Public report — bazel, published 29 Jul 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 29-07-2026 @ 16:22 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Bazelbuild/bazel

57% Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
middle

Very large · 727,422 LoC · rebuild ~8.9 person-years · weakest lens: Security (46%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

17/19dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
114findings with an exact file:lineof 128 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
19/94dimensions across the health lenses727422 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

bazelbuild/bazel is sound in substance but carries real gaps (57%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.

It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.

The area that most needs attention is Security (46%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Maturity (61%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: 33 Low finding(s) (Static Analysis (SAST)); Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions… (Architecture documentation); 2 Secret finding(s) (Secrets (history)).

For scale: Very large (~727,422 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~8.9 person-years (~5–17 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 46% · 50% weightMaturity 61% · 27% weightReadiness 64% · 15% weightArchitecture 100% · 8% weight

Raise Security 46 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 57 → ~66.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (64+)

64 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ssl-monitor.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ssl-monitor.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ssl-monitor.yml
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/peephole/InstructionSequenceConstants.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/Optimizer.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/evaluation/EvaluationShrinker.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/ConfigurationParser.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/util/ClassUtil.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/evaluation/InstructionUsageMarker.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/evaluation/EvaluationSimplifier.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/editor/CompactCodeAttributeComposer.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/editor/InstructionSequenceBuilder.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/evaluation/PartialEvaluator.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/io/ProgramClassReader.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/editor/CodeAttributeEditor.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/util/ArrayUtil.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/visitor/ClassPrinter.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/shrink/UsageMarker.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/util/SimplifiedVisitor.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/backport/LambdaExpressionConverter.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/editor/CodeAttributeComposer.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/util/DynamicMemberReferenceInitializer.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/ClassConstants.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/io/ProgramClassWriter.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/evaluation/Processor.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/editor/ConstantPoolEditor.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/peephole/InstructionSequenceReplacer.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/peephole/MethodInliner.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/info/ParameterEscapeMarker.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/evaluation/SimpleEnumUseSimplifier.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/evaluation/value/IntegerValue.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/peephole/ClassMerger.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/backport/AbstractAPIConverter.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/evaluation/SimpleEnumUseChecker.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/gson/GsonDeserializationOptimizer.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/ClassSpecificationVisitorFactory.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/evaluation/SimpleEnumDescriptorSimplifier.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/util/InstructionSequenceMatcher.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/editor/ConstantPoolRemapper.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/Initializer.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/ConfigurationWriter.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/instruction/Instruction.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/preverify/CodePreverifier.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/editor/AttributeAdder.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/configuration/ConfigurationLogger.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/evaluation/value/TypedReferenceValue.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/gson/GsonSerializationOptimizer.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/editor/ConstantPoolShrinker.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/gson/GsonBuilderInvocationFinder.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/peephole/BranchTargetFinder.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/gson/OptimizedTypeAdapterInitializer.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/obfuscate/Obfuscator.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/util/ClassReferenceInitializer.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/editor/ClassReferenceFixer.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/attribute/visitor/DebugAttributeVisitor.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/editor/SimplifiedClassEditor.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/shrink/ClassShrinker.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/obfuscate/ClassObfuscator.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/attribute/visitor/SingleTimeAttributeVisitor.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/evaluation/value/RangeIntegerValue.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/io/ZipOutput.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/util/DynamicClassReferenceInitializer.java
  • D34 · Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/backport/StreamSupportConverter.java
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €430,000–€2,200,000
Cost to rebuild€430,000–€2,200,000 (4.2–13.5 person-years (7,136–22,639 h), ~5–17 engineers)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.8× (at 57% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeVery large · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~8.9 person-years of build effort (about ~€1,300,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 46% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with package-info.java (2).
+5.9 pts · Low effort · Secrets (history)
2
Resolve the 33 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with compare.html (13), examples.html (12), changelog.html (8).
+6.3 pts · Medium effort · Static Analysis (SAST)
3
Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
+6.2 pts · Medium effort · Architecture documentation

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Very large asset (~8.9 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 46%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Very large, ~8.9 person-years rebuild (727,422 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 46%
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 33 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with compare.html (13), examples.html (12), changelog.html (8). The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 33 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with compare.html (13), examples.html (12), changelog.html (8).

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 61% · Adequate · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 64% · Adequate · gated by P4

At a glance — Security · 46% · Weak · gated by D28, D29, D36

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection50High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures3High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components1High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by resolving the 33 low-severity static analysis findings, focusing first on compare.html, examples.html, and changelog.html. Next, establish an architecture decision record log to capture significant design choices and their rationale. Address the two secret history findings, starting with package-info.java, to improve security hygiene. Finally, automate the release process in CI to ensure repeatable and reversible deployments, and update the root README with a testing section to clarify how to run the test suite.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with package-info.java (2).+5.9 ptsLowSecrets (history)
Resolve the 33 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with compare.html (13), examples.html (12), changelog.html (8).+6.3 ptsMediumStatic Analysis (SAST)
Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.+6.2 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history).+3.0 ptsLowSecrets (history)
Automate the release in CI — a deploy stage for a service (Helm/Kubernetes manifests or an equivalent rollout), or a tag-triggered publish job for an artifact — so releases are repeatable and reversible.+5.4 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.+5.3 ptsMediumDocumentation (README)
Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+2.5 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+2.5 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 19 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 79% mixed · 21% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/ssl-monitor.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
third_party/py/mock/__init__.py5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: eval-detected
third_party/aws-sdk-auth-lite/src/main/java/com/amazonaws/auth/profile/package-info.java5.8MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
.github/dependabot.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown
.github/workflows/cherry-picker.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: gha-workflow-env-secret
src/java_tools/junitrunner/javatests/com/google/testing/junit/runner/model/AntXmlResultWriterTest.java7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: documentbuilderfactory-disallow-doctype-decl-missing
third_party/py/concurrent/futures/_compat.py7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: exec-detected
third_party/py/dataclasses/dataclasses/__init__.py7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: exec-detected
requirements.txt7.2MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/examples/android-plugin/AndroidManifest.xml7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: exported_activity
third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/examples/android/AndroidManifest.xml7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: exported_activity
third_party/py/abseil/absl/flags/_flagvalues.py7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-defused-xml
third_party/py/abseil/absl/testing/xml_reporter.py7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-defused-xml
tools/android/instrumentation_test_check.py7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-defused-xml
tools/compliance/write_sbom.py7.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: insecure-hash-algorithm-md5
third_party/py/mock/html/compare.html8.6Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Low: plaintext-http-link
third_party/py/mock/html/examples.html8.6Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Low: plaintext-http-link
third_party/py/mock/html/changelog.html8.6Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Low: plaintext-http-link
examples/Readme.md9.5Near-cleanDocumentation Quality: The 'Bazel examples' section is marked as deprecated and points to a non-existent URL, signaling an outdated example directory that should be removed.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 17 of 19 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 19 dimensions across the health lenses
D13D16D19D21D28D29D34D35D36D37D38M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 114 of 128 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019faeaf-a0c7-7de5-a94f-9a4b66a4d801.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

645 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/main/java/com/google/devtools/build/lib/packages/Attribute.java.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 · ×3
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Further sole-owners (lower concentration) finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Bazel's documentation is clear and complete for a tool of this size: it starts with an excellent one-line summary ('Choose two'), lists speed, multi-language support, scalability, and extensibility before diving into Getting Started (install + start), Documentation (command line, rule reference, query, extend, tests, users), and ends with vulnerability reporting. The body is largely descriptive of the tool's purpose and a rationale for ijar, then a clipped examples directory that is not flagged as missing but appears to be an internal note.

The 'Bazel examples' section is marked as deprecated and points to a non-existent URL, signaling an outdated example directory that should be removed.examples/Readme.md

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 The 'Bazel examples' section is marked as deprecated and points to a… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with Readme.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 1.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

9 finding(s): 0 critical, 9 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×2third_party/aws-sdk-auth-lite/src/main/java/com/amazonaws/auth/profile/package-info.java:26detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with package-info.java (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.3 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

100 finding(s): 0 critical, 11 high, 6 medium, 83 low.

High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×11.github/dependabot.yml:8detected by semgrep finding
Medium: exported_activity · ×6third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/examples/android-plugin/AndroidManifest.xml:11detected by semgrep finding
Low: plaintext-http-link · ×33third_party/py/mock/html/changelog.html:65detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 33 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with compare.html (13), examples.html (12), changelog.html (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (33 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 11 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with __init__.py (4), ssl-monitor.yml (3), dependabot.yml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 6 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with AndroidManifest.xml (2), _flagvalues.py, xml_reporter.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

621 of 2771 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/peephole/InstructionSequenceConstants.java.

Orphaned knowledge · ×60third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/peephole/InstructionSequenceConstants.java
Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 60 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with InstructionSequenceConstants.java, Optimizer.java, EvaluationShrinker.java. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (60 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 2.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted]requirements.txtdetected by osv-scanner finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — the gate may be running tests, or "test" may be incidental (a path, "latest", a reporter). Make the test step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.

What to do

  • Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`pytest` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.
P3 · Security & performance tooling7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No release automation was found in CI — neither a deploy stage (Helm/Kubernetes/compose manifests, an orchestrated rollout) nor a publish job that ships the built artifact. Releases appear to be run by hand, which is slower, less repeatable and harder to reverse.

What to do

  • Automate the release in CI — a deploy stage for a service (Helm/Kubernetes manifests or an equivalent rollout), or a tag-triggered publish job for an artifact — so releases are repeatable and reversible.
P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Architecture100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity61%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness64%Adequate — gated by P4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security46%Weak — gated by D28, D29, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 75 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.java, .py) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~521413 lines of test source are present (.java, .py) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .java, .py — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.java, .py) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go, .java, .py) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.java, .py) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D4 Code Duplication — Most of this repository's production source (.java, .py) was not read by duplication detection, so code duplication was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's duplication. Not scored: no source of those file kinds was exposed to the token comparison by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .go, .java, .py, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.java, .py) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but skipped (1/2 markers — below the conservative bar): 38 value object(s)
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads .NET source (ILogger/Serilog, OpenTelemetry, health checks) and no such source carries this repository's product — because it is written in another language, or because the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET logging idiom is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from EF Core usage in .NET source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report` or the Gradle `jacocoTestReport` task) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 74 finding(s)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned knowledge · ×60
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/peephole/InstructionSequenceConstants.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/Optimizer.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/evaluation/EvaluationShrinker.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/ConfigurationParser.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/util/ClassUtil.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/evaluation/InstructionUsageMarker.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/evaluation/EvaluationSimplifier.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/editor/CompactCodeAttributeComposer.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/editor/InstructionSequenceBuilder.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/evaluation/PartialEvaluator.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/io/ProgramClassReader.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/editor/CodeAttributeEditor.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/util/ArrayUtil.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/visitor/ClassPrinter.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/shrink/UsageMarker.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/util/SimplifiedVisitor.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/backport/LambdaExpressionConverter.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/editor/CodeAttributeComposer.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/util/DynamicMemberReferenceInitializer.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/ClassConstants.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/io/ProgramClassWriter.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/evaluation/Processor.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/classfile/editor/ConstantPoolEditor.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/peephole/InstructionSequenceReplacer.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/src/proguard/optimize/peephole/MethodInliner.java — No living knowledge remains for this large file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • + 35 more in this group — see findings.md.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×11
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:8 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: gha-workflow-env-secret .github/workflows/cherry-picker.yml:14 — A secret is exposed in the workflow-level `env:` block, making it available to every job and step in this workflow — including any untrusted code run in pull-request workflows. Scope secrets as narrowly as possible: prefer step-level `env:` so the secret is only available where it is actually needed. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ssl-monitor.yml:23 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6.0.2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6.0.2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ssl-monitor.yml:26 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-python@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-python@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-python/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ssl-monitor.yml:45 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/github-script@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/github-script@v9`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/github-script/commits/v9 --jq .sha`.
  • High: documentbuilderfactory-disallow-doctype-decl-missing src/java_tools/junitrunner/javatests/com/google/testing/junit/runner/model/AntXmlResultWriterTest.java:164 — DOCTYPE declarations are enabled for this DocumentBuilderFactory. This is vulnerable to XML external entity attacks. Disable this by setting the feature "http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl" to true. Alternatively, allow DOCTYPE declarations and only prohibit external entities declarations. This can be done by setting the features "http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities" and "http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities" to false. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: exec-detected third_party/py/concurrent/futures/_compat.py:89 — Detected the use of exec(). exec() can be dangerous if used to evaluate dynamic content. If this content can be input from outside the program, this may be a code injection vulnerability. Ensure evaluated content is not definable by external sources. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: exec-detected third_party/py/dataclasses/dataclasses/__init__.py:340 — Detected the use of exec(). exec() can be dangerous if used to evaluate dynamic content. If this content can be input from outside the program, this may be a code injection vulnerability. Ensure evaluated content is not definable by external sources. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: eval-detected third_party/py/mock/__init__.py:212 — Detected the use of eval(). eval() can be dangerous if used to evaluate dynamic content. If this content can be input from outside the program, this may be a code injection vulnerability. Ensure evaluated content is not definable by external sources. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: eval-detected third_party/py/mock/__init__.py:277 — Detected the use of eval(). eval() can be dangerous if used to evaluate dynamic content. If this content can be input from outside the program, this may be a code injection vulnerability. Ensure evaluated content is not definable by external sources. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • High: exec-detected third_party/py/mock/__init__.py:287 — Detected the use of exec(). exec() can be dangerous if used to evaluate dynamic content. If this content can be input from outside the program, this may be a code injection vulnerability. Ensure evaluated content is not definable by external sources. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×2
  • Secret: generic-api-key third_party/aws-sdk-auth-lite/src/main/java/com/amazonaws/auth/profile/package-info.java:26 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key third_party/aws-sdk-auth-lite/src/main/java/com/amazonaws/auth/profile/package-info.java:30 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×1
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] requirements.txt — soupsieve 2.8.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.8.4 One upgrade of soupsieve 2.8.3 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Warning — 7 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×6
  • Medium: exported_activity third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/examples/android-plugin/AndroidManifest.xml:11 — The application exports an activity. Any application on the device can launch the exported activity which may compromise the integrity of your application or its data. Ensure that any exported activities do not have privileged access to your application's control plane.
  • Medium: exported_activity third_party/java/proguard/proguard6.2.2/examples/android/AndroidManifest.xml:11 — The application exports an activity. Any application on the device can launch the exported activity which may compromise the integrity of your application or its data. Ensure that any exported activities do not have privileged access to your application's control plane.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml third_party/py/abseil/absl/flags/_flagvalues.py:26 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml third_party/py/abseil/absl/testing/xml_reporter.py:24 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • Medium: use-defused-xml tools/android/instrumentation_test_check.py:23 — The Python documentation recommends using `defusedxml` instead of `xml` because the native Python `xml` library is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. These attacks can leak confidential data and "XML bombs" can cause denial of service. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
  • Medium: insecure-hash-algorithm-md5 tools/compliance/write_sbom.py:79 — Detected MD5 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. MD5 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use SHA256 or SHA3 instead.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 3 floating ref(s) across 1 workflow file(s): `actions/checkout@v6.0.2` (.github/workflows/ssl-monitor.yml:23), `actions/setup-python@v6` (.github/workflows/ssl-monitor.yml:26), `actions/github-script@v9` (.github/workflows/ssl-monitor.yml:45)
Recommendation — 45 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Low · ×33
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/changelog.html:65 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/changelog.html:245 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/changelog.html:490 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/changelog.html:495 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/changelog.html:595 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/changelog.html:597 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/changelog.html:709 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/changelog.html:848 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/compare.html:59 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/compare.html:60 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/compare.html:61 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/compare.html:62 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/compare.html:63 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/compare.html:66 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/compare.html:67 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/compare.html:69 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/compare.html:77 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/compare.html:85 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/compare.html:86 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/compare.html:87 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/compare.html:669 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/examples.html:126 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/examples.html:157 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/examples.html:161 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • Low: plaintext-http-link third_party/py/mock/html/examples.html:165 — This link points to a plaintext HTTP URL. Prefer an encrypted HTTPS URL if possible.
  • + 8 more in this group — see findings.md.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×3
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 604 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/main/java/com/google/devtools/build/lib/packages/Attribute.java, src/main/java/com/google/devtools/build/lib/skyframe/SkyframeActionExecutor.java, src/main/java/com/google/devtools/build/lib/runtime/BlazeRuntime.java, src/main/java/com/google/devtools/build/lib/skyframe/SkyframeBuildView.java, src/main/java/com/google/devtools/build/lib/query2/SkyQueryEnvironment.java, src/main/java/com/google/devtools/build/lib/skyframe/ActionExecutionFunction.java, src/main/java/com/google/devtools/build/lib/buildtool/BuildTool.java, src/main/java/net/starlark/java/syntax/Parser.java (+596 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #2 — If anonymized user #2 becomes unavailable, 18 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/main/java/com/google/devtools/build/lib/remote/util/AsyncTaskCache.java, src/main/java/com/google/devtools/build/lib/analysis/RepoMappingManifestAction.java, src/main/java/com/google/devtools/build/lib/bazel/repository/cache/LocalRepoContentsCache.java, src/tools/remote/src/main/java/com/google/devtools/build/remote/worker/ByteStreamServer.java, src/main/java/com/google/devtools/build/lib/bazel/repository/RepositoryUtils.java, src/main/java/com/google/devtools/build/lib/remote/merkletree/MerkleTree.java, src/main/java/com/google/devtools/build/lib/skyframe/TestExpansionFunction.java, src/main/java/com/google/devtools/build/lib/bazel/bzlmod/AttributeValuesAdapter.java (+10 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #3 — If anonymized user #3 becomes unavailable, 4 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/java_tools/buildjar/java/com/google/devtools/build/buildjar/javac/plugins/dependency/DependencyModule.java, src/java_tools/buildjar/java/com/google/devtools/build/buildjar/BazelJavaBuilder.java, src/java_tools/buildjar/java/com/google/devtools/build/buildjar/javac/plugins/dependency/ImplicitDependencyExtractor.java, src/java_tools/buildjar/java/com/google/devtools/build/buildjar/javac/plugins/processing/AnnotationProcessingModule.java. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.java, .py) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · complexity unreadable for .java, .py · ×1
  • complexity unreadable for .java, .py — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (157296 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .java, .py, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D16 · Bus Factor · Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
  • Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 13 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (645 single-owned of 2210 analysed files in total).
D19 · Documentation Quality · The 'Bazel examples' section is marked as deprecated and points to a non-existent URL, signaling an outdated example directory that should be removed. · ×1
  • The 'Bazel examples' section is marked as deprecated and points to a non-existent URL, signaling an outdated example directory that should be removed. examples/Readme.md — Delete the 'Deprecated: Bazel examples' note and remove any remaining references to this folder.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
  • Further orphaned files (smaller) — 561 smaller file(s) also have no living knowledge — folded into the freshness score and metrics rather than listed individually (621 orphaned of 2771 analysed files in total).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`cyclonedx-py` over the resolved Python environment/lockfile, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1
  • Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.java, .py) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — `mvn jacoco:report` or the Gradle `jacocoTestReport` task, or `coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .9artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .100artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .1artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019faeaf-a0c7-7de5-a94f-9a4b66a4d801 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md