the analyzed solution
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (1 of 2 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 39 value object(s)
ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and this analysis resolves a call's owner only where the receiver's type is written down in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, which this analysis does not build from source alone for this language. Reported as guidance rather than measured
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:50— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: egor-tensin/setup-clang@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `egor-tensin/setup-clang@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/egor-tensin/setup-clang/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:57— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:61— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: hendrikmuhs/ccache-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `hendrikmuhs/ccache-action@v1.2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/hendrikmuhs/ccache-action/commits/v1.2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:150— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:190— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:194— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:201— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: shivammathur/setup-php@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `shivammathur/setup-php@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/shivammathur/setup-php/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:227— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-java@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-java@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-java/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:235— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: stCarolas/setup-maven@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `stCarolas/setup-maven@v4.5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/stCarolas/setup-maven/commits/v4.5 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:241— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: microsoft/setup-msbuild@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `microsoft/setup-msbuild@v1.1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/microsoft/setup-msbuild/commits/v1.1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:245— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-python@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-python@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-python/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:252— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v3.6.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v3.6.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v3.6.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:258— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v3.0.3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v3.0.3 --jq .sha`. Note that `v3.0.3` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:264— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: dart-lang/setup-dart@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `dart-lang/setup-dart@v1.3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/dart-lang/setup-dart/commits/v1.3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:270— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v3.3.1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v3.3.1 --jq .sha`. Note that `v3.3.1` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:276— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: swift-actions/setup-swift@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `swift-actions/setup-swift@v1.19.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/swift-actions/setup-swift/commits/v1.19.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v1.19.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:282— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: hendrikmuhs/ccache-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `hendrikmuhs/ccache-action@v1.2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/hendrikmuhs/ccache-action/commits/v1.2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/hosted.yml:339— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: object-deserialization antlr4-maven-plugin/src/main/java/org/antlr/mojo/antlr4/GrammarDependencies.java:286— Found object deserialization using ObjectInputStream. Deserializing entire Java objects is dangerous because malicious actors can create Java object streams with unintended consequences. Ensure that the objects being deserialized are not user-controlled. If this must be done, consider using HMACs to sign the data stream to make sure it is not tampered with, or consider only transmitting object fields and populating a new object. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×8
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.json— @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs 7.25.0: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs to 7.29.4 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.json— cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.json— fast-uri 3.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — fast-uri is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fast-uri to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against fast-uri 3.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against fast-uri 3.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.json— flatted 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.3.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.json— js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 4.3.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.json— minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.json— picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High IaC: DS-0002 docker/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0029 docker/Dockerfile— 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
Dimension evaluation failed — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so solution shape could not be assessed
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×1
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.json— serialize-javascript 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.0.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.0.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.0.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.0.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Warning — 36 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×7
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.json— @babel/helpers 7.25.0: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/helpers is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/helpers to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.json— @babel/runtime 7.25.0: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/runtime is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/runtime to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.json— ajv 6.12.6: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 6.14.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.json— ajv 8.17.1: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 8.18.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.json— micromatch 4.0.7: [GHSA redacted] — micromatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin micromatch to 4.0.8 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: GO-2024-2598 runtime/Go/antlr/v4/go.mod— stdlib 1.20.99 (crypto/x509): GO-2024-2598 — fixed in Go 1.21.8; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. This one row stands for the 60 advisories this scan raises against stdlib 1.20.99: GO-2024-2598, GO-2024-2599, GO-2024-2600, GO-2024-2609, GO-2024-2610, GO-2024-2687, GO-2024-2887, GO-2024-2888, GO-2024-2963, GO-2024-3105, GO-2024-3106, GO-2024-3107, GO-2025-3373, GO-2025-3420, GO-2025-3447, GO-2025-3503, GO-2025-3563, GO-2025-3750, GO-2025-3751, GO-2025-3849, GO-2025-3956, GO-2025-4006, GO-2025-4007, GO-2025-4008, GO-2025-4009, GO-2025-4010, GO-2025-4011, GO-2025-4012, GO-2025-4013, GO-2025-4014, GO-2025-4015, GO-2025-4155, GO-2025-4175, GO-2026-4337, GO-2026-4340, GO-2026-4341, GO-2026-4342, GO-2026-4403, GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.json— webpack 5.93.0: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares webpack ^5.76.0, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 5.94.0, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so webpack moves onto 5.94.0 or later; if the flagged 5.93.0 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin webpack with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against webpack 5.93.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.104.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.104.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against webpack 5.93.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/atn/ATNConfig.java:181— runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/atn/ATNConfig.java:181-186 | runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/atn/LexerATNConfig.java:74-79 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/atn/ParserATNSimulator.java:2127— runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/atn/ParserATNSimulator.java:2127-2132 | runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/atn/ParserATNSimulator.java:2136-2141 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/tree/Trees.java:55— runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/tree/Trees.java:55-60 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/gui/Trees.java:115-120 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) tool/src/org/antlr/v4/semantics/AttributeChecks.java:172— tool/src/org/antlr/v4/semantics/AttributeChecks.java:172-177 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/semantics/AttributeChecks.java:186-191 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tool/src/org/antlr/v4/semantics/AttributeChecks.java:172` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) tool/src/org/antlr/v4/tool/GrammarTransformPipeline.java:306— tool/src/org/antlr/v4/tool/GrammarTransformPipeline.java:306-311 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/tool/GrammarTransformPipeline.java:328-333 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tool/src/org/antlr/v4/tool/GrammarTransformPipeline.java:306` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) tool/src/org/antlr/v4/automata/ParserATNFactory.java:567— tool/src/org/antlr/v4/automata/ParserATNFactory.java:567-576 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/automata/ParserATNFactory.java:615-624 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tool/src/org/antlr/v4/automata/ParserATNFactory.java:567` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) tool/src/org/antlr/v4/codegen/ParserFactory.java:122— tool/src/org/antlr/v4/codegen/ParserFactory.java:122-139 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/codegen/ParserFactory.java:162-171 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tool/src/org/antlr/v4/codegen/ParserFactory.java:122` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) tool/src/org/antlr/v4/gui/Interpreter.java:169— tool/src/org/antlr/v4/gui/Interpreter.java:169-178 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/gui/TestRig.java:172-181 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tool/src/org/antlr/v4/gui/Interpreter.java:169` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) tool/src/org/antlr/v4/parse/ScopeParser.java:285— tool/src/org/antlr/v4/parse/ScopeParser.java:285-294 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/parse/ScopeParser.java:296-305 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tool/src/org/antlr/v4/parse/ScopeParser.java:285` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/misc/Array2DHashSet.java:423— runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/misc/Array2DHashSet.java:423-431 | runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/misc/FlexibleHashMap.java:251-259 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/misc/Array2DHashSet.java:423` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/misc/IntervalSet.java:478— runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/misc/IntervalSet.java:478-486 | runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/misc/IntervalSet.java:518-526 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/misc/IntervalSet.java:478` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/misc/IntervalSet.java:587— runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/misc/IntervalSet.java:587-595 | runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/misc/IntervalSet.java:602-610 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/misc/IntervalSet.java:587` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) tool/src/org/antlr/v4/tool/LeftRecursiveRule.java:125— tool/src/org/antlr/v4/tool/LeftRecursiveRule.java:125-133 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/tool/LeftRecursiveRule.java:139-147 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tool/src/org/antlr/v4/tool/LeftRecursiveRule.java:125` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/misc/InterpreterDataReader.java:66— runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/misc/InterpreterDataReader.java:66-73 | runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/misc/InterpreterDataReader.java:75-82 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/LexerInterpreter.java:52— runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/LexerInterpreter.java:52-59 | runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/ParserInterpreter.java:102-109 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) tool/src/org/antlr/v4/analysis/LeftRecursiveRuleAnalyzer.java:126— tool/src/org/antlr/v4/analysis/LeftRecursiveRuleAnalyzer.java:126-133 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/analysis/LeftRecursiveRuleAnalyzer.java:174-181 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tool/src/org/antlr/v4/analysis/LeftRecursiveRuleAnalyzer.java:126` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) tool/src/org/antlr/v4/tool/DOTGenerator.java:72— tool/src/org/antlr/v4/tool/DOTGenerator.java:72-79 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/tool/DOTGenerator.java:81-88 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tool/src/org/antlr/v4/tool/DOTGenerator.java:72` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) tool/src/org/antlr/v4/unicode/UnicodeDataTemplateController.java:251— tool/src/org/antlr/v4/unicode/UnicodeDataTemplateController.java:251-258 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/unicode/UnicodeDataTemplateController.java:277-284 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/unicode/UnicodeDataTemplateController.java:330-337 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) tool/src/org/antlr/v4/unicode/UnicodeDataTemplateController.java:290— tool/src/org/antlr/v4/unicode/UnicodeDataTemplateController.java:290-297 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/unicode/UnicodeDataTemplateController.java:305-312 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/unicode/UnicodeDataTemplateController.java:319-326 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) tool/src/org/antlr/v4/codegen/model/decl/AltLabelStructDecl.java:35— tool/src/org/antlr/v4/codegen/model/decl/AltLabelStructDecl.java:35-41 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/codegen/model/decl/StructDecl.java:64-70 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tool/src/org/antlr/v4/codegen/model/decl/AltLabelStructDecl.java:35` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) tool/src/org/antlr/v4/codegen/model/ElementFrequenciesVisitor.java:217— tool/src/org/antlr/v4/codegen/model/ElementFrequenciesVisitor.java:217-223 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/codegen/model/ElementFrequenciesVisitor.java:260-266 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tool/src/org/antlr/v4/codegen/model/ElementFrequenciesVisitor.java:217` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
Medium: use-of-md5 antlr4-maven-plugin/src/main/java/org/antlr/mojo/antlr4/MojoUtils.java:29— Detected MD5 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. MD5 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use HMAC instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) tool/src/org/antlr/v4/gui/TreeViewer.java:510— tool/src/org/antlr/v4/gui/TreeViewer.java:510-524 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/gui/TreeViewer.java:574-587 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `tool/src/org/antlr/v4/gui/TreeViewer.java:510` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/atn/ParserATNSimulator.java:1822— runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/atn/ParserATNSimulator.java:1822-1833 | runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/atn/ParserATNSimulator.java:1870-1881 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `runtime/Java/src/org/antlr/v4/runtime/atn/ParserATNSimulator.java:1822` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 5) tool/src/org/antlr/v4/unicode/UnicodeDataTemplateController.java:230— tool/src/org/antlr/v4/unicode/UnicodeDataTemplateController.java:230-236 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/unicode/UnicodeDataTemplateController.java:272-278 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/unicode/UnicodeDataTemplateController.java:284-290 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/unicode/UnicodeDataTemplateController.java:338-344 | tool/src/org/antlr/v4/unicode/UnicodeDataTemplateController.java:347-353 — all 5 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Coverage not measured — analyzer environment — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the analyzer environment could not build/run this repository's test suite, whose production source is .cs, .dart, .go, .java, .py, .swift. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. We track the analyzer-image gap so it can be closed; in the meantime, produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference, or lcov — `flutter test --coverage` (or `dart test --coverage=coverage` then `dart run coverage:format_coverage --lcov`), or `go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`, or JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report`, or `coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`, or lcov — `swift test --enable-code-coverage` (SwiftPM) or `xcodebuild test -scheme <YourScheme> -enableCodeCoverage YES` (an .xcodeproj/.xcworkspace suite), then `xcrun llvm-cov export -format=lcov`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored and real coverage will be read.
D9 · Test Distribution· Tests outside the analyzed solution · ×1
Tests outside the analyzed solution — 2 .NET test project(s) exist on disk but aren't in the .NET solution that was analyzed (e.g. Test.csproj), so they aren't built or gated with the production code and can't be assessed here. If this .NET code is part of the product, add those projects to the solution or point Watchdog at a solution that includes them; if it is a client/compatibility harness beside a product written in another language, nothing is wrong here and this row can be ignored.
Recommendation — 9 finding(s)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Largest orphaned file · ×3
Largest orphaned file runtime/CSharp/src/Atn/ParserATNSimulator.cs— One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
Largest orphaned file runtime/CSharp/src/Parser.cs— One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
Largest orphaned file runtime/CSharp/src/Atn/ATNDeserializer.cs— One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.java, .py, .swift) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
complexity unreadable for .cs, .dart, .go, .py, .swift — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (0 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .cs, .dart, .go, .py, .swift, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 1 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: runtime/CSharp/src/IVocabulary.cs. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D19 · Documentation Quality· The demo application's build steps (place ANTLR jar, update LOCATION var) are non-trivial and the generated files live in a subfolder that is not referenced anywhere in the README. · ×1
The demo application's build steps (place ANTLR jar, update LOCATION var) are non-trivial and the generated files live in a subfolder that is not referenced anywhere in the README. runtime/Cpp/demo/README.md— Link to the generated files location so readers can find them without opening the folder.
Dormant codebase — 95 of 96 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 95 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] runtime/JavaScript/package-lock.json— @babel/core 7.25.2: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @babel/core ^7.19.1, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 7.29.6, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so @babel/core moves onto 7.29.6 or later; if the flagged 7.25.2 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin @babel/core with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — no packages were read — This repository has NuGet-managed production source (.cs), whose `<PackageReference>` dependencies are exactly what this dimension assesses — but `dotnet list package` returned no packages, so there was nothing to assess. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED. This is a gap in the analysis run (restore or project-load failed), not a verdict about this repository. Dependencies declared for the other ecosystems present here (.dart, .go, .java, .py, .swift) are not read yet either.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
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Run 019fd759-6a97-7496-9697-e9c63e13cd53 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 31 · Warnings: 36 · Recommendations: 9 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 06-08-2026 @ 13:53 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.