Clean-Architecture-Template

Executive summary

Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.

babaktaremi/Clean-Architecture-Template is in a workable but fragile state (56%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (53%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (55%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing… (Deployment & Rollback); Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates (Domain vs controller coverage); Stamp a semantic version (csproj <Version>… (Library API & versioning).

For scale: Small (~5,302 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

Code Health 61% Adequate · gated by X5 Architecture 83% ★ Exemplary Maturity 59% Adequate · gated by D34, M2 Readiness 53% Adequate · gated by D8, P9 Security 55% Adequate · gated by D30, C1 Performance 64% Strong

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 53% · 46% weightSecurity 55% · 25% weightMaturity 59% · 14% weightCode Health 61% · 8% weightPerformance 64% · 4% weightArchitecture 83% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 53 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 56 → ~59.

Code composition — where the lines go

Business logic 16%Plumbing 60%Tests 2%Generated 22%

New since the last scan (9+)

9 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D22 · Inconsistent naming for authentication/token generation endpoints. 'AdminLogin' implies a login flow, while 'TokenRequest' and 'PasswordTokenRequest' imply generic token issuance. There is no clear distinction between a 'Login' action and a 'TokenRequest' action in the API surface.
D22 · Inconsistent naming for read-only list/fetch operations. Some use 'Get' (GetOrders, GetRoles, GetAuthRoutes) while another uses 'GetAll' (GetAllUsers). This suggests a lack of standardization in how collection retrieval is named.
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_10 Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfile
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 src/API/CleanArc.Web.Api/appsettings.json
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 src/API/CleanArc.Web.Api/bin/Debug/net10.0/appsettings.json
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 src/API/CleanArc.Web.Api/bin/Release/net10.0/appsettings.json
D31 · Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/package.yml
P12 · Test suite runs only after the merge

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €2,800–€14,000

Cost to rebuild	€2,800–€14,000 (0.1 person-years (46–148 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	High — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.8× (at 56% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · 40% boilerplate · 39% straight-line · 21% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€8,400 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 53% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.4) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.

+2.7 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene

Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.

+2.7 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene

Resolve the 1 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.

+2.3 pts · Low effort · Dependency Hygiene

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 53%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (5,302 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 53%

→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0 C1 · Repo Data Protection 3.5

At a glance — Performance · 64% · Strong

The Good

PF1 · Repo Benchmark discipline 6.0 PF2 · Repo Allocation hygiene 7.7 PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 6.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	26	High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	9	High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection	5	High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures	3	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, implement health checks and immutable image tags to ensure reliable deployments and quick rollbacks. Next, increase unit test coverage for the domain layer to safeguard core business logic. Then, adopt semantic versioning for the library API to manage breaking changes effectively. After that, strengthen data protection by securing keys and encrypting sensitive columns. Finally, resolve the single high-severity vulnerability in dependency hygiene.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.	+2.7 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.	+2.7 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Resolve the 1 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.	+2.3 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.	+3.5 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback
Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates, value objects, domain services) — that's where correctness matters most.	+3.5 pts	Medium	Domain vs controller coverage
Stamp a semantic version (csproj <Version> or GitVersion/MinVer) and follow semver for breaking changes.	+3.4 pts	Medium	Library API & versioning
Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with package.yml (4).	+1.6 pts	Low	Static Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.	+1.5 pts	Low	Knowledge Freshness

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 15 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 7% slop · 13% mixed · 80% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
Dockerfile	2.0	Slop	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
.github/workflows/package.yml	2.7	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/API/CleanArc.Web.Api/appsettings.json	5.1	Mixed	Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs	6.7	Near-clean	Cyclomatic Complexity: ApplySummariesOperationFilter.Process (cyclomatic 21)
Web.Api/appsettings.json	7.2	Near-clean	Secrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/API/CleanArc.Web.Api/CleanArc.Web.Api.csproj	7.6	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
src/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity/Jwt/JwtService.cs	7.9	Near-clean	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: jwt-tokenvalidationparameters-no-expiry-validation
src/API/CleanArc.Web.Api/bin/Debug/net10.0/appsettings.json	7.9	Near-clean	IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6
src/API/CleanArc.Web.Api/bin/Release/net10.0/appsettings.json	7.9	Near-clean	IaC & Container Security: Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6
src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/ServiceConfiguration/ServiceCollectionExtension.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
src/Core/CleanArc.Application/Features/Users/Commands/Create/UserCreateCommand.Handler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
src/Core/CleanArc.Application/Features/Users/Queries/TokenRequest/UserTokenRequestQuery.Handler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
src/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity/Identity/DataProtection/LookupProtector.cs	8.5	Near-clean	Code Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)
src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Filters/ApiResultFilterAttribute.cs	9.4	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: ObsoleteWithoutCallers
src/Shared/CleanArc.SharedKernel/Extensions/ModelBuilderExtensions.cs	9.4	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: ObsoleteWithoutCallers

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 59 of 62 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 62 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D21D22D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D39AX1AX10AX3AX4AX5AX6AX7AX8AX9C1C2C4GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P10P2P4P8P9PF1PF2PF3S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 38 of 113 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc899-7629-7eef-a3a9-5988543a38f2.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D21, D22, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ApplySummariesOperationFilter.Process at 21.

ApplySummariesOperationFilter.Process (cyclomatic 21)src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:12

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ApplySummariesOperationFilter.Process at 29.

ApplySummariesOperationFilter.Process (cognitive 29)src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:12

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

3 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)src/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity/Identity/DataProtection/LookupProtector.cs:217

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:40

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2)src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:53

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D5 · Coupling9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

12 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: CleanArc.Infrastructure.Monitoring · ×2

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 6 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D8 · Code Coverage1.7 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 6.3%, branch coverage 3.3%.

What to do

Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 test methods: 4 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 4 tests.

Mock framework: NSubstitute

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky); other: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D12 · Dependency Hygiene6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

34 outdated, 1 vulnerable, 2 deprecated, 1 prerelease packages.

Vulnerable: NuGet.Packaging

Deprecated: Serilog.Sinks.Elasticsearch · ×2

Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore

Outdated: FluentValidation · ×34

What to do

Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 49 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D16 · Bus Factor9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/API/CleanArc.Web.Api/Program.cs.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D17 · Explicit Debt9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 4657 LoC (0.3/KLoC) → score 9.4.

NoWarnInCsprojsrc/API/CleanArc.Web.Api/CleanArc.Web.Api.csproj:8

TodoComment · ×2src/Core/CleanArc.Application/Features/Users/Commands/Create/UserCreateCommand.Handler.cs:49

CommentedOutCodesrc/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/ServiceConfiguration/ServiceCollectionExtension.cs:17

ObsoleteWithoutCallers · ×2src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Filters/ApiResultFilterAttribute.cs:8

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D18 · Solution Shape9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 projects, 164 source files, 4826 hand-written lines of code (4657 production / 169 test), plus 1534 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 44 inter-project edges.

Thin analysable surface across projects

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The single README is a usable starter guide for the Clean-Architecture Template, covering installation and an 'Excellent to know' link plus outlining every documented layer (CleanArc.Application/Domain/Infrastructure/Web) in its heading. However it is thin on content: there are no explanations of how each layer behaves or what problems they solve, only a one-line motivation ('most templates not usable in production') and the installation command; no architecture overview, no usage examples, and no links to the referenced cross-cutting/identity/persistence layers (which are zero-covered).

XML-doc coverage: CleanArc.SharedKernel · ×10src/Shared/CleanArc.SharedKernel/CleanArc.SharedKernel.csproj

What to do

Improve Documentation Quality — currently 4.0/10. — The single README is a usable starter guide for the Clean-Architecture Template, covering installation and an 'Excellent to know' link plus outlining every documented layer (CleanArc.Application/Domain/Infrastructure/Web) in its heading. However it is thin on content: there are no explanations of how each layer behaves or what problems they solve, only a one-line motivation ('most templates not usable in production') and the installation command; no architecture overview, no usage examples, and no links to the referenced cross-cutting/identity/persistence layers (which are zero-covered).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D22 · Internal API Consistency / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 API inconsistencies across 7 exposed types.

Inconsistent naming for authentication/token generation endpoints. 'AdminLogin' implies a login flow, while 'TokenRequest' and 'PasswordTokenRequest' imply generic token issuance. There is no clear distinction between a 'Login' action and a 'TokenRequest' action in the API surface.

Inconsistent naming for read-only list/fetch operations. Some use 'Get' (GetOrders, GetRoles, GetAuthRoutes) while another uses 'GetAll' (GetAllUsers). This suggests a lack of standardization in how collection retrieval is named.

What to do

Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for authentication/token generation endpoints.… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for read-only list/fetch operations. Some use 'Get'… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 12 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D27 · Navigability9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

93 % of calls cross a namespace and 2 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×2Web.Api/appsettings.json:7detected by gitleaks finding

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)4.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×4.github/workflows/package.yml:15detected by semgrep finding

Medium: jwt-tokenvalidationparameters-no-expiry-validationsrc/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity/Jwt/JwtService.cs:75detected by semgrep finding

What to do

Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with package.yml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with JwtService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

26 vulnerable package(s): 1 critical, 19 high, 5 medium, 1 low.

High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0 · ×19detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

Critical CVE: Scriban 6.2.0detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

Medium CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 · ×5detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

Low CVE: NuGet.Packaging 7.0.0detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

Resolve the 19 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (19 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D31 · IaC & Container Security8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

9 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 6 medium, 1 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×2Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_10 · ×6Dockerfile:27detected by trivy finding

Low IaC: DS-0026Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 6 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with appsettings.json (3), Dockerfile (2), package.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.5 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

18 of 19 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity/ServiceConfiguration/ServiceCollectionExtension.cs.

Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 of 457 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

IL efficiency: 1 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetsrc/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:15

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX10 · Code composition4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX6 · Interface segregation9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

`IAppUserManager` declares 22 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IAppUserManager.cs:6

What to do

Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX7 · Slice cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.

Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C1 · Data Protection3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

What to do

Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

C4 · Data Retention6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).

Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.

A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a scheduled purge / cleanup job (PurgeOlderThan / CleanupJob), a documented retention period / data-expiry.

What to do

Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.

Do you agree with this assessment?

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — UserRefreshTokenRepository.cs:38

What to do

Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.

Do you agree with this assessment?

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

`RemoveUserOldTokens` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — UserRefreshTokenRepository.cs:36
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×21) — ServiceCollectionExtension.cs:17, ServiceCollectionExtension.cs:18, ServiceCollectionExtension.cs:19, …

What to do

Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a README to the 12 of 12 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).

Do you agree with this assessment?

M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M4 · Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests

What to do

Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P10 · Library API & versioning6.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No <Version>/<VersionPrefix>/GitVersion/MinVer detected. A published library needs explicit semantic versioning so consumers can reason about breaking changes.

What to do

Stamp a semantic version (csproj <Version> or GitVersion/MinVer) and follow semver for breaking changes.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P2 · Observability8.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Only 5/9 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 9, 1 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P9 · Domain vs controller coverage1.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether test coverage concentrates on the domain (business rules) rather than the trivial web/controller layer — a focus check a generic tool can't make.

Method: Roslyn plus test-execution analysis: domain-layer versus trivial web/controller coverage ratio. Computed metric, deterministic.

Domain coverage is 4% — the layer carrying the business rules is under-tested.

What to do

Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates, value objects, domain services) — that's where correctness matters most.

Do you agree with this assessment?

PF1 · Benchmark discipline6.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

No benchmark suite was found. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

What to do

Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).

Do you agree with this assessment?

PF2 · Allocation hygiene7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 28 use(s) across 8,297 production line(s) (~3.4/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.

Do you agree with this assessment?

PF3 · Async & latency hygiene6.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

Only 0/154 awaits use ConfigureAwait(false). A library that captures the caller's context can stall or deadlock its host — the classic way a dependency drags an app down.

What to do

In library code, append .ConfigureAwait(false) to every await (or set <ConfigureAwait>false</ConfigureAwait> / use the analyzer CA2007) so the library never captures the host's context.

Do you agree with this assessment?

S1 · Web-Security Posture6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

`RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — ServiceCollectionExtension.cs:134
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X2 · Cancellation propagation6.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 22/47 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×25) — JwtService.cs:117, ServiceCollectionExtension.cs:217, BaseAsyncRepository.cs:21, …

What to do

Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X4 · Structured logging4.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. (×2) — UserCreateCommand.Handler.cs:47, UserTokenRequestQuery.Handler.cs:24

What to do

Interpolated log message defeats structured logging

Do you agree with this assessment?

X5 · Nullable reference types2.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

1/10 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
~0.1 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 1 suppression(s) across the 6761 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	61%	Adequate — gated by X5	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	83%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Maturity	59%	Adequate — gated by D34, M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	53%	Adequate — gated by D8, P9	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	55%	Adequate — gated by D30, C1	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance	64%	Strong	Solid.

Not included — 36 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — This is a dotnet-new template — it produces no released artifact to attest. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM are deferred to the application you build from it (add SLSA provenance / cosign signing / an SBOM in your app's release pipeline).
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 8 value object(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (18 CQRS handler(s))
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P3 Security & performance tooling — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarks are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 30 finding(s)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×19

High CVE: Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0 — Microsoft.OpenApi 2.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 11 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.11 — SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.11 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×4

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/package.yml:15 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/package.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: nuget/setup-nuget@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `nuget/setup-nuget@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/nuget/setup-nuget/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/package.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/package.yml:28 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: dorny/test-reporter@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `dorny/test-reporter@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/dorny/test-reporter/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.

D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×2

Secret: generic-api-key Web.Api/appsettings.json:7 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key src/API/CleanArc.Web.Api/appsettings.json:8 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×2

High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0009 Dockerfile — WORKDIR path not absolute

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×1

Vulnerable: NuGet.Packaging — NuGet.Packaging 7.0.0 — Low severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×1

NoWarnInCsproj src/API/CleanArc.Web.Api/CleanArc.Web.Api.csproj:8 — 1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×1

Critical CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

Warning — 28 finding(s)

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×6

Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_10 Dockerfile:27 — Ensure that WORKDIR values are absolute paths
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 src/API/CleanArc.Web.Api/appsettings.json:7 — Base64 High Entropy String
Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 src/API/CleanArc.Web.Api/bin/Debug/net10.0/appsettings.json:7 — Base64 High Entropy String
Medium IaC: CKV_SECRET_6 src/API/CleanArc.Web.Api/bin/Release/net10.0/appsettings.json:7 — Base64 High Entropy String
Medium IaC: CKV2_GHA_1 .github/workflows/package.yml:0 — Ensure top-level permissions are not set to write-all

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×5

Medium CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Scriban 6.2.0 — Scriban 6.2.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Api 1.13.1 — OpenTelemetry.Api 1.13.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×2

Deprecated: Serilog.Sinks.Elasticsearch — Serilog.Sinks.Elasticsearch 10.0.0 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `Elastic.Serilog.Sinks`; migrate the reference to it.
Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.9.3 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; migrate the reference to it.

D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×2

TodoComment src/Core/CleanArc.Application/Features/Users/Commands/Create/UserCreateCommand.Handler.cs:49 — //TODO Send Code Via Sms Provider — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment src/Core/CleanArc.Application/Features/Users/Queries/TokenRequest/UserTokenRequestQuery.Handler.cs:26 — //TODO Send Code Via Sms Provider — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.

D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×2

Off the main sequence: CleanArc.Infrastructure.Monitoring — CleanArc.Infrastructure.Monitoring: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 1 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: CleanArc.SharedKernel — CleanArc.SharedKernel: abstractness 0.05, instability 0.00, distance 0.95 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · ApplySummariesOperationFilter.Process (cyclomatic 21) · ×1

ApplySummariesOperationFilter.Process (cyclomatic 21) src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:12 — ApplySummariesOperationFilter.Process has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). Of this number, 20 points are the body's own statements and 1 belongs to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Prerelease dependency · ×1

Prerelease dependency: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Prometheus.AspNetCore resolves to 1.9.0-beta.1, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.

D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×1

CommentedOutCode src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/ServiceConfiguration/ServiceCollectionExtension.cs:17 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ApplySummariesOperationFilter.Process (cognitive 29) · ×1

ApplySummariesOperationFilter.Process (cognitive 29) src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:12 — ApplySummariesOperationFilter.Process has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). Of this number, 28 points are the body's own statements and 1 belongs to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · Inconsistent naming for authentication/token generation endpoints. 'AdminLogin' implies a login flow, while 'TokenRequest' and 'PasswordTokenRequest' imply generic token issuance. There is no clear distinction between a 'Login' action and a 'TokenRequest' action in the API surface. · ×1

Inconsistent naming for authentication/token generation endpoints. 'AdminLogin' implies a login flow, while 'TokenRequest' and 'PasswordTokenRequest' imply generic token issuance. There is no clear distinction between a 'Login' action and a 'TokenRequest' action in the API surface. — Unify authentication endpoints under a consistent naming convention, such as 'Authenticate', 'GenerateToken', or 'Login'. Ensure that all token-related endpoints follow the same verb-noun pattern. (signatures: AdminManagerController.AdminLogin | UserController.TokenRequest | UserController.PasswordTokenRequest)

D22 · Internal API Consistency · Inconsistent naming for read-only list/fetch operations. Some use 'Get' (GetOrders, GetRoles, GetAuthRoutes) while another uses 'GetAll' (GetAllUsers). This suggests a lack of standardization in how collection retrieval is named. · ×1

Inconsistent naming for read-only list/fetch operations. Some use 'Get' (GetOrders, GetRoles, GetAuthRoutes) while another uses 'GetAll' (GetAllUsers). This suggests a lack of standardization in how collection retrieval is named. — Standardize on 'Get' for all list operations (e.g., rename GetAllUsers to GetUsers) or 'GetAll' if the distinction is intentional (e.g., filtering vs. full list). Consistency requires a single pattern. (signatures: OrderManagementController.GetOrders | RoleManagerController.GetRoles | RoleManagerController.GetAuthRoutes | UserManagementController.GetAllUsers)

D24 · Comment Value · LLM evaluation failed · ×1

LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected start of a property name or value, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[5] | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1011.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×1

Medium: jwt-tokenvalidationparameters-no-expiry-validation src/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity/Jwt/JwtService.cs:75 — The TokenValidationParameters.ValidateLifetime is set to false, this means the JWT tokens lifetime is not validated. This can lead to an JWT token being used after it has expired, which has security implications. It is recommended to validate the JWT lifetime to ensure only valid tokens are used. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity/Identity/DataProtection/LookupProtector.cs:217 — src/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity/Identity/DataProtection/LookupProtector.cs:217-230 | src/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity/Identity/DataProtection/PersonalDataProtector.cs:222-235 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity/Identity/DataProtection/LookupProtector.cs:217` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:40 — src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:40-49 | src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:66-75 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:40` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:53 — src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:53-61 | src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:79-87 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:53` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

Recommendation — 10 finding(s)

D17 · Explicit Debt · ObsoleteWithoutCallers · ×2

ObsoleteWithoutCallers src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Filters/ApiResultFilterAttribute.cs:8 — [Obsolete] ApiResultFilterAttribute
ObsoleteWithoutCallers src/Shared/CleanArc.SharedKernel/Extensions/ModelBuilderExtensions.cs:85 — [Obsolete] RegisterEntityTypeConfiguration

D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 1 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/API/CleanArc.Web.Api/Program.cs. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.

D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1

Thin analysable surface across projects — 1 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `CleanArc.Infrastructure.CrossCutting` with 43 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 98 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 0.14 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1

Bounded contexts not declared — At 4657 LoC across 12 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.

D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×1

Low CVE: NuGet.Packaging 7.0.0 — NuGet.Packaging 7.0.0 (transitive) has a Low advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1

Low IaC: DS-0026 Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1

Further orphaned files (smaller) — 18 of 19 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: src/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity/ServiceConfiguration/ServiceCollectionExtension.cs, src/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity/Identity/DataProtection/PersonalDataProtector.cs, src/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity/Identity/DataProtection/LookupProtector.cs (and 15 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.

D39 · IL Efficiency · IL efficiency · ×1

IL efficiency: 1 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:15 — 1 of 457 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: CleanArc.WebFramework.Swagger.ApplySummariesOperationFilter.Process @ src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/Swagger/ApplySummariesOperationFilter.cs:15, 290 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 10.0/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.

Info — 45 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×34

Outdated: FluentValidation — FluentValidation 12.1.0 → 12.1.1 available (referenced by CleanArc.SharedKernel).
Outdated: Mapster — Mapster 7.4.0 → 10.0.11 available (referenced by CleanArc.SharedKernel).
Outdated: Mapster.DependencyInjection — Mapster.DependencyInjection 1.0.1 → 10.0.11 available (referenced by CleanArc.SharedKernel).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi — Microsoft.AspNetCore.OpenApi 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by CleanArc.SharedKernel).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by CleanArc.SharedKernel).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by CleanArc.SharedKernel).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Identity.Stores — Microsoft.Extensions.Identity.Stores 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by CleanArc.SharedKernel).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Hosting.Abstractions 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by CleanArc.Infrastructure.CrossCutting).
Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.MSSqlServer — Serilog.Sinks.MSSqlServer 9.0.2 → 10.0.0 available (referenced by CleanArc.Infrastructure.CrossCutting).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Identity.Core — Microsoft.Extensions.Identity.Core 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by CleanArc.Infrastructure.Persistence).
Outdated: Mediator.Abstractions — Mediator.Abstractions 3.0.1 → 3.0.2 available (referenced by CleanArc.Application).
Outdated: Mediator.SourceGenerator — Mediator.SourceGenerator 3.0.1 → 3.0.2 available (referenced by CleanArc.Application).
Outdated: System.Linq.Async — System.Linq.Async 6.0.3 → 7.0.1 available (referenced by CleanArc.Application).
Outdated: Grpc.AspNetCore — Grpc.AspNetCore 2.71.0 → 2.83.0 available (referenced by CleanArc.Web.Plugins.Grpc).
Outdated: Grpc.AspNetCore.Server.Reflection — Grpc.AspNetCore.Server.Reflection 2.71.0 → 2.83.0 available (referenced by CleanArc.Web.Plugins.Grpc).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by CleanArc.Web.Api).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Debug — Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Debug 10.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by CleanArc.Web.Api).
Outdated: Serilog.AspNetCore — Serilog.AspNetCore 9.0.0 → 10.0.0 available (referenced by CleanArc.Web.Api).
Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Http — Asp.Versioning.Http 8.1.0 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by CleanArc.WebFramework).
Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Mvc — Asp.Versioning.Mvc 8.1.0 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by CleanArc.WebFramework).
Outdated: Asp.Versioning.Mvc.ApiExplorer — Asp.Versioning.Mvc.ApiExplorer 8.1.0 → 10.0.1 available (referenced by CleanArc.WebFramework).
+ 9 more in this group — see findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×10

XML-doc coverage: CleanArc.SharedKernel src/Shared/CleanArc.SharedKernel/CleanArc.SharedKernel.csproj — CleanArc.SharedKernel: 11 % XML-doc coverage (7/62).
XML-doc coverage: CleanArc.Infrastructure.CrossCutting src/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.CrossCutting/CleanArc.Infrastructure.CrossCutting.csproj — CleanArc.Infrastructure.CrossCutting: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/2).
XML-doc coverage: CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity src/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity.csproj — CleanArc.Infrastructure.Identity: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/120).
XML-doc coverage: CleanArc.Infrastructure.Persistence src/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Persistence/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Persistence.csproj — CleanArc.Infrastructure.Persistence: 6 % XML-doc coverage (2/34).
XML-doc coverage: CleanArc.Application src/Core/CleanArc.Application/CleanArc.Application.csproj — CleanArc.Application: 1 % XML-doc coverage (1/144).
XML-doc coverage: CleanArc.Domain src/Core/CleanArc.Domain/CleanArc.Domain.csproj — CleanArc.Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/57).
XML-doc coverage: CleanArc.Web.Plugins.Grpc src/API/Plugins/CleanArc.Web.Plugins.Grpc/CleanArc.Web.Plugins.Grpc.csproj — CleanArc.Web.Plugins.Grpc: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/10).
XML-doc coverage: CleanArc.Web.Api src/API/CleanArc.Web.Api/CleanArc.Web.Api.csproj — CleanArc.Web.Api: 4 % XML-doc coverage (1/27).
XML-doc coverage: CleanArc.WebFramework src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/CleanArc.WebFramework.csproj — CleanArc.WebFramework: 5 % XML-doc coverage (2/43).
XML-doc coverage: CleanArc.Infrastructure.Monitoring src/Infrastructure/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Monitoring/CleanArc.Infrastructure.Monitoring.csproj — CleanArc.Infrastructure.Monitoring: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/7).

D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×1

Mock framework: NSubstitute — CleanArc.Tests.Setup references NSubstitute.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	2	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	5	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet list CleanArcTemplate.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json	26	artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	9	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — This is a dotnet-new template — it produces no released artifact to attest. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM are deferred to the application you build from it (add SLSA provenance / cosign signing / an SBOM in your app's release pipeline).	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019fc899-7629-7eef-a3a9-5988543a38f2 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 7 field(s) across 3 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 3 field(s)

BaseController.UserEmail src/API/CleanArc.WebFramework/BaseController/BaseController.cs:13
AddAdminCommand.Email src/Core/CleanArc.Application/Features/Admin/Commands/AddAdminCommand/AddAdminCommand.cs:10
GetUsersQueryResponse.Email src/Core/CleanArc.Application/Features/Users/Queries/GetUsers/GetUsersQuery.Response.cs:9

Name — 2 field(s)

UserCreateCommand.FamilyName src/Core/CleanArc.Application/Features/Users/Commands/Create/UserCreateCommand.cs:12
User.FamilyName src/Core/CleanArc.Domain/Entities/User/User.cs:14

Phone — 2 field(s)

UserCreateCommand.PhoneNumber src/Core/CleanArc.Application/Features/Users/Commands/Create/UserCreateCommand.cs:12
UserTokenRequestQuery.UserPhoneNumber src/Core/CleanArc.Application/Features/Users/Queries/TokenRequest/UserTokenRequestQuery.cs:10

Babaktaremi/Clean-Architecture-Template

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Architecture — module dependency matrix

At a glance — Code Health · 61% · Adequate · gated by X5

At a glance — Architecture · 83% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 59% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2

At a glance — Readiness · 53% · Adequate · gated by D8, P9

At a glance — Security · 55% · Adequate · gated by D30, C1

At a glance — Performance · 64% · Strong

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Downloadable artifacts