Public report — go-clean-architecture-web-application-boilerplate, published 3 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 03-08-2026 @ 20:36 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Bmf-San/go-Clean-Architecture-Web-Application-Boilerplate

template/sampleno automated tests
50% Weak
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
upper third — near Adequate
Domain Modelling 100% Exemplary Code Health 99% Exemplary Security 95% Exemplary Architecture 69% Strong Maturity 61% Adequate Readiness 23% Weak

Hobby · 595 LoC · weakest lens: Readiness (23%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

24/26dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
13findings with an exact file:lineof 22 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
26/102dimensions across the health lenses595 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.

bmf-san/go-clean-architecture-web-application-boilerplate carries serious gaps (50%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Code Health (99%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (23%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (61%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution); SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup).

For scale: Hobby (~595 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 99% ★ Exemplary Architecture 69% Strong Maturity 61% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 23% Weak · gated by D9, P3, P5 Security 95% ★ Exemplary Domain Modelling 100% ★ Exemplary
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 23% · 46% weightMaturity 61% · 25% weightArchitecture 69% · 14% weightSecurity 95% · 8% weightCode Health 99% · 4% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 23 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 50 → ~69.

New since the last scan (6+)

6 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D4 · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) app/infrastructure/logger.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) app/interfaces/post_controller.go
  • D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) app/interfaces/post_controller.go
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 docker/mysql/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 docker/mysql/Dockerfile
  • D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 docker/go/Dockerfile

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €250–€1,200
Cost to rebuild€250–€1,200 (0.1 person-years (4–13 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityHigh — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 50% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeHobby · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.4) — DDD/clean architecture, domain model × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
+23.4 pts · Low effort · Test Distribution
2
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
+23.4 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling
3
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
+23.4 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

5 modules, 5 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

…ation-boilerplate/app…oilerplate/app/domain…lerplate/app/usecases…rplate/app/interfaces…te/app/infrastructure…ation-boilerplate/app1…oilerplate/app/domain2…lerplate/app/usecases3…rplate/app/interfaces4…te/app/infrastructure584729

At a glance — Code Health · 99% · Exemplary

The Good
D1 · Go Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · Go Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · Go God Classes 10.0 D4 · Go Code Duplication 9.4

At a glance — Architecture · 69% · Strong

The Good
D35 · Go Change Coupling 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 61% · Adequate · gated by M2

The Good
D15 · Go Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · Go Documentation Quality 6.0 D21 · Go Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 8.0
The Ugly
M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 23% · Weak · gated by D9, P3, P5

The Good
D13 · Go Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0
The Bad
P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0
The Ugly
P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0

At a glance — Security · 95% · Exemplary

The Good
D28 · Go Secrets (history) 10.0 D29 · Go Static Analysis (SAST) 9.5 D31 · Go IaC & Container Security 9.0 D38 · Go OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 9.6

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 10.0 DM7 · Repo Repository granularity 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration7High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components2Medium
A03:2021 — Injection1Medium

Roadmap

First, resolve the missing test coverage to ensure code quality. Next, implement static analysis in the CI pipeline to prevent security regressions from reaching production. Then, codify disaster recovery and backup procedures in infrastructure as code to ensure data persistence and recovery capabilities. After that, add health checks and immutable image tags to enable reliable deployments and rollbacks. Finally, document architectural decisions to improve long-term maintainability.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.+23.4 ptsLowTest Distribution
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+23.4 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+23.4 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.+20.0 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).+6.1 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.+4.7 ptsMediumDocumentation (README)
Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.0/10.+3.8 ptsMediumDocumentation Quality
Add `*_test.go` files beside the packages they cover — `go test` compiles only those, in-package, so the suffix IS the separation (a tests/ folder is anti-idiomatic in Go) — and run `go test ./...` in CI.+3.8 ptsMediumFolder & project structure

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 6 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 0% slop · 33% mixed · 67% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
docker/mysql/Dockerfile3.0MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
docker/go/Dockerfile5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
go.mod6.9Near-cleanOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Medium CVE: GO-2026-4316
app/interfaces/post_controller.go7.8Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (9 lines × 3)
app/infrastructure/router.go7.9Near-cleanStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-tls
app/infrastructure/logger.go8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 24 of 26 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.4 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 26 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D9D13D15D19D21D28D29D31D35D38AX5DM5DM7DM8M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 13 of 22 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc958-056d-7af6-8aed-1bab02f3993d.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.4 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

3 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)app/infrastructure/logger.go:22
Duplicated block (9 lines × 3)app/interfaces/post_controller.go:61
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2)app/interfaces/post_controller.go:35

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No test suite found.

No tests found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The boilerplate README is a single file with strong content: it shows the app's one Docker build step, an architecture diagram, a directory listing, a table of API endpoints and their HTTP methods/parameters, and a Controller method naming rule. It also references tests and references but those sections are clipped by the scanner before they appear in the visible text. The boilerplate is clear and complete for its single-file size.

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.0/10. — The boilerplate README is a single file with strong content: it shows the app's one Docker build step, an architecture diagram, a directory listing, a table of API endpoints and their HTTP methods/parameters, and a Controller method naming rule. It also references tests and references but those sections are clipped by the scanner before they appear in the visible text. The boilerplate is clear and complete for its single-file size.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

Medium: use-tlsapp/infrastructure/router.go:24detected by semgrep finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 3 medium, 2 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×2docker/go/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 · ×3docker/mysql/Dockerfile:3detected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0005 · ×2docker/mysql/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 0 low.

Medium CVE: GO-2026-4316 · ×2go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

DM7 · Repository granularity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether repositories are per aggregate root (not per child entity) so the root's invariants can't be bypassed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): repository abstraction detection; repositories over non-aggregate-root entities flagged. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.

DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • No test surface was found — a `_test.go` file beside the code it tests is where this ecosystem separates tests, and none is present.

What to do

  • Add `*_test.go` files beside the packages they cover — `go test` compiles only those, in-package, so the suffix IS the separation (a tests/ folder is anti-idiomatic in Go) — and run `go test ./...` in CI.
M4 · Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: gosec / govulncheck (or golangci-lint) — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health99%ExemplarySolid.
Architecture69%StrongSolid.
Maturity61%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness23%Weak — gated by D9, P3, P5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security95%ExemplarySolid.
Domain Modelling100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Not included — 76 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — No tests were found in the analyzed repository to assess for quality.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — No tests — template/sample
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries — no aggregates detected — aggregate-boundary check not applicable
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model — no data-bearing entities detected — rich-vs-anemic model not assessable
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary — no domain-layer types detected — domain↔infrastructure boundary check not applicable
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 2 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×2
  • High IaC: DS-0002 docker/go/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser -S -D app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
  • High IaC: DS-0002 docker/mysql/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
Warning — 9 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×3
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 docker/mysql/Dockerfile:3 — Ensure that COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 docker/mysql/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
  • Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 docker/go/Dockerfile:1 — Ensure that a user for the container has been created
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×2
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-4316 go.mod — github.com/go-chi/chi 4.0.2+incompatible: GO-2026-4316 — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace github.com/go-chi/chi if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands.
  • Medium CVE: GO-2021-0226 go.mod — stdlib 1.13.99 (net/http/cgi, net/http/fcgi): GO-2021-0226 — fixed in Go 1.14.8; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. This one row stands for the 124 advisories this scan raises against stdlib 1.13.99: GO-2021-0226, GO-2021-0234, GO-2021-0235, GO-2021-0239, GO-2021-0240, GO-2021-0241, GO-2021-0242, GO-2021-0243, GO-2021-0245, GO-2021-0263, GO-2021-0264, GO-2021-0317, GO-2021-0319, GO-2021-0347, GO-2022-0236, GO-2022-0273, GO-2022-0288, GO-2022-0289, GO-2022-0433, GO-2022-0435, GO-2022-0477, GO-2022-0493, GO-2022-0515, GO-2022-0520, GO-2022-0521, GO-2022-0522, GO-2022-0523, GO-2022-0524, GO-2022-0525, GO-2022-0526, GO-2022-0527, GO-2022-0531, GO-2022-0532, GO-2022-0533, GO-2022-0537, GO-2022-0969, GO-2022-1037, GO-2022-1038, GO-2022-1039, GO-2022-1095, GO-2022-1143, GO-2022-1144, GO-2023-1568, GO-2023-1569, GO-2023-1570, GO-2023-1571, GO-2023-1621, GO-2023-1702, GO-2023-1703, GO-2023-1704, GO-2023-1705, GO-2023-1751, GO-2023-1752, GO-2023-1753, GO-2023-1840, GO-2023-1878, GO-2023-1987, GO-2023-2041, GO-2023-2043, GO-2023-2102, GO-2023-2185, GO-2023-2186, GO-2023-2375, GO-2023-2382, GO-2024-2598, GO-2024-2599, GO-2024-2600, GO-2024-2609, GO-2024-2610, GO-2024-2687, GO-2024-2887, GO-2024-2888, GO-2024-2963, GO-2024-3105, GO-2024-3106, GO-2024-3107, GO-2025-3373, GO-2025-3420, GO-2025-3447, GO-2025-3503, GO-2025-3563, GO-2025-3750, GO-2025-3751, GO-2025-3849, GO-2025-3956, GO-2025-4006, GO-2025-4007, GO-2025-4008, GO-2025-4009, GO-2025-4010, GO-2025-4011, GO-2025-4012, GO-2025-4013, GO-2025-4014, GO-2025-4015, GO-2025-4155, GO-2025-4175, GO-2026-4337, GO-2026-4340, GO-2026-4341, GO-2026-4342, GO-2026-4403, GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · Medium · ×1
  • Medium: use-tls app/infrastructure/router.go:24 — Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) app/infrastructure/logger.go:22 — app/infrastructure/logger.go:22-31 | app/infrastructure/logger.go:36-45 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `app/infrastructure/logger.go:22` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also register a scope-exit action (a `defer`-style statement) that runs when the function holding them returns: moved into a called unit it would run when THAT unit returns instead — before the caller uses what it releases — so keep the registration at the call site and extract only the work around it, or have the extracted unit hand the resource back for the caller to register.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) app/interfaces/post_controller.go:61 — app/interfaces/post_controller.go:61-69 | app/interfaces/post_controller.go:79-87 | app/interfaces/user_controller.go:52-60 — there are 3 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 3 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart. Note that the copies do not run to the end of the range shown: their LAST lines are different code, not the same code under different names — the matched region ends inside that line. Extract the lines above it, and read the last line of each site separately.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) app/interfaces/post_controller.go:35 — app/interfaces/post_controller.go:35-43 | app/interfaces/user_controller.go:34-42 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Recommendation — 7 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×2
  • Low IaC: DS-0005 docker/mysql/Dockerfile — ADD instead of COPY
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 docker/mysql/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — a request to its own listening endpoint, exiting non-zero when it does not answer — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test suite was found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D16 · Bus Factor · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (2 author(s) across 20 commit(s) sampled).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (20 commit(s) sampled).
D8 · Code Coverage · No tests · ×1
  • No tests — template/sample — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample; tests are deferred to the application built from it, so coverage is not scored here.
D9 · Test Distribution · No tests found · ×1
  • No tests found — No test suite could be collected — nothing here references a test framework (Go's `testing` package (`go test ./...`)), so there were no discoverable tests to count. Tests written as plain executables or shell/PowerShell harnesses are not collectible this way and are not scored here.
Info — 4 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · git history depth insufficient · ×1
  • git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — install a full clone for reliable trend signal.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
D35 · Change Coupling · git history depth insufficient · ×1
  • git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — a full clone gives reliable change-coupling.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .1artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)—none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .7artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenance—provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .2artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019fc958-056d-7af6-8aed-1bab02f3993d · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 2 · Warnings: 9 · Recommendations: 7 · Info: 4 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 03-08-2026 @ 20:36 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md