Executive summary
This system is a small, low-cost asset with a fragile operational foundation. While the underlying code structure is sound and the cost to rebuild is negligible, the overall health score of 36% signals that the system is currently too risky to operate confidently. The primary concern is not the code itself, but the lack of safeguards that ensure it remains stable and secure over time.
The value at stake is minimal, with a rebuild effort estimated at roughly one engineer-week. This low barrier to entry means that significant investment is not required to fix issues, but it also means the business cannot afford to ignore the gaps in operational maturity. The system is small enough that quick wins can dramatically improve its reliability without disrupting ongoing development.
The most critical risk lies in operational readiness. With a score of 20%, the system lacks the basic testing and automation needed to prevent regressions. This creates a high risk of defects reaching production, leading to increased support costs and potential downtime. Without automated checks, every change carries the danger of breaking existing functionality, which erodes trust in the system and slows down future delivery.
Another key theme is development maturity. The absence of automated tests and type checking means that new team members will struggle to understand the code’s behavior. This increases the likelihood of errors and makes maintenance more expensive. While the architecture is strong, the lack of documentation and testing practices creates a knowledge silo that hinders long-term sustainability.
On the positive side, the code architecture is robust, and security measures are largely in place. The system is well-structured, which provides a solid foundation for future improvements. However, these strengths are undermined by the lack of operational safeguards.
To address these issues, the first priority should be implementing a continuous integration workflow that runs tests on every code change. This single action will provide immediate visibility into code quality and prevent regressions. Once this is in place, adding comprehensive tests and type checking will further stabilize the system. This approach offers the highest return on effort, ensuring that the system becomes reliable and maintainable with minimal investment.
Code Health
59%
Adequate · gated by R1
Architecture
100% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
44%
Weak · gated by D34, M2
Readiness
20% ⚠
Critical · gated by D8, D9, R4, R6, P1, P3
Security
82%
Adequate · gated by D30
Accessibility
39%
Weak · gated by AC1, AC4
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 20% · 46% weightAccessibility 39% · 25% weightMaturity 44% · 14% weightCode Health 59% · 8% weightSecurity 82% · 4% weightArchitecture 100% · 2% weight
Raise Readiness 20 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 36 → ~49.
New since the last scan (1+)
- R6 · No test or typecheck script
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €1,100–€5,600
| Cost to rebuild | €1,100–€5,600 |
|---|---|
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 36% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€3,300 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 20% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
2
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
3
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 20%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D1 · JavaScript
Cyclomatic Complexity
8.7
D2 · JavaScript
Cognitive Complexity
7.6
D4 · JavaScript
Code Duplication
10.0
R10 · React / TS
Code Duplication
9.7
R2 · React / TS
Cyclomatic Complexity
8.8
R3 · React / TS
Large Files
7.8
R7 · React / TS
Dead Code
9.3
X25 · Repo
Inert configuration knob
10.0
X29 · Repo
Per-element action decided by a fixed element
10.0
The Bad
The Ugly
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
At a glance — Accessibility
The Bad
The Ugly
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 16 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Establish a CI workflow that builds the project and runs the test suite on every push to ensure immediate feedback. Implement a test runner and type checking as package scripts, then expand test coverage to include all unreached production modules. Finally, resolve the identified gaps in code coverage and test distribution to ensure comprehensive validation of the codebase.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. | +13.2 pts | Low | Code Coverage |
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +13.2 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +14.9 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +14.9 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) and type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI. | +14.3 pts | Medium | Tooling |
| Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +4.3 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. | +3.5 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video. | +5.7 pts | Medium | Text alternatives |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.5 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED |
| src/createOverlayManager.js | 7.4 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: createOverlayManager.createOverlayManager (cyclomatic 31) |
| src/lib/canvas2BlobPolyfill.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: (anonymous) (cyclomatic 34) |
| src/components/vue3-color/mixin/color.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: color._colorChange (cyclomatic 25) |
| src/lib/createScene.js | 7.8 | Mixed | Cognitive Complexity: createScene (cognitive 17) |
| src/lib/request.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: request.request (cognitive 16) |
How the grades work
Critical — 18
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 31
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Minor — 13
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 31
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 49 of 52 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 1.0 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 52 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D6D8D9D12D13D14D15D19D20D21D26D28D29D30D34D35D43D44AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX10AX3AX4M1M2M3M4P1P3R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9S1X24X25X29
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 43 of 62 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Watchdog duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable (1 contributor(s) across 113 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). Concentration needs a team to concentrate: with one contributor there is nobody to spread the knowledge to, so there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. This repository's source is written only in languages whose packages are published through a manifest, and no manifest in the tree makes a publication act: either there is no package manifest of any ecosystem (no package.json, pyproject.toml, setup.py, gemspec, Cargo.toml, pom.xml, build.gradle, composer.json, pubspec.yaml or mix.exs), or every one present declares in its package manager's own terms that it is not published (an npm package marked "private": true, a Cargo package with publish = false, a pubspec with publish_to: none, a Composer "project", a Poetry project with package-mode = false, or the "Private :: Do Not Upload" classifier). With no publication act there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
- C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
- C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
- ED5 Idempotency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check finds retry-prone mutations by walking the repository's declared types, and NONE was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to look at. That is a limit of the analyzer's reach — it reads .NET projects — not a finding that this repository has no command handlers or message consumers.
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
- X1 Async correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded and no Java or Rust was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Scala source only, and no C# was loaded and no Scala was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Scala source only, and no C# was loaded and no Scala was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
5 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was (anonymous) at 34.
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 34)src/lib/canvas2BlobPolyfill.js:17
createOverlayManager.createOverlayManager (cyclomatic 31)src/createOverlayManager.js:1
color._colorChange (cyclomatic 25)src/components/vue3-color/mixin/color.js:3
What to do
- Resolve the 1 (anonymous) (cyclomatic 34) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with canvas2BlobPolyfill.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 createOverlayManager.createOverlayManager (cyclomatic 31) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with createOverlayManager.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 color._colorChange (cyclomatic 25) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with color.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cyclomatic Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
9 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was createOverlayManager.createOverlayManager at 38.
createOverlayManager.createOverlayManager (cognitive 38)src/createOverlayManager.js:1
(anonymous) (cognitive 33)src/lib/canvas2BlobPolyfill.js:17
_colorChange (cognitive 22)src/components/vue3-color/mixin/color.js:3
createScene (cognitive 17)src/lib/createScene.js:17
request.request (cognitive 16)src/lib/request.js:3
What to do
- Resolve the 1 createOverlayManager.createOverlayManager (cognitive 38) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with createOverlayManager.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 (anonymous) (cognitive 33) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with canvas2BlobPolyfill.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 _colorChange (cognitive 22) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with color.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cognitive Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D3 · God Classes
2 over-large unit(s) detected — types, modules or files that carry too much.
FunctionTooLong: createOverlayManager.createOverlayManager src/createOverlayManager.js:1
What to do
- Resolve the 2 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with createOverlayManager.js, createScene.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate God Classes in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 5 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
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D8 · Code Coverage
No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.
No automated tests
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D9 · Test Distribution
No test suite found.
No tests found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
6 outdated direct production npm dependency(ies) of 8 graded, 0 pinning defect(s), across 1 package.json (1 of them the product) and 1 committed lockfile(s). Development dependencies are deliberately not graded: this dimension grades what SHIPS. Whether any of these packages is DEPRECATED or UNMAINTAINED is not graded — registry.npmjs.org's latest-version answer carries neither, and release age does not stand in for a maintenance status. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: that is a source question, and the frontend dependency lens (R8) answers it in this same run. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from the manifest there.
Outdated (npm): d3-geo
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D14 · License Compliance
0 of 8 shipped npm package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from registry.npmjs.org over the 8 production dependency(ies) this repository's committed lockfile resolves, across 1 product package.json manifest(s). Its 7 `devDependencies` declaration(s) are excluded: a consumer installs none of them. ★ DEPTH: this is the DIRECT production set the lockfile resolves, NOT the transitive closure — only one of the four lock dialects this pass reads states a full graph, so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is outside this verdict, exactly as the JVM arm's declaration-site verdict is. ★ Each licence is the one the registry publishes for the package's CURRENT release rather than for the pinned version, which is the same caveat the Hex and RubyGems arms carry.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D19 · Documentation Quality
The repository's single README is a well-written, descriptive document that explains what city-roads does (render every road in any city at once), shows an impressive demo, and covers the data source (OpenStreetMap overpass API with ODbL licensing), caching strategy (indexed cities stored as protobuf proto/place.proto in index-large-cities repo), name-resolution via nominatim, and scripting capability (city-script). It also states limitations (browser/memory capacity, Tokyo crash on a low-end phone) and support guidance. The document is well written but lacks the standard documentation elements for an open project: no installation/build instructions, no usage examples in the README itself, and no dedicated architecture or license section.
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.0/10. — The repository's single README is a well-written, descriptive document that explains what city-roads does (render every road in any city at once), shows an impressive demo, and covers the data source (OpenStreetMap overpass API with ODbL licensing), caching strategy (indexed cities stored as protobuf proto/place.proto in index-large-cities repo), name-resolution via nominatim, and scripting capability (city-script). It also states limitations (browser/memory capacity, Tokyo crash on a low-end phone) and support guidance. The document is well written but lacks the standard documentation elements for an open project: no installation/build instructions, no usage examples in the README itself, and no dedicated architecture or license section.
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D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
No ADRs found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 1 build units (npm) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
16 finding(s): 0 critical, 12 high, 4 medium, 0 low.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
- Resolve the 12 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (12). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Medium vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
17 of 17 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/components/FindPlace.vue. Counted over 17 of the 38 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
Orphaned files with no living knowledge
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
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D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 0 platform declaration(s) and 8 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
- A <canvas> with no aria-label/title and no inner fallback content can't be described by assistive tech. Add a name or fallback content. — index.html:55
What to do
- Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
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AC2 · Forms & labels
- This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. — src/components/EditableLabel.vue:5
- This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. — src/components/FindPlace.vue:8
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
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AC3 · Page structure
- The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). — index.html:2
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — index.html:2
- user-scalable=no/0 or a maximum-scale below 2 stops low-vision users zooming to 200%. Remove the zoom restriction from the viewport meta. — index.html:16
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
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AC4 · Keyboard semantics
- A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. — src/components/ColorPicker.vue:3
What to do
- Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
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AC5 · ARIA correctness
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AC6 · Visual & motion safety
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AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 13 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
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AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
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AX3 · Project dependency cycles
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AX4 · Dependency direction
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
What to do
- Start a test surface where your build system looks for one (tests/, test/, spec/, or your ecosystem's test source set) — the separation follows from putting the first tests in the right place.
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
- nominatim name resolution claimed but no nominatim dependency is present — reported by the model that read the README against this repository; no term search was run for this one, so nothing here has been checked against the tree. Treat it as a reading to confirm, not as a measured contradiction: verify it against the code before acting on it, and if the footprint it describes does exist, this row is wrong.
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: nominatim name resolution claimed but no nominatim dependency is present.
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P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
What to do
- Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/javascript`, or eslint-plugin-security — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety
- 0 typed · 37 plain JS — the untyped files are src/App.vue, src/NoWebGL.vue, src/components/ColorPicker.vue, src/components/EditableLabel.vue, src/components/FindPlace.vue, src/components/LoadingIcon.vue (+31 more).
What to do
- Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
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R10 · Code Duplication
- src/components/vue3-color/common/Hue.vue:72 · src/components/vue3-color/common/Saturation.vue:40 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 220 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — src/components/vue3-color/common/Hue.vue:72
- src/components/vue3-color/common/Hue.vue:100 · src/components/vue3-color/common/Hue.vue:119 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — src/components/vue3-color/common/Hue.vue:100
What to do
- Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.
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R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- _colorChange has cyclomatic complexity 25 and cognitive complexity 22; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/components/vue3-color/mixin/color.js:3
- (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 22 and cognitive complexity 17; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/lib/canvas2BlobPolyfill.js:17
- handleChange has cyclomatic complexity 14 and cognitive complexity 20; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive is at or above cyclomatic here, so the branching is nested or entangled rather than laid out side by side — extracting each decision into its own named function is the change that pays. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/components/vue3-color/common/Hue.vue:72
- inputChange has cyclomatic complexity 12 and cognitive complexity 9; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — src/components/vue3-color/Sketch.vue:127
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
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R3 · Large Files
What to do
- Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
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R4 · Test Coverage
- 0% of 36 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
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R5 · Dependency Freshness
What to do
- Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
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R6 · Tooling
- test ✗ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.
What to do
- Add a test runner (vitest / jest / playwright) and type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
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R7 · Dead Code
- Unreachable from the 1 application, 1 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on `npm run build` — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make (×3) — src/lib/protobufExport.js, src/proto/encode.js, src/proto/decode.js
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
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R8 · Dependency Hygiene
Do you agree with this assessment?
R9 · Circular Imports
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S1 · Web-Security Posture
- `https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtag/js?id=G-TXT6313TGG` is executed by this page with no Subresource Integrity. Whoever can answer that request — the CDN, anyone who compromises it, anyone on the network path — runs arbitrary script in this page's origin, with its session. The URL also names no version, so it resolves to whatever that origin serves at fetch time — the executed bytes can change with nobody touching this repository. — index.html:4
What to do
- Pin third-party scripts and verify them: name an exact version in the URL and add an `integrity="sha384-…"` hash alongside `crossorigin="anonymous"` (both are required — an integrity hash on a cross-origin script without `crossorigin` is not evaluated, it blocks the script). Where the vendor ships a continuously-updated loader and publishes no stable hash (tag managers, analytics, chat widgets), Subresource Integrity is not available: constrain it instead with a `Content-Security-Policy` that names the exact origins allowed to execute, and drop the script from the pages that do not need it. Where the page is shipped inside a package that others host, prefer vendoring the asset and serving it from the app’s own origin, so no consumer inherits a third-party dependency they did not choose.
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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped
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X25 · Inert configuration knob
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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element
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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC4 · Keyboard semantics | 2.1.1, 2.4.3 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 59% | Adequate — gated by R1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 44% | Weak — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 20% | Critical — gated by D8, D9, R4, R6, P1, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 82% | Adequate — gated by D30 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Accessibility | 39% | Weak — gated by AC1, AC4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not evidenced — 6 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
Not included — 73 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's.
- AX2 Stateful singletons — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs each process's requests on one event loop, so no two requests write a shared object at the same instant (interleaving across an await is a different defect).
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — the dev server did not expose a crawlable HTTP endpoint in time — no runtime evidence This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, firstName, dateOfBirth, phoneNumber, …) or stored credential on a TypeORM/MikroORM/sequelize-typescript/NestJS-Mongoose entity, a Mongoose schema, a Sequelize or Drizzle table, a Knex migration or a Prisma model — and no database or data-store client in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect. If it does persist personal data (through a hosted backend configured outside this repository, for instance), the controls belong to wherever that data is stored.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
- D11 Test Reliability — No test suite was found to re-run, so reliability couldn't be assessed. Two searches produced that zero and both came back empty: the classifier that reads the loaded workspace recognised no suite it could run, and a walk of the source on disk — which covers the JS/TS `*.test.*` and `*.spec.*` conventions and probes for a Pester suite — found no test source in any other ecosystem either. Neither search reaches a suite that is missing from the loaded workspace and carries no name either walk recognises, so this is 'no suite found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none.
- D16 Bus Factor — single-contributor repository — bus factor is not applicable
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this npm build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — This check finds retry-prone mutations (command handlers and message/event consumers) by walking the repository's declared types, and none was loaded here, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C# syntax, and none was loaded for this repository. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P2 Observability — This repository's JavaScript/TypeScript source (1 module(s), 26 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JavaScript/TypeScript source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for tinybench, mitata, benchmark.js, benny or vitest `bench(...)` calls in files that import them (or `*.bench.*` files), or one of those in a package.json, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: TypeScript/JavaScript runs on a garbage-collected runtime that gives a program no allocation-control idiom to choose on a hot path — no pools, stack allocation or value types — so allocation awareness is not something this code can be rated on.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: this repository declares no async functions, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X12 Unreachable branch — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X13 Undrained process stream — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X14 Bypassable address classification — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 18 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
AC2 · Forms & labels
- <input> without a programmatic label src/components/EditableLabel.vue:5
- <input> without a programmatic label src/components/FindPlace.vue:8
AC3 · Page structure
- <html> without a lang index.html:2
AC3 · Page structure
- Viewport restricts zoom index.html:16
AC4 · Keyboard semantics
- Click handler on a non-interactive <div> src/components/ColorPicker.vue:3
D8 · Code Coverage
- No automated tests
Serious — 31 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
D3 · God Classes
- FunctionTooLong: createOverlayManager.createOverlayManager src/createOverlayManager.js:1
- FunctionTooLong: createScene.createScene src/lib/createScene.js:17
AC1 · Text alternatives
- <canvas> without a text alternative index.html:55
AC3 · Page structure
- Page without a main landmark index.html:2
AC7 · A11y enforcement
- Accessibility enforcement below the top rung
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- (anonymous) (cyclomatic 34) src/lib/canvas2BlobPolyfill.js:17
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- createOverlayManager.createOverlayManager (cyclomatic 31) src/createOverlayManager.js:1
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- color._colorChange (cyclomatic 25) src/components/vue3-color/mixin/color.js:3
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- createOverlayManager.createOverlayManager (cognitive 38) src/createOverlayManager.js:1
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- (anonymous) (cognitive 33) src/lib/canvas2BlobPolyfill.js:17
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- _colorChange (cognitive 22) src/components/vue3-color/mixin/color.js:3
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- createScene (cognitive 17) src/lib/createScene.js:17
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- request.request (cognitive 16) src/lib/request.js:3
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- REDACTED
P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI pipeline
R1 · Type Safety
- Type Safety
R10 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block with local edits (31 matched lines × 2 locations) src/components/vue3-color/common/Hue.vue:72
R10 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2 locations) src/components/vue3-color/common/Hue.vue:100
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Complex function _colorChange (cyclomatic 25, cognitive 22) src/components/vue3-color/mixin/color.js:3
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 22, cognitive 17) src/lib/canvas2BlobPolyfill.js:17
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Complex function handleChange (cyclomatic 14, cognitive 20) src/components/vue3-color/common/Hue.vue:72
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Complex function inputChange (cyclomatic 12, cognitive 9) src/components/vue3-color/Sketch.vue:127
R4 · Test Coverage
- Test Coverage
R6 · Tooling
- No test or typecheck script
R7 · Dead Code
- Dead file (~27 LoC) src/lib/protobufExport.js
R7 · Dead Code
- Dead file (~24 LoC) src/proto/encode.js
R7 · Dead Code
- Dead file (~8 LoC) src/proto/decode.js
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- Third-party script without Subresource Integrity index.html:4
Minor — 7 finding(s)
D20 · ADR Quality
- No ADRs found
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Orphaned files with no living knowledge
D9 · Test Distribution
- No tests found
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No ADRs
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No architecture diagram/doc
M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README/code drift
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No SAST
Minor — 6 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Outdated (npm): d3-geo
- Outdated (npm): ngraph.events
- Outdated (npm): pbf
- Outdated (npm): tinycolor2
- Outdated (npm): vue
- Outdated (npm): w-gl
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-ce5cc37d38e148e896876e6ffe9243c5/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-ce5cc37d38e148e896876e6ffe9243c5/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off . | 0 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 16 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |