asciinema-server — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

asciinema/asciinema-server carries serious gaps (41%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Architecture (96%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (25%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (47%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow and knowledge is concentrated in too few people (a bus-factor risk).

Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).

For scale: Small (~17,188 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (96%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 63% Adequate · gated by R1 Architecture 96% ★ Exemplary Maturity 47% Weak · gated by D16, M2 Readiness 25% Weak · gated by R4, P3, P5 Security 55% Adequate · gated by D29, D36

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 25% · 47% weightMaturity 47% · 26% weightSecurity 55% · 14% weightCode Health 63% · 8% weightArchitecture 96% · 4% weight

Raise Readiness 25 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 41 → ~55.

Code composition — where the lines go

Tests 100%

New since the last scan (24+)

24 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D4 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/recordings.ex
D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex
D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex
D4 · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/asciinema_web/controllers/email_controller.ex
D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) lib/asciinema_web/controllers/recording_controller.ex
D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/accounts.ex
D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/asciinema_admin/controllers/recording_controller.ex
D4 · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex
D4 · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/recordings.ex
D4 · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/recordings.ex
D4 · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex
D4 · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) lib/asciinema_admin/query_ui.ex
D4 · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex
D4 · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/streaming/parser/asciicast_v2.ex
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfile
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock
R4 · Test Coverage

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €8,400–€42,000

Cost to rebuild	€8,400–€42,000 (0.1–0.3 person-years (140–443 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	Standard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 41% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€25,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 25% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with dev.exs.

+14.5 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

+16.3 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

+16.3 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 25%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.2 person-years rebuild (17,188 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 25%

→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

33 modules, 10 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

At a glance — Code Health · 63% · Adequate · gated by R1

The Good

D1 · Elixir Cyclomatic Complexity 9.1 D2 · Elixir Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · Elixir God Classes 7.7 D4 · Elixir Code Duplication 9.6 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 10.0 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 8.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 10.0 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 10.0

The Ugly

R1 · React / TS Type Safety 0.0

At a glance — Architecture · 96% · Exemplary

The Good

D35 · Elixir Change Coupling 9.2 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 47% · Weak · gated by D16, M2

The Good

D15 · Elixir Churn × Complexity Hotspots 9.8 D19 · Elixir Documentation Quality 7.0 D21 · Elixir Naming Consistency 10.0 D34 · Elixir Knowledge Freshness 10.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 9.0

The Ugly

D16 · Elixir Bus Factor 1.2 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 4.5 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 25% · Weak · gated by R4, P3, P5

The Good

P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 7.0 R5 · React / TS Dependency Freshness 9.6 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 10.0

The Bad

D13 · Elixir Secret Scanning 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 6.7

The Ugly

P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 0.0

At a glance — Security · 55% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36

The Good

D28 · Elixir Secrets (history) 7.0 D31 · Elixir IaC & Container Security 9.0 D33 · Elixir JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0

The Bad

D38 · Elixir OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 6.3

The Ugly

D29 · Elixir Static Analysis (SAST) 0.9 D36 · Elixir Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A03:2021 — Injection	14	High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	8	High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	5	High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures	1	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, integrate a security scanning step into the CI pipeline to fail builds on security regressions. Next, codify disaster recovery and backup procedures in infrastructure code and document recovery time objectives. Then, expand test coverage to include all production modules. After that, resolve the single leaked secret found in the development configuration. Finally, maintain a changelog to track each release.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with dev.exs.	+14.5 pts	Low	Secret Scanning
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.	+16.3 pts	Medium	Security & performance tooling
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.	+16.3 pts	Medium	DR & Backup
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).	+16.3 pts	Medium	Test Coverage
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.	+14.5 pts	Medium	Release Hygiene
Add type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.	+12.8 pts	Medium	Tooling
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.	+12.4 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor.	+4.4 pts	Low	Bus Factor

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 26 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 8% slop · 46% mixed · 46% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
mix.lock	0.9	Slop	OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
Dockerfile	2.0	Slop	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
.github/workflows/release.yml	4.4	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
lib/asciinema/recordings.ex	5.1	Mixed	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: recordings.ex ↔ seeds.exs
.github/workflows/nix.yml	5.1	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
lib/asciinema/accounts.ex	5.4	Mixed	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: accounts.ex ↔ user_controller.ex
lib/asciinema/streaming.ex	5.8	Mixed	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: streaming.ex ↔ stream_json.ex
lib/asciinema/streaming/parser/asciicast_v2.ex	6.5	Mixed	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: asciicast_v2.ex ↔ stream_producer_socket.ex
lib/asciinema/media.ex	7.0	Mixed	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: media.ex ↔ recording_html.ex
lib/asciinema/streaming/parser/alis_v1.ex	7.0	Mixed	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: alis_v1.ex ↔ stream_consumer_socket.ex
lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex	7.1	Mixed	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)
config/dev.exs	7.2	Mixed	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret
lib/asciinema_admin/query_parser.ex	7.8	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: QueryParser.parse_value (cyclomatic 34)
lib/asciinema_web/controllers/recording_controller.ex	7.8	Mixed	God Classes: TooManyMethods: RecordingController
lib/asciinema/vt.ex	8.0	Near-clean	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: vt.ex ↔ lib.rs
lib/asciinema/streaming/parser/raw.ex	8.0	Near-clean	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: raw.ex ↔ stream_producer_socket.ex
lib/asciinema_web/controllers/recording_svg.ex	8.5	Near-clean	God Classes: TooManyMethods: RecordingSVG
lib/asciinema_admin/components/core_components.ex	8.5	Near-clean	God Classes: TooManyMethods: CoreComponents
lib/asciinema/file_cache.ex	8.5	Near-clean	God Classes: TooManyMethods: FileCache
lib/asciinema/streaming/stream_server.ex	8.5	Near-clean	God Classes: TooManyMethods: StreamServer

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 35 of 37 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 37 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D13D15D16D19D21D28D29D31D33D34D35D36D38AX9M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5P6R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 71 of 81 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fcfaf-880d-7aad-9764-e2048e3539ed.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was QueryParser.parse_value at 34. A further 4 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being Recordings.apply_filter at 30 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.

QueryParser.parse_value (cyclomatic 34)lib/asciinema_admin/query_parser.ex:111

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

12 god class(es) detected.

TooManyMethods: Recordings · ×9lib/asciinema/recordings.ex:1

FileTooLong: asciinema/recordings.ex · ×3lib/asciinema/recordings.ex:0

What to do

Resolve the 9 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with recordings.ex, accounts.ex, streaming.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with recordings.ex, accounts.ex, streaming.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

16 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×3lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex:11

Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×3lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex:60

Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×3lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex:33

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×2lib/asciinema/accounts.ex:247

Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×2lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex:72

+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: high-entropy-secretconfig/dev.exs:13

What to do

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with dev.exs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Top hotspots: lib/asciinema/recordings.ex (18×30=540); lib/asciinema/streaming.ex (9×28=252); lib/asciinema_admin/query_parser.ex (5×34=170)

Hotspot: lib/asciinema/recordings.ex · ×3lib/asciinema/recordings.ex

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D16 · Bus Factor1.2 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

54 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is lib/asciinema/recordings.ex.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The single README for the asciinema server is a solid overview of purpose, technology stack (Elixir/Phoenix with avt), public hosting at asciinema.org, self-hosting guidance, and notable features such as full-text search over full terminal content. It links to external docs for API, CLI, streaming, and player, which are excellent cross-references. The outline is clipped mid-sentence ('full-text search...') so the remaining sections (Donations, Consulting, Copyright) exist in the outline but cannot be confirmed from the visible text; this leaves room for improvement on completeness.

The README mentions a public asciinema.org instance and self-hosting but does not state how to obtain or configure an account with your own server, which is critical for readers who want to run their own instance.README.md

What to do

Resolve the 1 The README mentions a public asciinema.org instance and self-hosting but… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

What to do

Improve Secrets (history) — currently 7.0/10. — 3 finding(s): 0 critical, 3 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.9 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

14 finding(s): 0 critical, 14 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×14.github/workflows/nix.yml:17detected by semgrep finding

What to do

Resolve the 14 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release.yml (11), nix.yml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 3 medium, 1 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×2Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

Medium IaC: DS-0013 · ×2Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

Low IaC: DS-0026Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: asciicast_v2.ex↔raw.ex 92%; local.ex↔s3.ex 84%; streaming.ex↔stream.ex 81%

Boundary-crossing change coupling: vt.ex ↔ lib.rs · ×10lib/asciinema/vt.ex

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions

PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block

No build provenance

No artifact signing

No SBOM

What to do

Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities6.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

8 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 3 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×5mix.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] · ×3mix.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

Resolve the 5 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with mix.lock (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with mix.lock (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M1 · Documentation (README)4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

158 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.

What to do

Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 5 of 5 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M4 · Documentation accuracy9.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

0 typed · 7 plain JS — the untyped files are assets/js/admin.js, assets/js/app.js, assets/js/dropdowns.js, assets/js/iframe.js, assets/js/modals.js, assets/js/player.js (+1 more).

What to do

Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R10 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. — admin.js:69

What to do

Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

0% of 7 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph

What to do

Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).

Do you agree with this assessment?

R5 · Dependency Freshness9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.

What to do

Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗

What to do

Add type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R8 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	63%	Adequate — gated by R1	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	96%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Maturity	47%	Weak — gated by D16, M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	25%	Weak — gated by R4, P3, P5	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	55%	Adequate — gated by D29, D36	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Not included — 69 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~12428 lines of test source are present (.exs, .ex) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Cargo manifest and package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ex, .exs, .rs) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Cargo manifest and package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ex, .exs, .rs, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.exs, .ex) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 3 aggregate root(s) (types guarding their own state behind command methods — this language has no AggregateRoot base to inherit); 11 value object(s)
ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and a call made through an inferred or generic receiver has no resolvable owner in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 32 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×14

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nix.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nix.yml:18 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: nixbuild/nix-quick-install-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `nixbuild/nix-quick-install-action@v30`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/nixbuild/nix-quick-install-action/commits/v30 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/nix.yml:21 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: nix-community/cache-nix-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `nix-community/cache-nix-action@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/nix-community/cache-nix-action/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:28 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/release.yml:32 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:44 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:47 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:55 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:74 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:86 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:89 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/download-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/download-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/download-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:107 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release.yml:110 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/login-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/login-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/login-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/release.yml:127 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.

D35 · Change Coupling · Boundary-crossing change coupling · ×10

Boundary-crossing change coupling: vt.ex ↔ lib.rs lib/asciinema/vt.ex — `lib/asciinema/vt.ex` (context asciinema) and `native/vt/src/lib.rs` (context native) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 80% of the time (12 of the 15 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: raw.ex ↔ stream_producer_socket.ex lib/asciinema/streaming/parser/raw.ex — `lib/asciinema/streaming/parser/raw.ex` (context asciinema) and `lib/asciinema_web/stream_producer_socket.ex` (context asciinema_web) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 69% of the time (9 of the 13 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: media.ex ↔ recording_html.ex lib/asciinema/media.ex — `lib/asciinema/media.ex` (context asciinema) and `lib/asciinema_web/controllers/recording_html.ex` (context asciinema_web) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 67% of the time (10 of the 15 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: accounts.ex ↔ user_controller.ex lib/asciinema/accounts.ex — `lib/asciinema/accounts.ex` (context asciinema) and `lib/asciinema_admin/controllers/user_controller.ex` (context asciinema_admin) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 62% of the time (8 of the 13 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: asciicast_v2.ex ↔ stream_producer_socket.ex lib/asciinema/streaming/parser/asciicast_v2.ex — `lib/asciinema/streaming/parser/asciicast_v2.ex` (context asciinema) and `lib/asciinema_web/stream_producer_socket.ex` (context asciinema_web) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 60% of the time (12 of the 20 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: alis_v1.ex ↔ stream_consumer_socket.ex lib/asciinema/streaming/parser/alis_v1.ex — `lib/asciinema/streaming/parser/alis_v1.ex` (context asciinema) and `lib/asciinema_web/stream_consumer_socket.ex` (context asciinema_web) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 59% of the time (16 of the 27 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: alis_v1.ex ↔ stream_producer_socket.ex lib/asciinema/streaming/parser/alis_v1.ex — `lib/asciinema/streaming/parser/alis_v1.ex` (context asciinema) and `lib/asciinema_web/stream_producer_socket.ex` (context asciinema_web) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 56% of the time (15 of the 27 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: recordings.ex ↔ seeds.exs lib/asciinema/recordings.ex — `lib/asciinema/recordings.ex` (context asciinema) and `priv/repo/seeds.exs` (context priv) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 55% of the time (6 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: media.ex ↔ stream_html.ex lib/asciinema/media.ex — `lib/asciinema/media.ex` (context asciinema) and `lib/asciinema_web/controllers/stream_html.ex` (context asciinema_web) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 53% of the time (8 of the 15 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.
Boundary-crossing change coupling: streaming.ex ↔ stream_json.ex lib/asciinema/streaming.ex — `lib/asciinema/streaming.ex` (context asciinema) and `lib/asciinema_web/controllers/api/stream_json.ex` (context asciinema_web) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 50% of the time (6 of the 12 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×5

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock — cowboy 2.14.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.15.0. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against cowboy 2.14.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against cowboy 2.14.2: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock — cowlib 2.16.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.16.1. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against cowlib 2.16.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.19.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.19.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against cowlib 2.16.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock — hackney 1.25.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.0.1. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against hackney 1.25.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock — plug 1.19.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.19.2. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against plug 1.19.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.19.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.19.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against plug 1.19.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] mix.lock — postgrex 0.21.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.22.2. This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postgrex 0.21.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.22.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.22.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against postgrex 0.21.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×2

High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser -S -D app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0025 Dockerfile — 'apk add' is missing '--no-cache' The install step leaves the package manager's index and downloaded packages behind in that layer, so every pull carries them and every CVE in them is attributed to your image. The step: this file installs with `apk`, so end the SAME `RUN` that installs with `&& apk cache clean` — a later `RUN` cannot help, because the cache is already committed to the earlier layer. (The rule's title names the command for a different package manager; the defect it measures is the same one.) Where the builder supports it, `RUN --mount=type=cache` is the alternative: the cache is mounted for the step and never enters a layer at all.

D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1

Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret config/dev.exs:13 — high-entropy-secret detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.

Warning — 39 finding(s)

D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×9

TooManyMethods: Recordings lib/asciinema/recordings.ex:1 — TooManyMethods — 88 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Accounts lib/asciinema/accounts.ex:1 — TooManyMethods — 77 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Streaming lib/asciinema/streaming.ex:1 — TooManyMethods — 46 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: RecordingSVG lib/asciinema_web/controllers/recording_svg.ex:1 — TooManyMethods — 44 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: CoreComponents lib/asciinema_admin/components/core_components.ex:1 — TooManyMethods — 37 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: QueryParser lib/asciinema_admin/query_parser.ex:1 — TooManyMethods — 37 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: FileCache lib/asciinema/file_cache.ex:1 — TooManyMethods — 34 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: StreamServer lib/asciinema/streaming/stream_server.ex:1 — TooManyMethods — 33 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: RecordingController lib/asciinema_web/controllers/recording_controller.ex:1 — TooManyMethods — 32 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot · ×3

Hotspot: lib/asciinema/recordings.ex lib/asciinema/recordings.ex — lib/asciinema/recordings.ex changed 18 times in last 90 days, max complexity 30. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: lib/asciinema/streaming.ex lib/asciinema/streaming.ex — lib/asciinema/streaming.ex changed 9 times in last 90 days, max complexity 28. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: lib/asciinema_admin/query_parser.ex lib/asciinema_admin/query_parser.ex — lib/asciinema_admin/query_parser.ex changed 5 times in last 90 days, max complexity 34. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.

D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×3

FileTooLong: asciinema/recordings.ex lib/asciinema/recordings.ex:0 — FileTooLong — 1009 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: asciinema/accounts.ex lib/asciinema/accounts.ex:0 — FileTooLong — 632 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: asciinema/streaming.ex lib/asciinema/streaming.ex:0 — FileTooLong — 522 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×3

Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock — decimal 2.3.0: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 3.0.0
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock — earmark 1.4.48: EEF-[CVE redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace earmark if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands.
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] mix.lock — swoosh 1.16.7: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 1.26.3

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×3

Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex:11 — lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex:11-22 | lib/asciinema/asciicast/v3.ex:12-23 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex` and `lib/asciinema/asciicast/v3.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 44 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex:79 — lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex:79-90 | lib/asciinema/asciicast/v3.ex:80-91 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex` and `lib/asciinema/asciicast/v3.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 44 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/asciinema_web/controllers/email_controller.ex:12 — lib/asciinema_web/controllers/email_controller.ex:12-23 | lib/asciinema_web/controllers/email_controller.ex:64-75 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×3

Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex:60 — lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex:60-67 | lib/asciinema/asciicast/v3.ex:61-68 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex` and `lib/asciinema/asciicast/v3.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 44 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/recordings.ex:159 — lib/asciinema/recordings.ex:159-166 | lib/asciinema/streaming.ex:83-90 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/asciinema/recordings.ex` and `lib/asciinema/streaming.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 32 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/recordings.ex:846 — lib/asciinema/recordings.ex:846-853 | lib/asciinema/streaming.ex:483-491 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/asciinema/recordings.ex` and `lib/asciinema/streaming.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 32 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×3

Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex:33 — lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex:33-37 | lib/asciinema/asciicast/v3.ex:33-37 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex` and `lib/asciinema/asciicast/v3.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 44 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/recordings/snapshot.ex:202 — lib/asciinema/recordings/snapshot.ex:202-206 | lib/asciinema/recordings/snapshot.ex:207-211 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/streaming/parser/asciicast_v2.ex:63 — lib/asciinema/streaming/parser/asciicast_v2.ex:63-67 | lib/asciinema/streaming/parser/asciicast_v3.ex:64-68 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×2

Medium IaC: DS-0013 Dockerfile — 'RUN cd ...' to change directory
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/accounts.ex:247 — lib/asciinema/accounts.ex:247-255 | lib/asciinema/recordings.ex:543-551 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) lib/asciinema_admin/controllers/recording_controller.ex:127 — lib/asciinema_admin/controllers/recording_controller.ex:127-135 | lib/asciinema_admin/controllers/stream_controller.ex:98-106 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex:72 — lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex:72-78 | lib/asciinema/asciicast/v3.ex:73-79 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/asciinema/asciicast/v2.ex` and `lib/asciinema/asciicast/v3.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 44 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) lib/asciinema_admin/query_ui.ex:212 — lib/asciinema_admin/query_ui.ex:212-218 | lib/asciinema_admin/query_ui.ex:233-239 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · QueryParser.parse_value (cyclomatic 34) · ×1

QueryParser.parse_value (cyclomatic 34) lib/asciinema_admin/query_parser.ex:111 — QueryParser.parse_value has cyclomatic complexity 34 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1

Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 19 floating ref(s) across 3 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block · ×1

PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block — 2 workflow(s) triggered by pull_request declare no `permissions:` block (test.yml, nix.yml) and so run with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, while 1 sibling workflow in the same repository is already scoped. Pull-request runs build the least-trusted code in the repository; give each of these workflows its own least-privilege block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of the workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/recordings.ex:445 — lib/asciinema/recordings.ex:445-459 | lib/asciinema/streaming.ex:316-330 — before extracting anything, compare `lib/asciinema/recordings.ex` and `lib/asciinema/streaming.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 32 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) lib/asciinema_web/controllers/recording_controller.ex:135 — lib/asciinema_web/controllers/recording_controller.ex:135-145 | lib/asciinema_web/controllers/recording_controller.ex:178-188 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) lib/asciinema/gzip.ex:187 — lib/asciinema/gzip.ex:187-196 | lib/asciinema/zstd.ex:167-176 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.

Recommendation — 8 finding(s)

D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1

Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.exs, .ex) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.

D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 54 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: lib/asciinema/recordings.ex, lib/asciinema/accounts.ex, lib/asciinema/streaming.ex, lib/asciinema_web/controllers/recording_controller.ex, lib/asciinema_admin/query_parser.ex, native/svg_raster/src/lib.rs, lib/asciinema_admin/components/core_components.ex, lib/asciinema_web/controllers/recording_svg.ex (+46 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.

D19 · Documentation Quality · The README mentions a public asciinema.org instance and self-hosting but does not state how to obtain or configure an account with your own server, which is critical for readers who want to run their own instance. · ×1

The README mentions a public asciinema.org instance and self-hosting but does not state how to obtain or configure an account with your own server, which is critical for readers who want to run their own instance. README.md — Add a short self-hosting walkthrough (or link to the self-hosting doc) that explains how to sign up for asciinema.org and set up your own server.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1

Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 4000`, so a request to `localhost:4000` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1

No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1

No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, cosign/sigstore for container images) so consumers can verify what you built.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1

No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.

D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1

Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.exs, .ex) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.

Info — 2 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1

Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifests (a Cargo manifest and package.json) were found, but this pass cannot parse them for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	3	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	14	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	none (no readable dependency manifest)	—	none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment	0	—
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	6	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs /bin/ --skip-dirs /obj/ . --skip-db-update	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive .	8	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019fcfaf-880d-7aad-9764-e2048e3539ed · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Asciinema/asciinema-Server

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — module dependency matrix

At a glance — Code Health · 63% · Adequate · gated by R1

At a glance — Architecture · 96% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 47% · Weak · gated by D16, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 25% · Weak · gated by R4, P3, P5

At a glance — Security · 55% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts