Public report — incubator-seata, published 6 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
132findings with an exact file:lineof 150 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
40/112dimensions across the health lenses269310 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
apache/incubator-seata carries serious gaps (48%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Architecture (99%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Accessibility (37%) — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost. Readiness (49%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative… (Text alternatives); Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler) (Keyboard semantics); Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark,… (Page structure).
For scale: Large (~269,310 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~2.7 person-years (~1–6 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
0.7× (at 48% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Large · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~2.7 person-years of build effort (about ~€390,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Accessibility at 37% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Large asset (~2.7 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Accessibility at 37%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Accessibility first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
44
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
39
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
21
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
3
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, ensure all media elements have appropriate text alternatives and captions. Next, make custom controls keyboard-operable and fix anchor links. Then, correct page structure by adding language attributes, titles, and landmarks, while ensuring proper heading order. After that, improve visual safety by maintaining focus styles, respecting reduced motion preferences, and fixing color contrast. Finally, enforce accessibility standards by integrating axe-core into your test runner and CI pipeline.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Accessibility linting is already configured — assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 38 of 40 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 40 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 132 of 150 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations: 24 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
25 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is rm-datasource/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/rm/datasource/exec/BaseInsertExecutor.java.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 · ×3
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
Apache Seata's documentation is comprehensive and well-structured across READMEs, architecture/design docs, and a test-suite benchmark CLI tool. It begins with an Apache-style license and a strong branding image before diving into What is Apache Seata?, the distributed transaction problem in microservices, and TCC implementation (SofaRpc/Dubbo/Local TCC), metrics, compatibility, and a benchmark CLI tool covering AT/TCC/SAGA/XA modes. The document is clipped mid-saga-state-machine-designer content but its outline lists every named section present; the visible material is clear and complete for an enterprise transaction framework. The documentation is mostly useful for a frontend FE project (npm/cnpm install, proxy config, test usage) and an isolated core README that maps request/response types to client/server code. The architecture section is clipped mid-sentence ('## tm client -> server' line), so the outlined sections are not flagged as missing; the visible material shows clear installation and configuration steps but lacks a cohesive overview of the project's main components, API surface, or migration path for new contributors.
The README is a single npm install/doc run/run build/run line block with no project overview, purpose, or prerequisites.console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/README.md
The core README lists request/response types and their directions but does not explain what each type represents or how to use them.core/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/core/README.md
What to do
Resolve the 1 The README is a single npm install/doc run/run build/run line block with… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 The core README lists request/response types and their directions but… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
3 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×2namingserver/src/main/resources/application.yml:58detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with application.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×22.github/workflows/build.yml:59detected by semgrep finding
Medium: weak-random · ×11common/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/common/util/IdWorker.java:182detected by semgrep finding
Low: script-engine-injection · ×11saga/seata-saga-engine/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/saga/engine/pcext/handlers/ScriptTaskStateHandler.java:70detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 22 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with build.yml (8), codeql-analysis.yml (4), license-checker.yaml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (22 issue-level).
Resolve the 11 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with TransactionInfo.tsx (3), IdWorker.java, CommonFenceConfig.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 warning-level).
Resolve the 11 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ScriptTaskStateHandler.java, apollo-config-interactive.sh, apollo-config.sh. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×4distribution/docker/namingserver/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 · ×28script/server/helm/seata-server/templates/deployment.yamldetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0005 · ×7distribution/docker/namingserver/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 28 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (15), seata-server.yaml (7), deployment.yaml (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (28 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2), deployment.yaml, seata-server.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 7 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (5), Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
347 of 915 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is rm-datasource/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/rm/datasource/sql/handler/oscar/OscarEscapeHandler.java.
Resolve the 14 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with OscarEscapeHandler.java, DbAndReportTcStateLogStore.java, RedisTransactionStoreManager.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.
Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×9console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×3console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×5console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 9 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (9). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads restrict network EGRESS with a NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy), limiting where a compromised pod can send data or reach a command-and-control server. Presence of committed egress-restricting policy, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn — language-agnostic): Kubernetes workloads gate applicability; credits a NetworkPolicy / Cilium policy that restricts egress (policyTypes: [Egress] / egress rules). Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10, never a deduction — baseline misconfigs stay with D31). Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads confine the kernel boundary — a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) plus an AppArmor/SELinux mandatory-access-control layer — shrinking the syscall attack surface a container escape would use. Presence of committed confinement config, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) and an AppArmor/SELinux MAC layer. Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10); NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 No seccomp profile finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No AppArmor/SELinux confinement finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d41_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives2.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×2) — Login.tsx:89, index.html:36
What to do
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC3 · Page structure4.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×2) — index.html:19, index.html:19
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabIndex={0} + a key handler. — Header.tsx:132
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
`.pagination > .disabled > span, .pagination > .disabled > span:hover, .pagination > .disabled > span:focus, .pagination > .disabled > a, .pagination > .disabled > a:hover, .pagination > .disabled > a:focus` sets color: #999999 on background-color: #ffffff — 2.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — bootstrap.css:5001
`.btn.btn-primary.disabled,.btn.btn-primary[disabled]` sets color: #fff on background-color: #ccc — 1.6:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. This is a MINIFIED, build-generated sheet — editing the literal here is undone by the next vendor drop or rebuild, so override the rule in your own stylesheet (or fix it upstream / in the source the bundle is built from). — console1412.css:17
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
An a11y linter is configured (Documented) but there's no automated a11y test or CI gate. Add your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) to verify at runtime, then gate it in CI.
What to do
Accessibility linting is already configured — assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
299 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 100 of 106 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.9 pts.
Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety4.1 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
44 typed · 63 plain JS — the untyped files are saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/src/Editor.js, saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/src/control/ExportControl.js, saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/src/control/ImportControl.js, saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/src/control/index.js, saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/src/index.js, saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/src/layout/Layouter.js (+57 more). 0 production file(s) opt out entirely with @ts-nocheck · 3 @ts-ignore suppression(s).
What to do
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/pages/GlobalLockInfo/GlobalLockInfo.tsx:328 · console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/pages/TransactionInfo/TransactionInfo.tsx:1059 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — GlobalLockInfo.tsx:328
saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/src/properties-panel/provider/properties/BaseText.js:24 · saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/src/properties-panel/provider/properties/BaseTextArea.js:24 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — BaseText.js:24
console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/pages/TransactionInfo/TransactionInfo.tsx:625 · console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/pages/TransactionInfo/TransactionInfo.tsx:798 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — TransactionInfo.tsx:625
console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/service/transactionInfo.ts:180 · console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/service/transactionInfo.ts:199 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — transactionInfo.ts:180
console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/pages/GlobalLockInfo/GlobalLockInfo.tsx:143 · console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/pages/TransactionInfo/TransactionInfo.tsx:395 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — GlobalLockInfo.tsx:143
console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/pages/TransactionInfo/TransactionInfo.tsx:657 · console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/pages/TransactionInfo/TransactionInfo.tsx:821 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — TransactionInfo.tsx:657
console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/pages/TransactionInfo/TransactionInfo.tsx:941 · console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/pages/TransactionInfo/TransactionInfo.tsx:957 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — TransactionInfo.tsx:941
console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/service/transactionInfo.ts:77 · console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/service/transactionInfo.ts:94 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — transactionInfo.ts:77
What to do
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — SagaExporter.js:42, index.js:61, GlobalLockInfo.tsx:103, …
What to do
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
What to do
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage0.3 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×8) — TransactionInfo.tsx, Renderer.js, GlobalLockInfo.tsx, …
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.
What to do
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗
What to do
Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×2) — locale.ts:18, clusterManager.ts:19
Declared in console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/test/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 72 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.java, .ts, .tsx) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~151721 lines of test source are present (.java, .js) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Maven POM), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .java — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.java, .ts, .tsx) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.java, .kt, .py, .ts, .tsx) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.java, .ts) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Maven POM — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D4 Code Duplication — Most of this repository's production source (.java, .ts) was not read by duplication detection, so code duplication was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's duplication. Not scored: no source of those file kinds was exposed to the token comparison by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .java, .kt, .py, .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.java, .js) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:59— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:64— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-python@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-python@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-python/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:69— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-java@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-java@v3.12.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-java/commits/v3.12.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v3.12.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:78— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache/restore@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache/restore@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v4 --jq .sha`. `actions/cache/restore` is hosted INSIDE the `actions/cache` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `actions/cache/restore` path in `uses:` and query only `actions/cache`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:119— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache/save@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache/save@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v4 --jq .sha`. `actions/cache/save` is hosted INSIDE the `actions/cache` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `actions/cache/save` path in `uses:` and query only `actions/cache`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:127— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: codecov/codecov-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `codecov/codecov-action@v4.0.1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/codecov/codecov-action/commits/v4.0.1 --jq .sha`. Note that `v4.0.1` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:143— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/build.yml:146— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-java@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-java@v3.12.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-java/commits/v3.12.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v3.12.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:46— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:50— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/init@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/init@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/init` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/init` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:55— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-java@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-java@v3.12.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-java/commits/v3.12.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v3.12.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml:64— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `github/codeql-action/analyze@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/github/codeql-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`. `github/codeql-action/analyze` is hosted INSIDE the `github/codeql-action` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `github/codeql-action/analyze` path in `uses:` and query only `github/codeql-action`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/license-checker.yaml:37— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/license-checker.yaml:39— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-docker.yml:40— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-docker.yml:43— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-java@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-java@v3.12.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-java/commits/v3.12.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v3.12.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push, so pin the floating-major and branch references in this file first.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-ossrh.yml:34— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2.4.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2.4.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v2.4.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/publish-ossrh.yml:37— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-java@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-java@v3.12.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-java/commits/v3.12.0 --jq .sha`. Note that `v3.12.0` is an exact release tag rather than a floating major: it is still mutable (a tag can be repointed), but by convention it moves only on a force-push.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/spotless-check.yml:37— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/spotless-check.yml:40— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-java@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-java@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-java/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: spel-injection saga/seata-saga-spring/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/saga/engine/expression/spel/SpringELExpressionFactory.java:46— A Spring expression is built with a dynamic value. The source of the value(s) should be verified to avoid that unfiltered values fall into this risky code evaluation. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
High: spel-injection test-suite/seata-benchmark-cli/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/benchmark/saga/SimpleSpelExpressionFactory.java:33— A Spring expression is built with a dynamic value. The source of the value(s) should be verified to avoid that unfiltered values fall into this risky code evaluation. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Orphaned knowledge rm-datasource/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/rm/datasource/sql/handler/oscar/OscarEscapeHandler.java— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge saga/seata-saga-spring/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/saga/engine/store/db/DbAndReportTcStateLogStore.java— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge server/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/server/storage/redis/store/RedisTransactionStoreManager.java— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge saga/seata-saga-engine/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/saga/engine/impl/ProcessCtrlStateMachineEngine.java— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge common/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/common/util/ReflectionUtil.java— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge rm-datasource/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/rm/datasource/undo/AbstractUndoLogManager.java— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge serializer/seata-serializer-protobuf/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/serializer/protobuf/manager/ProtobufConvertManager.java— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge server/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/server/storage/file/store/FileTransactionStoreManager.java— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge tm/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/tm/api/DefaultGlobalTransaction.java— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge core/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/core/rpc/processor/server/ServerOnRequestProcessor.java— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge saga/seata-saga-engine/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/saga/engine/config/AbstractStateMachineConfig.java— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge config/seata-config-zk/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/config/zk/ZookeeperConfiguration.java— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge config/seata-config-etcd3/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/config/etcd3/EtcdConfiguration.java— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge server/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/server/session/SessionHolder.java— No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×9
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— axios 1.16.1: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares axios ^1.13.5, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 1.18.0, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so axios moves onto 1.18.0 or later; if the flagged 1.16.1 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin axios with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This one row stands for the 10 advisories this scan raises against axios 1.16.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 1.1.13: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares brace-expansion ^1.1.13, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 1.1.16, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so brace-expansion moves onto 1.1.16 or later; if the flagged 1.1.13 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin brace-expansion with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.13, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.13: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 1.1.15: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the ^1.1.13 this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.15, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.15: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— fast-uri 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — fast-uri is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fast-uri to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against fast-uri 3.1.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json, saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/package-lock.json) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against fast-uri 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— form-data 4.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 4.0.6 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— immutable 5.1.5: [GHSA redacted] — immutable is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin immutable to 5.1.8 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against immutable 5.1.5: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— js-yaml 3.14.2: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares js-yaml ^3.14.2, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 3.15.0, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so js-yaml moves onto 3.15.0 or later; if the flagged 3.14.2 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin js-yaml with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/package-lock.json— js-yaml 4.1.1: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares js-yaml ^4.1.1, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 4.3.0, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so js-yaml moves onto 4.3.0 or later; if the flagged 4.1.1 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin js-yaml with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/package-lock.json— shell-quote 1.8.4: [GHSA redacted] — shell-quote is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin shell-quote to 1.9.0 with an `overrides` entry).
High IaC: DS-0002 distribution/docker/namingserver/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 distribution/docker/server/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: KSV-0014 script/server/helm/seata-server/templates/deployment.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 script/server/kubernetes/seata-server.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×3
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— postcss 8.5.15: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin postcss to 8.5.18 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 8.5.15, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.23 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.23 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json, saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/package-lock.json) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.5.15: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— serialize-javascript 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 7.0.3. This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.0.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.0.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json, saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/package-lock.json) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— svgo 3.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares svgo ^3.3.3, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 3.3.4, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so svgo moves onto 3.3.4 or later; if the flagged 3.3.3 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin svgo with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: NamingManager.java ↔ VGroupMappingController.java namingserver/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/namingserver/manager/NamingManager.java— `namingserver/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/namingserver/manager/NamingManager.java` (context namingserver) and `server/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/server/controller/VGroupMappingController.java` (context main) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: NamingserverRegistryServiceImpl.java ↔ NamingManager.java discovery/seata-discovery-namingserver/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/namingserver/NamingserverRegistryServiceImpl.java— `discovery/seata-discovery-namingserver/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/namingserver/NamingserverRegistryServiceImpl.java` (context discovery) and `namingserver/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/namingserver/manager/NamingManager.java` (context namingserver) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 57% of the time (8 of the 14 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— shell-quote 1.8.3: [GHSA redacted] — shell-quote is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin shell-quote to 1.8.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against shell-quote 1.8.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against shell-quote 1.8.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted] — websocket-driver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin websocket-driver to 0.7.5 with an `overrides` entry). (in 2 dependency files: console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json, saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/package-lock.json) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 script/server/helm/seata-server/templates/deployment.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 script/server/helm/seata-server/templates/deployment.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0013 script/server/helm/seata-server/templates/deployment.yaml— Image tag ":latest" used
Medium IaC: KSV-0023 script/server/helm/seata-server/templates/deployment.yaml— hostPath volumes mounted
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 script/server/helm/seata-server/templates/deployment.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 script/server/helm/seata-server/templates/deployment.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 script/server/kubernetes/seata-server.yaml— Can elevate its own privileges
Medium IaC: KSV-0012 script/server/kubernetes/seata-server.yaml— Runs as root user One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0012, KSV-0020, KSV-0021.
Medium IaC: KSV-0013 script/server/kubernetes/seata-server.yaml— Image tag ":latest" used
Medium IaC: KSV-0104 script/server/kubernetes/seata-server.yaml— Seccomp policies disabled One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0030, KSV-0104.
Medium IaC: KSV-0125 script/server/kubernetes/seata-server.yaml— Restrict container images to trusted registries
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_21 script/server/kubernetes/seata-server.yaml:18— The default namespace should not be used
Medium IaC: CKV_K8S_37 script/server/kubernetes/seata-server.yaml:37— Minimize the admission of containers with capabilities assigned
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 distribution/docker/server/Dockerfile:36— Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 distribution/docker/server/Dockerfile:37— Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 distribution/docker/server/Dockerfile:38— Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 distribution/docker/server/Dockerfile:39— Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 distribution/docker/server/Dockerfile:40— Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 distribution/docker/server/Dockerfile:41— Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 distribution/docker/server/Dockerfile:42— Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 distribution/docker/server/Dockerfile:1— Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 distribution/docker/namingserver/Dockerfile:36— Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 distribution/docker/namingserver/Dockerfile:37— Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 distribution/docker/namingserver/Dockerfile:38— Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 distribution/docker/namingserver/Dockerfile:39— Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
Medium: weak-random common/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/common/util/IdWorker.java:182— Detected use of the functions `Math.random()` or `java.util.Random()`. These are both not cryptographically strong random number generators (RNGs). If you are using these RNGs to create passwords or secret tokens, use `java.security.SecureRandom` instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/pages/TransactionInfo/TransactionInfo.tsx:792— Detection of dangerouslySetInnerHTML from non-constant definition. This can inadvertently expose users to cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks if this comes from user-provided input. If you have to use dangerouslySetInnerHTML, consider using a sanitization library such as DOMPurify to sanitize your HTML. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/pages/TransactionInfo/TransactionInfo.tsx:818— Detection of dangerouslySetInnerHTML from non-constant definition. This can inadvertently expose users to cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks if this comes from user-provided input. If you have to use dangerouslySetInnerHTML, consider using a sanitization library such as DOMPurify to sanitize your HTML. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: react-dangerouslysetinnerhtml console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/src/pages/TransactionInfo/TransactionInfo.tsx:863— Detection of dangerouslySetInnerHTML from non-constant definition. This can inadvertently expose users to cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks if this comes from user-provided input. If you have to use dangerouslySetInnerHTML, consider using a sanitization library such as DOMPurify to sanitize your HTML. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: weak-random integration-tx-api/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/integration/tx/api/fence/config/CommonFenceConfig.java:109— Detected use of the functions `Math.random()` or `java.util.Random()`. These are both not cryptographically strong random number generators (RNGs). If you are using these RNGs to create passwords or secret tokens, use `java.security.SecureRandom` instead. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: formatted-sql-string rm-datasource/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/rm/datasource/exec/mysql/MySQLInsertOnDuplicateUpdateExecutor.java:301— Detected a formatted string in a SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if variables in the SQL statement are not properly sanitized. Use a prepared statements (java.sql.PreparedStatement) instead. You can obtain a PreparedStatement using 'connection.prepareStatement'. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: formatted-sql-string rm-datasource/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/rm/datasource/sql/struct/cache/MariadbTableMetaCache.java:40— Detected a formatted string in a SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if variables in the SQL statement are not properly sanitized. Use a prepared statements (java.sql.PreparedStatement) instead. You can obtain a PreparedStatement using 'connection.prepareStatement'. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: formatted-sql-string rm-datasource/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/rm/datasource/sql/struct/cache/MysqlTableMetaCache.java:85— Detected a formatted string in a SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if variables in the SQL statement are not properly sanitized. Use a prepared statements (java.sql.PreparedStatement) instead. You can obtain a PreparedStatement using 'connection.prepareStatement'. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: formatted-sql-string rm-datasource/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/rm/datasource/sql/struct/cache/PolarDBXTableMetaCache.java:39— Detected a formatted string in a SQL statement. This could lead to SQL injection if variables in the SQL statement are not properly sanitized. Use a prepared statements (java.sql.PreparedStatement) instead. You can obtain a PreparedStatement using 'connection.prepareStatement'. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext script/server/kubernetes/seata-server.yaml:55— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: unrestricted-request-mapping server/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/server/controller/HealthController.java:35— Detected a method annotated with 'RequestMapping' that does not specify the HTTP method. CSRF protections are not enabled for GET, HEAD, TRACE, or OPTIONS, and by default all HTTP methods are allowed when the HTTP method is not explicitly specified. This means that a method that performs state changes could be vulnerable to CSRF attacks. To mitigate, add the 'method' field and specify the HTTP method (such as 'RequestMethod.POST'). This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Change coupling: RedisRegistryServiceImpl.java ↔ SofaRegistryServiceImpl.java discovery/seata-discovery-redis/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/redis/RedisRegistryServiceImpl.java— `discovery/seata-discovery-redis/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/redis/RedisRegistryServiceImpl.java` and `discovery/seata-discovery-sofa/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/sofa/SofaRegistryServiceImpl.java` change together 77% of the time (10 of the 13 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: EtcdRegistryServiceImpl.java ↔ SofaRegistryServiceImpl.java discovery/seata-discovery-etcd3/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/etcd3/EtcdRegistryServiceImpl.java— `discovery/seata-discovery-etcd3/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/etcd3/EtcdRegistryServiceImpl.java` and `discovery/seata-discovery-sofa/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/sofa/SofaRegistryServiceImpl.java` change together 69% of the time (9 of the 13 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: EtcdRegistryServiceImpl.java ↔ RedisRegistryServiceImpl.java discovery/seata-discovery-etcd3/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/etcd3/EtcdRegistryServiceImpl.java— `discovery/seata-discovery-etcd3/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/etcd3/EtcdRegistryServiceImpl.java` and `discovery/seata-discovery-redis/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/redis/RedisRegistryServiceImpl.java` change together 62% of the time (10 of the 16 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: SofaRegistryServiceImpl.java ↔ ZookeeperRegisterServiceImpl.java discovery/seata-discovery-sofa/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/sofa/SofaRegistryServiceImpl.java— `discovery/seata-discovery-sofa/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/sofa/SofaRegistryServiceImpl.java` and `discovery/seata-discovery-zk/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/zk/ZookeeperRegisterServiceImpl.java` change together 62% of the time (8 of the 13 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: NacosRegistryServiceImpl.java ↔ SofaRegistryServiceImpl.java discovery/seata-discovery-nacos/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/nacos/NacosRegistryServiceImpl.java— `discovery/seata-discovery-nacos/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/nacos/NacosRegistryServiceImpl.java` and `discovery/seata-discovery-sofa/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/sofa/SofaRegistryServiceImpl.java` change together 62% of the time (8 of the 13 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: ConsulRegistryServiceImpl.java ↔ EtcdRegistryServiceImpl.java discovery/seata-discovery-consul/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/consul/ConsulRegistryServiceImpl.java— `discovery/seata-discovery-consul/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/consul/ConsulRegistryServiceImpl.java` and `discovery/seata-discovery-etcd3/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/etcd3/EtcdRegistryServiceImpl.java` change together 56% of the time (9 of the 16 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: EurekaRegistryServiceImpl.java ↔ SofaRegistryServiceImpl.java discovery/seata-discovery-eureka/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/eureka/EurekaRegistryServiceImpl.java— `discovery/seata-discovery-eureka/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/eureka/EurekaRegistryServiceImpl.java` and `discovery/seata-discovery-sofa/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/sofa/SofaRegistryServiceImpl.java` change together 54% of the time (7 of the 13 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: ConsulRegistryServiceImpl.java ↔ SofaRegistryServiceImpl.java discovery/seata-discovery-consul/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/consul/ConsulRegistryServiceImpl.java— `discovery/seata-discovery-consul/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/consul/ConsulRegistryServiceImpl.java` and `discovery/seata-discovery-sofa/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/discovery/registry/sofa/SofaRegistryServiceImpl.java` change together 54% of the time (7 of the 13 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×5
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— http-proxy-middleware 2.0.9: [GHSA redacted] — http-proxy-middleware is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin http-proxy-middleware to 2.0.10 with an `overrides` entry). (in 2 dependency files: console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json, saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/package-lock.json)
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— launch-editor 2.11.1: [GHSA redacted] — launch-editor is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin launch-editor to 2.14.1 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/package-lock.json— launch-editor 2.14.0: [GHSA redacted] — launch-editor is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin launch-editor to 2.14.1 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— uuid 8.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — uuid is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 11.1.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 8.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 8.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). (in 2 dependency files: console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json, saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/package-lock.json)
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— webpack-dev-server 5.2.4: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares webpack-dev-server ^5.2.2, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 5.2.6, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so webpack-dev-server moves onto 5.2.6 or later; if the flagged 5.2.4 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin webpack-dev-server with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against webpack-dev-server 5.2.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.2.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 5.2.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json, saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/package-lock.json) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against webpack-dev-server 5.2.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 36 floating ref(s) across 9 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block · ×1
PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block — 3 workflow(s) triggered by pull_request declare no `permissions:` block (spotless-check.yml, license-checker.yaml, build.yml) and so run with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, while 2 sibling workflows in the same repository are already scoped. Pull-request runs build the least-trusted code in the repository; give each of these workflows its own least-privilege block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of the workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
Low: script-engine-injection saga/seata-saga-engine/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/saga/engine/pcext/handlers/ScriptTaskStateHandler.java:70— Detected potential code injection using ScriptEngine. Ensure user-controlled data cannot enter '.eval()', otherwise, this is a code injection vulnerability. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: request-host-used script/config-center/apollo/apollo-config-interactive.sh:87— '$http_host' and '$host' variables may contain a malicious value from attacker controlled 'Host' request header. Use an explicitly configured host value or a allow list for validation. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: request-host-used script/config-center/apollo/apollo-config.sh:94— '$http_host' and '$host' variables may contain a malicious value from attacker controlled 'Host' request header. Use an explicitly configured host value or a allow list for validation. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: request-host-used script/config-center/consul/consul-config-interactive.sh:42— '$http_host' and '$host' variables may contain a malicious value from attacker controlled 'Host' request header. Use an explicitly configured host value or a allow list for validation. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: request-host-used script/config-center/consul/consul-config.sh:42— '$http_host' and '$host' variables may contain a malicious value from attacker controlled 'Host' request header. Use an explicitly configured host value or a allow list for validation. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: request-host-used script/config-center/etcd3/etcd3-config-interactive.sh:45— '$http_host' and '$host' variables may contain a malicious value from attacker controlled 'Host' request header. Use an explicitly configured host value or a allow list for validation. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: request-host-used script/config-center/etcd3/etcd3-config.sh:44— '$http_host' and '$host' variables may contain a malicious value from attacker controlled 'Host' request header. Use an explicitly configured host value or a allow list for validation. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: request-host-used script/config-center/nacos/nacos-config-interactive.sh:64— '$http_host' and '$host' variables may contain a malicious value from attacker controlled 'Host' request header. Use an explicitly configured host value or a allow list for validation. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: request-host-used script/config-center/nacos/nacos-config.sh:66— '$http_host' and '$host' variables may contain a malicious value from attacker controlled 'Host' request header. Use an explicitly configured host value or a allow list for validation. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: request-host-used script/config-center/zk/zk-config-interactive.sh:51— '$http_host' and '$host' variables may contain a malicious value from attacker controlled 'Host' request header. Use an explicitly configured host value or a allow list for validation. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low: request-host-used script/config-center/zk/zk-config.sh:54— '$http_host' and '$host' variables may contain a malicious value from attacker controlled 'Host' request header. Use an explicitly configured host value or a allow list for validation. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Low IaC: DS-0005 distribution/docker/namingserver/Dockerfile— ADD instead of COPY
Low IaC: DS-0005 distribution/docker/server/Dockerfile— ADD instead of COPY
Low IaC: KSV-0003 script/server/helm/seata-server/templates/deployment.yaml— Default capabilities: some containers do not drop all One securityContext edit clears this facet's near-duplicate rules together: KSV-0003, KSV-0004, KSV-0106.
Low IaC: KSV-0011 script/server/helm/seata-server/templates/deployment.yaml— CPU not limited
Low IaC: KSV-0015 script/server/helm/seata-server/templates/deployment.yaml— CPU requests not specified
Low IaC: KSV-0016 script/server/helm/seata-server/templates/deployment.yaml— Memory requests not specified
Low IaC: KSV-0018 script/server/helm/seata-server/templates/deployment.yaml— Memory not limited
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 6 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: test-suite/seata-benchmark-cli/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/benchmark/executor/XAModeExecutor.java, test-suite/seata-benchmark-cli/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/benchmark/saga/SagaDbEnvironment.java, test-suite/seata-benchmark-cli/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/benchmark/saga/InventoryDbSagaService.java, test-suite/seata-benchmark-cli/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/benchmark/saga/PaymentDbSagaService.java, test-suite/seata-benchmark-cli/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/benchmark/BenchmarkRunner.java, test-suite/seata-benchmark-cli/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/benchmark/saga/OrderDbSagaService.java. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #2 — If anonymized user #2 becomes unavailable, 4 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: saga/seata-saga-engine/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/saga/engine/serializer/impl/ExceptionSerializer.java, saga/seata-saga-spring/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/saga/engine/expression/spel/SpringELExpressionFactory.java, serializer/seata-serializer-hessian/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/serializer/hessian/FieldCountCappingDeserializer.java, saga/seata-saga-spring/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/saga/engine/expression/spel/SpringELExpression.java. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #3 — If anonymized user #3 becomes unavailable, 4 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: saga/seata-saga-statelang/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/saga/statelang/parser/impl/JacksonJsonParser.java, json-common/json-common-core/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/common/json/JsonUtil.java, saga/seata-saga-statelang/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/saga/statelang/parser/impl/FastjsonParser.java, tcc/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/rm/tcc/json/JacksonJsonParser.java. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— @babel/core 7.28.4: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares @babel/core ^7.23.7, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 7.29.6, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so @babel/core moves onto 7.29.6 or later; if the flagged 7.28.4 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin @babel/core with an `overrides` entry so only one copy resolves.
