Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
bmf-san/gobel-api is sound in substance but carries real gaps (57%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Code Health (84%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Maturity (51%) — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent. Domain Modelling (53%) is the next concern — the domain model leaks and drifts, so business rules are harder to trust and change.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions… (Architecture documentation); Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately (Folder & project structure); strongly-typed ids across the domain (Strongly-typed ids).
For scale: Small (~5,533 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
84%
Strong
Architecture
100% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
51%
Adequate · gated by D34, M2
Readiness
54%
Adequate
Security
76%
Strong
Domain Modelling
53%
Adequate · gated by DM2, DM5
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Maturity 51% · 46% weightDomain Modelling 53% · 25% weightReadiness 54% · 14% weightSecurity 76% · 8% weightCode Health 84% · 4% weightArchitecture 100% · 2% weight
No single dominant problem — the weakest areas are close, so progress on any of them moves the score.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (18+)
- D3 · FileTooLong: repository/post.go app/interfaces/repository/post.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (37 lines × 2) app/interfaces/repository/post.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (33 lines × 2) app/interfaces/repository/post.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) app/interfaces/repository/post.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (22 lines × 3) app/interfaces/repository/category.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 5) app/interfaces/repository/post.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) app/interfaces/repository/post.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 3) app/interfaces/repository/category.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (9 lines × 4) app/interfaces/controller/auth.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (7 lines × 7) app/interfaces/controller/category.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) app/interfaces/controller/category.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) app/infrastructure/middleware.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) app/interfaces/controller/category.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) app/interfaces/controller/post.go
- D4 · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) app/interfaces/controller/tag.go
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] app/go.mod
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] app/go.mod
- D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2024-3105 app/go.mod
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €2,500–€13,000
| Cost to rebuild | €2,500–€13,000 |
| Domain complexity | High |
| Quality factor | 0.8× (at 57% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€7,600 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Maturity at 51% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with gobel-api.json.
2
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
3
Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with post.go.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Maturity at 51%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale. The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
At a glance — Security
The Good
The Bad
At a glance — Domain Modelling
The Good
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 12 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 6 | High / Critical |
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 3 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
Begin by establishing an ADR log to record significant architectural decisions and their rationale. Next, reorganize the project structure to separate production code from tooling, ensuring a clean separation between backend and frontend or other logical boundaries. Implement strongly-typed IDs across the domain to prevent transposed-argument bugs, and encapsulate entity state by restricting setters to enforce invariants. Finally, resolve the identified secret scanning issue by removing the leaked credential from the repository.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with gobel-api.json. | +4.4 pts | Low | Secret Scanning |
| Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +4.2 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with post.go. | +4.2 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale. | +5.5 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
| Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root. | +5.1 pts | Medium | Folder & project structure |
| Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs. | +4.6 pts | Medium | Strongly-typed ids |
| Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters). | +4.6 pts | Medium | Encapsulated state |
| Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically. | +4.4 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| doc/gobel-api.json | 2.0 | Slop | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: jwt |
| app/go.mod | 3.7 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| redis/Dockerfile.local | 4.4 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| app/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| redis-insight/Dockerfile.local | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| mysql/Dockerfile.local | 6.2 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| app/interfaces/repository/post.go | 7.0 | Mixed | Cyclomatic Complexity: Post.FindAllPublic (cyclomatic 22) |
| app/interfaces/controller/category.go | 7.1 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) |
| app/interfaces/controller/auth.go | 7.2 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (9 lines × 4) |
| app/Dockerfile.local | 7.2 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| gondola/Dockerfile.local | 7.2 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| app/usecase/dto/response/post.go | 7.4 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) |
| app/interfaces/controller/tag.go | 7.4 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) |
| app/interfaces/controller/post.go | 7.4 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (8 lines × 4) |
| app/interfaces/repository/category.go | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (22 lines × 3) |
| app/infrastructure/middleware.go | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) |
| app/interfaces/controller/comment.go | 7.8 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) |
| app/interfaces/repository/admin.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) |
| app/interfaces/repository/jwt.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) |
| app/usecase/interactor/post.go | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 26 of 28 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 28 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D13D15D19D21D28D29D31D34D35D38AX5DM1DM2DM4DM5DM7DM8M1M2M3M4P1P3P4
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 72 of 79 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
7 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Post.FindAllPublic at 22.
Post.FindAllPublic (cyclomatic 22)app/interfaces/repository/post.go:124
Post.FindAllPublicByKeyword (cyclomatic 22)app/interfaces/repository/post.go:359
Post.FindAllPublicByCategory (cyclomatic 22)app/interfaces/repository/post.go:596
Post.FindAllPublicByTag (cyclomatic 22)app/interfaces/repository/post.go:832
Post.FindAll (cyclomatic 22)app/interfaces/repository/post.go:1088
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Post.FindAllPublic (cyclomatic 22) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with post.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Post.FindAllPublicByKeyword (cyclomatic 22) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with post.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Post.FindAllPublicByCategory (cyclomatic 22) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with post.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity
7 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Post.FindAllPublic at 31.
Post.FindAllPublic (cognitive 31)app/interfaces/repository/post.go:124
Post.FindAllPublicByKeyword (cognitive 31)app/interfaces/repository/post.go:359
Post.FindAllPublicByCategory (cognitive 31)app/interfaces/repository/post.go:596
Post.FindAllPublicByTag (cognitive 31)app/interfaces/repository/post.go:832
Post.FindAll (cognitive 31)app/interfaces/repository/post.go:1088
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Post.FindAllPublic (cognitive 31) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with post.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Post.FindAllPublicByKeyword (cognitive 31) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with post.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Resolve the 1 Post.FindAllPublicByCategory (cognitive 31) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with post.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
- Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D3 · God Classes
1 god class(es) detected.
FileTooLong: repository/post.goapp/interfaces/repository/post.go:0
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D4 · Code Duplication
36 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) app/interfaces/controller/category.go:88
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) app/interfaces/controller/category.go:38
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) app/usecase/dto/response/post.go:148
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) app/infrastructure/middleware.go:82
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) app/usecase/interactor/category.go:17
What to do
- Resolve the 5 Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with category.go (2), tag.go (2), post.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with category.go, post.go, tag.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with post.go (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D13 · Secret Scanning
1 secret(s) detected.
Leaked secret: jwtdoc/gobel-api.json:1314
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with gobel-api.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D19 · Documentation Quality
The gobel-api project has a strong documentation set consisting of two README files plus thirteen architecture/design docs: a single README with Features, Documentation, and Get started sections plus a dedicated database/doc/dbdoc/README.md detailing the schema tables, relations, and an API doc (API.md) that is extremely detailed. The Coding Rule doc covers controller/repository method signatures, while Specification.md lists CRUD operations for each model type. All visible sections are present in the outline; the only unshown content is clipped mid-Root Endpoint.
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
5 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: jwt doc/gobel-api.json:1314
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
- Resolve the 4 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with gobel-api.json (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
12 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 3 medium, 3 low.
High IaC: DS-0002 app/Dockerfile
Medium IaC: DS-0001 app/Dockerfile
Low IaC: DS-0005 mysql/Dockerfile.local
What to do
- Resolve the 6 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile.local (5), Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile.local (2), Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile.local (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
18 of 18 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is app/interfaces/repository/post.go.
Orphaned knowledgeapp/interfaces/repository/post.go
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with post.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
3 finding(s): 1 critical, 1 high, 1 medium, 0 low.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]app/go.mod
High CVE: [GHSA redacted]app/go.mod
Medium CVE: GO-2024-3105app/go.mod
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX5 · Architecture & structure
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DM1 · Aggregate boundaries
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DM2 · Strongly-typed ids
- `JWT.AccessUUID` is a raw `string` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `string`, in whatever form your language spells that. — jwt.go:16
- `JWT.RefreshUUID` is a raw `string` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `string`, in whatever form your language spells that. — jwt.go:17
What to do
- Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model
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DM5 · Encapsulated state
- `JWT` exposes publicly writable state (AccessToken, RefreshToken, AccessUUID, RefreshUUID, AtExpires, RtExpires). — jwt.go:13
What to do
- Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
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DM7 · Repository granularity
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DM8 · Value-object opportunities
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a README to the 1 of 1 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
- Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
- No test surface was found — a `_test.go` file beside the code it tests is where this ecosystem separates tests, and none is present.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
- Add `*_test.go` files beside the packages they cover — `go test` compiles only those, in-package, so the suffix IS the separation (a tests/ folder is anti-idiomatic in Go) — and run `go test ./...` in CI.
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 84% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 51% | Adequate — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 54% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
| Security | 76% | Strong | Solid. |
| Domain Modelling | 53% | Adequate — gated by DM2, DM5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 74 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~5 lines of test source are present (.go) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.go) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .go, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.go) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary — no domain-layer types detected — domain↔infrastructure boundary check not applicable
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 14 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 app/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 app/Dockerfile.local
- High IaC: DS-0002 gondola/Dockerfile.local
- High IaC: DS-0002 mysql/Dockerfile.local
- High IaC: DS-0002 redis-insight/Dockerfile.local
- High IaC: DS-0002 redis/Dockerfile.local
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Secret: jwt doc/gobel-api.json:1314
- Secret: jwt doc/gobel-api.json:1321
- Secret: jwt doc/gobel-api.json:1313
- Secret: jwt doc/gobel-api.json:1320
D13 · Secret Scanning
- Leaked secret: jwt doc/gobel-api.json:1314
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Orphaned knowledge app/interfaces/repository/post.go
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] app/go.mod
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] app/go.mod
Warning — 56 finding(s)
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) app/interfaces/controller/category.go:88
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) app/interfaces/controller/category.go:150
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) app/interfaces/controller/tag.go:88
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) app/interfaces/controller/tag.go:150
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) app/usecase/interactor/post.go:119
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 app/Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 redis-insight/Dockerfile.local
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 redis/Dockerfile.local
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) app/interfaces/controller/category.go:38
- Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) app/interfaces/controller/post.go:91
- Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) app/interfaces/controller/tag.go:38
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) app/usecase/dto/response/post.go:148
- Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) app/usecase/dto/response/post.go:237
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) app/infrastructure/middleware.go:82
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) app/interfaces/controller/comment.go:110
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) app/usecase/interactor/category.go:17
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) app/usecase/interactor/tag.go:17
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Post.FindAllPublic (cyclomatic 22) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:124
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Post.FindAllPublicByKeyword (cyclomatic 22) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:359
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Post.FindAllPublicByCategory (cyclomatic 22) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:596
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Post.FindAllPublicByTag (cyclomatic 22) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:832
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Post.FindAll (cyclomatic 22) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:1088
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Post.FindPublicByTitle (cyclomatic 16) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:1318
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Post.FindByID (cyclomatic 16) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:1513
D16 · Bus Factor
- single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- Post.FindAllPublic (cognitive 31) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:124
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- Post.FindAllPublicByKeyword (cognitive 31) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:359
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- Post.FindAllPublicByCategory (cognitive 31) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:596
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- Post.FindAllPublicByTag (cognitive 31) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:832
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- Post.FindAll (cognitive 31) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:1088
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- Post.FindPublicByTitle (cognitive 19) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:1318
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
- Post.FindByID (cognitive 19) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:1513
D3 · God Classes
- FileTooLong: repository/post.go app/interfaces/repository/post.go:0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: GO-2024-3105 app/go.mod
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (37 lines × 2) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:277
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (33 lines × 2) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:1406
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:1332
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (22 lines × 3) app/interfaces/repository/category.go:98
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) app/interfaces/repository/admin.go:30
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (17 lines × 5) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:373
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) app/interfaces/repository/post.go:1738
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (16 lines × 3) app/interfaces/repository/category.go:192
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 4) app/usecase/dto/response/post.go:167
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) app/interfaces/repository/jwt.go:19
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (10 lines × 3) app/interfaces/controller/comment.go:77
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (9 lines × 4) app/interfaces/controller/auth.go:83
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) app/interfaces/controller/auth.go:59
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 10) app/interfaces/controller/category.go:50
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 4) app/interfaces/controller/post.go:169
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) app/usecase/interactor/auth.go:86
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 9) app/interfaces/controller/auth.go:42
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 7) app/interfaces/controller/category.go:109
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (7 lines × 5) app/interfaces/controller/post.go:51
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 5) app/interfaces/controller/auth.go:49
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) app/interfaces/controller/category.go:209
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) app/infrastructure/middleware.go:146
Recommendation — 7 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0005 mysql/Dockerfile.local
- Low IaC: DS-0026 mysql/Dockerfile.local
- Low IaC: DS-0026 redis/Dockerfile.local
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D28 · Secrets (history)
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Further orphaned files (smaller)
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 5 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 12 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 3 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |