Executive summary
⚠ A critical security finding caps this grade — resolve it before relying on the score below; see the Security lens.
Preview (pre-1.0). This repo hasn't declared a stable release, so it's judged against a relaxed, pre-production bar.
This system holds a 58% health score, placing it in the At Risk category. While the underlying code is clean and the architecture is sound, the system lacks the operational safeguards necessary for reliable, long-term delivery. The primary concern is not the quality of the code itself, but the absence of automated checks that prevent errors from reaching production. This gap creates unnecessary friction for developers and increases the likelihood of costly outages or security regressions slipping through the cracks.
The asset is small, comprising roughly 7,400 lines of production code, with a rebuild cost estimated at just under €9,000. This low value-at-stake means the business is not exposed to massive technical debt, but it is exposed to operational fragility. The code is well-structured and mature in its design, yet it fails to meet basic production readiness standards. Without automated testing and security scanning integrated into the development workflow, every change carries a hidden risk of regression, slowing down future feature delivery and increasing maintenance overhead.
The most critical theme is Operational Fragility. With a readiness score of 43%, the system lacks the safety nets required for confident deployment. There is no continuous integration pipeline to verify builds or run tests automatically. This means that bugs and security vulnerabilities can be introduced without immediate detection, relying instead on manual processes that are prone to human error. This lack of automation directly impacts delivery speed and reliability, as teams must spend more time verifying changes manually rather than shipping new value.
A secondary theme is Decision Visibility. The maturity score of 50% suggests that while the code is understandable, the rationale behind key architectural choices is not well-documented. This makes it difficult for new team members to onboard quickly or for existing members to understand the context of past decisions. Without clear records of significant design choices, the team risks repeating past mistakes or making inconsistent decisions that could complicate future maintenance.
On the positive side, the code health is excellent at 94%, and the architecture is robust at 100%. The security posture is also strong at 92%, indicating that current controls are effective. These strengths provide a solid foundation for improvement. The highest-leverage action is to implement a continuous integration workflow that builds and tests every change. This single step will address the most significant risks by automating quality checks and security scanning, providing immediate protection and enabling faster, safer delivery. Focus here first, as it unlocks the potential of the existing high-quality codebase.
Code Health
94% ★
Exemplary
Architecture
100% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
50%
Adequate · gated by D34, M2
Readiness
43%
Adequate · gated by P1, P3
Security
92% ★
Exemplary
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 43% · 47% weightMaturity 50% · 26% weightSecurity 92% · 14% weightCode Health 94% · 8% weightArchitecture 100% · 4% weight
Raise Readiness 43 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 58 → ~67.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (7+)
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €2,900–€15,000
| Cost to rebuild | €2,900–€15,000 |
|---|---|
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.8× (at 58% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€8,800 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 43% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
2
Run what this repository's stack ships: dialyzer or elvis — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
3
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 43%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — module dependency graph
Architecture — module dependency matrix
| depends on → | 1 (global) | 2 cotton_hessian | 3 dubbo_adapter | 4 dubbo_client_default | 5 dubbo_cluster_failfast | 6 dubbo_codec | 7 dubbo_common_fun | 8 dubbo_config_util | 9 dubbo_directory | 10 dubbo_exchanger | 11 dubbo_extension | 12 dubbo_filter | 13 dubbo_heartbeat | 14 dubbo_id_generator | 15 dubbo_invoker | 16 dubbo_java_type_defined | 17 dubbo_node_config_util | 18 dubbo_protocol | 19 dubbo_protocol_dubbo | 20 dubbo_protocol_registry | 21 dubbo_provider_consumer_reg_table | 22 dubbo_provider_protocol | 23 dubbo_provider_worker | 24 dubbo_reference_config | 25 dubbo_registry | 26 dubbo_registry_zookeeper | 27 dubbo_sample_service_app | 28 dubbo_sample_service_type_list | 29 dubbo_serializa_hessian | 30 dubbo_serializa_json | 31 dubbo_service_config | 32 dubbo_shutdown | 33 dubbo_time_util | 34 dubbo_traffic_control | 35 dubbo_type_encoding | 36 dubbo_type_register | 37 dubbo_type_transfer | 38 dubboerl | 39 org.apache.dubbo.erlang.analysis.parse | 40 org.apache.dubbo.erlang.analysis.generater |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (global) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2 cotton_hessian | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 dubbo_adapter | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 dubbo_client_default | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 dubbo_cluster_failfast | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 dubbo_codec | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 dubbo_common_fun | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 dubbo_config_util | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 dubbo_directory | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 dubbo_exchanger | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 dubbo_extension | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 dubbo_filter | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 dubbo_heartbeat | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14 dubbo_id_generator | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 dubbo_invoker | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 dubbo_java_type_defined | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 dubbo_node_config_util | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 dubbo_protocol | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 dubbo_protocol_dubbo | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20 dubbo_protocol_registry | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 dubbo_provider_consumer_reg_table | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22 dubbo_provider_protocol | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23 dubbo_provider_worker | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24 dubbo_reference_config | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25 dubbo_registry | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 26 dubbo_registry_zookeeper | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 27 dubbo_sample_service_app | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 28 dubbo_sample_service_type_list | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 29 dubbo_serializa_hessian | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 30 dubbo_serializa_json | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 31 dubbo_service_config | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 32 dubbo_shutdown | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 33 dubbo_time_util | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 34 dubbo_traffic_control | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 35 dubbo_type_encoding | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 36 dubbo_type_register | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 37 dubbo_type_transfer | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 38 dubboerl | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 39 org.apache.dubbo.erlang.analysis.parse | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 40 org.apache.dubbo.erlang.analysis.generater | 1 |
Dependency, pointing down the layeringAbove the diagonal — part of a cycleThe module itself
40→39 org.apache.dubbo.erlang.analysis.generater depends on org.apache.dubbo.erlang.analysis.parse✕
- Type pairs
- 1 distinct (type in org.apache.dubbo.erlang.analysis.generater → type in org.apache.dubbo.erlang.analysis.parse) reference.
- Which types
org.apache.dubbo.erlang.analysis.generater.ErlProjectGenerater→org.apache.dubbo.erlang.analysis.parse.InterfaceInfo
- Direction
- org.apache.dubbo.erlang.analysis.generater uses org.apache.dubbo.erlang.analysis.parse. Changing org.apache.dubbo.erlang.analysis.parse can break org.apache.dubbo.erlang.analysis.generater, not the reverse.
- Position
- Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D1 · Erlang
Cyclomatic Complexity
8.1
D2 · Erlang
Cognitive Complexity
9.0
D3 · Erlang
God Classes
9.5
D4 · Erlang
Code Duplication
9.2
D17 · Erlang
Explicit Debt
9.9
X25 · Repo
Inert configuration knob
10.0
X26 · Repo
Unsynchronised callback handoff
10.0
X27 · Repo
Collection changed while being enumerated
10.0
X29 · Repo
Per-element action decided by a fixed element
10.0
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
At a glance — Security
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 5 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, establish a CI workflow that builds the code and runs the test suite on every push to ensure immediate feedback. Integrate static analysis and security scanning into this pipeline so that regressions fail the build before they land. Simultaneously, document key architectural decisions in a dedicated directory and update the README with a clear quick-start guide to help new contributors. Finally, maintain a current changelog with versioned entries for each release to preserve project history.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +15.0 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Run what this repository's stack ships: dialyzer or elvis — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +15.0 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +6.5 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 1 Most significant orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with cotton_hessian.erl. | +6.5 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form). | +11.7 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs. | +7.0 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub. | +6.7 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Resolve the 1 Floating source dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. | +1.4 pts | Low | Dependency Hygiene |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 2.7 | Slop | Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED |
| src/cotton_hessian.erl | 6.0 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| src/dubbo_serializa_hessian.erl | 7.1 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) |
| src/dubbo_codec.erl | 7.8 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (30 lines × 3) |
| src/dubbo_type_transfer.erl | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| tools/erlanalysis/src/main/java/org/apache/dubbo/erlang/analysis/parse/CommonTypeInfo.java | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| src/dubbo_client_default.erl | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) |
| src/dubbo_extension.erl | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) |
| src/dubbo_common_fun.erl | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) |
| samples/dubboerl_demo/apps/dubbo_sample_service/src/dubbo_sample_service_app.erl | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) |
| tools/erlanalysis/src/main/java/org/apache/dubbo/erlang/analysis/generater/ErlProjectGenerater.java | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) |
| samples/dubboerl_demo/apps/dubbo_sample_service/src/userOperator.erl | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) |
| samples/dubboerl_demo/apps/dubbo_sample_service/src/dubbo_sample_service_sup.erl | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) |
How the grades work
Critical — 4
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 27
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Minor — 8
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 38
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 34 of 37 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 37 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D9D12D13D14D15D17D19D21D26D28D29D30D34D35D43D44AX10AX3AX4AX9M1M2M3M4P1P3P6X24X25X26X27X29
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 31 of 39 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Watchdog duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.erl) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.erl) and this repository declares a rebar3 project (repository root, 9 test files, 3 Common Test suites), but it was not re-run: the analyzer environment could not run it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (5 contributor(s) across 121 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 94% of the history; the other 4 hold 1.5% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (rebar.config), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection registrations in C# and annotated Spring beans in Java/Kotlin only, and this repository uses Spring but declares no bean through a stereotype annotation (@Component, @Service, …) this check reads — its beans are defined elsewhere, such as XML, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
- C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
- C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
- C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
- ED5 Idempotency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check finds retry-prone mutations by walking the repository's declared types, and NONE was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to look at. That is a limit of the analyzer's reach — it reads .NET projects — not a finding that this repository has no command handlers or message consumers.
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
- X1 Async correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Scala source only, and no C# was loaded and no Scala was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Scala source only, and no C# was loaded and no Scala was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. X7 measured the part of this repository it reads (C#, Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, Rust, Go, Java and Kotlin), and its Erlang source is outside the check's reach, so the card covers only part of the product. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the unread source is free of silent defaults.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
2 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was cotton_hessian.encode at 78. A further 1 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being cotton_hessian.encode at 22 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
cotton_hessian.encode (cyclomatic 78)src/cotton_hessian.erl:45
cotton_hessian.decode (cyclomatic 66)src/cotton_hessian.erl:501
What to do
- Resolve the 1 cotton_hessian.encode (cyclomatic 78) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with cotton_hessian.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 cotton_hessian.decode (cyclomatic 66) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with cotton_hessian.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cyclomatic Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
2 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was cotton_hessian.encode at 33.
cotton_hessian.encode (cognitive 33)src/cotton_hessian.erl:45
cotton_hessian.decode (cognitive 20)src/cotton_hessian.erl:501
What to do
- Resolve the 1 cotton_hessian.encode (cognitive 33) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with cotton_hessian.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 cotton_hessian.decode (cognitive 20) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with cotton_hessian.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cognitive Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes
1 over-large unit(s) detected — types, modules or files that carry too much.
FileTooLong: src/cotton_hessian.erlsrc/cotton_hessian.erl
What to do
- Resolve the 1 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with cotton_hessian.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate God Classes in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D4 · Code Duplication
16 duplicated block group(s) detected. 2 of the 16 are in trees this repository does not ship — vendored, example/demo, fixture and benchmark code — and are ranked below the shipped groups rather than excluded from them: the duplication there is real and is still counted in this dimension's score. The dimensions that publish a production-file census leave those trees out of theirs, so this count is deliberately drawn over the wider population.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/dubbo_serializa_hessian.erl:222
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/dubbo_serializa_hessian.erl:157
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/cotton_hessian.erl:724
Duplicated block (30 lines × 3)src/dubbo_codec.erl:104
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2)src/cotton_hessian.erl:645
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with dubbo_serializa_hessian.erl, dubbo_common_fun.erl, ErlProjectGenerater.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with dubbo_serializa_hessian.erl (2), dubbo_sample_service_app.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with cotton_hessian.erl, dubbo_serializa_hessian.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Duplication in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D5 · Coupling
2 production modules (Maven+OTP), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; 0 module(s) off the main sequence.
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D9 · Test Distribution
1 test methods: 1 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
1 outdated, 0 retired direct Hex dependencies declared by rebar3, 1 pinning defect(s). A dependency declared at an EXACT version — rebar3's own idiom — is graded against the current release and its remedy is an edit to the `rebar.config` declaration, because `rebar3 upgrade` cannot move past the version the manifest names; a `~>` or bounded requirement that EXCLUDES the newest release is reported as nothing, because that bound is a deliberate constraint. A `{ref, …}`, `{tag, …}` or branch-tracked git dependency is not graded for currency at all: its version is a revision, not a Hex release. Whether any of these packages is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — hex.pm publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Whether any is UNUSED is not graded either: a large idiomatic class of BEAM dependencies — runtime adapters, codec plugins, protocol implementations and OTP applications the release starts — is correctly declared and never referenced in source. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question.
Floating source dependency: dubboerl
Outdated: jsx
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Floating source dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Dependency Hygiene in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D14 · License Compliance
0 of 2 shipped Hex package(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from hex.pm over the packages a consumer installs — this repository's rebar.lock, which is already the transitive closure a consumer installs. rebar3 writes that lock for the DEFAULT profile ONLY, so a dependency declared inside `{profiles, [{test, [{deps, […]}]}]}` has no entry in it and is excluded here for the reason the Mix arm excludes an `only: [:dev, :test]` declaration: it is not installed by anything that depends on this repository. Each licence is the one hex.pm publishes for the package's current release. A further 8 package(s) the closure reaches resolve from git, a path or a local override and publish no licence this pass can read; they are outside this verdict. This repository publishes itself under Apache 2.0, which is its own choice and is not judged here.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D17 · Explicit Debt
3 deducted task-comment markers across 7441 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 9.9. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
TodoComment src/dubbo_type_transfer.erl:78
What to do
- Resolve the 3 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with dubbo_type_transfer.erl, cotton_hessian.erl, CommonTypeInfo.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Explicit Debt in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D19 · Documentation Quality
The repository's root README and its sibling docs are clear and complete for a project that is an Erlang implementation of Apache Dubbo. The root README states the project name (Dubbo Erlang), gives build status badges, lists supported features, shows import/deps via rebar.config, walks through Step1-Step5 with code, provides sample usage, links to docs, and ends with a 'More Documents' badge pointing to the official Dubbo ERlang docs. The sibling READMEs (start.md, protocol.md, consumer.md, provider.md) are each focused on one subsystem and provide configuration examples for their respective tiers. All four README files together give an overview, installation, usage, and contribution guidance; the root README is judged by its own directory's job.
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 1 build units (rebar3) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
5 finding(s): 2 critical, 2 high, 1 medium, 0 low.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
42 of 42 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/cotton_hessian.erl. Counted over 42 of the 66 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
Dormant codebase
Most significant orphaned filesrc/cotton_hessian.erl
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Most significant orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with cotton_hessian.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 15 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
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AX3 · Project dependency cycles
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AX4 · Dependency direction
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX9 · CQS / query purity
Do you agree with this assessment?
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 1 of 3 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.7 pts.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add dialyzer or elvis — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
What to do
- Run what this repository's stack ships: dialyzer or elvis — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P6 · Release Hygiene
- The changelog this check read carries 1 versioned entry, against a bar of 3. Counted as either an `x.y.z` string or a version-shaped section heading (`## [1.2.0]`, `## V14.x.x`, `## Updates in 8.0.x`), whichever is the larger — so a log sectioned by minor series counts its sections, not its individual patch numbers. Entries recorded somewhere this check does not read — release notes generated at tag time from a generator config it did not recognise, or a log kept outside the repository — are not counted here, and this row is about what is re-findable in the tree rather than about how often you release.
What to do
- Keep the changelog current — add a versioned entry (Keep-a-Changelog ## [x.y.z]) for each release so the history isn't a stub.
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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped
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X25 · Inert configuration knob
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X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff
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X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated
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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 94% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 50% | Adequate — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 43% | Adequate — gated by P1, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 92% | Exemplary | Solid. |
Unscored — 1 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
- X31 Test-only surface in a production module — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 5 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 76 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — No container singleton was found, so there is no shared instance for concurrent requests to race on. No class in this Java code is a Spring, JSR-330 or CDI singleton bean. Erlang processes share no mutable memory — state lives in a process's own mailbox — so there is no shared object to race on.
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — This repository has nothing the runtime tiers could boot or serve — no markup, no UI framework or web-server dependency, no UI component source, no native UI project and no API definition — nothing here is a surface to boot — so runtime a11y/egress/header evidence has no subject here. Not applicable: this is neither a gap in the scan nor a finding about your code.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~1001 lines of test source are present (.erl) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .erl suite was found but not re-run
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — D6 reads a CS/VB/GO/SCALA/SWIFT/DART/JAVA/PY/KT/TS/TSX/MTS/CTS/JS/JSX/MJS/CJS/PHP/RB/RS class graph only — this repository's production source is .erl, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (504 value object(s))
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — This check finds retry-prone mutations (command handlers and message/event consumers) by walking the repository's declared types, and none was loaded here, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C# syntax, and none was loaded for this repository. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P2 Observability — This repository's Erlang source (1 module(s), 51 file(s) read) declares no entry point and bootstraps no server, and nothing here deploys a service — it is a library, run inside whatever hosts it, so production observability (structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks) is N/A. If it grows a binary or a service, the dimension reactivates.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HTTP client call or construction in the Erlang, JVM source (service entry point: src/dubbo_protocol_dubbo.erl:167 (ranch:start_listener())
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Benchmark discipline was not assessed: this repository is written in Erlang, whose benchmark frameworks this check does not search yet. That is a gap in the analyzer's language reach, not a finding about your code.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: allocation awareness is rated where code engineers for it — at least 400 production lines that ship benchmarks or already use allocation-aware idioms (8 or more). This repository's Java has 1,519 production line(s), 0 such use(s) and no benchmarks, so there is no allocation work to rate. The card is reward-only: its absence costs nothing.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Not applicable: Erlang has no async/await function colour, so there is no asynchronous code for a blocking call to stall.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X12 Unreachable branch — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X13 Undrained process stream — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X14 Bypassable address classification — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 4 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- REDACTED
- REDACTED
Serious — 27 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt
- TodoComment src/dubbo_type_transfer.erl:78
- TodoComment src/cotton_hessian.erl:222
- TodoComment tools/erlanalysis/src/main/java/org/apache/dubbo/erlang/analysis/parse/CommonTypeInfo.java:61
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/dubbo_serializa_hessian.erl:222
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/dubbo_common_fun.erl:25
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) tools/erlanalysis/src/main/java/org/apache/dubbo/erlang/analysis/generater/ErlProjectGenerater.java:135
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/dubbo_serializa_hessian.erl:157
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/dubbo_serializa_hessian.erl:184
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) samples/dubboerl_demo/apps/dubbo_sample_service/src/dubbo_sample_service_app.erl:33
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/cotton_hessian.erl:724
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/dubbo_serializa_hessian.erl:211
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- cotton_hessian.encode (cyclomatic 78) src/cotton_hessian.erl:45
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- cotton_hessian.decode (cyclomatic 66) src/cotton_hessian.erl:501
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Floating source dependency: dubboerl
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- cotton_hessian.encode (cognitive 33) src/cotton_hessian.erl:45
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- cotton_hessian.decode (cognitive 20) src/cotton_hessian.erl:501
D3 · God Classes
- FileTooLong: src/cotton_hessian.erl src/cotton_hessian.erl
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- REDACTED
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (30 lines × 3) src/dubbo_codec.erl:104
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/cotton_hessian.erl:645
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/dubbo_serializa_hessian.erl:66
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/dubbo_client_default.erl:326
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) src/dubbo_codec.erl:94
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/dubbo_extension.erl:81
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) samples/dubboerl_demo/apps/dubbo_sample_service/src/userOperator.erl:55
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) samples/dubboerl_demo/apps/dubbo_sample_service/src/dubbo_sample_service_sup.erl:22
P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI pipeline
Minor — 7 finding(s)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Dormant codebase
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Most significant orphaned file src/cotton_hessian.erl
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No ADRs
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No architecture diagram/doc
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No SAST
P6 · Release Hygiene
- Changelog looks stale/thin
X31 · Test-only surface in a production module
- Test-only surface in a production module samples/dubboerl_demo/apps/dubboerl_demo/src/dubboerl_demo_app.erl:11
Minor — 1 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Outdated: jsx
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-3e814569d7644f7484cf8e0b954ab888/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-3e814569d7644f7484cf8e0b954ab888/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off . | 0 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . /tmp/codehealth-osv-sbom-f3021857ded543fd9b0322819a26e4fd | 5 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . /tmp/codehealth-osv-sbom-f3021857ded543fd9b0322819a26e4fd | 0 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |