mountpoint-s3 — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

The system holds an adequate overall standing of 65%, reflecting a robust technical foundation that is currently compromised by significant compliance gaps. While the core logic is sound and performant, the organization faces a tangible risk of regulatory non-compliance and exclusion of users with disabilities. This is not merely a technical debt issue but a direct business liability that threatens market reach and legal standing.

The asset is of medium size, representing approximately 0.7 person-years of effort to rebuild, with a replacement cost around €100,000. The codebase is highly efficient, containing almost no boilerplate or straight-line logic, which indicates a mature engineering culture. However, this value is concentrated against a weak lens: accessibility. The operational risk here is high because the system’s size amplifies the impact of any failure to meet inclusive design standards, potentially leading to costly litigation or loss of public trust.

The primary theme is Accessibility Compliance. With a score of 57%, this area is the system’s most critical vulnerability. The risk is not just about user experience but about legal exposure and brand reputation. Remediation here offers the highest leverage, as fixing foundational HTML landmarks and document structure is low-cost but high-impact. Ignoring this creates a persistent barrier to entry for a significant portion of users and invites regulatory scrutiny.

The second theme is Operational Maturity. While code health and architecture are strong, the maturity score of 68% suggests gaps in documentation and decision tracking. This could slow down new team members and obscure the rationale behind past choices. However, this is a manageable risk compared to the accessibility gap. The system is generally safe to operate, with good performance and security postures, but lacks the formal governance structures that ensure long-term sustainability.

What is genuinely good is the underlying code quality and performance. The system is fast, well-architected, and free of technical rot in the core logic. This provides a stable platform for rapid improvement. The focus should be on enforcing accessibility in the existing test suite, integrating checks into CI to prevent regressions. This small, targeted effort will secure the most value with minimal disruption, turning a liability into a competitive advantage.

Code Health 91% ★ Exemplary Architecture 93% Adequate · gated by D26 Maturity 68% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 85% Strong Security 64% Adequate · gated by D29, D31, D36 Accessibility 57% Adequate Performance 94% ★ Exemplary

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Accessibility 57% · 46% weightSecurity 64% · 25% weightMaturity 68% · 14% weightReadiness 85% · 8% weightCode Health 91% · 4% weightArchitecture 93% · 2% weightPerformance 94% · 1% weight

Raise Accessibility 57 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 65 → ~69.

Code composition — where the lines go

Tests 100%

New since the last scan (4+)

4 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-09-13) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D4 · Duplicated block (6–10 lines × 2) examples/pytorch/resnet.py
D5 · Off the main sequence: mountpoint-s3-fuser
D6 · Low cohesion: KernelConfig (LCOM4 5) mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/lib.rs
D15 · Hotspot: benchmark/benchmarks/mountpoint.py benchmark/benchmarks/mountpoint.py

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €33,000–€170,000

Cost to rebuild	€33,000–€170,000 (0.3–1.1 person-years (558–1,771 h), ~1–2 engineers)
Domain complexity	Standard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.9× (at 65% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.7 person-years of build effort (about ~€100,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Accessibility at 57% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.9× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.

+7.1 pts · Medium effort · Page structure

Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.

+7.1 pts · Medium effort · A11y enforcement

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.

+3.0 pts · Low effort · ADR Quality

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk

This is a Medium asset (~0.7 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Accessibility at 57%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~0.7 person-years rebuild (56,077 LoC) · weakest lens: Accessibility 57%

→ Direct remediation budget at Accessibility first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

188 modules, 476 dependencies. 3 dependency cycles across 57 modules, marked above the diagonal.

Showing the 40 most-connected modules; 148 more are not drawn.

Module dependency matrix. The row depends on the column; the number is how many type pairs create the dependency. A cell above the diagonal is part of a dependency cycle.
depends on →	1 mountpoint_s3_client.object_client.etag	2 mountpoint_s3_crt.checksums.crc32c	3 mountpoint_s3_crt.common.allocator	4 mountpoint_s3_crt.common.error	5 mountpoint_s3_fs.async_util	6 mountpoint_s3_fs.s3.path	7 mountpoint_s3_fs.checksums	8 mountpoint_s3_fs.memory.buffers	9 mountpoint_s3_fs.metablock.stat	10 mountpoint_s3_fs.object	11 mountpoint_s3_fs.upload.atomic	12 mountpoint_s3_fuser.ll.reply	13 mountpoint_s3_fs.memory.pool	14 mountpoint_s3_fs.metablock.path	15 mountpoint_s3_fuser.ll.request	16 mountpoint_s3_fs.memory.limiter	17 mountpoint_s3_fs.metablock	18 mountpoint_s3_fs.upload.incremental	19 mountpoint_s3_fuser	21 mountpoint_s3_fs.prefetch.cursor	22 mountpoint_s3_fs.prefetch.part_stream	23 mountpoint_s3_fs.prefetch	24 mountpoint_s3_fs.fs.config	25 mountpoint_s3_fs.fs.error	27 mountpoint_s3_fs.upload	28 mountpoint_s3_fs.fs	29 mountpoint_s3_fs.fs.handles	30 mountpoint_s3_fuser.ll.request.op	31 mountpoint_s3_crt.io.event_loop	32 mountpoint_s3_crt.s3.pool	33 mountpoint_s3_crt.s3.client	34 mountpoint_s3_client.object_client	36 mountpoint_s3_client.s3_crt_client	37 mountpoint_s3_fs.data_cache.express_data_cache	38 mountpoint_s3_fs.data_cache	39 mountpoint_s3_fs.data_cache.disk_data_cache
1 mountpoint_s3_client.object_client.etag
2 mountpoint_s3_crt.checksums.crc32c
3 mountpoint_s3_crt.common.allocator
4 mountpoint_s3_crt.common.error
5 mountpoint_s3_fs.async_util
6 mountpoint_s3_fs.s3.path
7 mountpoint_s3_fs.checksums		4
8 mountpoint_s3_fs.memory.buffers																2
9 mountpoint_s3_fs.metablock.stat																																1
10 mountpoint_s3_fs.object	2
11 mountpoint_s3_fs.upload.atomic		1			2																										3	1
12 mountpoint_s3_fuser.ll.reply															5				4							2	1
13 mountpoint_s3_fs.memory.pool								3								3				2										3	1
14 mountpoint_s3_fs.metablock.path						1			1
15 mountpoint_s3_fuser.ll.request				1								1
16 mountpoint_s3_fs.memory.limiter								2					2							3
17 mountpoint_s3_fs.metablock	1								1					1
18 mountpoint_s3_fs.upload.incremental	2				2			1					2																		5	1
19 mountpoint_s3_fuser									1						1
20 mountpoint_s3_fs.manifest.metablock	1					1			2					1			3
21 mountpoint_s3_fs.prefetch.cursor										1						2						1
22 mountpoint_s3_fs.prefetch.part_stream					1					3			3			1				1											4
23 mountpoint_s3_fs.prefetch										2										1	2										1	1
24 mountpoint_s3_fs.fs.config																	1					1
25 mountpoint_s3_fs.fs.error				1																		1			1
26 mountpoint_s3_fs.superblock	1					3			5					3			3						1
27 mountpoint_s3_fs.upload	1				1								1					1						1							3
28 mountpoint_s3_fs.fs				1	1								1						5			1	1		1						1
29 mountpoint_s3_fs.fs.handles	1										1			2			1	1								2
30 mountpoint_s3_fuser.ll.request.op												2			164				1								19
31 mountpoint_s3_crt.io.event_loop			1																									1
32 mountpoint_s3_crt.s3.pool			2																										3		2
33 mountpoint_s3_crt.s3.client			1	2																			1					1		1
34 mountpoint_s3_client.object_client	5																														5
35 mountpoint_s3_fs.prefetch.caching_stream					3		2			2			1								6										2
36 mountpoint_s3_client.s3_crt_client			2																									1	2	1	9	8
37 mountpoint_s3_fs.data_cache.express_data_cache		1					1			3										1											1	2			1
38 mountpoint_s3_fs.data_cache				1			1			1										1												1		1		2
39 mountpoint_s3_fs.data_cache.disk_data_cache		1					2			4			2							2															1
40 mountpoint_s3.cli						1																	3										1			1

Dependency, pointing down the layeringAbove the diagonal — part of a cycleThe module itself

At a glance — Code Health · 91% · Exemplary ·

The Good

D1 · Rust Cyclomatic Complexity 8.1 D2 · Rust Cognitive Complexity 7.7 D3 · Rust God Classes 8.9 D4 · Rust Code Duplication 9.8 D17 · Rust Explicit Debt 9.6

At a glance — Architecture · 93% · Adequate · gated by D26 ·

The Good

D5 · Rust Coupling 8.7 D6 · Rust Cohesion (LCOM4) 9.9 D35 · Rust Change Coupling 9.4 AX10 · Repo Code composition 9.7 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0

The Ugly

D26 · Rust Project Cohesion 3.9

At a glance — Maturity · 68% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

The Good

D15 · Rust Churn × Complexity Hotspots 9.9 D16 · Rust Bus Factor 9.7 D19 · Rust Documentation Quality 8.9 D21 · Rust Naming Consistency 10.0 D34 · Rust Knowledge Freshness 7.3 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.4 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0

The Ugly

D20 · Rust ADR Quality 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 85% · Strong ·

The Good

D9 · Rust Test Distribution 10.0 D13 · Rust Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P10 · Repo Library API & versioning 10.0 P2 · Repo Observability 8.5 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 8.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 7.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 10.0

At a glance — Security · 64% · Adequate · gated by D29, D31, D36 ·

The Good

D28 · Rust Secrets (history) 10.0 D30 · Rust Dependency Vulnerabilities 9.8 D43 · Rust Malicious Dependencies 10.0 D44 · Rust Platform End-of-Life 10.0

The Ugly

D29 · Rust Static Analysis (SAST) 1.6 D31 · Rust IaC & Container Security 3.1 D36 · Rust Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0

At a glance — Accessibility · 57% · Adequate ·

The Good

AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 10.0

The Ugly

AC3 · Repo Page structure 4.8 AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0

At a glance — Performance · 94% · Exemplary ·

The Good

PF1 · Repo Benchmark discipline 9.0 PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	41	High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection	13	High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	1	Medium

Roadmap

First, correct the page structure by adding essential semantic elements like language attributes, titles, and main landmarks while ensuring headings remain ordered and zoom is enabled. Second, enforce accessibility standards by integrating automated checks into your existing test suite and gating merges in CI to prevent regressions. Third, address the lack of architectural guidance by creating and organizing Architecture Decision Records that document significant choices, their context, and consequences. Finally, improve onboarding by adding a testing section to the root README that explains how to run the test suite.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.	+7.1 pts	Medium	Page structure
Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.	+7.1 pts	Medium	A11y enforcement
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.	+3.0 pts	Low	ADR Quality
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).	+3.0 pts	Medium	Architecture documentation
Resolve the 5 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2).	+1.2 pts	Low	Static Analysis (SAST)
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.	+2.2 pts	Medium	Documentation (README)
Resolve the 6 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with request.rs (2), reply.rs (2), lib.rs.	+1.1 pts	Low	Knowledge Freshness
Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED.	+0.8 pts	Low	Static Analysis (SAST)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 92 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 8% slop · 44% mixed · 48% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
REDACTED	0.8	Slop	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	0.8	Slop	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	0.9	Slop	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	1.6	Slop	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	1.9	Slop	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client.rs	2.4	Slop	Change Coupling: Boundary-crossing change coupling: s3_crt_client.rs ↔ data.rs
REDACTED	3.5	Slop	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.1	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.1	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.8	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.8	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/request.rs	6.0	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs	6.0	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
mountpoint-s3-client/src/mock_client.rs	6.0	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/request.rs	6.0	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
mountpoint-s3-crt/src/s3/client.rs	6.0	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs	6.0	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
mountpoint-s3-client/src/object_client.rs	6.0	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/lib.rs	6.0	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/argument.rs	6.0	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 33

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 223

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 20

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 44

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 40 of 44 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 44 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D13D15D16D17D19D20D21D26D28D29D30D31D34D35D36D43D44AC2AC3AC7AX10AX3AX4AX8AX9M1M2M3M4P1P10P2P3P4P6PF1PF3

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 260 of 276 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)	Code duplication	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a0ef48-87d2-73ad-a4f8-e53a74b835b2.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.rs) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.rs) and this repository declares a Cargo test suite (repository root, 134 test files), but it was not re-run: no test result was produced. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored — 66 direct Cargo declaration(s) were read, but the outdated signal needs crates.io, which could not be reached on this run, so this dimension's own question is only partly answered. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
D22 Internal API Consistency — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
AX1 Captive dependencies — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection registrations in C# and Spring beans in Java/Kotlin only, and no container it models, or knows cannot hold a captive, was found in this repository's source, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
AX2 Stateful singletons — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection singletons in C# and Spring/JSR-330/CDI singletons in Java and Kotlin only, and this repository's product is written in Go and Python, which was left unread, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
ED5 Idempotency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check finds retry-prone mutations by walking the repository's declared types, and NONE was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to look at. That is a limit of the analyzer's reach — it reads .NET projects — not a finding that this repository has no command handlers or message consumers.
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
X1 Async correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X13 Undrained process stream — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X14 Bypassable address classification — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X19 Unrestored process-global state — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X20 Mistyped argument guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X22 Contradicted release guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X25 Inert configuration knob — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. X7 measured the part of this repository it reads (C#, Python and TypeScript/JavaScript), and its Go, Rust source is outside the check's reach, so the card covers only part of the product. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the unread source is free of silent defaults.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D21, D26, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Request::dispatch_req at 60. A further 9 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being fuse_opcode::try_from at 50 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score. 6 files carry no cyclomatic complexity row at all for this reason — every one of their over-threshold functions was excluded, so the exclusion is disclosed nowhere in the file itself: mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/fuse_abi.rs (fuse_opcode::try_from at 50), mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/request.rs (Operation::fmt at 49), mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs/error.rs (InodeError::to_errno at 30), mountpoint-s3-fs/src/metrics/defs.rs (mountpoint_s3_fs::metrics::defs::lookup_config at 24), mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/mnt/fuse_pure.rs (mountpoint_s3_fuser::mnt::fuse_pure::option_group at 20), and 1 more not listed here. They are named here because the per-file figures other dimensions report are taken BEFORE this exclusion, so such a file can show a high maximum complexity elsewhere in this report and nothing here, with nothing to reconcile the two.

Superblock::readdir (cyclomatic 20) · ×2mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:1088

Request::dispatch_req (cyclomatic 60)mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/request.rs:71

S3CrtClientInner::meta_request_with_callbacks (cyclomatic 19)mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client.rs:680

SuperblockInner::update_slow_path (cyclomatic 17)mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:1720

What to do

Resolve the 2 Superblock finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with superblock.rs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Request finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with request.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 S3CrtClientInner finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with s3_crt_client.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

16 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was mountpoint_s3::bin::mount-s3-log-analyzer::main at 38.

Superblock::readdir (cognitive 38) · ×5mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:1088

mountpoint_s3::bin::mount-s3-log-analyzer::main (cognitive 38) · ×2mountpoint-s3/src/bin/mount-s3-log-analyzer.rs:82

SuperblockInner::update_slow_path (cognitive 26) · ×2mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:1720

MockClient::list_objects_ordered (cognitive 19) · ×2mountpoint-s3-client/src/mock_client.rs:273

S3CrtClientInner::meta_request_with_callbacks (cognitive 31)mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client.rs:680

+ 4 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 5 Superblock finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with superblock.rs (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 mountpoint_s3 finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with mount-s3-log-analyzer.rs, run.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 SuperblockInner finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with superblock.rs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

25 god class(es) detected.

FileTooLong: ll/request.rs · ×10mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/request.rs

MethodTooLong: Request.dispatch_req · ×6mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/request.rs:71

ClassTooLong: Superblock · ×6mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:68

TooManyFields: CliArgs · ×2mountpoint-s3/src/cli.rs:58

FunctionTooLong: mountpoint_s3_fuser::ll::request::op::parsemountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/request.rs:1614

What to do

Resolve the 10 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with request.rs, superblock.rs, s3_crt_client.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
Resolve the 6 MethodTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with request.rs (2), superblock.rs (2), s3_crt_client.rs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Resolve the 6 ClassTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with superblock.rs, cli.rs, fs.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Stronggated by 30 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

28 duplicated block group(s) detected. A further 2 rows report members as variants of one another; they aggregate block groups already counted above and are not themselves counted. 1 of the 30 are in trees this repository does not ship — vendored, example/demo, fixture and benchmark code — and are ranked below the shipped groups rather than excluded from them: the duplication there is real and is still counted in this dimension's score. The dimensions that publish a production-file census leave those trees out of theirs, so this count is deliberately drawn over the wider population.

Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×3mountpoint-s3-crt/src/s3/client.rs:1449

Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×3mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock/handles_map.rs:116

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×2mountpoint-s3-fs/src/metrics/defs.rs:75

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×2mountpoint-s3-client/src/imds_crt_client.rs:29

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×2mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs:629

+ 17 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with client.rs, fuse_pure.rs, request.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with handles_map.rs, get_object_attributes.rs, sha1.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with defs.rs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D5 · Coupling8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 production modules (Cargo), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; 1 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 5 of the 6 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, or have no source directory of their own).

Off the main sequence: mountpoint-s3-fuser

What to do

Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)9.9 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 173 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

Low cohesion: KernelConfig (LCOM4 5)mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/lib.rs:142

What to do

Resolve the 1 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with lib.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cohesion (LCOM4) in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

809 test methods: 453 unit, 356 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The Rust suite contributes 801 `#[test]` function(s) across 134 file(s) declaring at least one; its unit/integration split is Cargo's own — 56 of those file(s) are integration-test targets under a crate's tests/ directory, and the rest are #[test] functions compiled into the crate they test. The Python suite contributes 8 test function(s) across 2 file(s) declaring at least one — every `def test…` in a file pytest or unittest would collect, which is those frameworks' own definition of a case; a parametrize table counts once, so this is a floor. Its tier split is read from file names and paths only.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots9.9 / 10Stronggated by 2 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Top hotspots: mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs/error.rs (3×30=90); benchmark/benchmarks/mountpoint.py (2×29=58)

Hotspot: mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs/error.rs · ×2mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs/error.rs:159

What to do

Resolve the 2 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with error.rs, mountpoint.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D16 · Bus Factor9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is mountpoint-s3-crt/src/common/logging.rs. Counted over 149 of the 190 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

Further sole-owners (lower concentration)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D17 · Explicit Debt9.6 / 10Stronggated by 112 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

112 deducted task-comment markers across 56077 LoC (0.2/KLoC) → score 9.6. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

TodoComment · ×103mountpoint-s3-client/examples/list.rs:52

FixmeComment · ×8benchmark/analysis-scripts/autogroup.py:116

XxxCommentmountpoint-s3-fuser/examples/simple.rs:1469

What to do

Resolve the 103 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with request.rs (26), harness.rs (6), reply.rs (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (103 warning-level).
Resolve the 8 FixmeComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with autogroup.py, crt_benchmark.py, prefetch.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 XxxComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with simple.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation QualityStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The repository's root README gives a strong overview of Mountpoint for Amazon S3 as a high-throughput file client that mounts an S3 bucket as a local filesystem and explains its use cases (reading large objects from many clients concurrently, accessing only some S3 objects without predicting which ones) versus the incompatible features it does not implement. The benchmark/README provides installation, configuration via Hydra, getting started with uv, and running experiments; dev-container/README covers Docker build/run options, credential handling, .env setup, and a detailed run command list; mountpoint-s3-client/, -crt-sys/, -crt/, -fs/, and the package/README all document their respective directories (e.g. crates, SRPM builds, PyTorch examples) without covering the repository's root overview. The READMEs are well-structured with headings, an opening overview, and a clipped architecture/design doc outline; no single document is missing its scope. The Mountpoint for Amazon S3 repository is well documented: a README of each directory and a root INSTALL.md covering command-line installation on Linux (AL2023, RPM-based distributions), plus the dedicated BENCHMARKING.md, CONFIGURATION.md, CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, and LOGGING.md. The documentation is comprehensive for a project that is itself an S3 file system mounted as a local filesystem. Mountpoint's documentation is comprehensive and well-structured: a single SEMANTICS.md (5k words) covers Mountpoint's purpose, three behavior tenets, reading/writing files, directories/modifying directories, permissions/metadata, consistency/concurrency, optional metadata/object content caching, durability/error handling, detailed semantics, key S3-to-file key mappings, file operations, open/reads/writes/close/reopen/deletes, directory rename, and renaming a directory; another TROUBLESHOOTING.md (2k words) enumerates common error messages with code examples, random-writes behavior, writing to an existing file, deleting files, listing directories containing same-name files, renaming a file/directory, renaming a directory, rename rejected where unsupported, rename rejected due to existing destination, accessing Glacier objects, modifying metadata, invalid Hostname for DNS resolution, directory disappears after deleting all the files within it, slower throughput than expected, throttling errors, unable to upload large files, cannot open file for writing, and credentials errors. The two documents are well ordered with an overview paragraph under each title (Mountpoint for Amazon S3 file system behavior; Troubleshooting) and a full outline of sections present in both.

Documentation: no installation or build instructionsdoc/TROUBLESHOOTING.md

What to do

Resolve the 1 Documentation finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with TROUBLESHOOTING.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D26 · Project Cohesion3.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 of 6 build units (Cargo) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Projects may be oversized for their cohesion

What to do

Resolve the 1 Projects may be oversized for their cohesion finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)1.6 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

13 finding(s): 0 critical, 11 high, 2 medium, 0 low. 1 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 2 file(s) — `mountpoint-s3-crt/src/s3/pool.rs` (line 329, line 349, line 467, …), `vendor-fuser.sh` (line 10) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 5 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.

REDACTED

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 5 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities9.8 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 Medium advisory (unmaintained) finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D31 · IaC & Container Security3.1 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

41 finding(s): 0 critical, 14 high, 20 medium, 7 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 20 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (4), REDACTED (4), REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 warning-level).
Resolve the 14 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (5), REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level).
Resolve the 7 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D34 · Knowledge Freshness7.3 / 10Adequategated by 6 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

39 of 149 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/request.rs. Counted over 149 of the 190 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Orphaned knowledge · ×6mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/request.rs

Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

Resolve the 6 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with request.rs (2), reply.rs (2), lib.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling9.4 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: failure_client.rs↔throughput_client.rs 73%; atomic.rs↔incremental.rs 64%; disk_data_cache.rs↔in_memory_data_cache.rs 60%

Boundary-crossing change coupling: s3_crt_client.rs ↔ data.rsmountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client.rs

Change coupling: failure_client.rs ↔ throughput_client.rs · ×5mountpoint-s3-client/src/failure_client.rs

What to do

Resolve the 1 Boundary-crossing change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with s3_crt_client.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with failure_client.rs, atomic.rs, disk_data_cache.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

REDACTED

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

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D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 1 platform declaration(s) and 12 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC2 · Forms & labels10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

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AC3 · Page structure4.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.

The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). — benchmark_website/index.html:0

What to do

Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.

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AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

Coverage: Population: the repository's own tooling configuration — lint config, test and CI files — NOT the markup. It is read for a configured accessibility checker and an automated accessibility assertion (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse, or a native-toolkit equivalent), and it credits an INVOCATION, never a mention: a licence filename, an import comment or a doc reference earns no rung. Enforcement configured entirely outside the repository leaves no evidence here and cannot be credited.

No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.

What to do

Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.

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AX10 · Code composition9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.

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AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

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AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

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M1 · Documentation (README)8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 1 of 7 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 0.3 pts.

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M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).

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M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

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P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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P10 · Library API & versioning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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P2 · Observability8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Only 5/6 runnable modules use logging (modules with no entry point or server are excluded — they are libraries a runnable module hosts). Silent: `.`.

What to do

Extend structured logging to the remaining runnable modules so everything you run is diagnosable in production.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Dependabot is configured but does not watch `cargo`, `pip`, `gitsubmodule` — add those `package-ecosystem` entries to .github/dependabot.yml so those dependencies get the same automatic update and advisory pressure as the ones it already covers.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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PF1 · Benchmark discipline9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI; off .NET, the same ladder over Go testing.B, Rust criterion/#[bench]/divan, JMH/kotlinx-benchmark, pytest-benchmark/asv/pyperf, tinybench/mitata/vitest bench/benchmark.js and Swift package-benchmark — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

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PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 8 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (15%; ≈16% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 47 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

Dimension	WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria	Coverage
AC2 · Forms & labels	1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure	1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2	Partial signal
AC7 · A11y enforcement	enforcement — no page criterion	Enforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 47 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.1.1, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.3, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.7, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	91%	Exemplary	Solid.
Architecture	93%	Adequate — gated by D26	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity	68%	Adequate — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	85%	Strong	Solid.
Security	64%	Adequate — gated by D29, D31, D36	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility	57%	Adequate	Largest drag on the score — prioritise here.
Performance	94%	Exemplary	Strongest area.

Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control

Not included — 72 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No styled element found in the parsed markup — AC6 not applicable here.
AX1 Captive dependencies — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — docker build failed (exit 1) — DEPRECATED: The legacy builder is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Install the buildx component to build images with BuildKit: https://docs.docker.com/go/bui…; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~29584 lines of test source are present (.rs) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .rs suite was found but not re-run
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Not scored — 66 direct Cargo declaration(s) were read, but the outdated signal needs crates.io, which could not be reached on this run, so this dimension's own question is only partly answered. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's 344 shipped crate(s) were read from its REDACTED, but crates.io could not be asked for the licence of 3 of them (HTTP 429 Unknown Error), and a licence verdict over part of a dependency graph is not a licence verdict. Nothing is asserted about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D22 Internal API Consistency — LLM evaluation failed
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (1 of 2 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 54 value object(s)
ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and a call made through an inferred or generic receiver has no resolvable owner in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
ED5 Idempotency — This check finds retry-prone mutations (command handlers and message/event consumers) by walking the repository's declared types, and none was loaded here, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C# syntax, and none was loaded for this repository. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Rust source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: Rust spells out every heap allocation and makes borrowed slices (&[T], &str) its ordinary parameter types, so the allocation-aware style this card rewards elsewhere is the language's baseline rather than a rung to climb.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X12 Unreachable branch — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X13 Undrained process stream — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X14 Bypassable address classification — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X16 Unfloored truncation loop — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X19 Unrestored process-global state — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X22 Contradicted release guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X25 Inert configuration knob — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 33 finding(s)

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×14

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D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned knowledge · ×6

Orphaned knowledge mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/request.rs — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away, so if it breaks, no one currently understands it. It does carry its own tests, so the behaviour is pinned even though the understanding is gone: schedule a read-through, using those tests as the specification, before the next change lands here.
Orphaned knowledge mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/lib.rs — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/reply.rs — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away, so if it breaks, no one currently understands it. It does carry its own tests, so the behaviour is pinned even though the understanding is gone: schedule a read-through, using those tests as the specification, before the next change lands here.
Orphaned knowledge mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/fuse_abi.rs — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
Orphaned knowledge mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/reply.rs — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away, so if it breaks, no one currently understands it. It does carry its own tests, so the behaviour is pinned even though the understanding is gone: schedule a read-through, using those tests as the specification, before the next change lands here.
Orphaned knowledge mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/request.rs — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.

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AC3 · Page structure · <html> without a lang · ×1

<html> without a lang benchmark_website/index.html — The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").

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D35 · Change Coupling · Boundary-crossing change coupling · ×1

Boundary-crossing change coupling: s3_crt_client.rs ↔ data.rs mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client.rs — `mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client.rs` (context mountpoint-s3-client) and `mountpoint-s3-fs/src/metrics/data.rs` (context mountpoint-s3-fs) sit in DIFFERENT parts of the tree yet change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) — the bounded-context boundary may be in the wrong place, or one context is leaking into the other. This is the behavioural boundary violation a static scan can't see. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 6 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `0279442c` Update S3 request metrics for OTLP export (#1630); `6d7c1949` Add metrics for number of inodes (#781) (at that commit the file was still `mountpoint-s3/src/metrics/data.rs`); `35d23e92` Refactor metrics to have sharded shared state (#445) (at that commit the file was still `mountpoint-s3/src/metrics/data.rs`) — run `git show` on any of them.

Serious — 223 finding(s)

D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×103

TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/examples/list.rs:52 — // TODO: Expose max-keys and cont. token arg, print common prefixes and continuation token — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client.rs:566 — // TODO: Review the part size validation for read_part_size, read_part_size can have a more relax limit. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client.rs:1581 — // TODO: the CRT does some clamping to a max size rather than just swallowing the part size — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/src/object_client.rs:383 — // TODO: Populate this struct with return fields from the S3 API, e.g., version id, delete marker. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/src/object_client.rs:400 — // TODO: Populate this struct with return fields from the S3 API, e.g., etag. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/src/object_client.rs:419 — // TODO: Populate this struct with fields as and when required to satisfy various use cases. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/src/mock_client.rs:280 — // TODO delimiter and prefix should be optional in the API — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/src/mock_client.rs:377 — // TODO delimiter and prefix should be optional in the API — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/src/mock_client.rs:433 — // TODO: we may want to extend testing of failure conditions. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/src/imds_crt_client.rs:91 — // TODO: Add more fields as required. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/src/failure_client.rs:97 — // TODO failure hook for delete_object — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/src/failure_client.rs:199 — // TODO failure hook for get_object_attributes — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/src/failure_client.rs:212 — // TODO failure hook for rename_object — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/src/mock_client/throughput_client.rs:30 — /// TODO: make it bi-directional, so that upload throughput can be simulated as well. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/put_object.rs:464 — // TODO: consider exposing on the `PutObjectRequest` trait. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/tests/metrics.rs:202 — // TODO: this assertion won't work in other partitions — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/tests/get_object_attributes.rs:211 — // TODO: Review this test when adding support for the new algorithm. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/tests/get_object_attributes.rs:298 — // TODO: Review this test when adding support for the new algorithm. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/tests/get_object.rs:270 — // TODO: what happens if the object is deleted mid-GET? the CRT does lots of ranged GETs, so they — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-client/tests/copy_object.rs:82 — // TODO: Add integration test for cross bucket copy but before that need to set up a new environment variable for a new bucket. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-crt/benches/checksums.rs:11 — // TODO: If we add additional benchmarks needing CRT initialization, move to a benchmark harness script. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-crt/src/http/request_response.rs:66 — /// TODO: Where the variant contains an [OsString] for the header name, — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-crt/src/http/request_response.rs:313 — // TODO: figure out a better place to call this — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-crt/src/s3/client.rs:1041 — // TODO: do we need to clone the client into the options struct? Or will the CRT internally — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment mountpoint-s3-fs/examples/mount_from_config.rs:202 — // TODO(chagem): Remove some code duplication, by moving this logic into fs crate. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
+ 78 more in this group — see findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×20

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D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×10

FileTooLong: ll/request.rs mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/request.rs — FileTooLong — 1306 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 806 over it, 2.61× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/superblock.rs mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs — FileTooLong — 1265 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 765 over it, 2.53× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/s3_crt_client.rs mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client.rs — FileTooLong — 1092 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 592 over it, 2.18× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: s3/client.rs mountpoint-s3-crt/src/s3/client.rs — FileTooLong — 947 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 447 over it, 1.89× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/mock_client.rs mountpoint-s3-client/src/mock_client.rs — FileTooLong — 912 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 412 over it, 1.82× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: ll/fuse_abi.rs mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/fuse_abi.rs — FileTooLong — 796 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 296 over it, 1.59× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/cli.rs mountpoint-s3/src/cli.rs — FileTooLong — 631 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted), about 84% of them inside a single declaration: CliArgs (2 blocks, 58-852). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 131 over it, 1.26× the bar. Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
FileTooLong: src/object_client.rs mountpoint-s3-client/src/object_client.rs — FileTooLong — 551 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 51 over it, 1.10× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: src/lib.rs mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/lib.rs — FileTooLong — 544 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted), about 62% of them inside a single declaration: Filesystem (314-921). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 44 over it, 1.09× the bar. Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
FileTooLong: src/fs.rs mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs — FileTooLong — 543 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted), about 85% of them inside a single declaration: S3Filesystem (2 blocks, 52-835). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 43 over it, 1.09× the bar. Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.

D17 · Explicit Debt · FixmeComment · ×8

FixmeComment benchmark/analysis-scripts/autogroup.py:116 — # FIXME: Do not use this glob hack for fio throughput — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
FixmeComment benchmark/benchmarks/crt_benchmark.py:106 — # FIXME: Ideally, we should patch CRT benchmarks to emit bytes downloads — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `# REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
FixmeComment mountpoint-s3-fs/src/prefetch.rs:287 — // FIXME: Consider using histogram to capture partial hit ratios. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
FixmeComment mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock/inode.rs:783 — // FIXME: This invariant is violated by Mountpoint — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
FixmeComment mountpoint-s3-fs/tests/direct_io.rs:33 — // avoid stale inode issues. (FIXME) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
FixmeComment mountpoint-s3-fs/tests/fuse_tests/prefetch_test.rs:82 — // avoid stale inode issues. (FIXME) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
FixmeComment mountpoint-s3-fs/tests/fuse_tests/consistency_test.rs:16 — // avoid stale inode issues. (FIXME) — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
FixmeComment mountpoint-s3-fs/tests/fuse_tests/metrics_test.rs:152 — // FIXME: Revisit this if this is really needed. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.

D3 · God Classes · MethodTooLong · ×6

MethodTooLong: Request.dispatch_req mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/request.rs:71 — MethodTooLong — dispatch_req runs 417 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 317 over it, 4.17× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
MethodTooLong: Operation.fmt mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/request.rs:1921 — MethodTooLong — fmt runs 163 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 63 over it, 1.63× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
MethodTooLong: Superblock.rename mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:438 — MethodTooLong — rename runs 131 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 31 over it, 1.31× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
MethodTooLong: S3CrtClientInner.meta_request_with_callbacks mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client.rs:680 — MethodTooLong — meta_request_with_callbacks runs 117 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 17 over it, 1.17× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
MethodTooLong: S3CrtClientInner.new mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client.rs:452 — MethodTooLong — new runs 106 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 6 over it, 1.06× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
MethodTooLong: Superblock.readdir mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:1088 — MethodTooLong — readdir runs 106 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 6 over it, 1.06× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.

D3 · God Classes · ClassTooLong · ×6

ClassTooLong: Superblock mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:68 — ClassTooLong — 742 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted), 5 methods, 3 blocks, lines 68-1403. The bar is 400 significant lines; this is 342 over it, 1.86× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
ClassTooLong: CliArgs mountpoint-s3/src/cli.rs:58 — ClassTooLong — 530 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted), 22 methods, 2 blocks, lines 58-852. The bar is 400 significant lines; this is 130 over it, 1.33× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
ClassTooLong: S3Filesystem mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs:52 — ClassTooLong — 462 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted), 27 methods, 2 blocks, lines 52-835. The bar is 400 significant lines; this is 62 over it, 1.16× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
ClassTooLong: MockClient mountpoint-s3-client/src/mock_client.rs:127 — ClassTooLong — 460 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted), 18 methods, 3 blocks, lines 127-1211. The bar is 400 significant lines; this is 60 over it, 1.15× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
ClassTooLong: Request mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/request.rs:28 — ClassTooLong — 458 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted), 9 methods, 2 blocks, lines 28-652. The bar is 400 significant lines; this is 58 over it, 1.15× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
ClassTooLong: S3FuseFilesystem mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fuse.rs:83 — ClassTooLong — 403 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted), 1 methods, 3 blocks, lines 83-646. The bar is 400 significant lines; this is 3 over it, 1.01× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Superblock · ×5

Superblock::readdir (cognitive 38) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:1088 — Superblock::readdir has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13 (28 pts), loops 2 (5 pts), boolean chains 3, match/switch 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 19). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs holds 7 of the 16 functions over the threshold — including the worst — and 55 of the 109 points over it (50%), 2.4× the next-largest file (mountpoint-s3/src/bin/mount-s3-log-analyzer.rs at 23). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
Superblock::open_handle (cognitive 20) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:813 — Superblock::open_handle has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (12 pts), boolean chains 5, match/switch 3 (nesting depth added 2). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs holds 7 of the 16 functions over the threshold — including the worst — and 55 of the 109 points over it (50%), 2.4× the next-largest file (mountpoint-s3/src/bin/mount-s3-log-analyzer.rs at 23). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
Superblock::rename (cognitive 18) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:438 — Superblock::rename has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (13 pts), match/switch 4 (5 pts) (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs holds 7 of the 16 functions over the threshold — including the worst — and 55 of the 109 points over it (50%), 2.4× the next-largest file (mountpoint-s3/src/bin/mount-s3-log-analyzer.rs at 23). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
Superblock::forget (cognitive 17) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:1321 — Superblock::forget has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (16 pts), match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 10). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs holds 7 of the 16 functions over the threshold — including the worst — and 55 of the 109 points over it (50%), 2.4× the next-largest file (mountpoint-s3/src/bin/mount-s3-log-analyzer.rs at 23). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
Superblock::finish_writing (cognitive 16) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:924 — Superblock::finish_writing has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 4 (8 pts), match/switch 2 (4 pts), loops 2 (3 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs holds 7 of the 16 functions over the threshold — including the worst — and 55 of the 109 points over it (50%), 2.4× the next-largest file (mountpoint-s3/src/bin/mount-s3-log-analyzer.rs at 23). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.

D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×5

Change coupling: failure_client.rs ↔ throughput_client.rs mountpoint-s3-client/src/failure_client.rs — `mountpoint-s3-client/src/failure_client.rs` and `mountpoint-s3-client/src/mock_client/throughput_client.rs` change together 73% of the time (8 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 8 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `4a5f914f` Make ObjectClient part sizes no longer optional (#1542); `382a3696` Introduce builder pattern for mockclientconfig (#1502); `d5b36e8f` Improve get_object interface for backpressure (#1200) — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: atomic.rs ↔ incremental.rs mountpoint-s3-fs/src/upload/atomic.rs — `mountpoint-s3-fs/src/upload/atomic.rs` and `mountpoint-s3-fs/src/upload/incremental.rs` change together 64% of the time (7 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 7 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `5fdb9b4b` Implement content type detection for uploaded objects (#1790); `4a5f914f` Make ObjectClient part sizes no longer optional (#1542); `44159b56` Introduce UploaderConfig (#1526) — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: disk_data_cache.rs ↔ in_memory_data_cache.rs mountpoint-s3-fs/src/data_cache/disk_data_cache.rs — `mountpoint-s3-fs/src/data_cache/disk_data_cache.rs` and `mountpoint-s3-fs/src/data_cache/in_memory_data_cache.rs` change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency between them. They sit in the same directory, but in this ecosystem each file is its own module — a sibling reference still needs an import — so the missing import edge is real: the coupling runs through shared behaviour, not a declared dependency. If they duplicate structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 6 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `9206ed48` Bypass the shared cache for large objects (#1117) (at that commit the files were still `mountpoint-s3/src/data_cache/disk_data_cache.rs` and `mountpoint-s3/src/data_cache/in_memory_data_cache.rs`); `d62413d2` Make cache writes async (#1029) (at that commit the files were still `mountpoint-s3/src/data_cache/disk_data_cache.rs` and `mountpoint-s3/src/data_cache/in_memory_data_cache.rs`); `f4b420b2` Tidy up ChecksummedBytes public methods (#689) (at that commit the files were still `mountpoint-s3/src/data_cache/disk_data_cache.rs` and `mountpoint-s3/src/data_cache/in_memory_data_cache.rs`) — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: fs.rs ↔ part_queue.rs mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs — `mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs` and `mountpoint-s3-fs/src/prefetch/part_queue.rs` change together 55% of the time (12 of the 22 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 12 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `382a3696` Introduce builder pattern for mockclientconfig (#1502); `9326a489` Update to new `metrics` crate version (#787) (at that commit the files were still `mountpoint-s3/src/fs.rs` and `mountpoint-s3/src/prefetch/part_queue.rs`); `c6b2a17e` Introduce Prefetch trait (#595) (at that commit the files were still `mountpoint-s3/src/fs.rs` and `mountpoint-s3/src/prefetch/part_queue.rs`) — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: throughput_client.rs ↔ get_object.rs mountpoint-s3-client/src/mock_client/throughput_client.rs — `mountpoint-s3-client/src/mock_client/throughput_client.rs` and `mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/get_object.rs` change together 55% of the time (6 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 6 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `59391ff3` `GetObjectResponse` returns part content as `Bytes` rather than `Box<…; `d5b36e8f` Improve get_object interface for backpressure (#1200); `e544f8f6` Add support for getting object checksums in GetObject (#1123) — run `git show` on any of them.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×3

Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-crt/src/s3/client.rs:1449 — mountpoint-s3-crt/src/s3/client.rs:1449-1460 | mountpoint-s3-crt/src/s3/client.rs:1468-1479 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/mnt/fuse_pure.rs:288 — mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/mnt/fuse_pure.rs:288-299 | mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/mnt/fuse_pure.rs:300-311 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/request.rs:91 — mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/request.rs:91-102 | mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/request.rs:111-122 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×3

Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock/handles_map.rs:116 — mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock/handles_map.rs:116-120 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock/handles_map.rs:131-135 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/get_object_attributes.rs:192 — mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/get_object_attributes.rs:192-196 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/list_objects.rs:49-53 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-crt/src/checksums/sha1.rs:52 — mountpoint-s3-crt/src/checksums/sha1.rs:52-56 | mountpoint-s3-crt/src/checksums/sha256.rs:52-56 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Superblock · ×2

Superblock::readdir (cyclomatic 20) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:1088 — Superblock::readdir has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
Superblock::rename (cyclomatic 16) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:438 — Superblock::rename has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot · ×2

Hotspot: mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs/error.rs mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs/error.rs:159 — mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs/error.rs changed 3 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 30 in InodeError::to_errno at line 159. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-06-30..2026-09-28, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-30 11:25:19 +00:00' --until='2026-09-28 11:25:19 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs/error.rs`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
Hotspot: benchmark/benchmarks/mountpoint.py benchmark/benchmarks/mountpoint.py:24 — benchmark/benchmarks/mountpoint.py changed 2 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 29 in mountpoint.mount_mp at line 24. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, with the area under test before it moves. Counted over 2026-06-30..2026-09-28, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-06-30 11:25:19 +00:00' --until='2026-09-28 11:25:19 +00:00' --full-history --no-merges -- benchmark/benchmarks/mountpoint.py`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · mountpoint_s3 · ×2

mountpoint_s3::bin::mount-s3-log-analyzer::main (cognitive 38) mountpoint-s3/src/bin/mount-s3-log-analyzer.rs:82 — mountpoint_s3::bin::mount-s3-log-analyzer::main has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (29 pts), loops 4 (9 pts) (nesting depth added 23). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
mountpoint_s3::run::run (cognitive 17) mountpoint-s3/src/run.rs:45 — mountpoint_s3::run::run has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 4 (11 pts), if/else 3 (6 pts) (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SuperblockInner · ×2

SuperblockInner::update_slow_path (cognitive 26) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:1720 — SuperblockInner::update_slow_path has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (16 pts), boolean chains 5, match/switch 3 (5 pts) (nesting depth added 11). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs holds 7 of the 16 functions over the threshold — including the worst — and 55 of the 109 points over it (50%), 2.4× the next-largest file (mountpoint-s3/src/bin/mount-s3-log-analyzer.rs at 23). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
SuperblockInner::remote_lookup (cognitive 25) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:1519 — SuperblockInner::remote_lookup has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (19 pts), match/switch 2 (5 pts), loops 1 (nesting depth added 14). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body. This file is where this pass's cognitive complexity CONCENTRATES: mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs holds 7 of the 16 functions over the threshold — including the worst — and 55 of the 109 points over it (50%), 2.4× the next-largest file (mountpoint-s3/src/bin/mount-s3-log-analyzer.rs at 23). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · MockClient · ×2

MockClient::list_objects_ordered (cognitive 19) mountpoint-s3-client/src/mock_client.rs:273 — MockClient::list_objects_ordered has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (15 pts), match/switch 1 (3 pts), loops 1 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
MockClient::get_object (cognitive 16) mountpoint-s3-client/src/mock_client.rs:935 — MockClient::get_object has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (14 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D3 · God Classes · TooManyFields · ×2

TooManyFields: CliArgs mountpoint-s3/src/cli.rs:58 — TooManyFields — 53 stored fields beside 22 methods. The bar is 30 stored fields; this is 23 over it, 1.77× the bar. This is width in DATA, not behaviour: every reader that takes the whole type couples to all of its fields, so a change to any one of them is a change every reader has to be checked against. To reduce it, group the fields that are read together by the same callers into a smaller type of their own, and have this one hold that type as a single member — each reader then names only the group it uses.
TooManyFields: fuse_lowlevel_ops mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/mnt/fuse3_sys.rs:50 — TooManyFields — 45 stored fields. The bar is 30 stored fields; this is 15 over it, 1.50× the bar. This is width in DATA, not behaviour: every reader that takes the whole type couples to all of its fields, so a change to any one of them is a change every reader has to be checked against. To reduce it, group the fields that are read together by the same callers into a smaller type of their own, and have this one hold that type as a single member — each reader then names only the group it uses.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/metrics/defs.rs:75 — mountpoint-s3-fs/src/metrics/defs.rs:75-87 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/metrics/defs.rs:150-162 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/metrics/defs.rs:109 — mountpoint-s3-fs/src/metrics/defs.rs:109-121 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/metrics/defs.rs:149-161 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-client/src/imds_crt_client.rs:29 — mountpoint-s3-client/src/imds_crt_client.rs:29-39 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client.rs:457-467 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-crt/src/s3/client.rs:1253 — mountpoint-s3-crt/src/s3/client.rs:1253-1263 | mountpoint-s3-crt/src/s3/client.rs:1488-1498 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs:629 — mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs:629-638 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs:678-687 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:1194 — mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:1194-1203 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:1208-1217 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/request.rs:447 — mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/request.rs:447-452 | mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/request.rs:461-466 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-crt/src/checksums/sha1.rs:34 — mountpoint-s3-crt/src/checksums/sha1.rs:34-39 | mountpoint-s3-crt/src/checksums/sha256.rs:34-39 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.

AC7 · A11y enforcement · Accessibility enforcement below the top rung · ×1

Accessibility enforcement below the top rung — No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 1 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Request · ×1

Request::dispatch_req (cyclomatic 60) mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/request.rs:71 — Request::dispatch_req has cyclomatic complexity 60 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · S3CrtClientInner · ×1

S3CrtClientInner::meta_request_with_callbacks (cyclomatic 19) mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client.rs:680 — S3CrtClientInner::meta_request_with_callbacks has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · SuperblockInner · ×1

SuperblockInner::update_slow_path (cyclomatic 17) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:1720 — SuperblockInner::update_slow_path has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.

D17 · Explicit Debt · XxxComment · ×1

XxxComment mountpoint-s3-fuser/examples/simple.rs:1469 — // XXX: In theory we should only need to do this when WRITE_KILL_PRIV is set for 7.31+ — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · S3CrtClientInner · ×1

S3CrtClientInner::meta_request_with_callbacks (cognitive 31) mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client.rs:680 — S3CrtClientInner::meta_request_with_callbacks has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 23 (28 pts), match/switch 1 (2 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · CachingPartComposer · ×1

CachingPartComposer::compose_parts (cognitive 18) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/prefetch/caching_stream.rs:287 — CachingPartComposer::compose_parts has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (14 pts), loops 2 (3 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ReaddirIter · ×1

ReaddirIter::next (cognitive 17) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock/readdir.rs:481 — ReaddirIter::next has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (12 pts), match/switch 2 (4 pts), loops 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · mountpoint_s3_fuser · ×1

mountpoint_s3_fuser::mnt::fuse_pure::fuse_mount_fusermount (cognitive 17) mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/mnt/fuse_pure.rs:238 — mountpoint_s3_fuser::mnt::fuse_pure::fuse_mount_fusermount has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (16 pts), match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Request · ×1

Request::dispatch_req (cognitive 16) mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/request.rs:71 — Request::dispatch_req has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 5 (8 pts), match/switch 3 (5 pts), boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D3 · God Classes · FunctionTooLong · ×1

FunctionTooLong: mountpoint_s3_fuser::ll::request::op::parse mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/request.rs:1614 — FunctionTooLong — mountpoint_s3_fuser::ll::request::op::parse runs 180 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 80 over it, 1.80× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium advisory (unmaintained) · ×1

REDACTED

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D4 · Code Duplication · Members sharing a duplicated core (7 members, 50+ identical tokens) · ×1

Members sharing a duplicated core (7 members, 50+ identical tokens) mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/copy_object.rs:65 — mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/copy_object.rs:65-81 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/delete_object.rs:42-58 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/get_object.rs:269-286 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/get_object_attributes.rs:166-181 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/list_objects.rs:228-242 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/put_object.rs:322-357 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/rename_object.rs:93-124 — These 7 members share a duplicated core: a run of at least 50 identical tokens appears in every one of them. That run is NOT broken out as duplicated-block rows below — it is what admitted this row, and the blocks below cover only the part of it that clears the block floor, so they understate the correspondence. Read the members as one construct written 7 times. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Extracting the individual blocks below is not the same fix: it leaves every body in place and the next edit still has to be made 7 times.

D4 · Code Duplication · Members sharing a duplicated core (4 members, 50+ identical tokens) · ×1

Members sharing a duplicated core (4 members, 50+ identical tokens) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs:413 — mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs:413-461 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs:517-559 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs:628-651 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs:653-700 — These 4 members share a duplicated core: a run of at least 50 identical tokens appears in every one of them. That run is NOT broken out as duplicated-block rows below — it is what admitted this row, and the blocks below cover only the part of it that clears the block floor, so they understate the correspondence. Read the members as one construct written 4 times. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Extracting the individual blocks below is not the same fix: it leaves every body in place and the next edit still has to be made 4 times.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/argument.rs:36 — mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/argument.rs:36-49 | mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/argument.rs:58-71 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/metrics/defs.rs:75 — mountpoint-s3-fs/src/metrics/defs.rs:75-86 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/metrics/defs.rs:110-121 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/metrics/defs.rs:150-161 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9–10 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (9–10 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:796 — mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:796-804 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/superblock.rs:996-1005 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 4) · ×1

Duplicated block (8 lines × 4) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs:426 — mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs:426-433 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs:524-531 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs:629-636 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs.rs:678-685 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6 lines × 7) · ×1

Duplicated block (6 lines × 7) mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/copy_object.rs:66 — mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/copy_object.rs:66-71 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/delete_object.rs:43-48 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/get_object.rs:271-276 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/get_object_attributes.rs:167-172 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/list_objects.rs:229-234 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/put_object.rs:323-328 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/rename_object.rs:94-99 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from all 7 call sites, so a change lands once.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 8) · ×1

Duplicated block (5 lines × 8) mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/copy_object.rs:67 — mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/copy_object.rs:67-71 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/delete_object.rs:44-48 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/get_object.rs:272-276 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/get_object_attributes.rs:168-172 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/list_objects.rs:230-234 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/put_object.rs:324-328 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/put_object.rs:343-347 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/rename_object.rs:95-99 — there are 8 copies across 7 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 8 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (5 lines × 3) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/manifest/db.rs:168 — mountpoint-s3-fs/src/manifest/db.rs:168-172 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/manifest/db.rs:188-192 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/manifest/db.rs:208-212 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/mnt/fuse2.rs:13 — mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/mnt/fuse2.rs:13-19 | mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/mnt/fuse3.rs:18-24 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) mountpoint-s3-crt/src/checksums/crc32.rs:54 — mountpoint-s3-crt/src/checksums/crc32.rs:54-64 | mountpoint-s3-crt/src/checksums/crc32c.rs:54-64 | mountpoint-s3-crt/src/checksums/crc64nvme.rs:63-73 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from all 3 call sites, so a change lands once.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) · ×1

Duplicated block (7 lines × 3) mountpoint-s3-crt/src/http/request_response.rs:312 — mountpoint-s3-crt/src/http/request_response.rs:312-320 | mountpoint-s3-crt/src/s3/endpoint_resolver.rs:38-44 | mountpoint-s3-crt/src/s3/endpoint_resolver.rs:99-105 — there are 3 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 3 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 5) · ×1

Duplicated block (9 lines × 5) mountpoint-s3-crt/src/auth.rs:18 — mountpoint-s3-crt/src/auth.rs:18-26 | mountpoint-s3-crt/src/common.rs:22-30 | mountpoint-s3-crt/src/http.rs:14-22 | mountpoint-s3-crt/src/io.rs:19-27 | mountpoint-s3-crt/src/s3.rs:19-27 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from all 5 call sites, so a change lands once.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) mountpoint-s3-fs/src/logging/syslog.rs:178 — mountpoint-s3-fs/src/logging/syslog.rs:178-185 | mountpoint-s3-fs/src/logging/syslog.rs:194-201 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 9) · ×1

Duplicated block (5 lines × 9) mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/copy_object.rs:67 — mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/copy_object.rs:67-71 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/delete_object.rs:44-48 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/get_object.rs:272-276 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/get_object_attributes.rs:168-172 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/list_objects.rs:230-234 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/put_object.rs:324-328 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/put_object.rs:343-347 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/rename_object.rs:95-99 | mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/rename_object.rs:107-111 — there are 9 copies across 7 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 9 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (6–10 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (6–10 lines × 2) examples/pytorch/resnet.py:51 — examples/pytorch/resnet.py:51-56 | examples/pytorch/resnet.py:79-88 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.

D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1

Off the main sequence: mountpoint-s3-fuser — mountpoint-s3-fuser: abstractness 0.02, instability 0.00, distance 0.98 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 1 project(s), so it's rigid to change.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4) · Low cohesion · ×1

Low cohesion: KernelConfig (LCOM4 5) mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/lib.rs:142 — KernelConfig's methods fall into 5 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 5 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.

Minor — 20 finding(s)

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×7

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 2 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: mountpoint-s3-crt/src/common/logging.rs, mountpoint-s3-fs/src/fs/sse.rs. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.

D16 · Bus Factor · Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1

Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 2 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (4 single-owned of 149 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 149 of the 190 production source files in this repository met that bar). They are anonymized user #2 (1 file(s)), anonymized user #3 (1 file(s)) — spread or document their files in the same way, at lower priority than the named off-boarding risks above.

D19 · Documentation Quality · Documentation · ×1

Documentation: no installation or build instructions doc/TROUBLESHOOTING.md — The troubleshooting document does not describe how to install or configure Mountpoint. Add a short installation/usage section covering prerequisites, how to run the binary, and where logs are emitted.

D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1

No ADRs found — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`.

D26 · Project Cohesion · Projects may be oversized for their cohesion · ×1

Projects may be oversized for their cohesion — 2 of 6 project(s) overshoot their size bounds, lowering Project Cohesion to 3.9/10. The most over is `mountpoint-s3-fs` (27406 LoC, 219 public types across 15 directories). Review these for cohesion — draw the boundary inside the module first (group each responsibility into its own package or directory and keep the cross-boundary members non-public), since splitting a published package moves types between packages and breaks consumers.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1

Further orphaned files (smaller) — 33 smaller file(s) also have no living knowledge — folded into the freshness score and metrics rather than raised one row each — most significant first: mountpoint-s3-crt/src/s3/endpoint_resolver.rs, mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/mnt/fuse_pure.rs, mountpoint-s3-crt/src/io/event_loop.rs, mountpoint-s3-fs/src/manifest/core.rs, mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/session.rs, mountpoint-s3-client/src/s3_crt_client/get_object_attributes.rs, mountpoint-s3-fuser/src/ll/mod.rs, mountpoint-s3-fs/src/manifest/csv_reader.rs (and 25 more) (39 orphaned of 149 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 149 of the 190 production source files in this repository met that bar). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1

No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

P2 · Observability · Logging is not universal · ×1

Logging is not universal — Only 5/6 runnable modules use logging (modules with no entry point or server are excluded — they are libraries a runnable module hosts). Silent: `.`.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-e9e51825690846b598f9fa3fa0fbc3ca/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-e9e51825690846b598f9fa3fa0fbc3ca/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .	13	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive .	1	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	41	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D43 · Malicious Dependencies	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive .	0	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 01a0ef48-87d2-73ad-a4f8-e53a74b835b2 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Awslabs/mountpoint-S3

Findings by grade

This survey was produced by

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — module dependency graph

Architecture — module dependency matrix

At a glance — Code Health · 91% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Architecture · 93% · Adequate · gated by D26 ·

At a glance — Maturity · 68% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 85% · Strong ·

At a glance — Security · 64% · Adequate · gated by D29, D31, D36 ·

At a glance — Accessibility · 57% · Adequate ·

At a glance — Performance · 94% · Exemplary ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

How the grades work

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts