Public report — appointme, published 30 Jul 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 30-07-2026 @ 02:09 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Bravodev-Hub/appointme

54% Provisional

Small · 8,051 LoC · 17 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (32%)

Degraded — solution could not be loaded
The C# solution could not be loaded in the analyzer (the workspace returned 0 projects), so every compiler-dependent dimension ran on nothing and the size/effort figures were estimated directly from source text. This run is Degraded — treat the grade as indicative only. See diagnostics.md for the exact cause (which solution project references resolved vs were missing, a structure map of the analyzed tree, and the solution/project files), then re-run for a reliable result.

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

72/76dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 4 LLM-assisted, advisory
53findings with an exact file:lineof 72 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
76/117dimensions across the health lenses8051 LoC · 17 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

bravodev-hub/appointme is in a workable but fragile state (54%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.

It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Event-Driven (100%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (32%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Maturity (69%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your… (Outbound HTTP resilience); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).

For scale: Small (~8,051 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

Encouragingly, the gaps are in documentation and release process — not in the code's correctness, structure or security, which are strong. They're low-risk to close, and doing so would lift the grade without re-engineering anything that already works.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 32% · 45% weightMaturity 69% · 25% weightAccessibility 71% · 14% weightPerformance 72% · 8% weightArchitecture 73% · 4% weightSecurity 77% · 2% weightCode Health 87% · 1% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 1% weightEvent-Driven 100% · 0% weight

Raise Readiness 32 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 54 → ~71.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 17%Plumbing 64%Tests 19%
New since the last scan (30+)

30 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D4 · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/AppointMe.Api/Authentication/EntraExternalId/EntraExternalIdClaimsTransformer.cs
  • D8 · Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • D17 · NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/secret-scan.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/secret-scan.yml
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.7
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.7
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.7
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.7
  • D30 · High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.7
  • D36 · Secret passed as a command-line argument
  • D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] src/AppointMe.Frontend/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/AppointMe.Frontend/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/AppointMe.Frontend/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/AppointMe.Frontend/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] src/AppointMe.Frontend/package-lock.json
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/AppointMe.Frontend/package-lock.json
  • R2 · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 17, cognitive 12) src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/chart.tsx
  • R2 · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 11, cognitive 8) src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/chart.tsx
  • R4 · No test reaches this file src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/carousel.tsx
  • R4 · No test reaches this file src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/dropdown-menu.tsx

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €5,700–€28,000
Cost to rebuild€5,700–€28,000 (0.1–0.2 person-years (95–300 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityVery high — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.8× (at 54% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 51% boilerplate · 28% straight-line · 21% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€17,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 32% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×2.1) — microservices, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source (the solution did not build in-analyzer). Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appointme-realm.json.
+11.3 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning
2
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
+17.9 pts · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling
3
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
+17.9 pts · Medium effort · Outbound HTTP resilience

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 32%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (8,051 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 32%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

arch Api Api ctx:Booking Booking Booking · Contracts Api->ctx:Booking ctx:Crm Crm Contracts · Crm Api->ctx:Crm ctx:Identity Identity Contracts · Identity Api->ctx:Identity ctx:Organizations Organizations Contracts · Organizations Api->ctx:Organizations Api.Tests Api.Tests Aspire Aspire Booking.Tests Booking.Tests Crm.Tests Crm.Tests Identity.Tests Identity.Tests Organizations.Tests Organizations.Tests Shared.Tests Shared.Tests ctx:Booking->ctx:Crm ctx:Booking->ctx:Organizations ctx:Shared Shared Shared ctx:Booking->ctx:Shared ctx:Crm->ctx:Shared ctx:Identity->ctx:Organizations ctx:Identity->ctx:Shared ctx:Organizations->ctx:Shared

At a glance — Code Health · 87% · Strong

At a glance — Architecture · 73% · Adequate · gated by R9

At a glance — Maturity · 69% · Adequate · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 32% · Weak · gated by R4, R5, P3, P7

At a glance — Security · 77% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Accessibility · 71% · Strong

At a glance — Performance · 72% · Strong

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection11High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components11High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures1High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration1Medium

Roadmap

First, integrate static security analysis into the CI pipeline to fail the build on security regressions. Next, implement HTTP resilience policies to prevent external dependencies from taking the application down. Then, expand test coverage to include all production modules. After that, update outdated dependencies to reduce technical debt and security risks. Finally, document and test your disaster recovery and backup procedures.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appointme-realm.json.+11.3 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.+17.9 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.+17.9 ptsMediumOutbound HTTP resilience
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+17.9 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.+17.8 ptsMediumDependency Freshness
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).+17.8 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+17.7 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.+17.6 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 39 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 13% mixed · 87% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/devtest.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/AppointMe.Frontend/package-lock.json4.5MixedOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/secret-scan.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/AppointMe.Aspire/appointme-realm.json7.2MixedSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: signing-key
Directory.Build.props7.6MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/DeleteCustomer/DeleteCustomerEndpoint.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: DeleteCustomerEndpoint
src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/GetCustomerById/GetCustomerByIdEndpoint.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: GetCustomerByIdEndpoint
src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/GetCustomers/GetCustomersEndpoint.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: GetCustomersEndpoint
src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/RegisterCustomer/RegisterCustomerEndpoint.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: RegisterCustomerEndpoint
src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/UpdateCustomer/UpdateCustomerEndpoint.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: UpdateCustomerEndpoint
src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Companies/Onboarding/OnboardingEndpoint.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: OnboardingEndpoint
src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Employees/DeleteEmployee/DeleteEmployeeEndpoint.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: DeleteEmployeeEndpoint
src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Employees/GetTeam/GetTeamEndpoint.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: GetTeamEndpoint
src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Employees/UpdateEmployeeRoles/UpdateEmployeeRolesEndpoint.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: UpdateEmployeeRolesEndpoint
src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Invitations/AcceptInvitation/AcceptInvitationEndpoint.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: AcceptInvitationEndpoint
src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Invitations/CancelInvitation/CancelInvitationEndpoint.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: CancelInvitationEndpoint
src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Invitations/GetPendingInvitations/GetPendingInvitationsEndpoint.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: GetPendingInvitationsEndpoint
src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Invitations/InviteEmployee/InviteEmployeeEndpoint.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: InviteEmployeeEndpoint
src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Invitations/ResendInvitation/ResendInvitationEndpoint.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: ResendInvitationEndpoint
src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Me/GetCurrentUserEndpoint.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: Dead code: GetCurrentUserEndpoint

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 72 of 76 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 76 dimensions across the health lenses
D4D5D9D10D11D13D14D15D17D20D21D22D24D26D28D29D30D31D33D35D36D38AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8AX9C1C2DM6ED1ED3ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P7P8PF1PF2PF3R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 53 of 72 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fb0c8-caeb-7faa-9f3f-5797f011c8d1.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • Solution could not be loaded — run is Degraded — The C# workspace did not read this repository's production source, so every compiler-dependent dimension ran on estimated input. Treat the grade as indicative only; diagnostics.md records the exact cause.

Repo exclusion declarations: 4 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (6): D20, D21, D22, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

1 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)src/AppointMe.Api/Authentication/EntraExternalId/EntraExternalIdClaimsTransformer.cs:9

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

17 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: AppointMe.Shared

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

133 test methods: 133 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 133 tests.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: signing-keysrc/AppointMe.Aspire/appointme-realm.json:689

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appointme-realm.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 49 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt8.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 deducted debt markers + 32 dead symbols across 8051 LoC (0.9/KLoC) → score 8.2.

NoWarnInCsprojDirectory.Build.props:13
Dead code: DeleteCustomerEndpoint · ×32src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/DeleteCustomer/DeleteCustomerEndpoint.cs:4

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Directory.Build.props. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 32 Dead code finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with DeleteCustomerEndpoint.cs, GetCustomerByIdEndpoint.cs, GetCustomersEndpoint.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (32 warning-level).
  3. Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D22 · Internal API Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 API inconsistencies across 27 exposed types.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

26 valuable / 0 redundant across 66 sampled comments.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 17 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Split AppointMe.Organizations

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Split AppointMe.Organizations finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)1.5 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 1.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

11 finding(s): 0 critical, 11 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×11.github/workflows/devtest.yml:23detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 11 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with devtest.yml (9), secret-scan.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

5 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.7 · ×5detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 5 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 1 low.

Low IaC: DS-0026src/AppointMe.Api/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
Secret passed as a command-line argument
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Secret passed as a command-line argument finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities6.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×4src/AppointMe.Frontend/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×2src/AppointMe.Frontend/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC2 · Forms & labels5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • This UI-library field component has no label / aria-label / aria-labelledby / id / name — and neither does anything it renders — so it likely renders an unlabelled control. Name it whichever way this library supports: a label prop, an aria-label, or an id on the rendered control with a <label htmlFor> pointing at it. For a group of controls, name the group itself (aria-label, or a fieldset with a legend) — labelling each item leaves the set unnamed. — data-table-pagination.tsx:19

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

AC4 · Keyboard semantics10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y, assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C1 · Data Protection6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED3 · Event naming9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).

Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.

  • `EmployeeInvitationResent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — EmployeeInvitationResent.cs:5

What to do

  • Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

ED5 · Idempotency9.6 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

  • `UpdatePermissions.UpdatePermissionsCommandHandler.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (a database save) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — UpdatePermissionsCommandHandler.cs:10

What to do

  • Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a README to the 17 of 17 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 5/7 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
  • Add a health-check endpoint (AddHealthChecks/MapHealthChecks) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
P3 · Security & performance tooling3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
  • The pipeline declares a deployment environment, but whether required reviewers / protection rules are attached to it lives in repository settings we cannot read — confirm the gate is enforced before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

What to do

  • Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
  • Enable purge protection / soft-delete (and prevent_destroy on critical resources) so data stores can't be lost to an accidental or malicious delete.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

  • The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.

What to do

  • Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

PF1 · Benchmark discipline6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.

Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.

  • No benchmark suite was found. For a performance-sensitive library, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.

What to do

  • Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
PF2 · Allocation hygiene6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.

Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

What to do

  • Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 15 use(s) across 11,020 production line(s) (~1.4/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

R1 · Type Safety10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

R10 · Code Duplication6.6 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/context-menu.tsx:184 · src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/item.tsx:143 — context-menu.tsx:184
  • src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/dialog.tsx:99 · src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/drawer.tsx:86 — dialog.tsx:99
  • src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/command.tsx:114 · src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/context-menu.tsx:184 · src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/item.tsx:143 — command.tsx:114
  • src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/alert.tsx:31 · src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/input-group.tsx:132 — alert.tsx:31
  • src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/breadcrumb.tsx:78 · src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/pagination.tsx:84 — breadcrumb.tsx:78
  • src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/field.tsx:112 · src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/input-group.tsx:119 · src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/table.tsx:49 — field.tsx:112
  • src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/breadcrumb.tsx:7 · src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/empty.tsx:58 — breadcrumb.tsx:7
  • src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/carousel.tsx:166 · src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/carousel.tsx:196 — carousel.tsx:166

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×4) — chart.tsx:160, columns.tsx:27, chart.tsx:288, …
R3 · Large Files9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively. If it is a CLI, check whether a suite runs it as a child process; otherwise it has no test reaching it. (×8) — sidebar.tsx, chart.tsx, schedule-appointment-dialog.tsx, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.

  • 65 outdated package(s); JS/npm CVEs scored in D33

What to do

  • Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

R8 · Dependency Hygiene4.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. — app.tsx:7
  • Declared in src/AppointMe.Frontend/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
  • Every import is type-only — move it to devDependencies. — appointments.tsx:10

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports2.3 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

  • src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/app/layouts/header/header.tsx → src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/app/router/index.ts → src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/app/router/router.tsx → src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/app/layouts/index.ts → src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/app/layouts/layout.tsx → src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/app/layouts/header/index.ts → src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/app/layouts/header/header.tsx — header.tsx
  • src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/auth/can.tsx → src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/auth/index.ts → src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/auth/can.tsx — can.tsx
  • src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/theme/index.ts → src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/theme/mode-toggle.tsx → src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/theme/index.ts — index.ts
  • src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/data-table-pagination.tsx → src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/index.ts → src/AppointMe.Frontend/src/components/ui/data-table-pagination.tsx — data-table-pagination.tsx

What to do

  • Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
S1 · Web-Security Posture10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 122/127 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×5) — DbConnectionPaginationExtensions.cs:10, AntiforgeryMiddleware.cs:17, AntiforgeryMiddleware.cs:78, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 12 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (22%; ≈24% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 43 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 43 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.1.1, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health87%StrongSolid.
Architecture73%Adequate — gated by R9Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity69%Adequate — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness32%Weak — gated by R4, R5, P3, P7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security77%Adequate — gated by D29, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Event-Driven100%ExemplarySolid.
Accessibility71%StrongSolid.
Performance72%StrongSolid.
Not included — 41 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — this repository's dependencies are not NuGet
  • D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a C#/VB .NET solution, but this repository's production source is mostly .ts, .tsx, which the C#/VB workspace does not load — the projects that loaded are an immaterial minority, so solution shape was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D27 Navigability — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) was not read by navigability analysis, so tracing effort was not assessed — whatever else resolved (another language's projects) is not this repository's navigability. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.ts, .tsx) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
  • DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • ED2 Event/command shape — no command-shaped messages detected — single-handler-per-command check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 24 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×11
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml:23 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml:26 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-dotnet@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-dotnet@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-dotnet/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml:31 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml:48 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml:74 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml:77 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: azure/login@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `azure/login@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/azure/login/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml:87 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml:94 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/devtest.yml:114 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: azure/login@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `azure/login@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/azure/login/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/secret-scan.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/secret-scan.yml:22 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: gitleaks/gitleaks-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `gitleaks/gitleaks-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/gitleaks/gitleaks-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×5
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.7 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.7 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.7 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.7 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.7 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.7 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.7 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.7 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.7 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 10.0.7 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×4
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/AppointMe.Frontend/package-lock.json — brace-expansion 2.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry). One upgrade of brace-expansion 2.0.3 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/AppointMe.Frontend/package-lock.json — fast-uri 3.1.3: [GHSA redacted] — fast-uri is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fast-uri to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/AppointMe.Frontend/package-lock.json — js-yaml 4.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 4.3.0 with an `overrides` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/AppointMe.Frontend/package-lock.json — react-router 7.17.0: [GHSA redacted] — react-router is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin react-router to 7.18.0 with an `overrides` entry). One upgrade of react-router 7.17.0 clears all 5 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×2
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] src/AppointMe.Frontend/package-lock.json — axios 1.17.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.18.0 One upgrade of axios 1.17.0 clears all 10 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] src/AppointMe.Frontend/package-lock.json — postcss 8.5.15: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin postcss to 8.5.18 with an `overrides` entry).
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • Leaked secret: signing-key src/AppointMe.Aspire/appointme-realm.json:689 — signing-key detected.
D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×1
  • NoWarnInCsproj Directory.Build.props:13 — NU1608
Warning — 38 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×32
  • Dead code: DeleteCustomerEndpoint src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/DeleteCustomer/DeleteCustomerEndpoint.cs:4 — NamedType DeleteCustomerEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: GetCustomerByIdEndpoint src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/GetCustomerById/GetCustomerByIdEndpoint.cs:4 — NamedType GetCustomerByIdEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: GetCustomersEndpoint src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/GetCustomers/GetCustomersEndpoint.cs:5 — NamedType GetCustomersEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: RegisterCustomerEndpoint src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/RegisterCustomer/RegisterCustomerEndpoint.cs:6 — NamedType RegisterCustomerEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: UpdateCustomerEndpoint src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/UpdateCustomer/UpdateCustomerEndpoint.cs:5 — NamedType UpdateCustomerEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: OnboardingEndpoint src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Companies/Onboarding/OnboardingEndpoint.cs:6 — NamedType OnboardingEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: DeleteEmployeeEndpoint src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Employees/DeleteEmployee/DeleteEmployeeEndpoint.cs:3 — NamedType DeleteEmployeeEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: GetTeamEndpoint src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Employees/GetTeam/GetTeamEndpoint.cs:5 — NamedType GetTeamEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: UpdateEmployeeRolesEndpoint src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Employees/UpdateEmployeeRoles/UpdateEmployeeRolesEndpoint.cs:5 — NamedType UpdateEmployeeRolesEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: AcceptInvitationEndpoint src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Invitations/AcceptInvitation/AcceptInvitationEndpoint.cs:3 — NamedType AcceptInvitationEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: CancelInvitationEndpoint src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Invitations/CancelInvitation/CancelInvitationEndpoint.cs:3 — NamedType CancelInvitationEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: GetPendingInvitationsEndpoint src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Invitations/GetPendingInvitations/GetPendingInvitationsEndpoint.cs:3 — NamedType GetPendingInvitationsEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: InviteEmployeeEndpoint src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Invitations/InviteEmployee/InviteEmployeeEndpoint.cs:6 — NamedType InviteEmployeeEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: ResendInvitationEndpoint src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Invitations/ResendInvitation/ResendInvitationEndpoint.cs:3 — NamedType ResendInvitationEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: GetCurrentUserEndpoint src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Me/GetCurrentUserEndpoint.cs:3 — NamedType GetCurrentUserEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: GetPermissionsEndpoint src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Settings/Permissions/GetPermissions/GetPermissionsEndpoint.cs:3 — NamedType GetPermissionsEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: CompanyPermissionsChangedEventHandler src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Settings/Permissions/Infrastructure/CompanyPermissionsChangedEventHandler.cs:5 — NamedType CompanyPermissionsChangedEventHandler — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: ResetPermissionsEndpoint src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Settings/Permissions/ResetPermissions/ResetPermissionsEndpoint.cs:3 — NamedType ResetPermissionsEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: UpdatePermissionsEndpoint src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Settings/Permissions/UpdatePermissions/UpdatePermissionsEndpoint.cs:5 — NamedType UpdatePermissionsEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: GetCurrentUserAccessEndpoint src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/UserAccess/GetCurrentUserAccessEndpoint.cs:3 — NamedType GetCurrentUserAccessEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: LoginEndpoint src/Identity/AppointMe.Identity/Login/LoginEndpoint.cs:10 — NamedType LoginEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: LogoutEndpoint src/Identity/AppointMe.Identity/Logout/LogoutEndpoint.cs:9 — NamedType LogoutEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: SignupEndpoint src/Identity/AppointMe.Identity/Signup/SignupEndpoint.cs:7 — NamedType SignupEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: CancelAppointmentEndpoint src/Booking/AppointMe.Booking/Appointments/CancelAppointment/CancelAppointmentEndpoint.cs:5 — NamedType CancelAppointmentEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • Dead code: GetAppointmentByIdEndpoint src/Booking/AppointMe.Booking/Appointments/GetAppointmentById/GetAppointmentByIdEndpoint.cs:4 — NamedType GetAppointmentByIdEndpoint — no references found in solution.
  • + 7 more in this group — see findings.md.
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1129.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 11 floating ref(s) across 2 workflow file(s): `actions/checkout@v4` (.github/workflows/secret-scan.yml:17), `gitleaks/gitleaks-action@v2` (.github/workflows/secret-scan.yml:22), `actions/checkout@v4` (.github/workflows/devtest.yml:23), `actions/setup-dotnet@v4` (.github/workflows/devtest.yml:26), `actions/setup-node@v4` (.github/workflows/devtest.yml:31), `actions/upload-artifact@v4` (.github/workflows/devtest.yml:48), `actions/checkout@v4` (.github/workflows/devtest.yml:74), `azure/login@v2` (.github/workflows/devtest.yml:77), … (+3 more)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Secret passed as a command-line argument · ×1
  • Secret passed as a command-line argument — 4 CI command(s) pass a credential as a bare command-line argument, where it is visible in the runner's process table to any other process on the host (and to anything that logs a command line): devtest.yml: az acr login --name ${{ secrets.ACR_NAME }}; devtest.yml: az webapp config container set --name ${{ secrets.APP_SERVICE_NAME }} --resource-group ${{ secrets.RESOURCE_GROUP }} --container-image-name ${{ needs.publish-image.outputs.image_tag }}; devtest.yml: az webapp restart --name ${{ secrets.APP_SERVICE_NAME }} --resource-group ${{ secrets.RESOURCE_GROUP }} …. Pass the credential through the environment instead (an `env:` mapping on the step, read by the tool from its own variable) or on stdin, so it never appears in an argument vector.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/AppointMe.Api/Authentication/EntraExternalId/EntraExternalIdClaimsTransformer.cs:9 — src/AppointMe.Api/Authentication/EntraExternalId/EntraExternalIdClaimsTransformer.cs:9-27 | src/AppointMe.Api/Authentication/Keycloak/KeycloakClaimsTransformer.cs:9-21 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it wherever the callers may both depend on (the module they already share, or a small common one if they share none) and call it from each site — until then, every change has to be made twice.
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: AppointMe.Shared — AppointMe.Shared: abstractness 0.19, instability 0.00, distance 0.81 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the repo's own test suite did not build (a C#/MSBuild compiler error in the test code), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. Fix the test build, or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 9 finding(s)
D16 · Bus Factor · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor (4 author(s) across 42 commit(s) sampled).
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 8051 LoC spread over 17 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
D26 · Project Cohesion · Split AppointMe.Organizations · ×1
  • Split AppointMe.Organizations — A catch-all name that is large (2k LoC) and sprawls over 31 unrelated namespaces. Suggested: by namespace: Organizations.People, Organizations.Rents, Organizations.Payments
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 src/AppointMe.Api/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1
  • early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (42 commit(s) sampled).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`dotnet sbom-tool generate` (or the CycloneDX .NET tool) over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
Info — 1 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — this repository's dependencies are not NuGet — Dependency hygiene is currently assessed for .NET (NuGet) dependencies only, and this repository's production source is .ts, .tsx. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Dependencies declared for other ecosystems (a Python pyproject.toml/requirements.txt (pip/uv/Poetry), a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), an OSGi MANIFEST.MF/target platform, a Maven POM, a Gradle version catalogue, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)) are not read yet.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .11artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list AppointMe.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json5artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .1artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .6artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardeningruntime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0

