Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
apache/couchdb carries serious gaps (49%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Event Sourcing (100%) — its event log is trustworthy to replay. Architecture (100%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (38%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Code Health (49%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Run what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage); Nothing pauses a release for a human (Deployment & Rollback).
For scale: Large (~131,491 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~1.3 person-years (~1–3 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Event Sourcing foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
49%
Weak · gated by R1
Architecture
100% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
77%
Strong
Readiness
38%
Weak · gated by R4, P3
Security
56%
Adequate · gated by D28, D29
Event-Driven
60%
Adequate
Event Sourcing
100% ★
Exemplary
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 38% · 46% weightCode Health 49% · 25% weightSecurity 56% · 14% weightEvent-Driven 60% · 8% weightMaturity 77% · 4% weightArchitecture 100% · 2% weightEvent Sourcing 100% · 1% weight
Raise Readiness 38 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 49 → ~57.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €64,000–€320,000
| Cost to rebuild | €64,000–€320,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 49% quality) |
| Size & shape | Large · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~1.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€190,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 38% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Run what this repository's stack ships: dialyzer or elvis — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
2
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
3
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Large asset (~1.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 38%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Run what this repository's stack ships: dialyzer or elvis — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Event-Driven
At a glance — Event Sourcing
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 35 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 13 | High / Critical |
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 1 | Medium |
Roadmap
First, integrate security and performance tooling, such as semgrep, to fail the build on regressions. Next, establish a safe release process by gating deployments behind manual approval to prevent bad builds from reaching users. Then, introduce TypeScript type checking to the frontend build and add tests for all production modules to ensure coverage. Finally, reduce cyclomatic complexity in high-traffic functions to improve maintainability.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Run what this repository's stack ships: dialyzer or elvis — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +9.5 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +9.5 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it. | +9.0 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up. | +4.5 pts | Medium | Type Safety |
| Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5. | +4.4 pts | Medium | Cyclomatic Complexity |
| Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components. | +3.0 pts | Medium | Code Duplication |
| Remove synchronous peer round-trips (gen_server:call / hand-rolled receive) and blocking sleeps from OTP message handlers — cast a follow-up or resolve state locally, so processes stay temporally decoupled and deadlock-free. | +2.3 pts | Medium | Handler temporal coupling |
| Resolve the 7 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with run-test262.c (5), run, quickjs-libc.c. | +1.0 pts | Low | Static Analysis (SAST) |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| dev/run | 2.8 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: eval-detected |
| src/docs/src/api/server/authn.rst | 4.4 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| src/couch_quickjs/quickjs/run-test262.c | 4.6 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn |
| src/docs/src/api/database/bulk-api.rst | 4.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| share/doc/src/api/database/bulk-api.rst | 4.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| share/doc/src/api/server/authn.rst | 4.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| share/doc/src/api/authn.rst | 5.1 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| src/docs/src/intro/security.rst | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| share/doc/src/config/auth.rst | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| share/doc/src/intro/security.rst | 5.8 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| src/fabric/src/fabric_view_map.erl | 7.0 | Mixed | God Classes: FileTooLong: src/fabric_view_map.erl |
| src/docs/src/config/auth.rst | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| src/docs/src/json-structure.rst | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| src/docs/src/query-server/protocol.rst | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| rel/overlay/etc/default.ini | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| share/doc/src/query-server/protocol.rst | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| share/doc/src/json-structure.rst | 7.2 | Mixed | Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key |
| src/couch_quickjs/quickjs/quickjs-libc.c | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn |
| src/chttpd/src/chttpd_db.erl | 7.8 | Mixed | God Classes: FileTooLong: src/chttpd_db.erl |
| src/couch/src/couch_db.erl | 7.8 | Mixed | God Classes: TooManyMethods: couch_db |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 29 of 31 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 31 dimensions across the health lenses
D3D4D7D13D16D20D21D28D29D31D34D35D38AX9ED1ES1ES2M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6R1R10R2R3R4R9
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 171 of 182 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D3 · God Classes
115 god class(es) detected.
FileTooLong: src/chttpd_db.erl src/chttpd/src/chttpd_db.erl:0
TooManyMethods: couch_db src/couch/src/couch_db.erl:13
What to do
- Resolve the 61 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with chttpd_db.erl, couch_db.erl, mango_cursor_view.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (61 warning-level).
- Resolve the 54 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with couch_db.erl, chttpd.erl, couch_httpd.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (54 warning-level).
- Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D7 · Architectural Integrity
Of 9 mechanizable ADRs, 9 are prevented by analyzers, 0 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Dependency cycles not checked (no project-reference graph; where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor
66 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/mango/src/mango_selector.erl.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D20 · ADR Quality
Evaluated 16 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 7.5/10 (mixed — many ADRs miss context or consequences). 1 flagged with a specific gap.
