VerticalCleanModularMicroservices

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

ardalis/VerticalCleanModularMicroservices is in a workable but fragile state (55%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (48%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (48%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection /… (Data Protection); authorization at every handler (Access Controls).

For scale: Small (~2,188 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

Code Health 81% Strong Architecture 82% Strong Maturity 72% Strong Readiness 48% Weak · gated by P1, P3 Security 48% Weak · gated by D30, C1, C2 Performance 71% Strong

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 48% · 46% weightSecurity 48% · 25% weightPerformance 71% · 14% weightMaturity 72% · 8% weightCode Health 81% · 4% weightArchitecture 82% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 48 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 55 → ~61.

Code composition — where the lines go

Business logic 6%Plumbing 54%Tests 23%Generated 16%

New since the last scan (18+)

18 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D17 · CommentedOutCode 02-CleanArchitecture/tests/OrderDemo.CleanArch.FunctionalTests/CustomWebApplicationFactory.cs
D17 · CommentedOutCode 02-CleanArchitecture/tests/OrderDemo.CleanArch.FunctionalTests/CustomWebApplicationFactory.cs
D17 · NoWarnInCsproj 05-CleanVertical/Directory.Build.props
D17 · NoWarnInCsproj 02-CleanArchitecture/Directory.Build.props
D30 · High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
D30 · High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
D30 · Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.13.1
D30 · Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.13.1
D30 · Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.13.1
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €1,300–€6,400

Cost to rebuild	€1,300–€6,400 (0.1 person-years (21–67 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	High — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.8× (at 55% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · 41% boilerplate · 48% straight-line · 11% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€3,800 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 48% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.5) — microservices, CQRS × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

+7.2 pts · Medium effort · CI/CD gates

Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

+7.1 pts · Medium effort · Data Protection

Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.

+7.1 pts · Medium effort · Access Controls

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 48%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (2,188 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 48%

→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

32 modules, 37 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

At a glance — Code Health · 81% · Strong

The Good

D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 8.7 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 7.7 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 9.9 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 8.7 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 9.7

The Bad

X1 · Repo Async correctness 6.2

At a glance — Architecture · 82% · Strong

The Good

D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 8.2 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX7 · Repo Slice cohesion 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0

The Ugly

AX10 · Repo Code composition 4.0

At a glance — Maturity · 72% · Strong

The Good

D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 9.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 8.0

The Bad

M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 5.0

The Ugly

D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 48% · Weak · gated by P1, P3

The Good

D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 9.2 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 10.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 8.0 P2 · Repo Observability 8.8 P7 · Repo Outbound HTTP resilience 10.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0

The Ugly

P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0

At a glance — Security · 48% · Weak · gated by D30, C1, C2

The Good

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 10.0 C3 · Repo Audit Trail 7.5 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 8.0

The Ugly

D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0 C1 · Repo Data Protection 3.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 3.0

At a glance — Performance · 71% · Strong

The Good

PF2 · Repo Allocation hygiene 7.6 PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 8.5

The Bad

PF1 · Repo Benchmark discipline 6.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	43	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish a continuous integration workflow to automatically build and test every change. Next, secure sensitive data by implementing encryption at rest and managing keys in a vault. Then, enforce strict access controls by applying authorization guards to every handler to ensure protected-by-default practices. Additionally, implement a structural audit mechanism to log all sensitive changes to an immutable log. Finally, strengthen the web security posture by adding essential security headers for defense in depth.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.	+7.2 pts	Medium	CI/CD gates
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).	+7.1 pts	Medium	Data Protection
Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.	+7.1 pts	Medium	Access Controls
Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.	+6.1 pts	Medium	Audit Trail
Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance.	+2.6 pts	Low	License Compliance
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.	+5.1 pts	Medium	Web-Security Posture
Resolve the 22 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities.	+4.3 pts	Medium	Dependency Vulnerabilities
Resolve the 20 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities.	+3.9 pts	Medium	Dependency Vulnerabilities

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 6 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 50% mixed · 50% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
02-CleanArchitecture/tests/OrderDemo.CleanArch.FunctionalTests/CustomWebApplicationFactory.cs	7.3	Mixed	Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
05-CleanVertical/Directory.Build.props	7.6	Mixed	Explicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
02-CleanArchitecture/Directory.Build.props	7.6	Mixed	Explicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
04-Microservices/src/Nimble.Modulith.Email.Contracts/Nimble.Modulith.Email.Contracts.csproj	9.5	Near-clean	Solution Shape: Shell project: Nimble.Modulith.Email.Contracts
04-Microservices/src/Nimble.Modulith.Reporting.Contracts/Nimble.Modulith.Reporting.Contracts.csproj	9.5	Near-clean	Solution Shape: Shell project: Nimble.Modulith.Reporting.Contracts
02-CleanArchitecture/src/OrderDemo.CleanArch.Web/Cart/AddToCart.cs	9.5	Near-clean	Comment Value: redundant comment

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 46 of 48 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 48 dimensions across the health lenses

D5D6D9D10D12D13D14D17D18D20D21D24D26D28D29D30D35AX1AX10AX3AX5AX6AX7AX8AX9C1C2C3GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P7P8PF1PF2PF3S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 7 of 67 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc8cb-8cb5-75a8-920f-45159f82dd1d.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D20, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D5 · Coupling8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

9 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: OrderDemo.CleanArch.ServiceDefaults · ×2

What to do

Resolve the 2 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 3 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 test methods: 1 unit, 6 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 2 mock references across 11 tests.

Mock framework: NSubstitute · ×2

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D14 · License Compliance8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 57 packages use a banned license.

Banned license: NsDepCop

What to do

Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate License Compliance in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D17 · Explicit Debt8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 1812 LoC (0.7/KLoC) → score 8.7.

NoWarnInCsproj · ×205-CleanVertical/Directory.Build.props:11

CommentedOutCode · ×202-CleanArchitecture/tests/OrderDemo.CleanArch.FunctionalTests/CustomWebApplicationFactory.cs:66

What to do

Resolve the 2 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Directory.Build.props (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 CommentedOutCode finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with CustomWebApplicationFactory.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Explicit Debt in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D18 · Solution Shape7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

15 projects, 128 source files, 4120 hand-written lines of code (4058 production / 62 test), plus 1261 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 25 inter-project edges.

Monorepo: only 1 of 7 solutions was scored

Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository

Shell project: Nimble.Modulith.Email.Contracts · ×204-Microservices/src/Nimble.Modulith.Email.Contracts/Nimble.Modulith.Email.Contracts.csproj

Thin analysable surface across projects

What to do

Resolve the 2 Shell project finding(s) in Solution Shape — start with Nimble.Modulith.Email.Contracts.csproj, Nimble.Modulith.Reporting.Contracts.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Monorepo finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

26 valuable / 1 redundant across 134 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.

redundant comment02-CleanArchitecture/src/OrderDemo.CleanArch.Web/Cart/AddToCart.cs:46

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 9 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

43 vulnerable package(s): 1 critical, 22 high, 20 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: Microsoft.Build.Tasks.Core 17.14.8 · ×22detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

Critical CVE: Scriban 6.2.0detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Api 1.9.0 · ×20detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

Resolve the 22 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (22 issue-level).
Resolve the 20 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX10 · Code composition4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX7 · Slice cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.

Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

Do you agree with this assessment?

C2 · Access Controls3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

Authorization machinery exists but no [Authorize] usage and no imperative guard calls were found at handlers.

What to do

Enforce authorization at every handler — call the guard method (throw-on-violation) from each one, or adopt [Authorize] so protected-by-default is demonstrable.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.

What to do

Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.

Do you agree with this assessment?

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

A placeholder string ("guest@example.com") is still in shipped code — typical of generated boilerplate that was never filled in. — Checkout.cs:28

What to do

Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.

Do you agree with this assessment?

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 6 of 9 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.3 pts.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).

Do you agree with this assessment?

M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M4 · Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists

What to do

Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P2 · Observability8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Only 3/5 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 5, 2 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.

What to do

Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

PF1 · Benchmark discipline6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

No benchmark suite was found. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

What to do

Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).

Do you agree with this assessment?

PF2 · Allocation hygiene7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 8 use(s) across 2,572 production line(s) (~3.1/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.

Do you agree with this assessment?

PF3 · Async & latency hygiene8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

1 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.

What to do

Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.

Do you agree with this assessment?

S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X1 · Async correctness6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. — AppDbContext.cs:23

What to do

Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)

Do you agree with this assessment?

X2 · Cancellation propagation8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 14/18 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×4) — SeedData.cs:9, SeedData.cs:19, MiddlewareConfig.cs:11, …

What to do

Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X5 · Nullable reference types9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

~0.4 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 5 suppression(s) across the 13224 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	81%	Strong	Solid.
Architecture	82%	Strong	Strongest area.
Maturity	72%	Strong	Solid.
Readiness	48%	Weak — gated by P1, P3	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	48%	Weak — gated by D30, C1, C2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance	71%	Strong	Solid.

Not included — 49 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a vertical-slice + CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .cs — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.cs) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
D4 Code Duplication — Most of this repository's production source (.cs) was not read by duplication detection, so code duplication was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's duplication. Not scored: no source of those file kinds was exposed to the token comparison by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 1 aggregate-constrained repository/repositories (IRepository<T> where T : IAggregateRoot); 4 per-aggregate domain namespaces (…/BasketAggregate, …/OrderAggregate)
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): a message-bus package; 5 CQRS handler(s)
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 26 finding(s)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×22

High CVE: Microsoft.Build.Tasks.Core 17.14.8 — Microsoft.Build.Tasks.Core 17.14.8 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.Build.Utilities.Core 17.14.8 — Microsoft.Build.Utilities.Core 17.14.8 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0 — Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×2

NoWarnInCsproj 05-CleanVertical/Directory.Build.props:11 — 1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj 02-CleanArchitecture/Directory.Build.props:11 — 1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.

D14 · License Compliance · Banned license · ×1

Banned license: NsDepCop — NsDepCop 2.6.0 is licensed GPL-2.0-only (banned by policy).

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×1

Critical CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

Warning — 29 finding(s)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×20

Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Api 1.9.0 — OpenTelemetry.Api 1.9.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MailKit 4.14.0 — MailKit 4.14.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MimeKit 4.14.0 — MimeKit 4.14.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Api 1.13.1 — OpenTelemetry.Api 1.13.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.13.1 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.13.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.13.1 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.13.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.13.1 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol 1.13.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.5.192 — MessagePack 2.5.192 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×2

CommentedOutCode 02-CleanArchitecture/tests/OrderDemo.CleanArch.FunctionalTests/CustomWebApplicationFactory.cs:66 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
CommentedOutCode 02-CleanArchitecture/tests/OrderDemo.CleanArch.FunctionalTests/CustomWebApplicationFactory.cs:70 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines

D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×2

Off the main sequence: OrderDemo.CleanArch.ServiceDefaults — OrderDemo.CleanArch.ServiceDefaults: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: OrderDemo.CleanArch.Core — OrderDemo.CleanArch.Core: abstractness 0.08, instability 0.00, distance 0.92 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.

D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not measured · ×1

Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results — Test reliability NOT MEASURED: the test run produced no results for any test tier, so no test ever ran and flakiness could not be exercised. The cause could not be attributed, so it is excluded from the score rather than read as an absence of tests.

D18 · Solution Shape · Monorepo · ×1

Monorepo: only 1 of 7 solutions was scored — This repository contains 7 .NET solutions, but a scan analyzes ONE. Every score, lens, and finding here reflects only `04-Microservices/src/OrderDemo.ModulithMicroservice.slnx` — the other 6 (`01-VerticalSlice/OrderDemo.VerticalSlice.slnx`, `02-CleanArchitecture/OrderDemo.CleanArch.slnx`, `02-CleanArchitecture/src/OrderDemo.CleanArch.Core/OrderDemo.CleanArch.Core.sln`, `03-ModularMonolith/src/OrderDemo.Modulith.slnx`, `05-CleanVertical/OrderDemo.CleanVertical.slnx`, `05-CleanVertical/src/OrderDemo.CleanArch.Core/OrderDemo.CleanArch.Core.sln`) were not analyzed and are not represented in the headline. To cover them, scan each solution as its own target and group them in a Solution or Product for a portfolio roll-up. If a secondary solution is an archived or vendored tree, declare it — `.gitattributes` (`path/** linguist-vendored`) or `.editorconfig` (`[path/**] generated_code = true`) — to exclude it from discovery the same way generated code is.

D18 · Solution Shape · Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository · ×1

Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository — The scored solution `04-Microservices/src/OrderDemo.ModulithMicroservice.slnx` is not representative of this repository — it references only 137 of 586 discovered C# files (23 %). Lenses that need the product's source (domain modelling, event-driven, event sourcing) abstain because the aggregates, EF configs, and domain events under the product tree were not loaded. Point the scan at the product solution (or scan its directory directly) so the whole codebase is analyzed, not a build-tooling sub-solution.

D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1

LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1253.

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1

Coverage not measured — analyzer environment — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the analyzer environment could not build/run the test suite (a target framework / SDK band or targeting pack the analyzer image doesn't carry). This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. We track the analyzer-image gap so it can be closed; in the meantime, no coverage collector was found in your CI either, so there is no existing report to hand us — add a collector to your test run and commit (or publish into the working tree) its Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov output, and real coverage will be read.

Recommendation — 9 finding(s)

D18 · Solution Shape · Shell project · ×2

Shell project: Nimble.Modulith.Email.Contracts 04-Microservices/src/Nimble.Modulith.Email.Contracts/Nimble.Modulith.Email.Contracts.csproj — `Nimble.Modulith.Email.Contracts` contributes only 7 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
Shell project: Nimble.Modulith.Reporting.Contracts 04-Microservices/src/Nimble.Modulith.Reporting.Contracts/Nimble.Modulith.Reporting.Contracts.csproj — `Nimble.Modulith.Reporting.Contracts` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · complexity unreadable for .cs · ×1

complexity unreadable for .cs — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (0 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .cs, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.

D16 · Bus Factor · early-stage repository · ×1

early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (2 author(s) across 44 commit(s) sampled).

D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1

Thin analysable surface across projects — 3 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `Nimble.Modulith.Products.Contracts` with 10 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 71 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 2.34 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.

D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1

No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1

Bounded contexts not declared — At 1812 LoC across 9 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.

D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×1

redundant comment 02-CleanArchitecture/src/OrderDemo.CleanArch.Web/Cart/AddToCart.cs:46 — "Add tags for API grouping" — trim - duplicate of Tags comment; one keeps the link, the other repeats it

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1

early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (44 commit(s) sampled).

Info — 3 finding(s)

D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×2

Mock framework: NSubstitute — OrderDemo.CleanArch.IntegrationTests references NSubstitute.
Mock framework: NSubstitute — OrderDemo.CleanArch.UnitTests references NSubstitute.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	0	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet list 04-Microservices/src/OrderDemo.ModulithMicroservice.slnx package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json	43	artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.	0	—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019fc8cb-8cb5-75a8-920f-45159f82dd1d · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 3 field(s) across 1 category, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 3 field(s)

GuestUser.Email 02-CleanArchitecture/src/OrderDemo.CleanArch.Core/GuestUserAggregate/GuestUser.cs:11
CheckoutCommand.Email 02-CleanArchitecture/src/OrderDemo.CleanArch.UseCases/Cart/Checkout/CheckoutCommand.cs:6
CheckoutRequest.Email 02-CleanArchitecture/src/OrderDemo.CleanArch.Web/Cart/Checkout.CheckoutRequest.cs:8

Ardalis/VerticalCleanModularMicroservices

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Architecture — module dependency matrix

At a glance — Code Health · 81% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 82% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 72% · Strong

At a glance — Readiness · 48% · Weak · gated by P1, P3

At a glance — Security · 48% · Weak · gated by D30, C1, C2

At a glance — Performance · 71% · Strong

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Downloadable artifacts