Run 019fb0c8-caeb-7faa-9f3f-5797f011c8d1 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 82 field(s) across 3 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Name — 42 field(s)
  • PersonName.FirstName src/AppointMe.Shared/Domain/Common/PersonName.cs:5
  • PersonName.LastName src/AppointMe.Shared/Domain/Common/PersonName.cs:5
  • PersonName.FirstNameMaxLength src/AppointMe.Shared/Domain/Common/PersonName.cs:7
  • PersonName.LastNameMaxLength src/AppointMe.Shared/Domain/Common/PersonName.cs:8
  • FullName src/AppointMe.Shared/Domain/Common/PersonName.cs:15
  • AppointmentDto.ProviderFirstName src/Booking/AppointMe.Booking/Appointments/AppointmentDto.cs:10
  • AppointmentDto.ProviderLastName src/Booking/AppointMe.Booking/Appointments/AppointmentDto.cs:11
  • AppointmentDto.AttendeeFirstName src/Booking/AppointMe.Booking/Appointments/AppointmentDto.cs:15
  • AppointmentDto.AttendeeLastName src/Booking/AppointMe.Booking/Appointments/AppointmentDto.cs:16
  • ServiceProviderDto.FirstName src/Booking/AppointMe.Booking/ServiceProviders/ServiceProviderDto.cs:6
  • ServiceProviderDto.LastName src/Booking/AppointMe.Booking/ServiceProviders/ServiceProviderDto.cs:7
  • ServiceProviderDto.FullName src/Booking/AppointMe.Booking/ServiceProviders/ServiceProviderDto.cs:8
  • CustomerSnapshot.FirstName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm.Contracts/Customers/CustomerSnapshot.cs:6
  • CustomerSnapshot.LastName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm.Contracts/Customers/CustomerSnapshot.cs:7
  • CustomerRegisteredEvent.FirstName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm.Contracts/Customers/Events/CustomerRegisteredEvent.cs:8
  • CustomerRegisteredEvent.LastName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm.Contracts/Customers/Events/CustomerRegisteredEvent.cs:9
  • CustomerUpdatedEvent.FirstName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm.Contracts/Customers/Events/CustomerUpdatedEvent.cs:8
  • CustomerUpdatedEvent.LastName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm.Contracts/Customers/Events/CustomerUpdatedEvent.cs:9
  • CustomerDto.FullName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/CustomerDto.cs:6
  • CustomerDto.FirstName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/CustomerDto.cs:7
  • CustomerDto.LastName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/CustomerDto.cs:8
  • CustomerRecord.FirstName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/Database/CustomerRecord.cs:6
  • CustomerRecord.LastName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/Database/CustomerRecord.cs:7
  • RegisterCustomerCommand.FirstName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/RegisterCustomer/RegisterCustomerCommand.cs:5
  • RegisterCustomerCommand.LastName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/RegisterCustomer/RegisterCustomerCommand.cs:6
  • RegisterCustomerRequest.FirstName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/RegisterCustomer/RegisterCustomerRequest.cs:5
  • RegisterCustomerRequest.LastName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/RegisterCustomer/RegisterCustomerRequest.cs:6
  • UpdateCustomerCommand.FirstName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/UpdateCustomer/UpdateCustomerCommand.cs:6
  • UpdateCustomerCommand.LastName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/UpdateCustomer/UpdateCustomerCommand.cs:7
  • UpdateCustomerRequest.FirstName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/UpdateCustomer/UpdateCustomerRequest.cs:5
  • UpdateCustomerRequest.LastName src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/UpdateCustomer/UpdateCustomerRequest.cs:6
  • EmployeeRegistered.FirstName src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations.Contracts/Employees/Events/EmployeeRegistered.cs:9
  • EmployeeRegistered.LastName src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations.Contracts/Employees/Events/EmployeeRegistered.cs:10
  • EmployeeRolesUpdated.FirstName src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations.Contracts/Employees/Events/EmployeeRolesUpdated.cs:9
  • EmployeeRolesUpdated.LastName src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations.Contracts/Employees/Events/EmployeeRolesUpdated.cs:10
  • EmployeeSnapshot.FirstName src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations.Contracts/Employees/IEmployeeRehydrationSource.cs:9
  • EmployeeSnapshot.LastName src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations.Contracts/Employees/IEmployeeRehydrationSource.cs:10
  • TeamMemberRecord.FirstName src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Employees/Database/TeamMemberRecord.cs:8
  • TeamMemberRecord.LastName src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Employees/Database/TeamMemberRecord.cs:9
  • TeamMemberDto.FullName src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Employees/TeamMemberDto.cs:6
  • + 2 more field(s) in this category.
Email — 29 field(s)
  • DemoLoginEndpoint.EmailClaimTypes src/AppointMe.Api/Authentication/DemoLogin/DemoLoginEndpoint.cs:19
  • SuperAdminRegistry._emails src/AppointMe.Api/Authorization/SuperAdminRegistry.cs:11
  • UserIdentity.Email src/AppointMe.Shared/Authentication/UserIdentity.cs:6
  • DemoUserOptions.Email src/AppointMe.Shared/Configuration/DemoOptions.cs:12
  • Attendee.Email src/Booking/AppointMe.Booking/Attendees/Attendee.cs:10
  • CustomerSnapshot.Email src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm.Contracts/Customers/CustomerSnapshot.cs:9
  • CustomerRegisteredEvent.Email src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm.Contracts/Customers/Events/CustomerRegisteredEvent.cs:11
  • CustomerUpdatedEvent.Email src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm.Contracts/Customers/Events/CustomerUpdatedEvent.cs:11
  • Customer.Email src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/Customer.cs:11
  • CustomerDto.Email src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/CustomerDto.cs:12
  • CustomerRecord.Email src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/Database/CustomerRecord.cs:10
  • RegisterCustomerCommand.Email src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/RegisterCustomer/RegisterCustomerCommand.cs:9
  • RegisterCustomerRequest.Email src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/RegisterCustomer/RegisterCustomerRequest.cs:9
  • UpdateCustomerCommand.Email src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/UpdateCustomer/UpdateCustomerCommand.cs:10
  • UpdateCustomerRequest.Email src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/UpdateCustomer/UpdateCustomerRequest.cs:9
  • AuthenticatedUser.Email src/Identity/AppointMe.Identity.Contracts/Identity/AuthenticatedUser.cs:9
  • KeycloakIdentityProvider.RequiredActionVerifyEmail src/Identity/AppointMe.Identity/Keycloak/KeycloakIdentityProvider.cs:14
  • SignupCommand.Email src/Identity/AppointMe.Identity/Signup/SignupCommand.cs:6
  • SignupRequest.Email src/Identity/AppointMe.Identity/Signup/SignupRequest.cs:6
  • User.Email src/Identity/AppointMe.Identity/Users/User.cs:11
  • EmployeeInvitationResent.Email src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations.Contracts/Invitations/Events/EmployeeInvitationResent.cs:5
  • EmployeeInvited.Email src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations.Contracts/Invitations/Events/EmployeeInvited.cs:5
  • TeamMemberRecord.Email src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Employees/Database/TeamMemberRecord.cs:10
  • Employee.Email src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Employees/Employee.cs:11
  • TeamMemberDto.Email src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Employees/TeamMemberDto.cs:10
  • EmployeeInvitation.Email src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Invitations/EmployeeInvitation.cs:10
  • InviteEmployeeCommand.Email src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Invitations/InviteEmployee/InviteEmployeeCommand.cs:5
  • InviteEmployeeRequest.Email src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Invitations/InviteEmployee/InviteEmployeeRequest.cs:5
  • GetCurrentUserResponse.Email src/Organizations/AppointMe.Organizations/Me/GetCurrentUserResponse.cs:9
Date of birth — 11 field(s)
  • Attendee.DateOfBirth src/Booking/AppointMe.Booking/Attendees/Attendee.cs:9
  • CustomerSnapshot.DateOfBirth src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm.Contracts/Customers/CustomerSnapshot.cs:8
  • CustomerRegisteredEvent.DateOfBirth src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm.Contracts/Customers/Events/CustomerRegisteredEvent.cs:10
  • CustomerUpdatedEvent.DateOfBirth src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm.Contracts/Customers/Events/CustomerUpdatedEvent.cs:10
  • Customer.DateOfBirth src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/Customer.cs:9
  • CustomerDto.DateOfBirth src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/CustomerDto.cs:10
  • CustomerRecord.DateOfBirth src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/Database/CustomerRecord.cs:8
  • RegisterCustomerCommand.DateOfBirth src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/RegisterCustomer/RegisterCustomerCommand.cs:7
  • RegisterCustomerRequest.DateOfBirth src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/RegisterCustomer/RegisterCustomerRequest.cs:7
  • UpdateCustomerCommand.DateOfBirth src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/UpdateCustomer/UpdateCustomerCommand.cs:8
  • UpdateCustomerRequest.DateOfBirth src/CRM/AppointMe.Crm/Customers/UpdateCustomer/UpdateCustomerRequest.cs:7

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md