Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
aspnetrun/run-aspnetcore-microservices carries serious risk (35%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Architecture (82%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (18%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (41%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your… (Outbound HTTP resilience).
For scale: Small (~3,308 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
78%
Strong
Architecture
82%
Strong
Maturity
58%
Adequate · gated by M2
Readiness
18% ⚠
Critical · gated by D8, D9, P1, P3, P5, P7
Security
41%
Weak · gated by D30, C1, C2
Domain Modelling
68%
Adequate · gated by DM2
Event-Driven
100% ★
Exemplary
Accessibility
42%
Weak · gated by AC1, AC4
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 18% · 45% weightSecurity 41% · 25% weightAccessibility 42% · 14% weightMaturity 58% · 8% weightDomain Modelling 68% · 4% weightCode Health 78% · 2% weightArchitecture 82% · 1% weightEvent-Driven 100% · 1% weight
Raise Readiness 18 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 35 → ~48.
Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 2%Plumbing 79%Generated 19%
New since the last scan (3+)
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €1,400–€6,700
| Cost to rebuild | €1,400–€6,700 |
| Domain complexity | Very high |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 35% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · 46% boilerplate · 51% straight-line · 3% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€4,100 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 18% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
2
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
3
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 18%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph
Architecture — module dependency matrix
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D1 · .NET / C#
Cyclomatic Complexity
10.0
D2 · .NET / C#
Cognitive Complexity
10.0
D3 · .NET / C#
God Classes
10.0
D4 · .NET / C#
Code Duplication
9.9
D17 · .NET / C#
Explicit Debt
9.9
D18 · .NET / C#
Solution Shape
9.4
GD1 · Repo
Unfinished & placeholder code
10.0
IC1 · Repo
Incompleteness & stubs
10.0
X2 · Repo
Cancellation propagation
7.7
X3 · Repo
Exception handling
10.0
X4 · Repo
Structured logging
10.0
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
D5 · .NET / C#
Coupling
10.0
D6 · .NET / C#
Cohesion (LCOM4)
10.0
D26 · .NET / C#
Project Cohesion
10.0
D27 · .NET / C#
Navigability
9.3
D35 · .NET / C#
Change Coupling
10.0
AX1 · Repo
Captive dependencies
10.0
AX3 · Repo
Project dependency cycles
10.0
AX4 · Repo
Dependency direction
10.0
AX5 · Repo
Architecture & structure
10.0
AX6 · Repo
Interface segregation
10.0
AX9 · Repo
CQS / query purity
10.0
The Ugly
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
The Bad
The Ugly
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Domain Modelling
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Event-Driven
The Good
At a glance — Accessibility
The Ugly
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 15 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 9 | Medium |
Roadmap
First, establish a continuous integration workflow to build and test the application on every push or pull request. Next, codify disaster recovery and backup procedures in infrastructure as code, explicitly documenting recovery time and point objectives. Then, implement HTTP client resilience policies to prevent external dependency failures from taking down the application. Finally, address the single gaps in automated testing by resolving the identified code coverage and test distribution issues.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. | +13.7 pts | Low | Code Coverage |
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +13.7 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +14.4 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. | +14.4 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down. | +14.3 pts | Medium | Outbound HTTP resilience |
| Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding. | +13.7 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf. | +12.6 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.). | +4.1 pts | Medium | Data Protection |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Application/Orders/EventHandlers/Integration/BasketCheckoutEventHandler.cs | 7.7 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| src/Services/Basket/Basket.API/Basket/DeleteBasket/DeleteBasketHandler.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Infrastructure/Data/Configurations/OrderConfiguration.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) |
| src/ApiGateways/YarpApiGateway/Dockerfile | 9.3 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: Low IaC: DS-0026 |
| src/Services/Basket/Basket.API/Dockerfile | 9.3 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: Low IaC: DS-0026 |
| src/Services/Basket/Basket.API/Dockerfile.original | 9.3 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: Low IaC: DS-0026 |
| src/Services/Catalog/Catalog.API/Dockerfile | 9.3 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: Low IaC: DS-0026 |
| src/Services/Catalog/Catalog.API/Dockerfile.original | 9.3 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: Low IaC: DS-0026 |
| src/Services/Discount/Discount.Grpc/Dockerfile | 9.3 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: Low IaC: DS-0026 |
| src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.API/Dockerfile | 9.3 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: Low IaC: DS-0026 |
| src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.API/Dockerfile.original | 9.3 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: Low IaC: DS-0026 |
| src/WebApps/Shopping.Web/Dockerfile | 9.3 | Near-clean | IaC & Container Security: Low IaC: DS-0026 |
| README.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Documentation Quality: The README mentions Docker Compose but does not show how to run the project (e.g. build/run commands) from the repository root. |
| src/ApiGateways/YarpApiGateway/Program.cs | 9.5 | Near-clean | Comment Value: redundant comment |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 71 of 74 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 74 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX3AX4AX5AX6AX9C1C2C3DM1DM2DM3DM4DM5DM6DM8ED1ED2ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P7P8S1X1X2X3X4X5
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 26 of 50 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D4 · Code Duplication
1 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Infrastructure/Data/Configurations/OrderConfiguration.cs:37
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling
11 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
Off the main sequence: BuildingBlocks.Messaging
Do you agree with this assessment?
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 13 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D8 · Code Coverage
No automated tests — no test code was found in this repository.
No automated tests
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution
No test suite found.
No tests found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 24 packages use a banned license.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D17 · Explicit Debt
2 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 2830 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 9.9.
TodoComment src/Services/Basket/Basket.API/Basket/DeleteBasket/DeleteBasketHandler.cs:19
Do you agree with this assessment?
D18 · Solution Shape
11 projects, 140 source files, 2830 hand-written lines of code (2830 production / 0 test), plus 772 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 15 inter-project edges.
Thin analysable surface across projects
Do you agree with this assessment?
D19 · Documentation Quality
The repository's README is a decent single-page description of the project and its features but it is heavily tied to an Udemy course link (https://www.udemy.com/course/microservices-architecture-and-implementation-on-dotnet/?couponCode=MARC26) rather than being self-contained documentation. It mentions the microservices, technologies used (CQRS with MediatR, Marten, Carter, Redis, RabbitMQ), and a brief check on Medium before committing to an architecture outline; it also links out to Docker Compose setup and run-the-project instructions but does not itself cover the full architecture or each service's scope. The document is informative but thin on concrete guidance for new contributors.
The README mentions Docker Compose but does not show how to run the project (e.g. build/run commands) from the repository root.README.md
XML-doc coverage: Catalog.API src/Services/Catalog/Catalog.API/Catalog.API.csproj
What to do
- Resolve the 1 The README mentions Docker Compose but does not show how to run the… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
No ADRs found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D24 · Comment Value
14 valuable / 2 redundant across 96 sampled comments; 2 shown with locations.
redundant comment src/ApiGateways/YarpApiGateway/Program.cs:5
What to do
- Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Program.cs, BasketCheckoutEventHandler.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 11 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D27 · Navigability
91 % of calls cross a namespace and 13 % go through an interface, but 99 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
15 vulnerable package(s): 2 critical, 7 high, 5 medium, 1 low.
High CVE: Npgsql 8.0.0
Critical CVE: Marten 6.4.1
Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.10.3
Low CVE: Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.56.0
What to do
- Resolve the 7 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
- Resolve the 5 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Do you agree with this assessment?
D31 · IaC & Container Security
9 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 9 low.
Low IaC: DS-0026 src/ApiGateways/YarpApiGateway/Dockerfile
Do you agree with this assessment?
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
- An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×4) — Cart.cshtml:40, OrderList.cshtml:43, ProductDetail.cshtml:28, …
What to do
- Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels
- This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×2) — Cart.cshtml:43, ProductDetail.cshtml:59
- This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×3) — Checkout.cshtml:49, Checkout.cshtml:193, _Layout.cshtml:46
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC3 · Page structure
- Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×2) — Checkout.cshtml:34, Confirmation.cshtml:14
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC4 · Keyboard semantics
- An <a href="#"> (or javascript:) with a click handler is a button dressed as a link — it announces the wrong role and stops working without JS. Use a <button> for an action. (×2) — ProductDetail.cshtml:67, _ProductItemPartial.cshtml:17
What to do
- Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC5 · ARIA correctness
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX1 · Captive dependencies
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX10 · Code composition
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX4 · Dependency direction
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX5 · Architecture & structure
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX6 · Interface segregation
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX9 · CQS / query purity
Do you agree with this assessment?
C1 · Data Protection
- No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.
What to do
- Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
Do you agree with this assessment?
C2 · Access Controls
- No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.
What to do
- Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C3 · Audit Trail
- An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an immutable audit-log / audit-trail type to write to, [Audited] per-entity coverage.
What to do
- Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM1 · Aggregate boundaries
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM2 · Strongly-typed ids
- `IDomainEvent.EventId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `Guid`, in whatever form your language spells that. — IDomainEvent.cs:6
What to do
- Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM3 · Integration-event coupling
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model
- `OrderItem` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — OrderItem.cs:2
What to do
- Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM5 · Encapsulated state
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
- `OrderCreatedEventHandler` (domain layer) references `MassTransit` — an infrastructure concern (persistence/HTTP/web). — OrderCreatedEventHandler.cs:5
What to do
- Invert domain→infrastructure dependencies: declare interfaces in the domain, implement them in infrastructure (Dependency Inversion).
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM8 · Value-object opportunities
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED1 · Handler temporal coupling
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED2 · Event/command shape
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED3 · Event naming
- `BasketCheckoutEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — BasketCheckoutEvent.cs:2
What to do
- Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write
Do you agree with this assessment?
ED5 · Idempotency
- `CreateOrder.CreateOrderHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — CreateOrderHandler.cs:5
What to do
- Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
Do you agree with this assessment?
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
Do you agree with this assessment?
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×3) — Program.cs:33, OrderName.cs:10, Index.cshtml.cs:12
What to do
- Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 11 of 11 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Do you agree with this assessment?
M3 · Folder & project structure
- No test surface was found — there are no tests here to separate from production code, so the folder question hasn't been reached yet.
- Only 4/11 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.
What to do
- Start a test surface where your build system looks for one (tests/, test/, spec/, or your ecosystem's test source set) — the separation follows from putting the first tests in the right place.
- Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
Do you agree with this assessment?
M4 · Documentation accuracy
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability
- Only 4/10 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 10, 6 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
What to do
- Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
- Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (ActivitySource / AddMetrics) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.
What to do
- Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup
- A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
- Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience
- The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.
What to do
- Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P8 · Schema migrations
Do you agree with this assessment?
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
- Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X1 · Async correctness
- Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. (×2) — DatabaseExtentions.cs:13, DispatchDomainEventsInterceptor.cs:10
What to do
- Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
Do you agree with this assessment?
X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 29/47 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×18) — DatabaseExtentions.cs:7, DatabaseExtentions.cs:18, DatabaseExtentions.cs:25, …
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X3 · Exception handling
Do you agree with this assessment?
X4 · Structured logging
Do you agree with this assessment?
X5 · Nullable reference types
- ~5.6 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 117 suppression(s) across the 20777 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
- Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC4 · Keyboard semantics | 2.1.1, 2.4.3 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 78% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 82% | Strong | Solid. |
| Maturity | 58% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 18% | Critical — gated by D8, D9, P1, P3, P5, P7 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 41% | Weak — gated by D30, C1, C2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 68% | Adequate — gated by DM2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Event-Driven | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Accessibility | 42% | Weak — gated by AC1, AC4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 33 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data (event-sourced storage — lifecycle is stream archival / event TTL, not row CASCADE) — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
- D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (an event-store package (Marten/EventStore))
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 10 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: Npgsql 8.0.0
- High CVE: System.Text.Json 8.0.0
- High CVE: System.Text.Json 8.0.0
- High CVE: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 8.0.0
- High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.6
- High CVE: System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0
- High CVE: System.Text.Json 7.0.3
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical CVE: Marten 6.4.1
- Critical CVE: Refit 7.0.0
D8 · Code Coverage
- No automated tests
Warning — 10 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.10.3
- Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.10.3
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.56.0
- Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.24.0
- Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.24.0
D17 · Explicit Debt
- TodoComment src/Services/Basket/Basket.API/Basket/DeleteBasket/DeleteBasketHandler.cs:19
- TodoComment src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Application/Orders/EventHandlers/Integration/BasketCheckoutEventHandler.cs:12
D16 · Bus Factor
- single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Infrastructure/Data/Configurations/OrderConfiguration.cs:37
D5 · Coupling
- Off the main sequence: BuildingBlocks.Messaging
Recommendation — 18 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/ApiGateways/YarpApiGateway/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Basket/Basket.API/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Basket/Basket.API/Dockerfile.original
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Catalog/Catalog.API/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Catalog/Catalog.API/Dockerfile.original
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Discount/Discount.Grpc/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.API/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.API/Dockerfile.original
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/WebApps/Shopping.Web/Dockerfile
D24 · Comment Value
- redundant comment src/ApiGateways/YarpApiGateway/Program.cs:5
- redundant comment src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Application/Orders/EventHandlers/Integration/BasketCheckoutEventHandler.cs:21
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D18 · Solution Shape
- Thin analysable surface across projects
D19 · Documentation Quality
- The README mentions Docker Compose but does not show how to run the project (e.g. build/run commands) from the repository root. README.md
D20 · ADR Quality
- No ADRs found
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling
- Bounded contexts not declared
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Low CVE: Microsoft.Identity.Client 4.56.0
D9 · Test Distribution
- No tests found
Info — 12 finding(s)
D19 · Documentation Quality
- XML-doc coverage: Catalog.API src/Services/Catalog/Catalog.API/Catalog.API.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: BuildingBlocks src/BuildingBlocks/BuildingBlocks/BuildingBlocks.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Basket.API src/Services/Basket/Basket.API/Basket.API.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Discount.Grpc src/Services/Discount/Discount.Grpc/Discount.Grpc.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Ordering.API src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.API/Ordering.API.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Ordering.Domain src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Domain/Ordering.Domain.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Ordering.Application src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Application/Ordering.Application.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Ordering.Infrastructure src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Infrastructure/Ordering.Infrastructure.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: BuildingBlocks.Messaging src/BuildingBlocks/BuildingBlocks.Messaging/BuildingBlocks.Messaging.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: YarpApiGateway src/ApiGateways/YarpApiGateway/YarpApiGateway.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Shopping.Web src/WebApps/Shopping.Web/Shopping.Web.csproj
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet list src/eshop-microservices.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json | 15 | artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 9 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Name — 12 field(s)
- BasketCheckoutEvent.FirstName src/BuildingBlocks/BuildingBlocks.Messaging/Events/BasketCheckoutEvent.cs:9
- BasketCheckoutEvent.LastName src/BuildingBlocks/BuildingBlocks.Messaging/Events/BasketCheckoutEvent.cs:10
- BasketCheckoutDto.FirstName src/Services/Basket/Basket.API/Dtos/BasketCheckoutDto.cs:10
- BasketCheckoutDto.LastName src/Services/Basket/Basket.API/Dtos/BasketCheckoutDto.cs:11
- AddressDto.FirstName src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Application/Dtos/AddressDto.cs:2
- AddressDto.LastName src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Application/Dtos/AddressDto.cs:2
- Address.FirstName src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Domain/ValueObjects/Address.cs:4
- Address.LastName src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Domain/ValueObjects/Address.cs:5
- BasketCheckoutModel.FirstName src/WebApps/Shopping.Web/Models/Basket/BasketCheckoutModel.cs:10
- BasketCheckoutModel.LastName src/WebApps/Shopping.Web/Models/Basket/BasketCheckoutModel.cs:11
- AddressModel.FirstName src/WebApps/Shopping.Web/Models/Ordering/OrderModel.cs:15
- AddressModel.LastName src/WebApps/Shopping.Web/Models/Ordering/OrderModel.cs:15
Address — 9 field(s)
- BasketCheckoutEvent.ZipCode src/BuildingBlocks/BuildingBlocks.Messaging/Events/BasketCheckoutEvent.cs:15
- BasketCheckoutDto.ZipCode src/Services/Basket/Basket.API/Dtos/BasketCheckoutDto.cs:16
- AddressDto.ZipCode src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Application/Dtos/AddressDto.cs:2
- OrderDto.BillingAddress src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Application/Dtos/OrderDto.cs:10
- Order.BillingAddress src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Domain/Models/Order.cs:10
- Address.ZipCode src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Domain/ValueObjects/Address.cs:10
- BasketCheckoutModel.ZipCode src/WebApps/Shopping.Web/Models/Basket/BasketCheckoutModel.cs:16
- OrderModel.BillingAddress src/WebApps/Shopping.Web/Models/Ordering/OrderModel.cs:8
- AddressModel.ZipCode src/WebApps/Shopping.Web/Models/Ordering/OrderModel.cs:15
Email — 7 field(s)
- BasketCheckoutEvent.EmailAddress src/BuildingBlocks/BuildingBlocks.Messaging/Events/BasketCheckoutEvent.cs:11
- BasketCheckoutDto.EmailAddress src/Services/Basket/Basket.API/Dtos/BasketCheckoutDto.cs:12
- AddressDto.EmailAddress src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Application/Dtos/AddressDto.cs:2
- Customer.Email src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Domain/Models/Customer.cs:5
- Address.EmailAddress src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Domain/ValueObjects/Address.cs:6
- BasketCheckoutModel.EmailAddress src/WebApps/Shopping.Web/Models/Basket/BasketCheckoutModel.cs:12
- AddressModel.EmailAddress src/WebApps/Shopping.Web/Models/Ordering/OrderModel.cs:15
Financial (card / IBAN) — 6 field(s)
- BasketCheckoutEvent.CardNumber src/BuildingBlocks/BuildingBlocks.Messaging/Events/BasketCheckoutEvent.cs:19
- BasketCheckoutDto.CardNumber src/Services/Basket/Basket.API/Dtos/BasketCheckoutDto.cs:20
- PaymentDto.CardNumber src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Application/Dtos/PaymentDto.cs:3
- Payment.CardNumber src/Services/Ordering/Ordering.Domain/ValueObjects/Payment.cs:5
- BasketCheckoutModel.CardNumber src/WebApps/Shopping.Web/Models/Basket/BasketCheckoutModel.cs:20
- PaymentModel.CardNumber src/WebApps/Shopping.Web/Models/Ordering/OrderModel.cs:17