Decision/consequences are cut by the scanner clip marker mid-terminology definition ("min_backoff_penalty": ...), so the explicit replicator implementation decision and its trade-offs fall past the visible portionsrc/docs/rfcs/016-fdb-replicator.md
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Decision/consequences are cut by the scanner clip marker mid-terminology… finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 016-fdb-replicator.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D28 · Secrets (history)
41 finding(s): 0 critical, 41 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/api/server/authn.rst:332
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
- Resolve the 34 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with authn.rst (14), bulk-api.rst (8), security.rst (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (34 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
13 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 3 medium, 3 low.
High: eval-detected dev/run:1362
Medium: use-defused-xml build-aux/show-test-results.py:8
Low: dynamic-urllib-use-detected dev/run:1113
What to do
- Resolve the 7 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with run-test262.c (5), run, quickjs-libc.c. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with run (2), show-test-results.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with run (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D31 · IaC & Container Security
trivy and checkov found no infrastructure-as-code or container misconfigurations.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
36 of 343 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/weatherreport/src/weatherreport_getopt.erl.
Orphaned knowledge src/weatherreport/src/weatherreport_getopt.erl
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with weatherreport_getopt.erl, couch_mrview_debug.erl, couch_index.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: fabric_view_map.erl↔fabric_view_reduce.erl 65%; fabric_doc_open.erl↔fabric_doc_open_revs.erl 57%; loop.js↔util.js 54%
Change coupling: fabric_view_map.erl ↔ fabric_view_reduce.erl src/fabric/src/fabric_view_map.erl
Do you agree with this assessment?
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, 0 low.
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted]src/mango/requirements.txt
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX9 · CQS / query purity
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED1 · Handler temporal coupling
- `couch_httpd_vhost` clause `handle_config_change/5#413` makes a synchronous `gen_server`/`gen_statem:call` round-trip to a peer process while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, react by casting a follow-up message (fire-and-forget), or resolve the needed state locally. — couch_httpd_vhost.erl:414
- `couch_log_sup` clause `handle_config_change/5#57` makes a synchronous `gen_server`/`gen_statem:call` round-trip to a peer process while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, react by casting a follow-up message (fire-and-forget), or resolve the needed state locally. — couch_log_sup.erl:72
What to do
- Remove synchronous peer round-trips (gen_server:call / hand-rolled receive) and blocking sleeps from OTP message handlers — cast a follow-up or resolve state locally, so processes stay temporally decoupled and deadlock-free.
Do you agree with this assessment?
ES1 · Fold determinism
Do you agree with this assessment?
ES2 · Immutable events
Do you agree with this assessment?
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 1 of 9 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.2 pts.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M2 · Architecture documentation
What to do
- Grow the ADR log (currently 17) — reach 20 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M3 · Folder & project structure
Do you agree with this assessment?
M4 · Documentation accuracy
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates
Do you agree with this assessment?
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add dialyzer or elvis (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.
What to do
- Run what this repository's stack ships: dialyzer or elvis — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P6 · Release Hygiene
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety
- 0 typed · 14 plain JS — the untyped files are share/server/60/rewrite_fun.js, share/server/60/rewrite_fun_ast_bypass.js, share/server/dispatch-quickjs.js, share/server/dreyfus.js, share/server/filter.js, share/server/loop.js (+8 more).
What to do
- Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R10 · Code Duplication
- share/server/60/rewrite_fun.js:34 · share/server/60/rewrite_fun_ast_bypass.js:40 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and what repeats is a LIST OF ENTRIES rather than behaviour — the same names written out more than once. Extract them into one shared, exported constant and spread that constant into each site, rather than into a function the sites call: a list like this often lives in declarative metadata (a decorator's options object, a static configuration table) that a build step must be able to read statically, where a function call is not allowed. Adding an entry to one copy and not the other is the failure this prevents. — rewrite_fun.js:34
- share/server/dispatch-quickjs.js:26 · share/server/loop.js:31 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and what repeats is a LIST OF ENTRIES rather than behaviour — the same names written out more than once. Extract them into one shared, exported constant and spread that constant into each site, rather than into a function the sites call: a list like this often lives in declarative metadata (a decorator's options object, a static configuration table) that a build step must be able to read statically, where a function call is not allowed. Adding an entry to one copy and not the other is the failure this prevents. — dispatch-quickjs.js:26
- share/server/dispatch-quickjs.js:48 · share/server/loop.js:57 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — dispatch-quickjs.js:48
- share/server/dispatch-quickjs.js:159 · share/server/dispatch-quickjs.js:171 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — dispatch-quickjs.js:159
- share/server/dreyfus.js:48 · share/server/nouveau.js:94 · share/server/views.js:125 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — dreyfus.js:48
- share/server/dispatch-quickjs.js:14 · share/server/loop.js:16 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and what repeats is a LIST OF ENTRIES rather than behaviour — the same names written out more than once. Extract them into one shared, exported constant and spread that constant into each site, rather than into a function the sites call: a list like this often lives in declarative metadata (a decorator's options object, a static configuration table) that a build step must be able to read statically, where a function call is not allowed. Adding an entry to one copy and not the other is the failure this prevents. — dispatch-quickjs.js:14
- share/server/dreyfus.js:15 · share/server/nouveau.js:15 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — dreyfus.js:15
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×3) — render.js:237, mimeparse.js:90, util.js:13
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage
- 0% of 14 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Do you agree with this assessment?
R9 · Circular Imports
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 49% | Weak — gated by R1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 77% | Strong | Solid. |
| Readiness | 38% | Weak — gated by R4, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 56% | Adequate — gated by D28, D29 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Event-Driven | 60% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Event Sourcing | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Not included — 75 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.erl, .exs, .hrl, .java, .py) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~78815 lines of test source are present (.exs, .erl, .py, .ex) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — no supported dependency manifest was read
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .erl, .exs, .hrl, .java, .py — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.erl, .exs, .hrl, .java, .py) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.erl, .exs, .hrl, .java, .py) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — none of 16 ADRs are conformance-checkable — unverifiable.
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), a Gradle version catalogue, a Maven POM, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .erl, .exs, .hrl, .java, .py, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.exs, .erl, .py, .ex) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (877 value object(s))
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
- R6 Tooling — no package.json in the repository — test/lint/typecheck wiring is read from package.json scripts (corroborated against CI), so this project's own toolchain isn't measured here
- R7 Dead Code — Not measured — no application, tooling or test entry point was detected, so no file can be shown to be reachable or unreachable. Declare an entry (package.json main/module/exports, src/index.*, or an index.html script) to enable reachability.
- R8 Dependency Hygiene — Not measured — no package.json declares any dependency, so there is nothing to check imports against (imports may resolve through a host runtime rather than node).
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 44 finding(s)
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/api/server/authn.rst:332
- Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/api/database/bulk-api.rst:63
- Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/api/database/bulk-api.rst:70
- Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/api/database/bulk-api.rst:77
- Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/api/database/bulk-api.rst:84
- Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/api/server/authn.rst:155
- Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/api/server/authn.rst:184
- Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/api/server/authn.rst:211
- Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/api/server/authn.rst:223
- Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/api/server/authn.rst:260
- Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/api/server/authn.rst:321
- Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/config/auth.rst:330
- Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/intro/security.rst:233
- Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/intro/security.rst:465
- Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/json-structure.rst:403
- Secret: generic-api-key src/docs/src/query-server/protocol.rst:571
- Secret: generic-api-key rel/overlay/etc/default.ini:107
- Secret: generic-api-key share/doc/src/config/auth.rst:222
- Secret: generic-api-key share/doc/src/config/auth.rst:315
- Secret: generic-api-key share/doc/src/intro/security.rst:230
- Secret: generic-api-key share/doc/src/intro/security.rst:424
- Secret: generic-api-key share/doc/src/api/database/bulk-api.rst:99
- Secret: generic-api-key share/doc/src/api/database/bulk-api.rst:106
- Secret: generic-api-key share/doc/src/api/database/bulk-api.rst:113
- Secret: generic-api-key share/doc/src/api/database/bulk-api.rst:120
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: eval-detected dev/run:1362
- High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn src/couch_quickjs/quickjs/quickjs-libc.c:513
- High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn src/couch_quickjs/quickjs/run-test262.c:291
- High: insecure-use-strcat-fn src/couch_quickjs/quickjs/run-test262.c:292
- High: insecure-use-string-copy-fn src/couch_quickjs/quickjs/run-test262.c:294
- High: double-free src/couch_quickjs/quickjs/run-test262.c:1577
- High: double-free src/couch_quickjs/quickjs/run-test262.c:1578
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Orphaned knowledge src/weatherreport/src/weatherreport_getopt.erl
- Orphaned knowledge src/couch_mrview/src/couch_mrview_debug.erl
- Orphaned knowledge src/couch_index/src/couch_index.erl
Warning — 125 finding(s)
D3 · God Classes
- FileTooLong: src/chttpd_db.erl src/chttpd/src/chttpd_db.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/couch_db.erl src/couch/src/couch_db.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/mango_cursor_view.erl src/mango/src/mango_cursor_view.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/chttpd.erl src/chttpd/src/chttpd.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/couch_replicator_scheduler.erl src/couch_replicator/src/couch_replicator_scheduler.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/couch_httpd.erl src/couch/src/couch_httpd.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/couch_httpd_db.erl src/couch/src/couch_httpd_db.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/mem3_rep.erl src/mem3/src/mem3_rep.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/mango_selector.erl src/mango/src/mango_selector.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/couch_mrview_util.erl src/couch_mrview/src/couch_mrview_util.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/couch_btree.erl src/couch/src/couch_btree.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/mango_cursor_text.erl src/mango/src/mango_cursor_text.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/couch_replicator_scheduler_job.erl src/couch_replicator/src/couch_replicator_scheduler_job.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/mango_cursor.erl src/mango/src/mango_cursor.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/couch_debug.erl src/couch/src/couch_debug.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/fabric_doc_update.erl src/fabric/src/fabric_doc_update.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/couch_bt_engine.erl src/couch/src/couch_bt_engine.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/couch_multidb_changes.erl src/couch/src/couch_multidb_changes.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/couch_server.erl src/couch/src/couch_server.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/couch_replicator_api_wrap.erl src/couch_replicator/src/couch_replicator_api_wrap.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/couch_query_servers.erl src/couch/src/couch_query_servers.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/couch_replicator_doc_processor.erl src/couch_replicator/src/couch_replicator_doc_processor.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/couch_log_trunc_io.erl src/couch_log/src/couch_log_trunc_io.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/fabric_view.erl src/fabric/src/fabric_view.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/couch_file.erl src/couch/src/couch_file.erl:0
D3 · God Classes
- TooManyMethods: couch_db src/couch/src/couch_db.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: chttpd src/chttpd/src/chttpd.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: couch_httpd src/couch/src/couch_httpd.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: couch_mrview_util src/couch_mrview/src/couch_mrview_util.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: couch_bt_engine src/couch/src/couch_bt_engine.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: couch_util src/couch/src/couch_util.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: couch_replicator_scheduler src/couch_replicator/src/couch_replicator_scheduler.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: couch_file src/couch/src/couch_file.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: fabric src/fabric/src/fabric.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: chttpd_db src/chttpd/src/chttpd_db.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: fabric_rpc src/fabric/src/fabric_rpc.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: mem3 src/mem3/src/mem3.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: config src/config/src/config.erl:19
- TooManyMethods: couch_query_servers src/couch/src/couch_query_servers.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: couch_btree src/couch/src/couch_btree.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: couch_debug src/couch/src/couch_debug.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: couch_quickjs_scanner_plugin src/couch_quickjs/src/couch_quickjs_scanner_plugin.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: mem3_reshard src/mem3/src/mem3_reshard.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: couch_proc_manager src/couch/src/couch_proc_manager.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: couch_db_engine src/couch/src/couch_db_engine.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: couch_server src/couch/src/couch_server.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: couch_scanner_plugin src/couch_scanner/src/couch_scanner_plugin.erl:83
- TooManyMethods: mem3_reshard_job src/mem3/src/mem3_reshard_job.erl:13
- TooManyMethods: couch_log_trunc_io_fmt src/couch_log/src/couch_log_trunc_io_fmt.erl:23
- TooManyMethods: mem3_rep src/mem3/src/mem3_rep.erl:13
D35 · Change Coupling
- Change coupling: fabric_view_map.erl ↔ fabric_view_reduce.erl src/fabric/src/fabric_view_map.erl
- Change coupling: fabric_doc_open.erl ↔ fabric_doc_open_revs.erl src/fabric/src/fabric_doc_open.erl
- Change coupling: loop.js ↔ util.js share/server/loop.js
- Change coupling: util.js ↔ views.js share/server/util.js
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: use-defused-xml build-aux/show-test-results.py:8
- Medium: dangerous-subprocess-use-tainted-env-args dev/run:793
- Medium: dangerous-subprocess-use-tainted-env-args dev/run:896
D19 · Documentation Quality
- LLM evaluation failed
D20 · ADR Quality
- Decision/consequences are cut by the scanner clip marker mid-terminology definition ("min_backoff_penalty": ...), so the explicit replicator implementation decision and its trade-offs fall past the visible portion src/docs/rfcs/016-fdb-replicator.md
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/mango/requirements.txt
Recommendation — 11 finding(s)
D16 · Bus Factor
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #2
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #3
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Low: dynamic-urllib-use-detected dev/run:1113
- Low: subprocess-shell-true dev/run:1353
- Low: subprocess-shell-true dev/run:1357
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
- complexity unreadable for .erl, .exs, .hrl, .java, .py — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — no supported dependency manifest was read
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 41 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 13 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 1 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |