Public report — hologram, published 6 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
191findings with an exact file:lineof 196 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
31/106dimensions across the health lenses30231 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
bartblast/hologram is sound in substance but carries real gaps (55%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
The area that most needs attention is Code Health (48%) — changes there are slower and more error-prone. Maturity (57%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow and knowledge is concentrated in too few people (a bus-factor risk).
Leadership focus, highest impact first: TypeScript for the frontend (Type Safety); each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it (Large Files); Break down the listed branch-heavy functions (Cyclomatic Complexity).
For scale: Medium (~30,231 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.8 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
0.8× (at 55% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.8 person-years of build effort (about ~€120,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Code Health at 48% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
The top-ranked fix costs roughly 3–10 engineer-days once. Not doing it costs about 723.1–4820.7 engineer-days every year, paid as drag on the ~14,462,087 lines this team changes annually — a bill that arrives whether or not anyone books it. On those figures the fix breaks even in roughly 1–2 months and is free after that. Method, stated so this is not read as a quotation: debt from the ranked task's effort band; interest = annual changed lines (measured, annualised from the 90-day window) ÷ an ASSUMED 150–400 lines per engineer-day × the 2–5% drag implied by the code-quality signals; breaking point = debt ÷ annual interest. A modelled planning range built from measured inputs and one named assumption — not a quotation, a valuation, or a certified figure.
Evidence: D15 churn: 3,565,994 line(s) changed over a 90-day window ⇒ ~14,462,087/year · D1/D2/D4 code quality: averaging 7.3/10 ⇒ a 2–5% drag on each change · top-ranked remediation: Medium effort ⇒ about 3–10 engineer-day(s)
→ Do the top-ranked fix now if this code will still be yours in 2 months.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.8 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Code Health at 48%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Code Health first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
A velocity tax on every change · Medium · Economics
The code-quality signals (complexity, duplication, cohesion) average 7.3/10, which acts as a tax on every change in the weaker areas: modifications there plausibly cost on the order of 2–5% more than in clean code, and the tax compounds as the codebase grows. (A modelled estimate, not a measured fact.)
Evidence: D1/D2/D4 code quality: averaging 7.3/10 across the code-quality signals actually measured
→ Pay it down where churn is highest — the hotspots — not everywhere; that's where the tax is actually paid.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
30 modules, 6 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
At a glance — Code Health · 48% · Weak · gated by R1, R3
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A03:2021 — Injection
33
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
4
High / Critical
Roadmap
Begin by adopting TypeScript for the frontend, starting with the highest-traffic modules to establish type safety. Next, refactor the largest files by splitting them into smaller, focused modules to improve maintainability. Then, reduce cyclomatic complexity in branch-heavy functions to ensure code remains simple and readable. Finally, document significant architectural decisions in a dedicated folder and update the root README with clear instructions on how to run the test suite.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Reconcile the README with reality: README claims Hologram is a public LinkedIn/X/Bluesky presence but the repository contains no such social media profiles; README lists an Erlang Ecosystem Foundation sponsor whose logo appears in .sponsors/*, but there is no sponsorship manifest or project showing this sponsorship.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 29 of 31 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 31 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 191 of 196 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations: 1 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
48 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was _format_erlang_error/3 at 109. A further 4 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being decodeTerm at 29 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
+ 43 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 _format_erlang_error/3 (cyclomatic 109) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with erl_erts_errors.mjs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 #matchNodeDispatch (cyclomatic 51) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with regex_interpreter.mjs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 compare (cyclomatic 43) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with bitstring.mjs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 63 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 _format_erlang_error/3 (cognitive 100) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with erl_erts_errors.mjs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 compare (cognitive 85) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with bitstring.mjs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 _cpl/2 (cognitive 60) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with unicode_util.mjs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 11 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with erlang.mjs, regex_parser.mjs, call_graph.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 warning-level).
Resolve the 6 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with call_graph.ex, reflection.ex, compiler.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D16 · Bus Factor3.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
68 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is assets/js/interpreter.mjs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
Hologram's documentation is clear and complete for a tooling project: the READMEs describe build in public, sponsors, feature tests, umbrella test structure, benchmarks, and results. The architecture docs are thin but present (one markdown file), and all visible sections appear in the outline. The Elixir benchmark suite covers every listed result set with full tables of average cold/warm execution time for each test, plus a dedicated reflection module benchmark. The benchmark READMEs are mostly well written and show good structure for each test case (System table, Configuration table, Run Time table), but they all share a common flaw: the document is a single repeated benchmark file across six files with identical content, so every one is a copy of the same data dump. The visible material is consistent across them — System/Configuration tables and Run Time tables for each test (list_elixir_modules/0, list_components/0, has_struct?/1, has_function?/3, erlang_module?/1, maybe_load_module_digest_plt/1, maybe_load_ir_plt/1) — but the actual content is identical across all six files. There are no real test results or performance numbers for any of them; each README merely repeats the same benchmark data with the same table format and no meaningful difference between tests.
What to do
Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.8/10. — Hologram's documentation is clear and complete for a tooling project: the READMEs describe build in public, sponsors, feature tests, umbrella test structure, benchmarks, and results. The architecture docs are thin but present (one markdown file), and all visible sections appear in the outline. The Elixir benchmark suite covers every listed result set with full tables of average cold/warm execution time for each test, plus a dedicated reflection module benchmark. The benchmark READMEs are mostly well written and show good structure for each test case (System table, Configuration table, Run Time table), but they all share a common flaw: the document is a single repeated benchmark file across six files with identical content, so every one is a copy of the same data dump. The visible material is consistent across them — System/Configuration tables and Run Time tables for each test (list_elixir_modules/0, list_components/0, has_struct?/1, has_function?/3, erlang_module?/1, maybe_load_module_digest_plt/1, maybe_load_ir_plt/1) — but the actual content is identical across all six files. There are no real test results or performance numbers for any of them; each README merely repeats the same benchmark data with the same table format and no meaningful difference between tests.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×33.github/dependabot.yml:4detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 33 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ci.yml (29), fix-dependabot-lockfile.yml (3), dependabot.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (33 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2assets/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]assets/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted]assets/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Low CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 1 of 1 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README claims Hologram is a public LinkedIn/X/Bluesky presence but the repository contains no such social media profiles
README lists an Erlang Ecosystem Foundation sponsor whose logo appears in .sponsors/*, but there is no sponsorship manifest or project showing this sponsorship
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README claims Hologram is a public LinkedIn/X/Bluesky presence but the repository contains no such social media profiles; README lists an Erlang Ecosystem Foundation sponsor whose logo appears in .sponsors/*, but there is no sponsorship manifest or project showing this sponsorship.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
0 typed · 227 plain JS — the untyped files are assets/js/app.mjs, assets/js/asset_path_registry.mjs, assets/js/bitstring.mjs, assets/js/client.mjs, assets/js/common/sequence.mjs, assets/js/component_registry.mjs (+221 more).
What to do
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
assets/js/elixir/string/tokenizer.mjs:88 · scripts/identifier_tokenizer/generate_classes.mjs:55 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and what repeats is a LIST OF ENTRIES rather than behaviour — the same names written out more than once. Extract them into one shared, exported constant and spread that constant into each site, rather than into a function the sites call: a list like this often lives in declarative metadata (a decorator's options object, a static configuration table) that a build step must be able to read statically, where a function call is not allowed. Adding an entry to one copy and not the other is the failure this prevents. — tokenizer.mjs:88
assets/js/elixir/string.mjs:82 · assets/js/elixir/string.mjs:152 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — string.mjs:82
assets/js/erlang/erl_erts_errors.mjs:703 · assets/js/erlang/erl_kernel_errors.mjs:82 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — erl_erts_errors.mjs:703
assets/js/erlang/erlang.mjs:573 · assets/js/erlang/erlang.mjs:2602 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — erlang.mjs:573
assets/js/erlang/binary.mjs:427 · assets/js/erlang/binary.mjs:571 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — binary.mjs:427
assets/js/erlang/elixir_utils.mjs:90 · assets/js/erlang/string.mjs:140 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — elixir_utils.mjs:90
assets/js/erlang/maps.mjs:154 · assets/js/erlang/maps.mjs:309 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — maps.mjs:154
assets/js/erlang/unicode.mjs:542 · assets/js/erlang/unicode.mjs:835 · assets/js/erlang/unicode.mjs:977 · assets/js/erlang/unicode.mjs:1121 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited. — unicode.mjs:542
What to do
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — erl_erts_errors.mjs:65, regex_interpreter.mjs:605, bitstring.mjs:43, …
What to do
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files3.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
19 file(s) over 400 lines (counted as significant lines — blank lines excluded — over production source only, tests excluded), largest first: assets/js/erlang/erlang.mjs (2826), assets/js/interpreter.mjs (2316), assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs (2073), assets/js/renderer.mjs (1571), assets/js/bitstring.mjs (1316), assets/js/hologram.mjs (1100) (+13 more).
What to do
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
No test imports this module directly or transitively. Import reachability cannot see a test that executes a file by path instead of importing it, nor one that drives it through a running browser by navigating to a URL — if neither does, no test reaches this one. (×2) — folding_oracle.mjs, console.mjs
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.
What to do
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
188 file(s) (~105547 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package's entry point(s) resolved, but the walk stopped one hop in: test/javascript/support/helpers.mjs imports '../../../assets/node_modules/chai/index.js', which is not in the scanned tree. That is usually a generated or build-output module, so reachability cannot see past it and no dead-code claim is made about this package. Nothing is necessarily wrong here.
113 file(s) (~34008 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package's entry point(s) resolved, but the walk stopped one hop in: assets/js/hologram.mjs imports './vendor/snabbdom/build/index.js', which is not in the scanned tree. That is usually a generated or build-output module, so reachability cannot see past it and no dead-code claim is made about this package. Nothing is necessarily wrong here. — assets
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — eslint.config.mjs:5, eslint.config.mjs:4, eslint.config.mjs:1
Declared in assets/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×2)
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R9 · Circular Imports3.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
assets/js/bitstring.mjs → assets/js/erts.mjs → assets/js/erts/application_env.mjs → assets/js/type.mjs → assets/js/bitstring.mjs (one verified cycle inside a mutually-dependent group of 15 files) — bitstring.mjs
assets/js/client.mjs → assets/js/hologram.mjs → assets/js/client.mjs (one verified cycle inside a mutually-dependent group of 5 files) — client.mjs
Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 75 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~86495 lines of test source are present (.exs, .ex, .mjs) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ex, .exs) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ex, .exs, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.exs, .ex, .mjs) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (51 value object(s))
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:4— This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule reporting a POLICY that is absent or weaker than its recommendation, not an exploitable defect. Confirm whether the current setting is a deliberate decision for this repository — and apply the change where it is not; where it is (a policy your release process already enforces elsewhere, or one this repository has consciously opted out of), record the decision and leave the configuration as it is. This configuration file has 4 such entries; one cooldown decision clears them all — reported once.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:73— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: erlef/setup-beam@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `erlef/setup-beam@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/erlef/setup-beam/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:83— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:89— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:98— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:108— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:118— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: nick-fields/retry@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `nick-fields/retry@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/nick-fields/retry/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:126— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: nick-fields/retry@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `nick-fields/retry@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/nick-fields/retry/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:181— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache/restore@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache/restore@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v6 --jq .sha`. `actions/cache/restore` is hosted INSIDE the `actions/cache` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `actions/cache/restore` path in `uses:` and query only `actions/cache`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:199— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache/save@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache/save@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v6 --jq .sha`. `actions/cache/save` is hosted INSIDE the `actions/cache` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `actions/cache/save` path in `uses:` and query only `actions/cache`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:261— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: erlef/setup-beam@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `erlef/setup-beam@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/erlef/setup-beam/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:271— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:277— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:286— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:296— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:306— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: nick-fields/retry@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `nick-fields/retry@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/nick-fields/retry/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:316— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: nick-fields/retry@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `nick-fields/retry@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/nick-fields/retry/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:380— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache/restore@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache/restore@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v6 --jq .sha`. `actions/cache/restore` is hosted INSIDE the `actions/cache` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `actions/cache/restore` path in `uses:` and query only `actions/cache`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:398— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache/save@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache/save@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v6 --jq .sha`. `actions/cache/save` is hosted INSIDE the `actions/cache` repository (a subdirectory action or a reusable workflow), so the SHA to pin is that repository's commit — keep the full `actions/cache/save` path in `uses:` and query only `actions/cache`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:424— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:455— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: erlef/setup-beam@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `erlef/setup-beam@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/erlef/setup-beam/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:465— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v7`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v7 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:471— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:480— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:490— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
+ 8 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×2
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 1.1.16: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.17 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.16, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.16: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 2.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.3 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.1.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×1
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— serialize-javascript 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 6.0.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 6.0.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.0.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.0.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against serialize-javascript 6.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
FileTooLong: erlang/erlang.mjs assets/js/erlang/erlang.mjs:0— FileTooLong — 1633 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded; the length bar is tripled for a single-responsibility module of 4 or fewer top-level units), about 99% of them inside a single declaration: Erlang (40-3448). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
FileTooLong: regex/regex_parser.mjs assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:0— FileTooLong — 1504 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded; the length bar is tripled for a single-responsibility module of 4 or fewer top-level units). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: compiler/call_graph.ex lib/hologram/compiler/call_graph.ex:0— FileTooLong — 1420 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: compiler/encoder.ex lib/hologram/compiler/encoder.ex:0— FileTooLong — 927 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: compiler/transformer.ex lib/hologram/compiler/transformer.ex:0— FileTooLong — 774 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: hologram/compiler.ex lib/hologram/compiler.ex:0— FileTooLong — 756 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: regex/regex_interpreter.mjs assets/js/erts/regex/regex_interpreter.mjs:0— FileTooLong — 643 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded; the length bar is tripled for a single-responsibility module of 4 or fewer top-level units), about 95% of them inside a single declaration: RegexInterpreter (63-1150). Moving the declarations that sit BESIDE it into sibling files will not shorten this file. Extract from INSIDE that declaration instead: lift each cohesive group of its body — the parts that share the same inputs and are named together — into its own unit in a sibling file, and have the original call them.
FileTooLong: hologram/reflection.ex lib/hologram/reflection.ex:0— FileTooLong — 628 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: hologram/framework.ex lib/hologram/framework.ex:0— FileTooLong — 618 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: hologram/server.ex lib/hologram/server.ex:0— FileTooLong — 605 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: compiler/ir.ex lib/hologram/compiler/ir.ex:0— FileTooLong — 504 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
Hotspot: assets/js/interpreter.mjs assets/js/interpreter.mjs— assets/js/interpreter.mjs changed 74 times in last 90 days, max complexity 22. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: assets/js/hologram.mjs assets/js/hologram.mjs— assets/js/hologram.mjs changed 54 times in last 90 days, max complexity 26. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 53 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, cover the area it touches with tests, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time.
Hotspot: test/javascript/support/helpers.mjs test/javascript/support/helpers.mjs— test/javascript/support/helpers.mjs changed 39 times in last 90 days, max complexity 26. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 38 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, cover the area it touches with tests, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time.
Hotspot: assets/js/erlang/re.mjs assets/js/erlang/re.mjs— assets/js/erlang/re.mjs changed 22 times in last 90 days, max complexity 36. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: assets/js/renderer.mjs assets/js/renderer.mjs— assets/js/renderer.mjs changed 39 times in last 90 days, max complexity 20. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: assets/js/erts/regex/regex_interpreter.mjs assets/js/erts/regex/regex_interpreter.mjs— assets/js/erts/regex/regex_interpreter.mjs changed 15 times in last 90 days, max complexity 51. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: assets/js/erlang/erl_erts_errors.mjs assets/js/erlang/erl_erts_errors.mjs— assets/js/erlang/erl_erts_errors.mjs changed 7 times in last 90 days, max complexity 109. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: assets/js/erlang/erlang.mjs assets/js/erlang/erlang.mjs— assets/js/erlang/erlang.mjs changed 20 times in last 90 days, max complexity 37. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs— assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs changed 11 times in last 90 days, max complexity 36. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
Hotspot: assets/js/erts/regex/regex_engine.mjs assets/js/erts/regex/regex_engine.mjs— assets/js/erts/regex/regex_engine.mjs changed 11 times in last 90 days, max complexity 34. Frequent change and high complexity in one file compound: schedule the next change to it to include carving out the part being edited, behind tests written first.
TooManyMethods: CallGraph lib/hologram/compiler/call_graph.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 73 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Reflection lib/hologram/reflection.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 51 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Compiler lib/hologram/compiler.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 45 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Renderer lib/hologram/template/renderer.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 44 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Encoder lib/hologram/compiler/encoder.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 40 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Server lib/hologram/server.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 34 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
Change coupling: erl_stdlib_errors.mjs ↔ call_graph.ex assets/js/erlang/erl_stdlib_errors.mjs— `assets/js/erlang/erl_stdlib_errors.mjs` and `lib/hologram/compiler/call_graph.ex` change together 55% of the time (6 of the 11 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge.
Change coupling: filename.mjs ↔ call_graph.ex assets/js/erlang/filename.mjs— `assets/js/erlang/filename.mjs` and `lib/hologram/compiler/call_graph.ex` change together 53% of the time (10 of the 19 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge.
Change coupling: sets.mjs ↔ call_graph.ex assets/js/erlang/sets.mjs— `assets/js/erlang/sets.mjs` and `lib/hologram/compiler/call_graph.ex` change together 50% of the time (12 of the 24 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) and are written in DIFFERENT LANGUAGES, so no import can join them and they cannot be co-located into one unit — they compile and ship as separate artifacts. What binds them is a CONTRACT across that boundary — an event or message name, a route, a serialised shape — that each side currently spells out on its own, which is exactly why a change to one drags the other. Declare that contract once where both sides read it (a shared schema, a generated constants file, an interface-definition file) so a change on one side fails the other's build instead of drifting silently; where the surface is too small to be worth that, name the counterpart in a comment on both sides so the next reader finds it. There is nothing here to merge.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) lib/hologram/compiler/digraph.ex:291— lib/hologram/compiler/digraph.ex:291-304 | lib/hologram/compiler/digraph.ex:311-324 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) lib/hologram/controller.ex:191— lib/hologram/controller.ex:191-204 | lib/hologram/controller.ex:308-322 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/hologram/compiler/digraph.ex:30— lib/hologram/compiler/digraph.ex:30-41 | lib/hologram/compiler/digraph.ex:73-84 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) lib/hologram/realtime/subscription_registry.ex:369— lib/hologram/realtime/subscription_registry.ex:369-380 | lib/hologram/realtime/subscription_registry.ex:393-404 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
_format_erlang_error/3 (cyclomatic 109) assets/js/erlang/erl_erts_errors.mjs:65— _format_erlang_error/3 has cyclomatic complexity 109 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#matchNodeDispatch (cyclomatic 51) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_interpreter.mjs:605— #matchNodeDispatch has cyclomatic complexity 51 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
compare (cyclomatic 43) assets/js/bitstring.mjs:43— compare has cyclomatic complexity 43 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
float_to_binary/2 (cyclomatic 37) assets/js/erlang/erlang.mjs:1822— float_to_binary/2 has cyclomatic complexity 37 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
run/3 (cyclomatic 36) assets/js/erlang/re.mjs:288— run/3 has cyclomatic complexity 36 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#calculateBranchLengthRange (cyclomatic 36) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:334— #calculateBranchLengthRange has cyclomatic complexity 36 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
_cpl/2 (cyclomatic 34) assets/js/erlang/unicode_util.mjs:14— _cpl/2 has cyclomatic complexity 34 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
cp/1 (cyclomatic 34) assets/js/erlang/unicode_util.mjs:584— cp/1 has cyclomatic complexity 34 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
collectCluster (cyclomatic 34) assets/js/erlang/unicode_util.mjs:786— collectCluster has cyclomatic complexity 34 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
decodeUtf8 (cyclomatic 34) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_engine.mjs:155— decodeUtf8 has cyclomatic complexity 34 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
_cpl_cont/2 (cyclomatic 31) assets/js/erlang/unicode_util.mjs:267— _cpl_cont/2 has cyclomatic complexity 31 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
_format_binary_error/3 (cyclomatic 30) assets/js/erlang/erl_stdlib_errors.mjs:77— _format_binary_error/3 has cyclomatic complexity 30 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#parseGroupExtension (cyclomatic 29) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:1530— #parseGroupExtension has cyclomatic complexity 29 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity· match (cyclomatic 29) · ×1
match (cyclomatic 29) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_interpreter.mjs:78— match has cyclomatic complexity 29 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#parseCondition (cyclomatic 28) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:1073— #parseCondition has cyclomatic complexity 28 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
split/3 (cyclomatic 27) assets/js/erlang/binary.mjs:1193— split/3 has cyclomatic complexity 27 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
parseRunOptions (cyclomatic 26) assets/js/erlang/re.mjs:403— parseRunOptions has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#translateNode (cyclomatic 26) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_translator.mjs:286— #translateNode has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#parseGReference (cyclomatic 25) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:1364— #parseGReference has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
replace/4 (cyclomatic 24) assets/js/erlang/binary.mjs:725— replace/4 has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#parseConcatenation (cyclomatic 23) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:990— #parseConcatenation has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#matchBitstringPattern (cyclomatic 22) assets/js/interpreter.mjs:2379— #matchBitstringPattern has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
matches/3 (cyclomatic 22) assets/js/erlang/binary.mjs:584— matches/3 has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 22) assets/js/erlang/binary.mjs:855— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#parseCharacterClass (cyclomatic 22) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:760— #parseCharacterClass has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
match/3 (cyclomatic 21) assets/js/erlang/binary.mjs:440— match/3 has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#matchAnchor (cyclomatic 21) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_interpreter.mjs:415— #matchAnchor has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#renderElement (cyclomatic 20) assets/js/renderer.mjs:1395— #renderElement has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
unbox (cyclomatic 19) assets/js/elixir/hologram/js.mjs:32— unbox has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#hasUnresolvedVariablePattern (cyclomatic 18) assets/js/interpreter.mjs:2068— #hasUnresolvedVariablePattern has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
isPrintableCodePoint (cyclomatic 18) assets/js/bitstring.mjs:540— isPrintableCodePoint has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
length/1 (cyclomatic 18) assets/js/erlang/string.mjs:277— length/1 has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#parseVerb (cyclomatic 18) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:2122— #parseVerb has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#matchVerb (cyclomatic 18) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_interpreter.mjs:992— #matchVerb has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
callAnonymousFunction (cyclomatic 17) assets/js/interpreter.mjs:167— callAnonymousFunction has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#fromSegmentWithIntegerWithinNumberRangeValue (cyclomatic 17) assets/js/bitstring.mjs:1061— #fromSegmentWithIntegerWithinNumberRangeValue has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#fromSegmentWithIntegerOutsideNumberRangeValue (cyclomatic 17) assets/js/bitstring.mjs:1198— #fromSegmentWithIntegerOutsideNumberRangeValue has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
error/3 (cyclomatic 17) assets/js/erlang/erlang.mjs:1717— error/3 has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
_format_lists_error/2 (cyclomatic 17) assets/js/erlang/erl_stdlib_errors.mjs:271— _format_lists_error/2 has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
_format_re_error/3 (cyclomatic 17) assets/js/erlang/erl_stdlib_errors.mjs:510— _format_re_error/3 has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
encode/2 (cyclomatic 17) assets/js/elixir/uri.mjs:8— encode/2 has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
list_to_integer/2 (cyclomatic 16) assets/js/erlang/erlang.mjs:2614— list_to_integer/2 has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
formatDetail (cyclomatic 16) assets/js/erlang/erl_erts_errors.mjs:618— formatDetail has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
jaro_similarity/2 (cyclomatic 16) assets/js/erlang/elixir_utils.mjs:14— jaro_similarity/2 has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
_parse_search_opts/1 (cyclomatic 16) assets/js/erlang/binary.mjs:154— _parse_search_opts/1 has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#parseEscape (cyclomatic 16) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:1305— #parseEscape has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
walkAst (cyclomatic 16) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_analyzer.mjs:30— walkAst has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
#collectDefiniteGroups (cyclomatic 16) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_analyzer.mjs:129— #collectDefiniteGroups has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
_format_erlang_error/3 (cognitive 100) assets/js/erlang/erl_erts_errors.mjs:65— _format_erlang_error/3 has cognitive complexity 100 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
compare (cognitive 85) assets/js/bitstring.mjs:43— compare has cognitive complexity 85 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
_cpl/2 (cognitive 60) assets/js/erlang/unicode_util.mjs:14— _cpl/2 has cognitive complexity 60 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
_cpl_cont/2 (cognitive 56) assets/js/erlang/unicode_util.mjs:267— _cpl_cont/2 has cognitive complexity 56 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
decodeUtf8 (cognitive 56) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_engine.mjs:155— decodeUtf8 has cognitive complexity 56 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#matchNodeDispatch (cognitive 55) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_interpreter.mjs:605— #matchNodeDispatch has cognitive complexity 55 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
run/3 (cognitive 51) assets/js/erlang/re.mjs:288— run/3 has cognitive complexity 51 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
cp/1 (cognitive 48) assets/js/erlang/unicode_util.mjs:584— cp/1 has cognitive complexity 48 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
float_to_binary/2 (cognitive 48) assets/js/erlang/erlang.mjs:1822— float_to_binary/2 has cognitive complexity 48 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#parseGReference (cognitive 48) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:1364— #parseGReference has cognitive complexity 48 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
_format_binary_error/3 (cognitive 45) assets/js/erlang/erl_stdlib_errors.mjs:77— _format_binary_error/3 has cognitive complexity 45 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
parseRunOptions (cognitive 43) assets/js/erlang/re.mjs:403— parseRunOptions has cognitive complexity 43 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity· match (cognitive 42) · ×1
match (cognitive 42) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_interpreter.mjs:78— match has cognitive complexity 42 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#calculateBranchLengthRange (cognitive 36) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:334— #calculateBranchLengthRange has cognitive complexity 36 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#parseGroupExtension (cognitive 34) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:1530— #parseGroupExtension has cognitive complexity 34 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#parseCharacterClass (cognitive 32) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:760— #parseCharacterClass has cognitive complexity 32 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
length/1 (cognitive 31) assets/js/erlang/string.mjs:277— length/1 has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
replace/4 (cognitive 31) assets/js/erlang/binary.mjs:725— replace/4 has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous) (cognitive 31) assets/js/erlang/binary.mjs:855— (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
split/3 (cognitive 31) assets/js/erlang/binary.mjs:1193— split/3 has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#parseConcatenation (cognitive 31) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:990— #parseConcatenation has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#matchBitstringPattern (cognitive 30) assets/js/interpreter.mjs:2379— #matchBitstringPattern has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#parseCondition (cognitive 30) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:1073— #parseCondition has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
collectCluster (cognitive 29) assets/js/erlang/unicode_util.mjs:786— collectCluster has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#fromSegmentWithIntegerOutsideNumberRangeValue (cognitive 28) assets/js/bitstring.mjs:1198— #fromSegmentWithIntegerOutsideNumberRangeValue has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
_cpl_cont2/2 (cognitive 27) assets/js/erlang/unicode_util.mjs:405— _cpl_cont2/2 has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
_cpl_cont3/2 (cognitive 27) assets/js/erlang/unicode_util.mjs:481— _cpl_cont3/2 has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
callAnonymousFunction (cognitive 26) assets/js/interpreter.mjs:167— callAnonymousFunction has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#fromSegmentWithIntegerWithinNumberRangeValue (cognitive 26) assets/js/bitstring.mjs:1061— #fromSegmentWithIntegerWithinNumberRangeValue has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
_format_re_error/3 (cognitive 25) assets/js/erlang/erl_stdlib_errors.mjs:510— _format_re_error/3 has cognitive complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
reconcile (cognitive 23) assets/js/event_listener_registry.mjs:22— reconcile has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
jaro_similarity/2 (cognitive 23) assets/js/erlang/elixir_utils.mjs:14— jaro_similarity/2 has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#textFromListCharData (cognitive 23) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_engine.mjs:599— #textFromListCharData has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
to_graphemes/1 (cognitive 22) assets/js/erlang/string.mjs:737— to_graphemes/1 has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
compile/2 (cognitive 22) assets/js/erlang/re.mjs:33— compile/2 has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
extractCodePoints (cognitive 22) assets/js/erlang/elixir_utils.mjs:15— extractCodePoints has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
match/3 (cognitive 22) assets/js/erlang/binary.mjs:440— match/3 has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
matches/3 (cognitive 22) assets/js/erlang/binary.mjs:584— matches/3 has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#parseVerb (cognitive 22) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:2122— #parseVerb has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#matchVerb (cognitive 22) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_interpreter.mjs:992— #matchVerb has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
jaro_similarity/2 (cognitive 21) assets/js/erlang/string.mjs:106— jaro_similarity/2 has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
_format_lists_error/2 (cognitive 21) assets/js/erlang/erl_stdlib_errors.mjs:271— _format_lists_error/2 has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
_aho_corasick_search/3 (cognitive 21) assets/js/erlang/binary.mjs:15— _aho_corasick_search/3 has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
continueTokens (cognitive 21) assets/js/elixir/string/tokenizer.mjs:228— continueTokens has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
unbox (cognitive 21) assets/js/elixir/hologram/js.mjs:32— unbox has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
_parse_search_opts/1 (cognitive 20) assets/js/erlang/binary.mjs:154— _parse_search_opts/1 has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#renderAttributesAndProps (cognitive 19) assets/js/renderer.mjs:1260— #renderAttributesAndProps has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#renderElement (cognitive 19) assets/js/renderer.mjs:1395— #renderElement has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
scanStartOptions (cognitive 19) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:196— scanStartOptions has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#classItemsMatch (cognitive 19) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_interpreter.mjs:251— #classItemsMatch has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity· match (cognitive 19) · ×1
match (cognitive 19) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_engine.mjs:297— match has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous) (cognitive 18) assets/js/interpreter.mjs:1727— (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#compareLists (cognitive 18) assets/js/interpreter.mjs:1842— #compareLists has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#toIntegerFromBitstringWithoutLeftoverBits (cognitive 18) assets/js/bitstring.mjs:1434— #toIntegerFromBitstringWithoutLeftoverBits has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#walkComprehension (cognitive 17) assets/js/interpreter.mjs:2628— #walkComprehension has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#asyncWalkComprehension (cognitive 17) assets/js/interpreter.mjs:2714— #asyncWalkComprehension has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
resolveStartPosition (cognitive 17) assets/js/erlang/re.mjs:569— resolveStartPosition has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
list_to_integer/2 (cognitive 17) assets/js/erlang/erlang.mjs:2614— list_to_integer/2 has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#parseClassCharOrRange (cognitive 17) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:861— #parseClassCharOrRange has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#tryParseCharEscapeCodePoint (cognitive 17) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_parser.mjs:2505— #tryParseCharEscapeCodePoint has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
#hasUnresolvedVariablePattern (cognitive 16) assets/js/interpreter.mjs:2068— #hasUnresolvedVariablePattern has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
find/3 (cognitive 16) assets/js/erlang/string.mjs:24— find/3 has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
keytake/3 (cognitive 16) assets/js/erlang/lists.mjs:584— keytake/3 has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
error/3 (cognitive 16) assets/js/erlang/erlang.mjs:1717— error/3 has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
collect (cognitive 16) assets/js/erlang/erlang.mjs:2491— collect has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
isValidIolist (cognitive 16) assets/js/erlang/erl_stdlib_errors.mjs:660— isValidIolist has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
encode/2 (cognitive 16) assets/js/elixir/uri.mjs:8— encode/2 has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous) (cognitive 16) assets/js/erts/regex/regex_analyzer.mjs:256— (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) lib/hologram/compiler/digraph.ex:376— lib/hologram/compiler/digraph.ex:376-390 | lib/hologram/compiler/digraph.ex:399-413 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) lib/hologram/compiler/call_graph.ex:903— lib/hologram/compiler/call_graph.ex:903-915 | lib/hologram/compiler/call_graph.ex:975-987 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) lib/hologram/compiler/encoder.ex:708— lib/hologram/compiler/encoder.ex:708-717 | lib/hologram/compiler/transformer.ex:504-513 | lib/hologram/template/parser.ex:1066-1075 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) lib/hologram/framework.ex:224— lib/hologram/framework.ex:224-233 | lib/hologram/framework.ex:293-302 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Recommendation — 4 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.exs, .ex, .mjs) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 68 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: assets/js/interpreter.mjs, lib/hologram/compiler/call_graph.ex, assets/js/renderer.mjs, assets/js/bitstring.mjs, lib/hologram/compiler/encoder.ex, lib/hologram/template/parser.ex, assets/js/hologram.mjs, lib/hologram/compiler.ex (+60 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] assets/package-lock.json— diff 7.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — diff is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 8.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 7.0.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 7.0.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.exs, .ex, .mjs) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`), or lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (package.json) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
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Run 019fd4a6-2a68-79c2-bbdb-569ca0dc03b9 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 36 · Warnings: 154 · Recommendations: 4 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 06-08-2026 @ 01:18 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.