Public report — MyWarehouse, published 29 Jun 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 29-06-2026 @ 21:56 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Baratgabor/MyWarehouse

No regression coverage not measuredsingle-maintainer
50% At Risk
Architecture 78% Strong Maturity 76% Adequate Code Health 74% Strong Security 58% Adequate Readiness 56% Adequate Accessibility 35% Weak

Small · 4,744 LoC · 10 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Accessibility (35%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

67/69dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
67findings with an exact file:lineof 160 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
69/104dimensions across the health lenses4744 LoC · 10 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.

baratgabor/MyWarehouse is in a workable but fragile state (50%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Accessibility (35%) — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost. Readiness (56%) is the next concern — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative… (Text alternatives); Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler) (Keyboard semantics); accessibility in the toolchain (A11y enforcement).

For scale: Small (~4,744 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

Code Health 74% Strong Architecture 78% Strong Maturity 76% Adequate · gated by D34 Readiness 56% Adequate · gated by D12, R8 Security 58% Adequate · gated by D30, D36, D38 Accessibility 35% Weak · gated by AC1, AC4
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Accessibility 35% · 46% weightReadiness 56% · 25% weightSecurity 58% · 14% weightCode Health 74% · 8% weightMaturity 76% · 4% weightArchitecture 78% · 2% weight

Raise Accessibility 35 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 50 → ~61.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 9%Plumbing 45%Tests 27%Generated 19%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €2,800–€14,000
Cost to rebuild€2,800–€14,000 (0.1 person-years (47–146 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityHigh — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 50% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 45% boilerplate · 39% straight-line · 16% branching logic
Dead frontend code~25 LoC unreachable (2 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€8,300 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Accessibility at 35% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.4) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video.
+13.1 pts · Medium effort · Text alternatives
2
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
+13.1 pts · Medium effort · Keyboard semantics
3
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
+13.0 pts · Medium effort · A11y enforcement

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Accessibility at 35%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (4,744 LoC) · weakest lens: Accessibility 35%
→ Direct remediation budget at Accessibility first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video.
Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+5.7 pts/run over 5 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Evidence: trajectory: +5.7 pts/run over 5 runs

Trajectory

Where this codebase is heading — something a one-shot snapshot cannot show. 50, unchanged across 5 runs.

025507510029 Junnow
OverallCode HealthArchitectureMaturityReadinessSecurityAccessibility

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch Application Application Domain Domain Application->Domain Infrastructure Infrastructure Infrastructure->Application Infrastructure->Domain SampleData SampleData Infrastructure->SampleData SampleData->Domain WebApi WebApi WebApi->Infrastructure

At a glance — Code Health · 74% · Strong

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.8 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 9.6 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 8.8 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 9.8 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 10.0 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 9.7 X1 · Repo Async correctness 7.1 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 7.8
The Bad
R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 6.1 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 6.0

At a glance — Architecture · 78% · Strong

The Good
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 7.6 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.8 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 9.8 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0
The Bad
AX10 · Repo Code composition 5.5 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 5.5

At a glance — Maturity · 76% · Adequate · gated by D34

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 6.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Ugly
D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 56% · Adequate · gated by D12, R8

The Good
D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D11 · .NET / C# Test Reliability 10.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P2 · Repo Observability 7.2 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0 R5 · React / TS Dependency Freshness 8.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 6.7
The Bad
D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 3.6 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 3.5

At a glance — Security · 58% · Adequate · gated by D30, D36, D38

The Good
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 8.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 10.0 D33 · .NET / C# JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 7.0
The Bad
S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 6.5
The Ugly
D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 D38 · .NET / C# OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

At a glance — Accessibility · 35% · Weak · gated by AC1, AC4

The Good
AC3 · Repo Page structure 7.1 AC5 · Repo ARIA correctness 10.0 AC6 · Repo Visual & motion safety 10.0
The Bad
AC2 · Repo Forms & labels 4.4 AC7 · Repo A11y enforcement 4.0
The Ugly
AC1 · Repo Text alternatives 1.0 AC4 · Repo Keyboard semantics 1.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components91High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures2High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by adding text alternatives for all images, SVGs, and videos to ensure media is accessible. Next, make all custom controls keyboard-operable and ensure anchors have valid hrefs. Then, implement programmatic labels for every form control and button to replace placeholders. Finally, enforce accessibility standards in the development toolchain and CI pipeline, while also correcting page structure by adding a language attribute, title, and main landmark.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video.+13.1 ptsMediumText alternatives
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.+13.1 ptsMediumKeyboard semantics
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.+13.0 ptsMediumA11y enforcement
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.+12.9 ptsMediumForms & labels
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.+10.9 ptsMediumPage structure
Resolve the 5 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+3.6 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.+3.0 ptsLowDependency Hygiene
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+3.6 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 12 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 0% slop · 8% mixed · 92% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
src/WebUI/package-lock.json4.4MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/backend-CI.yml7.2Near-cleanSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
src/Application/Common/AppOperationResult.cs7.3Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/Application/Common/Exceptions/InputValidationException.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/Domain/Partners/Address.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/Infrastructure/Authentication/External/Services/ExternalSignInService.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/Infrastructure/Authorization/Startup.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/Infrastructure/Common/Extensions/QueryableExtensions.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/WebApi/Authentication/Dtos/LoginResponseDto.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
tests/Application.IntegrationTests/TestFramework.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: TodoComment
src/Application/Products/CreateProduct/CreateProductCommandValidator.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)
src/Application/Partners/CreatePartner/CreatePartnerCommandValidator.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (8 lines × 2)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 67 of 69 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 69 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D21D26D27D28D29D30D33D34D35D36D38AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8AX9C2ED5GD1IC1M1M3M4P1P2P4P8R1R10R2R3R5R6R7R8R9S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 67 of 160 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019f1562-265c-7ae6-a709-9a7c6cba08d0.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D21, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)src/Application/Products/CreateProduct/CreateProductCommandValidator.cs:8
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2)src/Application/Partners/CreatePartner/CreatePartnerCommandValidator.cs:8

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling7.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: SampleData · ×3

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 7 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

128 test methods: 93 unit, 35 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 3 mock references across 128 tests.

Mock framework: Moq · ×3

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky); integration: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene3.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

30 outdated, 1 vulnerable, 5 deprecated packages.

Vulnerable: Azure.Identity
Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity · ×5
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity · ×30

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  3. Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 31 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

9 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 3918 LoC (0.2/KLoC) → score 9.6.

TodoComment · ×8src/Application/Common/AppOperationResult.cs:9
CommentedOutCodesrc/Application/Common/AppOperationResult.cs:16

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 projects, 191 .cs files, 6356 hand-written lines of code (3918 production / 2438 test), plus 1726 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 26 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The main documentation is a single long README for MyWarehouse that serves as an informative personal overview of the project's purpose and direction while also linking to live demo and CI status. It begins with motivation and two-fold purposes before diving into a detailed Live Demo section (sign-in, backend hosted on Azure App Service, frontend on GitHub Pages) and a list of planned features in the full outline. The accompanying Angular CLI README is thin but present for the web client; it documents ng serve, scaffolding, build, test commands with links to Karma/Protractor, and ends with further help. Coverage is low across the four project types (WebApi, Application, Infrastructure, SampleData) at 15% WebApi/XML, 3% Application/XML, 8% Infrastructure/XML, 67% SampleData/XML; the README files are the only visible documentation.

XML-doc coverage: WebApi · ×5src/WebApi/WebApi.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.0/10. — The main documentation is a single long README for MyWarehouse that serves as an informative personal overview of the project's purpose and direction while also linking to live demo and CI status. It begins with motivation and two-fold purposes before diving into a detailed Live Demo section (sign-in, backend hosted on Azure App Service, frontend on GitHub Pages) and a list of planned features in the full outline. The accompanying Angular CLI README is thin but present for the web client; it documents ng serve, scaffolding, build, test commands with links to Karma/Protractor, and ends with further help. Coverage is low across the four project types (WebApi, Application, Infrastructure, SampleData) at 15% WebApi/XML, 3% Application/XML, 8% Infrastructure/XML, 67% SampleData/XML; the README files are the only visible documentation.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 10 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

97 % of calls cross a namespace and 4 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key.github/workflows/backend-CI.yml:39detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with backend-CI.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

41 vulnerable package(s): 3 critical, 17 high, 19 medium, 2 low.

High CVE: AutoMapper 11.0.0 · ×17detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Critical CVE: NuGet.Packaging 5.11.0 · ×3detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.6.0 · ×19detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Low CVE: NuGet.Packaging 5.11.0 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 19 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (19 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 17 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (17 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 3 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

15 of 15 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Infrastructure/Persistence/Context/ApplicationDbContext.cs.

Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

173 finding(s): 14 critical, 77 high, 61 medium, 21 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×36src/WebUI/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×14src/WebUI/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 36 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (36). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (36 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 14 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (14). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×3) — login-form.component.html:12, login-form.component.html:51, header.component.html:8

What to do

  • Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels4.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×19) — partner-form.component.html:16, partner-form.component.html:26, partner-form.component.html:34, …
  • This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×4) — partner-lookup-field.component.html:11, partner-lookup-field.component.html:21, product-lookup-field.component.html:11, …

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

  • No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — index.html:2

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×3) — partner-index.component.html:97, product-index.component.html:109, transaction-index.component.html:123

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

  • `Application.IntegrationTests` is a Application project but references `WebApi`, a Web project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.

What to do

  • Keep dependencies pointing inward: domain/application define interfaces, infrastructure/web implement them (Dependency Inversion).
AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

  • `IListResponseModel` declares 19 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IListResponseModel.cs:3

What to do

  • Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C2 · Access Controls7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.

What to do

  • Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.
ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs8.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • `ConfigureServices` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — Startup.cs:11
  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×2) — QueryableExtensions.cs:94, InfrastructureStartup.cs:21

What to do

  • Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a README to the 10 of 10 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability7.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 3/4 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
  • Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (ActivitySource / AddMetrics) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

R1 · Type Safety9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication6.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • src/WebUI/src/app/products/components/product-insights/product-insights.component.ts:5 · src/WebUI/src/app/stock/components/stock-metrics/stock-metrics.component.ts:3 · src/WebUI/src/app/stock/components/stock-summary/stock-summary.component.ts:3 — product-insights.component.ts:5
  • src/WebUI/src/app/stock/components/stock-metrics/stock-metrics.component.ts:5 · src/WebUI/src/app/stock/components/stock-summary/stock-summary.component.ts:5 — stock-metrics.component.ts:5
  • src/WebUI/src/app/partners/components/partner-edit/partner-edit.component.ts:5 · src/WebUI/src/app/products/components/product-edit/product-edit.component.ts:5 — partner-edit.component.ts:5
  • src/WebUI/src/app/transactions/useCases/createNew/components/transaction-new/transaction-new.component.ts:15 · src/WebUI/src/app/transactions/useCases/viewExisting/components/transaction-view/transaction-view.component.ts:7 — transaction-new.component.ts:15
  • src/WebUI/src/app/products/models/product.ts:1 · src/WebUI/src/app/transactions/useCases/viewExisting/models/transaction-details.ts:3 — product.ts:1
  • src/WebUI/src/app/partners/pages/partner-index/partner-index.component.ts:109 · src/WebUI/src/app/products/pages/product-index/product-index.component.ts:140 — partner-index.component.ts:109
  • src/WebUI/src/app/partners/pages/partner-index/partner-index.component.ts:8 · src/WebUI/src/app/products/pages/product-index/product-index.component.ts:9 · src/WebUI/src/app/transactions/useCases/listAll/pages/transaction-index/transaction-index.component.ts:9 — partner-index.component.ts:8
  • src/WebUI/src/app/partners/pages/partner-index/partner-index.component.ts:48 · src/WebUI/src/app/transactions/useCases/listAll/pages/transaction-index/transaction-index.component.ts:55 — partner-index.component.ts:48

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

R5 · Dependency Freshness8.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.

What to do

  • Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗

What to do

  • Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • Unreachable from the 1 application, 5 tooling and 3 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (1 application, 5 tooling, 3 test roots considered) (×2) — test.ts, login-request.ts
  • Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. — api-service.ts:70

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene3.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Declared in src/WebUI/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — Startup.cs:66
  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)

What to do

  • Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
X1 · Async correctness7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. — DbInitializer.cs:61

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 · Cancellation propagation6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 17/50 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) — AccountController.cs:22, AccountController.cs:31, AccountController.cs:51, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types7.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • ~2.8 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 · Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health74%StrongSolid.
Architecture78%StrongStrongest area.
Maturity76%Adequate — gated by D34Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness56%Adequate — gated by D12, R8Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security58%Adequate — gated by D30, D36, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility35%Weak — gated by AC1, AC4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 36 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — This is a dotnet-new template — at-rest encryption and key-vaulting are deferred to the application you build from it. Add ASP.NET Data Protection / column encryption + a key vault for your real data store when you productionise.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 3918 LoC the codebase is small despite 10 projects, so its size alone makes it not yet large enough to require explicit boundaries.
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — No first-party assembly was produced by the build.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 9 value object(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
  • ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): a message-bus package; 16 CQRS handler(s)
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P3 Security & performance tooling — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarks are deferred to the application you build from it, so their absence is not a defect here. The dimension reactivates once the repo becomes a real app.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • R4 Test Coverage — 3 test file(s) reach none of 90 production file(s) via imports — exercised outside the JS import graph (integration/bundled), not import-reachable
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 72 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×36
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — @angular/common: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — @angular/common: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — @angular/common: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — @angular/common: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — @angular/common: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — @angular/compiler: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — @angular/compiler: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — @angular/core: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — @angular/core: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — ansi-html: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — ansi-regex: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — async: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — body-parser: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — braces: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — browserify-sign: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — cross-spawn: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — decode-uri-component: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — dns-packet: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — engine.io: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — flatted: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — flatted: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — follow-redirects: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — form-data: [GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — glob-parent: [GHSA redacted]
  • + 11 more in this group — see findings.md.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×17
  • High CVE: AutoMapper 11.0.0 — AutoMapper 11.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Azure.Identity 1.6.0 — Azure.Identity 1.6.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: MessagePack 2.1.152 — MessagePack 2.1.152 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: MessagePack 2.1.152 — MessagePack 2.1.152 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.1.4 — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.1.4 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 6.0.1 — Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 6.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: NuGet.Common 5.11.0 — NuGet.Common 5.11.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: NuGet.Protocol 5.11.0 — NuGet.Protocol 5.11.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: NuGet.Protocol 5.11.0 — NuGet.Protocol 5.11.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 — System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.0.6 — SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.0.6 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.Json 6.0.0 — System.Text.Json 6.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Azure.Identity 1.3.0 — Azure.Identity 1.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 4.0.0 — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 4.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 9.0.1 — Newtonsoft.Json 9.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×14
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — @babel/traverse: [GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — cipher-base: [GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — elliptic: [GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — eventsource: [GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — form-data: [GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — gh-pages: [GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — json-schema: [GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — loader-utils: [GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — minimist: [GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — pbkdf2: [GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — pbkdf2: [GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — sha.js: [GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — socket.io-parser: [GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/WebUI/package-lock.json — url-parse: [GHSA redacted]
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×3
  • Critical CVE: NuGet.Packaging 5.11.0 — NuGet.Packaging 5.11.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 4.7.0 — System.Drawing.Common 4.7.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 5.0.0 — System.Drawing.Common 5.0.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×1
  • Vulnerable: Azure.Identity — Azure.Identity 1.6.0 — High severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×1
  • Secret: generic-api-key .github/workflows/backend-CI.yml:39 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Warning — 42 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×19
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.6.0 — Azure.Identity 1.6.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.6.0 — Azure.Identity 1.6.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.152 — MessagePack 2.1.152 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.152 — MessagePack 2.1.152 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.152 — MessagePack 2.1.152 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.152 — MessagePack 2.1.152 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.152 — MessagePack 2.1.152 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.152 — MessagePack 2.1.152 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.152 — MessagePack 2.1.152 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.152 — MessagePack 2.1.152 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.152 — MessagePack 2.1.152 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.152 — MessagePack 2.1.152 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.10.0 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.10.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.10.0 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.10.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.5.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 4.5.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.3.0 — Azure.Identity 1.3.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Azure.Identity 1.3.0 — Azure.Identity 1.3.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.8.0 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.8.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.8.0 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.8.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×8
  • TodoComment src/Application/Common/AppOperationResult.cs:9 — //TODO: Complete 'operation result' scaffolding to return validation problems this way instead of throwing exceptions. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Application/Common/Exceptions/InputValidationException.cs:6 — // TODO: Replace throwing exceptions for validation with an app-wide result model that contains operation result. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Domain/Partners/Address.cs:25 — // TODO: Add validation and constraints — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Infrastructure/Authentication/External/Services/ExternalSignInService.cs:42 — // TODO: Consider if user creation is needed, or if external logins should be registered in Identity tables. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Infrastructure/Authorization/Startup.cs:7 — // TODO: Implement authorization system, actually preferably in Application layer; if a good, simple use case can be established in this sample project. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/Infrastructure/Common/Extensions/QueryableExtensions.cs:73 — //TODO: Look into the necessity (or lack thereof) of filtering out multiple orderBy on the same property. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment src/WebApi/Authentication/Dtos/LoginResponseDto.cs:16 — // TODO: Consider supporting refresh tokens. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
  • TodoComment tests/Application.IntegrationTests/TestFramework.cs:53 — // TODO: Find a better solution. Especially because this hides the method documentation. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: PROJ-123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×5
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
  • Deprecated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Abstractions — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Abstractions 2.2.0 — Other,Legacy
  • Deprecated: microsoft.aspnetcore.mvc.versioning.apiexplorer — microsoft.aspnetcore.mvc.versioning.apiexplorer 5.0.0 — Other Asp.Versioning.Mvc.ApiExplorer >= 0.0.0
  • Deprecated: Serilog.Sinks.Loggly — Serilog.Sinks.Loggly 5.4.0 — Legacy
  • Deprecated: Azure.Identity — Azure.Identity 1.6.0 — Other
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×3
  • Off the main sequence: SampleData — SampleData: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.17, distance 0.83 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: Domain — Domain: abstractness 0.25, instability 0.00, distance 0.75 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: Application — Application: abstractness 0.15, instability 0.14, distance 0.70 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D16 · Bus Factor · single-maintainer · ×1
  • single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk (1 author(s) across 132 commit(s) sampled).
D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×1
  • CommentedOutCode src/Application/Common/AppOperationResult.cs:16 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines
D24 · Comment Value · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[4].verdict | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1074.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/Application/Products/CreateProduct/CreateProductCommandValidator.cs:8 — src/Application/Products/CreateProduct/CreateProductCommandValidator.cs:8-20 | src/Application/Products/UpdateProduct/UpdateProductCommandValidator.cs:8-20
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Application/Partners/CreatePartner/CreatePartnerCommandValidator.cs:8 — src/Application/Partners/CreatePartner/CreatePartnerCommandValidator.cs:8-15 | src/Application/Partners/UpdatePartner/UpdatePartnerCommandValidator.cs:8-15
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — The test suite couldn't be built/run in-image and no coverage report is committed, so line coverage was not measured — and it is EXCLUDED from the score rather than scored on a LoC-ratio proxy. Commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces (anywhere in the repo), or make the suite runnable in-image, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 7 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×2
  • Low CVE: NuGet.Packaging 5.11.0 — NuGet.Packaging 5.11.0 (transitive) has a Low advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Low CVE: NuGet.Protocol 5.11.0 — NuGet.Protocol 5.11.0 (transitive) has a Low advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
  • Further orphaned files (smaller) — 15 smaller file(s) also have no living knowledge — folded into the freshness score and metrics rather than listed individually (15 orphaned of 15 analysed files in total).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
Info — 39 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×30
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity 2.2.0 → 2.3.11 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Abstractions — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Abstractions 2.2.0 → 2.3.11 available.
  • Outdated: microsoft.aspnetcore.mvc.versioning.apiexplorer — microsoft.aspnetcore.mvc.versioning.apiexplorer 5.0.0 → 5.1.0 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.NetAnalyzers — Microsoft.CodeAnalysis.NetAnalyzers 6.0.0 → 10.0.301 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 6.0.6 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools 6.0.6 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design — Microsoft.VisualStudio.Web.CodeGeneration.Design 6.0.6 → 10.0.2 available.
  • Outdated: Serilog.AspNetCore — Serilog.AspNetCore 5.0.0 → 10.0.0 available.
  • Outdated: Serilog.Enrichers.Environment — Serilog.Enrichers.Environment 2.2.0 → 3.0.1 available.
  • Outdated: AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection — AutoMapper.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 11.0.0 → 12.0.1 available.
  • Outdated: FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions — FluentValidation.DependencyInjectionExtensions 11.1.0 → 12.1.1 available.
  • Outdated: MediatR.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection — MediatR.Extensions.Microsoft.DependencyInjection 10.0.1 → 11.1.0 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions 6.0.1 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Azure.Extensions.AspNetCore.Configuration.Secrets — Azure.Extensions.AspNetCore.Configuration.Secrets 1.2.2 → 1.5.1 available.
  • Outdated: Azure.Identity — Azure.Identity 1.6.0 → 1.21.0 available.
  • Outdated: Google.Apis.Auth — Google.Apis.Auth 1.57.0 → 1.75.0 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 6.0.6 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore 6.0.6 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore 6.0.6 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer 6.0.6 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: StringToExpression — StringToExpression 1.1.1 → 2.2.0 available.
  • Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 6.3.1 → 10.2.3 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Sqlite 6.0.6 → 10.0.9 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 17.2.0 → 18.7.0 available.
  • Outdated: Moq — Moq 4.18.1 → 4.20.72 available.
  • + 5 more in this group — see findings.md.
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×5
  • XML-doc coverage: WebApi src/WebApi/WebApi.csproj — WebApi: 15 % XML-doc coverage (13/88).
  • XML-doc coverage: Application src/Application/Application.csproj — Application: 3 % XML-doc coverage (6/239).
  • XML-doc coverage: Infrastructure src/Infrastructure/Infrastructure.csproj — Infrastructure: 8 % XML-doc coverage (12/157).
  • XML-doc coverage: SampleData src/SampleData/SampleData.csproj — SampleData: 67 % XML-doc coverage (2/3).
  • XML-doc coverage: Domain src/Domain/Domain.csproj — Domain: 8 % XML-doc coverage (10/120).
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×3
  • Mock framework: Moq — Infrastructure.UnitTests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — Application.IntegrationTests references Moq.
  • Mock framework: Moq — WebApi.UnitTests references Moq.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .2artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0—
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet list MyWarehouse.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json41artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .173artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019f1562-265c-7ae6-a709-9a7c6cba08d0 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 13 field(s) across 3 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Address — 5 field(s)
  • AddressDto.ZipCode src/Application/Partners/CreatePartner/CreatePartnerCommand.cs:14
  • AddressDto.ZipCode src/Application/Partners/GetPartnerDetails/PartnerDetailsDto.cs:24
  • PartnerDto.ZipCode src/Application/Partners/GetPartnersList/PartnerDto.cs:14
  • AddressDto.ZipCode src/Application/Partners/UpdatePartner/UpdatePartnerCommand.cs:16
  • Address.ZipCode src/Domain/Partners/Address.cs:18
Email — 5 field(s)
  • SignInData.Email src/Infrastructure/Authentication/Core/Model/SignInData.cs:7
  • ExternalUserData.Email src/Infrastructure/Authentication/External/Model/ExternalUserData.cs:5
  • ExternalUserData.EmailVerified src/Infrastructure/Authentication/External/Model/ExternalUserData.cs:6
  • UserSeedSettings.DefaultEmail src/Infrastructure/Persistence/Settings/UserSeedSettings.cs:17
  • LoginResponseDto.Email src/WebApi/Authentication/Dtos/LoginResponseDto.cs:31
Name — 3 field(s)
  • ExternalUserData.FullName src/Infrastructure/Authentication/External/Model/ExternalUserData.cs:7
  • ExternalUserData.FirstName src/Infrastructure/Authentication/External/Model/ExternalUserData.cs:8
  • ExternalUserData.LastName src/Infrastructure/Authentication/External/Model/ExternalUserData.cs:9

Issues: 72 · Warnings: 42 · Recommendations: 7 · Info: 39 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 29-06-2026 @ 21:56 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md