Executive summary
The system holds an adequate standing with a health score of 66%, indicating a workable asset that carries real operational risk. While the code itself is clean and the architecture is sound, the primary concern lies in how safely the system is operated and released. This gap exposes the business to preventable outages and security incidents, despite the underlying logic being robust.
The value at stake is relatively contained, with a small footprint of roughly 14,653 lines of production code. Rebuilding this system would require minimal effort, estimated at just 0.2 person-years or approximately €24,000. This low rebuild cost means the business is not locked into legacy debt, but it also means the current operational weaknesses are a choice rather than a constraint. The system is small enough to fix quickly, making the current risks entirely avoidable with focused attention.
The most critical theme is operational readiness. With a readiness score of 59%, the system lacks the safeguards needed for safe daily operation. This includes incomplete backup strategies and unclear disaster recovery plans, which could lead to significant data loss or extended downtime during an incident. The second theme is release security. The current release process allows builds to be published without visible protection rules, creating a risk that faulty or compromised code could reach users before it is caught. This is a direct exposure to both reliability and security threats.
On the positive side, the code health is excellent at 95%, and the architecture is fully mature at 100%. This means developers can make changes efficiently without fear of breaking the system’s structure. However, these strengths are undermined by the lack of operational discipline. The picture is also partial, as domain modeling and event-driven patterns were not measured, leaving some aspects of the system’s design unverified.
Focus first on securing the release pipeline. Confirming required reviewers or enforcing draft releases provides the highest leverage, stopping bad builds before they impact users. This single action addresses the most immediate risk with minimal effort, protecting the business while longer-term operational improvements are planned.
Raise Readiness 59 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 66 → ~71.
New since the last scan (19+)
- D4 · Duplicated block (24 lines × 2) examples/hooks_demo.erl
- D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/hornbeam_hooks.erl
- D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/hornbeam_lifespan.erl
- D4 · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/hornbeam_tasks.erl
- D4 · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/hornbeam_presence.erl
- D4 · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/hornbeam_presence.erl
- D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) priv/hornbeam_lifespan_runner.py
- D4 · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) examples/embedding_chat/src/embedding_chat_app.erl
- D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) examples/embedding_chat/src/embedding_chat_app.erl
- D12 · No dependency lockfile committed (examples/demo/ml_caching/rebar.config)
- D12 · Floating source dependency: erlang_python
- D12 · Floating source dependency: hornbeam
- D12 · No dependency lockfile committed (examples/demo/multi_app/rebar.config)
- D12 · Floating source dependency: erlang_python
- D12 · Floating source dependency: hornbeam
- D12 · No dependency lockfile committed (examples/embedding_chat/rebar.config)
- D12 · Floating source dependency: hornbeam
- D12 · No dependency lockfile committed (rebar.config)
- PF3 · Sync-over-async blocking js/build.js
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €8,100–€41,000
| Cost to rebuild | €8,100–€41,000 |
|---|---|
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.9× (at 66% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€24,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 59% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Architecture — module dependency matrix
| depends on → | 1 (global) | 2 benchmarks | 3 embedding_chat_ws | 4 examples | 5 examples.async_chat | 6 examples.channels_chat | 7 examples.demo.distributed_rpc.app | 8 examples.demo.ml_caching.priv.app | 9 examples.demo.ml_caching.priv.embedding_app | 10 examples.demo.multi_app.priv.admin | 11 examples.demo.multi_app.priv.api.api_app | 12 examples.demo.multi_app.priv.frontend | 13 examples.demo.realtime_chat | 14 examples.distributed_rpc | 15 examples.embedding_chat.priv | 16 examples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat.app | 17 examples.embedding_service | 18 examples.erlang_integration | 19 examples.hello_asgi | 20 examples.hello_wsgi | 21 examples.hooks_lifespan | 22 examples.hooks_lifespan.app | 23 examples.llm_chat | 24 examples.multi_app_test | 25 examples.websocket_chat | 26 hornbeam_callbacks | 27 hornbeam_channel | 28 hornbeam_channel_registry | 29 hornbeam_config | 30 hornbeam_context_pool | 31 hornbeam_hooks | 32 hornbeam_lifespan | 33 hornbeam_presence | 34 priv.hornbeam_channels | 35 priv.hornbeam_websocket_runner | 36 examples.demo.distributed_rpc | 37 examples.demo.ml_caching.priv | 38 examples.demo.multi_app.priv.api | 39 examples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat | 40 priv |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (global) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2 benchmarks | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 3 embedding_chat_ws | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 4 examples | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 5 examples.async_chat | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 6 examples.channels_chat | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 7 examples.demo.distributed_rpc.app | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 8 examples.demo.ml_caching.priv.app | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 9 examples.demo.ml_caching.priv.embedding_app | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 10 examples.demo.multi_app.priv.admin | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 11 examples.demo.multi_app.priv.api.api_app | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 12 examples.demo.multi_app.priv.frontend | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 13 examples.demo.realtime_chat | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 14 examples.distributed_rpc | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 15 examples.embedding_chat.priv | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 16 examples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat.app | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 17 examples.embedding_service | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 18 examples.erlang_integration | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 19 examples.hello_asgi | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 20 examples.hello_wsgi | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 21 examples.hooks_lifespan | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 22 examples.hooks_lifespan.app | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 23 examples.llm_chat | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 24 examples.multi_app_test | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 25 examples.websocket_chat | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 26 hornbeam_callbacks | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 27 hornbeam_channel | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 28 hornbeam_channel_registry | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 29 hornbeam_config | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 30 hornbeam_context_pool | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 31 hornbeam_hooks | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 32 hornbeam_lifespan | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 33 hornbeam_presence | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 34 priv.hornbeam_channels | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 35 priv.hornbeam_websocket_runner | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 36 examples.demo.distributed_rpc | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 37 examples.demo.ml_caching.priv | 2 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 38 examples.demo.multi_app.priv.api | 1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 39 examples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat | 3 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 40 priv | 2 | 1 |
36→7 examples.demo.distributed_rpc depends on examples.demo.distributed_rpc.app✕
- Type pairs
- 1 distinct (type in examples.demo.distributed_rpc → type in examples.demo.distributed_rpc.app) reference.
- Which types
examples.demo.distributed_rpc.app→examples.demo.distributed_rpc.app.InferRequest
- Direction
- examples.demo.distributed_rpc uses examples.demo.distributed_rpc.app. Changing examples.demo.distributed_rpc.app can break examples.demo.distributed_rpc, not the reverse.
- Position
- Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
37→8 examples.demo.ml_caching.priv depends on examples.demo.ml_caching.priv.app✕
- Type pairs
- 2 distinct (type in examples.demo.ml_caching.priv → type in examples.demo.ml_caching.priv.app) references.
- Which types
examples.demo.ml_caching.priv.app→examples.demo.ml_caching.priv.app.EmbedRequestexamples.demo.ml_caching.priv.app→examples.demo.ml_caching.priv.app.SimilarityRequest
- Direction
- examples.demo.ml_caching.priv uses examples.demo.ml_caching.priv.app. Changing examples.demo.ml_caching.priv.app can break examples.demo.ml_caching.priv, not the reverse.
- Position
- Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
38→11 examples.demo.multi_app.priv.api depends on examples.demo.multi_app.priv.api.api_app✕
- Type pairs
- 1 distinct (type in examples.demo.multi_app.priv.api → type in examples.demo.multi_app.priv.api.api_app) reference.
- Which types
examples.demo.multi_app.priv.api.api_app→examples.demo.multi_app.priv.api.api_app.Item
- Direction
- examples.demo.multi_app.priv.api uses examples.demo.multi_app.priv.api.api_app. Changing examples.demo.multi_app.priv.api.api_app can break examples.demo.multi_app.priv.api, not the reverse.
- Position
- Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
39→16 examples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat depends on examples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat.app✕
- Type pairs
- 3 distinct (type in examples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat → type in examples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat.app) references.
- Which types
examples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat.app→examples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat.app.EmbedRequestexamples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat.app→examples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat.app.FindSimilarRequestexamples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat.app→examples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat.app.SimilarityRequest
- Direction
- examples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat uses examples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat.app. Changing examples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat.app can break examples.embedding_chat.priv.embedding_chat, not the reverse.
- Position
- Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
40→34 priv depends on priv.hornbeam_channels✕
- Type pairs
- 2 distinct (type in priv → type in priv.hornbeam_channels) references.
- Which types
priv.hornbeam_channels→priv.hornbeam_channels.Channelpriv.hornbeam_channels→priv.hornbeam_channels.Socket
- Direction
- priv uses priv.hornbeam_channels. Changing priv.hornbeam_channels can break priv, not the reverse.
- Position
- Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
40→35 priv depends on priv.hornbeam_websocket_runner✕
- Type pairs
- 1 distinct (type in priv → type in priv.hornbeam_websocket_runner) reference.
- Which types
priv.hornbeam_websocket_runner→priv.hornbeam_websocket_runner.WebSocketSession
- Direction
- priv uses priv.hornbeam_websocket_runner. Changing priv.hornbeam_websocket_runner can break priv, not the reverse.
- Position
- Below the diagonal — points down the layering, which is what you want.
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Accessibility
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2021 — Injection | 22 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 7 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, secure the release process by confirming required reviewers are attached to the environment or publishing as a draft release to prevent bad builds from reaching users. Second, codify backups and geo-recovery in infrastructure as code to ensure the disaster recovery plan is technically supported. Third, resolve the missing architecture decision records by documenting significant decisions with their context and consequences in a standard directory structure. Finally, improve system responsiveness by replacing synchronous file and process operations with their asynchronous counterparts.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| The release job declares an environment, but its protection rules are not visible from the repository — confirm required reviewers are attached, or publish as a draft release so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it. | +6.2 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC (snapshot/replication/geo-redundant) to back the DR plan. | +6.2 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. | +1.6 pts | Low | ADR Quality |
| Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form). | +1.6 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| TypeScript/JavaScript: use the promise APIs (fs/promises, a promisified child_process.execFile, the async zlib/crypto functions) and await them instead of the *Sync variants. | +1.4 pts | Medium | Async & latency hygiene |
| Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape. | +1.2 pts | Medium | Documentation (README) |
| Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh. | +1.0 pts | Medium | Page structure |
| Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add an a11y linter that can read your UI — no component framework was detected, so the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins would have nothing to lint; use an HTML-template a11y linter (html-eslint, htmlhint) or run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI. | +1.0 pts | Medium | A11y enforcement |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| REDACTED | 0.9 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 2.5 | Slop | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 4.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED |
| REDACTED | 6.4 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED |
| src/hornbeam.erl | 6.7 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: TodoComment |
| src/hornbeam_presence.erl | 7.2 | Mixed | Cognitive Complexity: hornbeam_presence.do_untrack (cognitive 21) |
| src/hornbeam_lifespan.erl | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: hornbeam_lifespan.handle_call (cyclomatic 24) |
| priv/hornbeam_wsgi_worker.py | 7.8 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: hornbeam_wsgi_worker._iterate_response (cyclomatic 19) |
| priv/hornbeam_erlang.py | 7.8 | Mixed | Cognitive Complexity: hornbeam_erlang.stream (cognitive 21) |
| src/hornbeam_hooks.erl | 7.8 | Mixed | God Classes: TooManyFunctions: hornbeam_hooks |
| priv/hornbeam_lifespan_runner.py | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (22–29 lines × 2) |
| priv/hornbeam_channels_runner.py | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) |
| examples/embedding_chat/src/embedding_chat_app.erl | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) |
| priv/hornbeam_channels.py | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: hornbeam_channels._normalize_event_result (cognitive 25) |
| priv/hornbeam_websocket_runner.py | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cognitive Complexity: hornbeam_websocket_runner._run_app_until_response (cognitive 22) |
| src/hornbeam_channel.erl | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: TooManyFunctions: hornbeam_channel |
| js/hornbeam.js | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: FileTooLong: js/hornbeam.js |
| examples/hooks_demo.erl | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (24 lines × 2) |
How the grades work
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 45 of 48 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 48 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 89 of 108 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Watchdog duplication detector (in-process) | Code duplication | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.400 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.erl, .py, .js) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML), or `coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`, or lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML), or `coverage run -m pytest` then `coverage xml`, or lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
- D9 Test Distribution — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test distribution NOT SCORED: this repository's production source spans more than one ecosystem, and the test-pyramid census cannot read the .erl, .py test suite(s) — so the pyramid was not measured for the repository as a whole. The suites we could count came back with 28 test method(s) (28 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e), but that is a shape for one part of the product and we do not publish a partial pyramid as if it were complete. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — test distribution is excluded from the score rather than counted.
- D10 Test Quality — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 28 test(s) behind this row are the ones the JavaScript/TypeScript census could read, and this repository also carries at least 23 test source file(s) (.erl, .py) that it cannot: it reads JavaScript/TypeScript test declarations off disk, so a JUnit/pytest-style suite is invisible to it. Skipped tests, zero-assertion tests and the other quality signals on this row are UNMEASURED in that suite — their absence from the counts above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that those tests are sound.
- D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.erl, .py, .js) and this repository declares a rebar3 project (repository root, 17 Common Test suites), but it was not re-run: the analyzer environment could not run it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Not scored — 5 shipped Python distribution(s) were read, but the outdated signal needs pypi.org, and no declaration here carries an exact pin to ask about — a floor or a range installs the newest release it admits and cannot be behind one, so this dimension's own question is only partly answered. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), but the licence verdict published here was taken over its Python distribution dependencies. Nothing was read about its Rebar dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its Python distribution dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
- D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (2 contributor(s) across 98 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 99% of the history; the other 1 hold 1% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: it declares a published package (js/package.json), but no published-package marker D22 reads admitted any project here, so this ecosystem's public API has no collector, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection registrations in C# and Spring beans in Java/Kotlin only, and this repository defines its own container in examples/llm_chat/app.py, whose lifetimes are not modelled yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
- C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
- C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
- C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
- ED5 Idempotency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check finds retry-prone mutations by walking the repository's declared types, and NONE was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to look at. That is a limit of the analyzer's reach — it reads .NET projects — not a finding that this repository has no command handlers or message consumers.
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check's reader does not cover the language this repository's product is written in, so it had nothing of the product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding about this repository.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
- X1 Async correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X13 Undrained process stream — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X14 Bypassable address classification — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java, Kotlin and Scala source only, and no C# was loaded, no Java, Kotlin or Scala was found, and this repository's Python is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java and Rust source only, and no C# was loaded and no Java or Rust was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Scala source only, and no C# was loaded and no Scala was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Scala source only, and no C# was loaded and no Scala was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. X7 measured the part of this repository it reads (C#, Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, Rust, Go, Java and Kotlin), and its Erlang source is outside the check's reach, so the card covers only part of the product. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the unread source is free of silent defaults.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
- D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
2 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was hornbeam_lifespan.handle_call at 24. A further 3 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being hornbeam_channel.call_event_handler at 19 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score. 2 files carry no cyclomatic complexity row at all for this reason — every one of their over-threshold functions was excluded, so the exclusion is disclosed nowhere in the file itself: src/hornbeam_channel.erl (hornbeam_channel.call_event_handler at 19), src/hornbeam_tasks.erl (hornbeam_tasks.handle_call at 16). They are named here because the per-file figures other dimensions report are taken BEFORE this exclusion, so such a file can show a high maximum complexity elsewhere in this report and nothing here, with nothing to reconcile the two.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 hornbeam_lifespan.handle_call (cyclomatic 24) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with hornbeam_lifespan.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 hornbeam_wsgi_worker._iterate_response (cyclomatic 19) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with hornbeam_wsgi_worker.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
5 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was hornbeam_wsgi_worker._iterate_response at 30.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 hornbeam_wsgi_worker._iterate_response (cognitive 30) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with hornbeam_wsgi_worker.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 hornbeam_channels._normalize_event_result (cognitive 25) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with hornbeam_channels.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 hornbeam_websocket_runner._run_app_until_response (cognitive 22) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with hornbeam_websocket_runner.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D3 · God Classes
5 over-large unit(s) detected — types, modules or files that carry too much.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 TooManyFunctions finding(s) in God Classes — start with hornbeam_presence.erl, hornbeam_hooks.erl, hornbeam_channel.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with hornbeam.erl, hornbeam.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D4 · Code Duplication
17 duplicated block group(s) detected. 5 of the 17 are in trees this repository does not ship — vendored, example/demo, fixture and benchmark code — and are ranked below the shipped groups rather than excluded from them: the duplication there is real and is still counted in this dimension's score. The dimensions that publish a production-file census leave those trees out of theirs, so this count is deliberately drawn over the wider population.
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with hornbeam_lifespan_runner.py, embedding_chat_app.erl, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with hornbeam_presence.erl, embedding_chat_app.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with hornbeam_presence.erl, hornbeam_channels_runner.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D5 · Coupling
3 production modules (npm+OTP), 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on module(s). Read from the build's own module declarations; 0 module(s) off the main sequence, with abstractness counted on 1 of the 3 (the rest declare no modelled class or interface, export only macros, or have no source directory of their own).
D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 27 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 28 tests (1 harness-style project(s) excluded from the assertion penalty). Measured on the JavaScript/TypeScript suite only — at least 23 test source file(s) (.erl, .py) went unread, so its test quality is unmeasured and is not in these counts.
D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
D14 · License Compliance
0 of 69 shipped Python distribution(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from PyPI over the distributions a consumer installs — this repository's 5 declared runtime requirement(s) closed transitively over each distribution's published `requires_dist` (64 reached that way). Requirements it states ONLY under an extra, a PEP 735 dependency group, a Poetry dev group or a dev-named requirements file are excluded: pip does not install any of them for a consumer. ★ This repository commits no dependency lockfile that this pass reads, so each licence is the one PyPI publishes for the distribution's CURRENT release rather than for a pinned version. 10 of them publish no licence on PyPI this pass can read; that is missing data, not a violation, and none of them is charged. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's Python distribution dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex) and package.json, and the licences of those dependency graphs were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D17 · Explicit Debt
1 deducted task-comment markers across 14653 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with hornbeam.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D19 · Documentation Quality
Hornbeam's documentation is clear, complete, and well-structured: the root README (docs/index.md) gives a strong overview of what Hornbeam does and where to find installation/usage guides; each directory's README documents that directory (e.g. examples/demo/, examples/embedding_chat/) rather than the repository; there are architecture/design docs for distributed RPC, ML integration, and Erlang-native asyncio; and every document is clipped by the scanner so unshown sections cannot be flagged as missing. The erlang_python documentation is excellent: it contains four README-style getting-started guides (context affinity, getting started with Erlang Python, logging and tracing integration, memory management) plus six architecture/design documents covering context-aware functions, streaming, testing free-threading, threading support, and scalability. The content is well-organized by order and each document's title states its scope; the READMEs are focused on their own directories (context affinity, getting started with Erlang Python, logging/tracing integration) rather than the repository as a whole. The project's documentation is comprehensive: the READMEs for each example are well written with a clear overview (e.g. ASGI/Wsgi modules, distributed ML), detailed tables comparing marshalling paths and performance gains, code examples showing how to build scope, run modules, and call endpoints, plus an architecture diagram of the Erlang cluster. The architecture/Docs markdown files cover type conversion, web framework integration, channels chat, embedding service, FastAPI, Flask with ETS caching, and a distributed ML example, all well-organized and complete. The documentation is excellent: the READMEs for each project are well written and scoped to their directories with clear usage examples, while architecture/Docs markdown files provide comprehensive design coverage. The WebSocket Chat example shows a real-time chat app using Hornbeam Erlang Pub/Sub plus an ASGI guide covering scope tables, FastAPI integration, and streaming responses, all of which are visible in the excerpt.
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 1 build units (rebar3) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
26 finding(s): 0 critical, 22 high, 3 medium, 1 low. 13 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `examples/channels_chat/REDACTED` (lines 42–54) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.
What to do
- Resolve the 4 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 13 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable dependencies in any ecosystem this repository declares.
D31 · IaC & Container Security
7 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 2 medium, 1 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 36 of the 42 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
What to do
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D43 · Malicious Dependencies
No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.
D44 · Platform End-of-Life
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 0 platform declaration(s) and 5 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
AC2 · Forms & labels
AC3 · Page structure
- Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. — website/src/pages/index.astro:176
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (an a11y linter that can read your UI — no component framework was detected, so the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins would have nothing to lint; use an HTML-template a11y linter (html-eslint, htmlhint) or run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 10 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add an a11y linter that can read your UI — no component framework was detected, so the JSX/Vue ESLint plugins would have nothing to lint; use an HTML-template a11y linter (html-eslint, htmlhint) or run axe/pa11y over the rendered pages, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX2 · Stateful singletons
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX4 · Dependency direction
AX9 · CQS / query purity
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 3 of 5 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure
M4 · Documentation accuracy
P1 · CI/CD gates
P10 · Library API & versioning
P2 · Observability
P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- The release job declares an environment, but its protection rules are not visible from the repository — confirm required reviewers are attached, or publish as a draft release so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P5 · DR & Backup
What to do
- Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC (snapshot/replication/geo-redundant) to back the DR plan.
- Enable purge protection / soft-delete (and prevent_destroy on critical resources) so data stores can't be lost to an accidental or malicious delete.
P6 · Release Hygiene
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
- `build` is async and calls readFileSync, writeFileSync — a blocking call inside async code stalls the event loop — every other request waits for as long as it runs. — js/build.js:62
What to do
- TypeScript/JavaScript: use the promise APIs (fs/promises, a promisified child_process.execFile, the async zlib/crypto functions) and await them instead of the *Sync variants.
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped
X25 · Inert configuration knob
X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 95% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 69% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 59% | Adequate — gated by P5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 72% | Adequate — gated by D29, D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Accessibility | 73% | Strong | Solid. |
| Performance | 70% | Strong | Solid. |
Not evidenced — 3 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
Not included — 71 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- AXR1 Runtime accessibility — compose up failed (exit 17 — an image could not be built) — failed to solve: dockerfile parse error on line 42: unknown instruction: cd (did you mean cmd?); runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .erl suite was found but not re-run
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Not scored — 5 shipped Python distribution(s) were read, but the outdated signal needs pypi.org, and no declaration here carries an exact pin to ask about — a floor or a range installs the newest release it admits and cannot be behind one, so this dimension's own question is only partly answered. NOT a finding that these dependencies are current or healthy.
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — D6 reads a CS/VB/GO/SCALA/SWIFT/DART/JAVA/PY/KT/TS/TSX/MTS/CTS/JS/JSX/MJS/CJS/PHP/RB/RS class graph only — this repository's production source is .erl, which was left unread. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test distribution not scored — polyglot repository, one half's tests are uncountable
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this lens looks for (23 value object(s))
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — This check finds retry-prone mutations (command handlers and message/event consumers) by walking the repository's declared types, and none was loaded here, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C# syntax, and none was loaded for this repository. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the Erlang, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
- P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML)) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Benchmark discipline was not assessed: this repository is written in Erlang, whose benchmark frameworks this check does not search yet. That is a gap in the analyzer's language reach, not a finding about your code.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: Erlang and Python and TypeScript/JavaScript runs on a garbage-collected runtime that gives a program no allocation-control idiom to choose on a hot path — no pools, stack allocation or value types — so allocation awareness is not something this code can be rated on.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X12 Unreachable branch — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X13 Undrained process stream — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X14 Bypassable address classification — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X16 Unfloored truncation loop — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X19 Unrestored process-global state — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X22 Contradicted release guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
- X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X31 Test-only surface in a production module — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
- X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Critical — 22 finding(s)
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Serious — 49 finding(s)
- Floating source dependency: erlang_python
- Floating source dependency: hornbeam
- Floating source dependency: erlang_python
- Floating source dependency: hornbeam
- Floating source dependency: hornbeam
- TooManyFunctions: hornbeam_presence src/hornbeam_presence.erl:25
- TooManyFunctions: hornbeam_hooks src/hornbeam_hooks.erl:40
- TooManyFunctions: hornbeam_channel src/hornbeam_channel.erl:28
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) priv/hornbeam_lifespan_runner.py:39
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) examples/embedding_chat/src/embedding_chat_app.erl:100
- Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) REDACTED:80
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- FileTooLong: src/hornbeam.erl src/hornbeam.erl
- FileTooLong: js/hornbeam.js js/hornbeam.js
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- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/hornbeam_presence.erl:335
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) examples/embedding_chat/src/embedding_chat_app.erl:83
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) src/hornbeam_presence.erl:646
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) priv/hornbeam_channels_runner.py:205
- Heading level jumps from h2 to h4 website/src/pages/index.astro:176
- Accessibility enforcement below the top rung
- hornbeam_lifespan.handle_call (cyclomatic 24) src/hornbeam_lifespan.erl:253
- hornbeam_wsgi_worker._iterate_response (cyclomatic 19) priv/hornbeam_wsgi_worker.py:241
- No dependency lockfile committed (examples/demo/ml_caching/rebar.config)
- No dependency lockfile committed (examples/demo/multi_app/rebar.config)
- No dependency lockfile committed (examples/embedding_chat/rebar.config)
- No dependency lockfile committed (rebar.config)
- TodoComment src/hornbeam.erl:500
- hornbeam_wsgi_worker._iterate_response (cognitive 30) priv/hornbeam_wsgi_worker.py:241
- hornbeam_channels._normalize_event_result (cognitive 25) priv/hornbeam_channels.py:339
- hornbeam_websocket_runner._run_app_until_response (cognitive 22) priv/hornbeam_websocket_runner.py:167
- hornbeam_presence.do_untrack (cognitive 21) src/hornbeam_presence.erl:334
- hornbeam_erlang.stream (cognitive 21) priv/hornbeam_erlang.py:215
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- Duplicated block (24 lines × 2) examples/hooks_demo.erl:200
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/hornbeam_hooks.erl:417
- Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) src/hornbeam_lifespan.erl:308
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/hornbeam_tasks.erl:111
- Duplicated block (22–29 lines × 2) priv/hornbeam_lifespan_runner.py:145
- Duplicated block (26–28 lines × 2) priv/hornbeam_erlang.py:134
- Duplicated block (14–16 lines × 2) priv/hornbeam_presence.py:92
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) priv/hornbeam_channels_runner.py:188
- Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) examples/async_chat/app.py:25
- Duplicated block (20 lines × 3) examples/multi_app_test/admin_app.py:4
- Sync-over-async blocking js/build.js:62
Minor — 36 finding(s)
- No direct assertions: Timer - schedules timeout js/test/hornbeam.test.js:102
- No direct assertions: Timer - reset clears timeout js/test/hornbeam.test.js:120
- No direct assertions: Timer - tracks tries js/test/hornbeam.test.js:138
- No direct assertions: Socket - constructs with endpoint js/test/hornbeam.test.js:161
- No direct assertions: Socket - appends params to URL js/test/hornbeam.test.js:166
- No direct assertions: Socket - creates channels js/test/hornbeam.test.js:175
- No direct assertions: Socket - tracks multiple channels js/test/hornbeam.test.js:182
- No direct assertions: Socket - makeRef increments js/test/hornbeam.test.js:189
- No direct assertions: Socket - connectionState reflects WebSocket state js/test/hornbeam.test.js:196
- No direct assertions: Socket - isConnected returns false when closed js/test/hornbeam.test.js:205
- No direct assertions: Channel - initializes with topic and params js/test/hornbeam.test.js:214
- No direct assertions: Channel - join returns Push js/test/hornbeam.test.js:223
- No direct assertions: Channel - join can only be called once js/test/hornbeam.test.js:231
- No direct assertions: Channel - state transitions to joining js/test/hornbeam.test.js:244
- No direct assertions: Channel - on registers event handler js/test/hornbeam.test.js:258
- No direct assertions: Channel - off removes event handler js/test/hornbeam.test.js:271
- No direct assertions: Channel - isClosed returns correct state js/test/hornbeam.test.js:288
- No direct assertions: Push - receive registers callback js/test/hornbeam.test.js:301
- No direct assertions: Push - receive chains js/test/hornbeam.test.js:325
- No direct assertions: Presence - initializes with channel js/test/hornbeam.test.js:341
- No direct assertions: Presence - syncState merges new state js/test/hornbeam.test.js:350
- No direct assertions: Presence - syncState detects leaves js/test/hornbeam.test.js:362
- No direct assertions: Presence - syncDiff handles joins js/test/hornbeam.test.js:385
- No direct assertions: Presence - syncDiff handles leaves js/test/hornbeam.test.js:405
- No direct assertions: Presence - list returns array of presences js/test/hornbeam.test.js:431
- Test project verifies nothing: js js/test/hornbeam.test.js:102
- No ADRs found
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- No ADRs
Minor — 1 finding(s)
- Dependency hygiene PARTLY measured — Python dependencies read, no exact pin to grade for currency
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-80252ee868274c79b5af0edba34391f6/history.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-80252ee868274c79b5af0edba34391f6/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off . | 26 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 7 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D43 · Malicious Dependencies | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json |