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json— body-parser 1.20.5: [GHSA redacted] — body-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin body-parser to 1.20.6 with an `overrides` entry). (in 2 dependency files: console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/package-lock.json, saga/seata-saga-statemachine-designer/package-lock.json)
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.java, .js) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
complexity unreadable for .java — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (8139 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .java, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D16 · Bus Factor· Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 8 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (25 single-owned of 915 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). They are anonymized user #4 (2 file(s)), anonymized user #5 (2 file(s)), anonymized user #6 (2 file(s)), anonymized user #7 (1 file(s)), anonymized user #8 (1 file(s)), anonymized user #9 (1 file(s)) (+2 more) — spread or document their files in the same way, at lower priority than the named off-boarding risks above.
D19 · Documentation Quality· The README is a single npm install/doc run/run build/run line block with no project overview, purpose, or prerequisites. · ×1
The README is a single npm install/doc run/run build/run line block with no project overview, purpose, or prerequisites. console/src/main/resources/static/console-fe/README.md— Add a one-paragraph summary stating what the console FE does (test recording, browser plugin support) and its target audience.
D19 · Documentation Quality· The core README lists request/response types and their directions but does not explain what each type represents or how to use them. · ×1
The core README lists request/response types and their directions but does not explain what each type represents or how to use them. core/src/main/java/org/apache/seata/core/README.md— Describe the RegisterRMRequest/RegisterTMRequest payloads (what fields they carry) so a new reader can call them without reading the code.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 333 smaller file(s) also have no living knowledge — folded into the freshness score and metrics rather than listed individually (347 orphaned of 915 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first).
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (the `cyclonedx-maven-plugin` bound to the package phase, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D40 · Network Egress Confinement· No network policy · ×1
No network policy — No Kubernetes NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy) found. Without one, every pod can talk to every other pod and reach out to the internet by default. Add a default-deny policy and open only the flows you need.
No seccomp profile — Workloads do not set a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault or a Localhost profile). Seccomp blocks the syscalls a container never needs, shrinking the kernel attack surface a container escape would use.
No AppArmor/SELinux confinement — Workloads declare no AppArmor or SELinux profile. A mandatory-access-control profile confines what a compromised container can touch on the host, complementing seccomp's syscall filter.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT READ here — but this repository measures it: a Codecov configuration (codecov.yml) and a coverage step in CI (`codecov/codecov-action`) shows that coverage is collected and tracked in your own CI. The built-in collector has no runner for this ecosystem (.java, .js), so the analyzer could not read the number — a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not an unmeasured repo. Not scored. To have the real number read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report`, or lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Maven POM) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — The repository ships application workloads but no cluster-governance resources (CRDs, admission webhooks, or a committed policy engine). Runtime threat-detection (Falco/Tetragon) and admission control (Kyverno/OPA-Gatekeeper/PodSecurity) are cluster-OPERATOR controls owned by the platform, not shipped by an application repo/chart — nothing for this repo to assess.
0
—
Run 019fd6e8-438c-7326-9887-cd392d4d213a · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 58 · Warnings: 54 · Recommendations: 36 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 06-08-2026 @ 11:49 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.