Public report of cablehead/http-nu, published 21 October 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive report Measured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.10.5). Watchdog signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey → Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 21 October 2026, 23:08 UTC · Survey ID cd_8dd95540e1c44021896ff4d6e95342a7

cablehead/http-nu

Measured 21 October 2026, 23:05 UTC, at code version 3bedf9e

CAI score 55out of 100 At risk Down 12 since the last survey

The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.

Event Sourcing 100 Exemplary Performance 100 Exemplary Architecture 100 Exemplary Code Health 89 Exemplary Maturity 74 Strong Production Readiness 61 Adequate Security and Compliance 33 Weak

A small codebase: 7,270 lines of product code in 1 project, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.1 person-years · Weakest lens: Security and Compliance, 33

Findings by how serious they are

19 critical 89 serious 46 minor

19 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, Watchdog either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard it looks for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.

This survey was produced by

Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
21 October 2026, 23:05 UTC

A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds Watchdog. It is open to any tool that implements it, and today Watchdog is the only one that does.

A critical security finding is open, such as a library with a known critical vulnerability or a password or key found in the code. The score itself is unchanged, but its band shows At risk until the finding is fixed. See the Security and Compliance lens.

The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. Watchdog works it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸

49of 55 dimensions measured by tools. The other 6 are advisory notes from an AI model, which explain the code but don't count towards the score.
111of 154 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 43 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
55dimensions across 7 lenses, read from 7,270 lines of product code in 1 project.
Chapters

Executive summary

cablehead/http-nu scores 55 out of 100, but it is rated At risk while a critical security finding is open; the score itself is unchanged. The project hasn't declared a stable release yet, so its lenses are rated against a lower bar than a released product's, while the score itself is worked out as for any repository.

The weakest lens counts most in the score, and here that is Security and Compliance, which scores 33 and is rated Weak. Its Supply-chain Provenance & Signing dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Security and Compliance can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do and to set security response headers on what the server sends — actix-web's `DefaultHeaders::new().add((header::X_CONTENT_TYPE_OPTIONS, "nosniff"))`, tower-http's `SetResponseHeaderLayer::overriding(…)` on an axum router, or keep Rocket's default `Shield` — with `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Content-Type-Options` and a frame policy on every response, and if Security and Compliance rose to 70, the score would rise from 55 to about 70.

19 findings are critical: 15 in Static Analysis (SAST) and four in Dependency Vulnerabilities.

Watchdog couldn't measure 18 dimensions in this code, among them Code Coverage, Test Reliability and Navigability, so they are left out of the score. The product code is 7,270 lines, which would take an estimated 0.1 person-years, around €11,000, to rebuild.

Code Health 89 ★ Exemplary Architecture 100 ★ Exemplary Maturity 74 Strong Production Readiness 61 Adequate, capped by Security & performance tooling Security and Compliance 33 Weak, capped by Static Analysis (SAST), Dependency Vulnerabilities, Supply-chain Provenance & Signing and Access Controls Event Sourcing 100 ★ Exemplary Performance 100 ★ Exemplary

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Security and Compliance 33 · counts for 46%Production Readiness 61 · counts for 25%Maturity 74 · counts for 14%Code Health 89 · counts for 8%Architecture 100 · counts for 4%Event Sourcing 100 · counts for 2%Performance 100 · counts for 1%

If Security and Compliance rose from 33 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 55 to about 70.

Code composition: what the lines of code are
Product code 69%Tests 31%
New since the last survey: 8 findings

These 8 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026.

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 1 finding

This critical or serious finding was in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026, and is gone from this one.

  • Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED
Rebuild cost: about €11,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild€3,500 to €18,000, for 59 to 186 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problemStandard, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor×0.8 at a score of 55. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
SizeSmall: 7,270 lines of product code

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty. For this code, every line is priced as straight logic, which keeps the estimate on the low side.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

1
Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do.
Raises the score by about 15 points · Medium effort · Access Controls
2
Set security response headers on what the server sends — actix-web's `DefaultHeaders::new().add((header::X_CONTENT_TYPE_OPTIONS, "nosniff"))`, tower-http's `SetResponseHeaderLayer::overriding(…)` on an axum router, or keep Rocket's default `Shield` — with `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Content-Type-Options` and a frame policy on every response.
Raises the score by about 4 points · Medium effort · Web-Security Posture
3
Improve Dependency Hygiene — currently 8.7/10.
Raises the score by about 3 points · Medium effort · Dependency Hygiene

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €11,000 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Security and Compliance, at 33 (Weak). Security and Compliance is about how well the product is protected, and how it handles personal data. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Security and Compliance also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Security and Compliance grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Security and Compliance actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 15 points for medium effort. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

22 modules, with 16 dependencies between them. One loop runs through 2 of the modules, marked above the diagonal.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →1 benchmarks.bench-flask-comparison2 examples.2048.static3 examples.2048.static.game-board4 examples.2048.static.scrub-knob5 examples.2048.test6 examples.2048.throwaway7 examples.markdown-mermaid.assets8 examples.mermaid-editor.assets.mermaid-diagram9 http_nu.bus10 http_nu.compression11 http_nu.listener12 http_nu.listener.win_uds_compat13 http_nu.request14 http_nu.response15 http_nu.stdlib16 http_nu.logging17 http_nu.store18 http_nu.engine19 http_nu.handler20 http_nu.worker21 http_nu.main22 http_nu.commands
1 benchmarks.bench-flask-comparison
2 examples.2048.static
3 examples.2048.static.game-board
4 examples.2048.static.scrub-knob
5 examples.2048.test
6 examples.2048.throwaway
7 examples.markdown-mermaid.assets
8 examples.mermaid-editor.assets.mermaid-diagram
9 http_nu.bus
10 http_nu.compression
11 http_nu.listener
12 http_nu.listener.win_uds_compat
13 http_nu.request
14 http_nu.response
15 http_nu.stdlib
16 http_nu.logging2
17 http_nu.store2
18 http_nu.engine11
19 http_nu.handler111
20 http_nu.worker11
21 http_nu.main1121
22 http_nu.commands2314
Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself
1 benchmarks.bench-flask-comparison2 examples.2048.static3 examples.2048.static.game-board4 examples.2048.static.scrub-knob5 examples.2048.test6 examples.2048.throwaway7 examples.markdown-mermaid.assets8 examples.mermaid-editor.assets.mermaid-diagram9 http_nu.bus10 http_nu.compression11 http_nu.listener12 http_nu.listener.win_uds_compat13 http_nu.request14 http_nu.response15 http_nu.stdlib16 http_nu.logging17 http_nu.store18 http_nu.engine19 http_nu.handler20 http_nu.worker21 http_nu.main22 http_nu.commandsbenchmarks.bench-flask-comparison1examples.2048.static2examples.2048.static.game-board3examples.2048.static.scrub-knob4examples.2048.test5examples.2048.throwaway6examples.markdown-mermaid.assets7examples.mermaid-editor.assets.mermaid-diagram8http_nu.bus9http_nu.compression10http_nu.listener11http_nu.listener.win_uds_compat12http_nu.request13http_nu.response14http_nu.stdlib15http_nu.logging16http_nu.store17http_nu.engine18http_nu.handler19http_nu.worker20http_nu.main21http_nu.commands2222111111111212314

At a glance — Code Health · 89% · Exemplary ·

The Good
D1 · Rust Cyclomatic Complexity 8.1 D3 · Rust God Classes 7.3 D4 · Rust Code Duplication 9.5 D17 · Rust Explicit Debt 10.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X27 · Repo Collection changed while being enumerated 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0
The Ugly
D2 · Rust Cognitive Complexity 4.7

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good
D6 · Rust Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D7 · Rust Architectural Integrity 10.0 D26 · Rust Project Cohesion 10.0 D35 · Rust Change Coupling 10.0 AX10 · Repo Code composition 10.0 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0
The Bad
D22 · Rust Internal API Consistency 6.0

At a glance — Maturity · 74% · Strong ·

The Good
D15 · Rust Churn × Complexity Hotspots 9.9 D19 · Rust Documentation Quality 9.0 D20 · Rust ADR Quality 8.6 D21 · Rust Naming Consistency 10.0 D25 · Rust ADR Conformance 10.0 D34 · Rust Knowledge Freshness 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 7.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0
The Bad
M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 6.0

At a glance — Readiness · 61% · Adequate · gated by P3 ·

The Good
D9 · Rust Test Distribution 10.0 D12 · Rust Dependency Hygiene 8.7 D13 · Rust Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · Rust License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P2 · Repo Observability 8.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 10.0
The Bad
P10 · Repo Library API & versioning 6.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0
The Ugly
P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 3.0

At a glance — Security · 33% · Weak · gated by D29, D30, D36, C2 ·

The Good
D28 · Rust Secrets (history) 10.0 D43 · Rust Malicious Dependencies 10.0 D44 · Rust Platform End-of-Life 10.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0
The Bad
S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 6.0
The Ugly
D29 · Rust Static Analysis (SAST) 3.3 D30 · Rust Dependency Vulnerabilities 1.4 D36 · Rust Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 0.0

At a glance — Event Sourcing · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good
ES1 · Repo Fold determinism 10.0 ES2 · Repo Immutable events 10.0

At a glance — Performance · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good
PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures41High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection23High / Critical

Roadmap

First, enforce strict access controls by implementing a global authentication guard with explicit public opt-outs and named role permissions. Second, harden the web security posture by adding essential response headers like Content-Security-Policy and X-Content-Type-Options to all server responses. Third, resolve the fourteen medium-severity dependency vulnerabilities, prioritizing those in REDACTED and REDACTED, and update outdated direct dependencies to maintain hygiene. Finally, integrate security and performance tooling, such as SAST and secret scanning, to run automatically on pull requests to prevent regressions.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do.+14.7 ptsMediumAccess Controls
Set security response headers on what the server sends — actix-web's `DefaultHeaders::new().add((header::X_CONTENT_TYPE_OPTIONS, "nosniff"))`, tower-http's `SetResponseHeaderLayer::overriding(…)` on an axum router, or keep Rocket's default `Shield` — with `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Content-Type-Options` and a frame policy on every response.+4.4 ptsMediumWeb-Security Posture
Improve Dependency Hygiene — currently 8.7/10.+3.3 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Trigger your SAST workflow on pull requests — a scan that only runs on a cron reports history, it does not gate.+3.1 ptsMediumSecurity & performance tooling
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED.+1.5 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3).+1.5 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED.+1.5 ptsLowDependency Vulnerabilities
Resolve the 3 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED.+1.5 ptsLowDependency Vulnerabilities

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 17 files carrying findings, judged against the Preview bar: 12% slop · 23% mixed · 65% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
REDACTED0.9SlopDependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED1.6SlopDependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED3.0MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: REDACTED
REDACTED5.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED6.9MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
src/commands.rs7.0Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: ReverseProxyCommand::run (cyclomatic 24)
src/logging.rs7.0Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: http_nu::logging::run_human_handler (cyclomatic 33)
src/main.rs7.0Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: http_nu::main (cyclomatic 25)
src/handler.rs7.1Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: http_nu::handler::handle_inner (cyclomatic 28)
src/worker.rs7.4Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: http_nu::worker::spawn_eval_thread::inner (cyclomatic 24)
src/compression.rs8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: BrotliStream::poll_next (cognitive 24)
src/engine.rs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (28–30 lines × 2)
src/listener.rs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)
docs/adr/0003-html-dsl-design.md9.5Near-cleanADR Quality: ADR has no Consequences section
docs/adr/0002-html-escaping-strategy.md9.5Near-cleanADR Quality: ADR has no Decision and Consequences section
docs/adr/0001-explicit-append-html-dsl.md9.5Near-cleanADR Quality: ADR has no Consequences section

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 19

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 89

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 46

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 19

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 49 of 55 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 6 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 55 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D6D7D9D12D13D14D15D17D19D20D21D22D25D26D28D29D30D34D35D36D43D44AX10AX2AX3AX4AX8AX9C2ES1ES2M1M2M3M4P1P10P2P3P4P6PF3S1X1X14X15X21X27X28X29X30

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 111 of 154 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)Code duplication1.0.0✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.400✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.400✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivySecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a160b6-6af9-7658-951c-a9b5e8eec327.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.rs) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
  • D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.rs) and this repository declares a Cargo test suite (repository root, 11 test files), but it was not re-run: its build outgrew the 6 GB scratch ceiling (6.202 GB measured) and was stopped; its suite was not run. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (2 contributor(s) across 589 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 100% of the history; the other 1 hold 0% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
  • D27 Navigability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Navigability is taken over call sites whose callee resolved. For C# that population includes calls into referenced assemblies; for this language only calls declared inside the repository count, so the abstention threshold reads the repository's use of its standard library as a resolution failure. That is a limit of this analyzer, not a build problem in this repository.
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby or Scala was found, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby and Scala source only, and no C#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Dart, Ruby or Scala was found, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
  • X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X13 Undrained process stream — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, PHP, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or Kotlin was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Dart, Ruby, Scala or PHP was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X19 Unrestored process-global state — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala or PHP was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X22 Contradicted release guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and Java, TypeScript/JavaScript, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin and PHP source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, F#, Python, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Kotlin or PHP was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby and Python source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Scala, Ruby or Python was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X25 Inert configuration knob — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Erlang, Python, Dart and Ruby source only, and no C# was loaded and no JavaScript/TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Scala, PHP, Erlang, Python, Dart or Ruby was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax, and PHP, Java, Kotlin, Python, Ruby, Scala, Dart, Swift, Erlang, Go and JavaScript/TypeScript source only, and no C# was loaded and no PHP, Java, Kotlin, Python, Ruby, Scala, Dart, Swift, Erlang, Go, JavaScript or TypeScript was found in this repository, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check reads C# syntax and MSBuild project configuration, TypeScript source and its tsconfig files, Java source and its package and module declarations, PHP source and its PHPStan and Psalm configuration, Dart source and its pubspec language version, Ruby source and its Sorbet and Steep configuration, Scala source and its build's explicit-nulls, WartRemover and Scalafix settings, and Kotlin source only, and no C# was loaded, no TypeScript was found, and this repository's Rust is not read yet, so it had nothing of this repository's product to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.

Repo exclusion declarations: 4 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
  • D25 ADR Conformance: ADR conformance is the LLM-scored fraction of sampled code that follows recorded decisions — it checks the decisions that were written down and the slices it sampled, not unrecorded rules or the whole tree.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
  • D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (REDACTED, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (6): D19, D20, D21, D22, D25, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

8 function(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was http_nu::logging::run_human_handler at 33.

http_nu::logging::run_human_handler (cyclomatic 33) · ×7src/logging.rs:543
ReverseProxyCommand::run (cyclomatic 24)src/commands.rs:460

What to do

  1. Bring the 8 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with http_nu::logging::run_human_handler (cyclomatic 33), http_nu::handler::handle_inner (cyclomatic 28), http_nu::main (cyclomatic 25). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 8 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 8.1 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
  2. Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity4.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 4.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

14 function(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was http_nu::handler::handle_inner at 68.

http_nu::handler::handle_inner (cognitive 68) · ×10src/handler.rs:63
ReverseProxyCommand::run (cognitive 64)src/commands.rs:460
BrotliStream::poll_next (cognitive 24)src/compression.rs:118
MdCommand::run (cognitive 22)src/commands.rs:1367
MjCompileCommand::run (cognitive 19)src/commands.rs:859

What to do

  1. Bring the 14 bodies over 15 down to 15 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with http_nu::handler::handle_inner (cognitive 68), ReverseProxyCommand::run (cognitive 64), http_nu::logging::run_human_handler (cognitive 46). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 14 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 4.7 to about 10.0/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 15.
  2. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

10 over-large unit(s) detected — types, modules or files that carry too much.

FunctionTooLong: http_nu::handler::handle_inner · ×6src/handler.rs:63
FileTooLong: src/commands.rs · ×3src/commands.rs
MethodTooLong: MjCommand.runsrc/commands.rs:652

What to do

  1. Resolve the 6 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with handler.rs (2), logging.rs (2), main.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with commands.rs, logging.rs, main.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 MethodTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with commands.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.5 / 10Stronggated by 10 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

10 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (28–30 lines × 2)src/engine.rs:167
Duplicated block (20 lines × 2)src/commands.rs:185
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2)src/commands.rs:717
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)src/main.rs:684
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2)src/commands.rs:664

+ 5 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (28–30 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with engine.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with commands.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with commands.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 9 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D7 · Architectural Integrity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.

Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

All 7 mechanizable ADR(s) are enforced: 6 by analyzers, 1 by tests. Dependency cycles not checked (no project-reference graph; where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

183 test methods: 95 unit, 88 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e. The Rust suite contributes 183 `#[test]` function(s) across 11 file(s) declaring at least one; its unit/integration split is Cargo's own — 2 of those file(s) are integration-test targets under a crate's tests/ directory, and the rest are #[test] functions compiled into the crate they test.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

27 outdated, 0 yanked direct Cargo dependencies. Only DIRECT edges are graded: a transitive crate cannot be moved past what its parent's requirement admits, so reporting one would be advice its owner cannot take. A newer release is reported only where this repository's OWN requirement already admits it, so the remedy is `cargo update` and never a manifest edit — which means a release outside the declared range is deliberately NOT charged, because a written-down constraint is a decision rather than a defect. Note that a bare requirement is a CARET, and for a 0.x crate its ceiling is the minor. Whether any crate is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — crates.io publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED there.

Outdated: arc-swap · ×27

What to do

  1. Improve Dependency Hygiene — currently 8.7/10. — 27 outdated, 0 yanked direct Cargo dependencies. Only DIRECT edges are graded: a transitive crate cannot be moved past what its parent's requirement admits, so reporting one would be advice its owner cannot take. A newer release is reported only where this repository's OWN requirement already admits it, so the remedy is `cargo update` and never a manifest edit — which means a release outside the declared range is deliberately NOT charged, because a written-down constraint is a decision rather than a defect. Note that a bare requirement is a CARET, and for a 0.x crate its ceiling is the minor. Whether any crate is UNMAINTAINED is not graded — crates.io publishes no maintenance status, and release age does not stand in for one. Known CVEs in this dependency graph are D30's question, read from REDACTED there.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 893 shipped crate(s) use a banned license. Licences were resolved from crates.io over the crates a consumer compiles — this repository's REDACTED closed over its manifests' `[dependencies]` and `[build-dependencies]`. Crates it asks for ONLY under `[dev-dependencies]` are excluded: they are not compiled by anything that depends on this repository. This repository publishes itself under MIT, which is its own choice and is not judged here.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots9.9 / 10Stronggated by 1 serious finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Top hotspots: src/main.rs (2×25=50)

Hotspot: src/main.rssrc/main.rs:530

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Hotspot finding(s) in Churn × Complexity Hotspots — start with main.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 deducted task-comment markers across 7270 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 10.0. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md.

D19 · Documentation QualityExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The repository's READMEs and ADR docs are excellent for their purposes. The examples/2048/research directories each document a research bundle (history, incremental/clicker genre, addiction mechanics), while the root README documents the project as a whole. All visible documents are well-structured with headings, an explicit reading order, and clear rationale; the only unshown elements are the ADRs' own architecture/usage sections, which the outline names but the body is clipped. (16 of 25 sampled documents could not be assessed: 1 of 2 evaluation groups failed.)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md.

D20 · ADR QualityStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Evaluated 7 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 8.6/10 (consistently complete and clear). 0 flagged with a specific gap.

ADR has no Consequences section · ×2docs/adr/0003-html-dsl-design.md:1detected by adr-integrity
ADR has no Decision and Consequences sectiondocs/adr/0002-html-escaping-strategy.md:4detected by adr-integrity

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 ADR has no Consequences section finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0003-html-dsl-design.md, 0001-explicit-append-html-dsl.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 ADR has no Decision and Consequences section finding(s) in ADR Quality — start with 0002-html-escaping-strategy.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D22 · Internal API ConsistencyAdequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 API inconsistencies across 49 exposed types.

Duplicate method signature with different parameter names (one uses 'engine', the other '_engine'). This suggests a copy-paste error or unresolved conflict in the API surface.
Duplicate method signature with different parameter names (prefixed with underscores in the second). This indicates a copy-paste error or unresolved conflict.
Inconsistent naming convention for command registration. 'add_store_commands' and 'add_processor_commands' follow a generic pattern, while 'add_store_mj_commands' is specific to 'mj' (Midjourney?). If these are distinct domains, the naming is inconsistent with the generic 'add_*_commands' pattern used for others. It implies 'mj' is a special case of 'store' commands, breaking the symmetry.
Inconsistent parameter structure for logging lifecycle events. 'log_request' takes the full Request object, while 'log_response' and 'log_complete' take specific fields (status, headers, bytes, times). This makes it difficult to implement a uniform logging handler that expects a consistent 'event' structure.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Duplicate method signature with different parameter names (one uses… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Duplicate method signature with different parameter names (prefixed with… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming convention for command registration.… finding(s) in Internal API Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D25 · ADR ConformanceExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the code actually follows the decisions recorded in the project's ADRs.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature against ADRs plus a deterministic structural code summary; findings linked to repo-rooted ADR paths for traceability. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 conform / 0 violate across 7 ADRs.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d25_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 1 build units (Cargo) flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)3.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

23 finding(s): 0 critical, 15 high, 8 medium, 0 low. 11 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `src/main.rs` (line 563, line 565) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 1 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  3. No action in Static Analysis (SAST) — all 11 REDACTED finding(s) are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), so none is charged to this dimension. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (11 issue-level, 0 of them charged here).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities1.4 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

34 finding(s): 1 critical, 3 high, 29 medium, 1 low.

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 14 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (11), REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked. Counted over 15 of the 17 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 2 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX10 · Code composition10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.
AX2 · Stateful singletons10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

C2 · Access Controls0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • This repository serves requests — a server (.serve_connection_with_upgrades) (src/main.rs:409) — and no route guard, auth-gate middleware, global guard or imperative check that refuses a caller (401/403, an Unauthorized/Forbidden error) was found: its endpoints may be unprotected. — src/main.rs:409

What to do

  • Protect endpoints by default-deny: a global authentication guard or middleware with explicit public opt-outs, or a guard on every route, plus named role/permission rules for what an authenticated caller may do.
ES1 · Fold determinism10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event Sourcing — Whether the recovery-replay fold is deterministic — state derived purely from each event's own fields, no clock/random/IO on the replay path.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan (event-sourcing gated): Apply/When folds checked for forbidden tokens (DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random, IO), stripped of comments/strings. Deterministic, hard fact per fold.

ES2 · Immutable events10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event Sourcing — Whether domain events stay immutable (private fields, set once) rather than carrying mutable state.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-sourcing gated): persisted events checked for public setters; immutability verified per property/field. Deterministic, hard fact.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 1 of 1 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Grow the ADR log (currently 7) — reach 8 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy6.0 / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • Embedded cross.stream Persistent Event Stream — searched for: `embedded-crossstream`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest and configuration files (package.json and other *.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.sln/*.slnx, *.yml, *.toml, *.config, tool configs such as eslint.config.js, Dockerfile); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:1
  • Embedded modules (Routing/HTML DSL/Datastar SDK/Cookies) — searched for: `embedded-modules`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest and configuration files (package.json and other *.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.sln/*.slnx, *.yml, *.toml, *.config, tool configs such as eslint.config.js, Dockerfile); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:1
  • README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists — searched for: `dockerfile`, `docker-compose`, `compose.yaml`, `compose.yml`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest and configuration files (package.json and other *.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.sln/*.slnx, *.yml, *.toml, *.config, tool configs such as eslint.config.js, Dockerfile); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — README.md:1298
  • docs/how-to/refresh-datastar-sdk.md names `.js.br`, but no file or folder `.js.br` exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong. — docs/how-to/refresh-datastar-sdk.md:24

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: Embedded cross.stream Persistent Event Stream; Embedded modules (Routing/HTML DSL/Datastar SDK/Cookies); README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists; docs/how-to/refresh-datastar-sdk.md names `.js.br`, but no file or folder `.js.br` exists.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P10 · Library API & versioning6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.

Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • 38/48 types (79%) declared in the published library are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — keep implementation types off the surface and expose only the intended API.

What to do

  • Keep implementation types off the public surface (Rust: `pub(crate)`, or keep the module private) so internals can change without breaking consumers.
P2 · Observability8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (opentelemetry with tracing-opentelemetry) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
P3 · Security & performance tooling3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • `REDACTED` run(s) a static-analysis scan, but no workflow that runs one is triggered by a pull request (or a merge queue, or an unfiltered push) — the scan fires on a schedule or a manual dispatch only. A vulnerable change therefore merges clean and is reported on the next scheduled run, by which time it is on the default branch and the only remedy is a follow-up fix. Add the pull-request trigger to the workflow that runs the scan so the finding arrives before the merge rather than after it.

What to do

  • Trigger your SAST workflow on pull requests — a scan that only runs on a cron reports history, it does not gate.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.

What to do

  • Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

PF3 · Async & latency hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

S1 · Web-Security Posture6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Read from this repository's Rust source: cryptographic hygiene (weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source) and outbound TLS (certificate validation, protocol version) — facts about code that hold whether or not it serves anything itself. This repository serves HTTP itself (`.serve_connection_with_upgrades(` (src/main.rs:409)), so its Rust source was also read for the server controls: TLS served or HSTS set, security response headers, cookie flags and inbound validation — each credited where its Rust spelling appears in production source, not proven on every route. A Rocket 0.5 application is credited the headers Rocket's default `Shield` sends unless it attaches its own, and its cookie jar's SameSite=Strict default; a session middleware its default cookie flags.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

  • None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is set on a response this repository's Rust server sends — defense in depth, even when a proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: `.serve_connection_with_upgrades(` (src/main.rs:409).
  • No handler of this repository's Rust server answers 400, 413 or 422 (`StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST`, `HttpResponse::BadRequest()`, `Status::BadRequest`, tonic `Status::invalid_argument`), and nothing declares validation — no `validator`/`garde` derive, no body limit (`DefaultBodyLimit::max`, `RequestBodyLimitLayer`, `JsonConfig::default().limit(…)`, Rocket `Limits`) — nothing shows inbound requests being checked, and refused, before a handler acts on them. A check that answers its failure with 200 and an error body is not seen. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: `.serve_connection_with_upgrades(` (src/main.rs:409).

What to do

  • Set security response headers on what the server sends — actix-web's `DefaultHeaders::new().add((header::X_CONTENT_TYPE_OPTIONS, "nosniff"))`, tower-http's `SetResponseHeaderLayer::overriding(…)` on an axum router, or keep Rocket's default `Shield` — with `Content-Security-Policy`, `X-Content-Type-Options` and a frame policy on every response.
  • Validate what the server reads from a request — path, query, headers, body size and shape — and answer what fails with 400 (413 for an oversized body) before a handler acts on it: derive `validator::Validate` (or `garde::Validate`) on the request types and reject with `StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST`, and cap bodies with `DefaultBodyLimit::max`/`RequestBodyLimitLayer` or actix's `JsonConfig::default().limit(…)`.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `for` loop leaves the `RefCell` it is walking alone — safe Rust rejects a body that changes the collection its loop borrows at compile time, except through interior mutability: a `RefCell` borrowed in the loop's header stays borrowed until the loop ends, so a `borrow_mut()` of it inside the body panics with `already borrowed: BorrowMutError` and the remaining elements are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health89%ExemplarySolid.
Architecture100%ExemplarySolid.
Maturity74%StrongSolid.
Readiness61%Adequate — gated by P3Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security33%Weak — gated by D29, D30, D36, C2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event Sourcing100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Performance100%ExemplarySolid.
Unscored — 3 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 1 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 62 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — Not applicable: this repository's JavaScript imports no dependency-injection container and defines no container of its own — nothing that both registers and resolves bindings, and nothing that names two lifetimes — so nothing holds one lifetime's instance while handing out another's; Rust with no dependency-injection crate has no container to hand one lifetime's instance to another — every value is owned by the code that builds it, and the borrow checker rejects a longer-lived value keeping a borrow of a shorter-lived one.
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AXB1 Runtime evidence locked — no reproducible boot — This repository has nothing the runtime tiers could boot or serve — no markup, no UI framework or web-server dependency, no UI component source, no native UI project and no API definition — nothing here is a surface to boot — so runtime a11y/egress/header evidence has no subject here. Not applicable: this is neither a gap in the scan nor a finding about your code.
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in a Diesel schema, a SeaORM entity, a Diesel or sqlx row struct, or a SQL CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store crate (sqlx, Diesel, SeaORM, rusqlite, tokio-postgres, MongoDB, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no data at rest for these controls to protect.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in a Diesel schema, a SeaORM entity, a Diesel or sqlx row struct, or a SQL CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store crate (sqlx, Diesel, SeaORM, rusqlite, tokio-postgres, MongoDB, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no sensitive data whose changes an audit trail would record. If it does (through a store configured outside this repository, for instance), the trail belongs to wherever that data is stored.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in a Diesel schema, a SeaORM entity, a Diesel or sqlx row struct, or a SQL CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store crate (sqlx, Diesel, SeaORM, rusqlite, tokio-postgres, MongoDB, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data whose lifetime a retention limit would bound.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in a persisted data model — no PII-named field (email, first_name, date_of_birth, phone, …) or stored credential in a Diesel schema, a SeaORM entity, a Diesel or sqlx row struct, or a SQL CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE — and no database or data-store crate (sqlx, Diesel, SeaORM, rusqlite, tokio-postgres, MongoDB, …) in the source either, so this repository keeps no personal data for a data subject to erase, export or consent over.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~3286 lines of test source are present (.rs) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — the .rs suite was found but not re-run
  • D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D27 Navigability — D27 counts a call into the standard library or a dependency as unresolved for this repository's language (.rs), so too few call sites counted as resolved to assess navigability. Not scored: this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Not applicable — this Cargo build ships 1 production module(s), so there is no coupling BETWEEN modules to measure. (Its test and non-production modules are not part of the shipped graph.)
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 1 value object(s); 1 domain event(s); its domain events are published by services or handlers — no domain entity raises one
  • ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and a call made through an inferred or generic receiver has no resolvable owner in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C#, F#, JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby and Scala, and none was read for this repository's product. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — no HTTP server, API framework or worker entry point was found in the JavaScript/TypeScript, Rust source, so there is no service whose uptime a failing dependency could take down
  • P8 Schema migrations — no ORM, schema-migration tool or schema auto-create was found in this repository's dependency manifests or source, so there is no database schema for this check to judge
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo install cargo-llvm-cov`, then `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Not applicable: no benchmark suite was found. This check searched for `#[bench]`, criterion's `bench_function`/`bench_with_input`, `#[divan::bench]` or `#[library_benchmark]` in any `.rs` file, or criterion, divan, iai or a `[[bench]]` target in a Cargo.toml, and for a `*benchmark*` script that this repository's CI runs. Benchmarks are credited as a bonus, so their absence is neither scored nor deducted.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Not applicable: Rust spells out every heap allocation and makes borrowed slices (&[T], &str) its ordinary parameter types, so the allocation-aware style this card rewards elsewhere is the language's baseline rather than a rung to climb. TypeScript/JavaScript runs on a garbage-collected runtime that gives a program no allocation-control idiom to choose on a hot path — no pools, stack allocation or value types — so allocation awareness is not something this code can be rated on.
  • X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X12 Unreachable branch — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X13 Undrained process stream — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X19 Unrestored process-global state — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# was loaded; this repository's Rust was read, and no request in it can be cancelled by a caller — a Rust request takes no token: a future is cancelled by dropping it, from outside the call (select!, a timeout, an aborted task), and reqwest, hyper and tonic take none
  • X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check asks whether an argument guard reports an EMPTY value as a NULL one, which needs a language that throws a null-specific argument exception — .NET's ArgumentNullException, the JVM's NullPointerException, Dart's ArgumentError.notNull. This repository contains none of those languages: the ones it is written in have a single exception for a bad argument, so there is no pair of exceptions to confuse and nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X22 Contradicted release guard — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X25 Inert configuration knob — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — Not applicable: this check looks for a collection written by a callback on one thread while the body waiting on it touches it on another, and in this repository's languages no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Rust's compiler refuses the unsynchronised version: a collection shared between a callback's thread and the waiting body must be `Sync`, which a `Vec`, `VecDeque` or `HashMap` is only behind a `Mutex`/`RwLock`, so the race this check looks for cannot be written in safe Rust. TypeScript/JavaScript runs every callback on the one thread that owns its objects: a callback runs only when the body waiting on it has yielded, never alongside it, and a worker thread receives a COPY of what it is sent. A SharedArrayBuffer carries raw bytes, never an Array, Map or Set, so no collection is reachable from two threads at once. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check is about how a .NET program searches the assemblies loaded into its process for a type, and this repository contains no .NET source, so there is nothing here for it to assess. Not a gap in the analyzer and not a finding about your code.
  • X4 Structured logging — This check asks whether log calls keep a message's values apart from its text, which needs a logger that can carry them as fields. This repository's Rust was read, and it logs through none: the `log` crate's macros take one finished message (as log4net does in C#; its `kv` values are an opt-in its backends mostly drop), `println!`/`eprintln!` are not loggers, or it makes no log call outside its tests and examples at all. Calls through `tracing` (`tracing::info!`, or `info!` imported from it) would be judged.
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 19 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×3
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×1
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Serious — 89 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×14
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D2 · Cognitive Complexity · http_nu · ×10
  • http_nu::handler::handle_inner (cognitive 68) src/handler.rs:63 — http_nu::handler::handle_inner has cognitive complexity 68 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21 (43 pts), match/switch 9 (16 pts), loops 3 (7 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 33). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • http_nu::logging::run_human_handler (cognitive 46) src/logging.rs:543 — http_nu::logging::run_human_handler has cognitive complexity 46 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16 (36 pts), match/switch 3 (8 pts), boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 25). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • http_nu::handler::build_normal_response (cognitive 41) src/handler.rs:382 — http_nu::handler::build_normal_response has cognitive complexity 41 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14 (23 pts), match/switch 8 (13 pts), loops 2 (5 pts) (nesting depth added 17). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • http_nu::worker::spawn_eval_thread::inner (cognitive 40) src/worker.rs:73 — http_nu::worker::spawn_eval_thread::inner has cognitive complexity 40 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13 (31 pts), match/switch 3 (5 pts), loops 2 (4 pts) (nesting depth added 22). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
  • http_nu::file_source (cognitive 39) src/main.rs:177 — http_nu::file_source has cognitive complexity 39 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (27 pts), match/switch 2 (8 pts), boolean chains 2, loops 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 26). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
  • http_nu::serve (cognitive 36) src/main.rs:323 — http_nu::serve has cognitive complexity 36 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12 (25 pts), match/switch 4 (8 pts), loops 2, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 17). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • http_nu::main (cognitive 31) src/main.rs:530 — http_nu::main has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12 (19 pts), match/switch 6 (10 pts), loops 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • http_nu::stdin_source (cognitive 28) src/main.rs:272 — http_nu::stdin_source has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (19 pts), loops 2 (5 pts), match/switch 1 (4 pts) (nesting depth added 18). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • http_nu::commands::event_to_string (cognitive 23) src/commands.rs:329 — http_nu::commands::event_to_string has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (15 pts), loops 1 (4 pts), match/switch 2 (4 pts) (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • http_nu::logging::run_jsonl_handler (cognitive 19) src/logging.rs:240 — http_nu::logging::run_jsonl_handler has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (13 pts), match/switch 2 (4 pts), boolean chains 1, loops 1 (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · http_nu · ×7
  • http_nu::logging::run_human_handler (cyclomatic 33) src/logging.rs:543 — http_nu::logging::run_human_handler has cyclomatic complexity 33 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
  • http_nu::handler::handle_inner (cyclomatic 28) src/handler.rs:63 — http_nu::handler::handle_inner has cyclomatic complexity 28 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
  • http_nu::main (cyclomatic 25) src/main.rs:530 — http_nu::main has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
  • http_nu::worker::spawn_eval_thread::inner (cyclomatic 24) src/worker.rs:73 — http_nu::worker::spawn_eval_thread::inner has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
  • http_nu::handler::build_normal_response (cyclomatic 20) src/handler.rs:382 — http_nu::handler::build_normal_response has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
  • http_nu::logging::run_jsonl_handler (cyclomatic 20) src/logging.rs:240 — http_nu::logging::run_jsonl_handler has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
  • http_nu::serve (cyclomatic 16) src/main.rs:323 — http_nu::serve has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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D3 · God Classes · FunctionTooLong · ×6
  • FunctionTooLong: http_nu::handler::handle_inner src/handler.rs:63 — FunctionTooLong — http_nu::handler::handle_inner runs 216 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 116 over it, 2.16× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
  • FunctionTooLong: http_nu::main src/main.rs:530 — FunctionTooLong — http_nu::main runs 189 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 89 over it, 1.89× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
  • FunctionTooLong: http_nu::worker::spawn_eval_thread src/worker.rs:62 — FunctionTooLong — http_nu::worker::spawn_eval_thread runs 176 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 76 over it, 1.76× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
  • FunctionTooLong: http_nu::logging::run_human_handler src/logging.rs:543 — FunctionTooLong — http_nu::logging::run_human_handler runs 140 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 40 over it, 1.40× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
  • FunctionTooLong: http_nu::logging::run_jsonl_handler src/logging.rs:240 — FunctionTooLong — http_nu::logging::run_jsonl_handler runs 126 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 26 over it, 1.26× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
  • FunctionTooLong: http_nu::handler::build_normal_response src/handler.rs:382 — FunctionTooLong — http_nu::handler::build_normal_response runs 101 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 1 over it, 1.01× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium advisory (unmaintained) · ×6
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability · ×5
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium advisory (unsound) · ×4
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D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×3
  • FileTooLong: src/commands.rs src/commands.rs — FileTooLong — 1210 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 710 over it, 2.42× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/logging.rs src/logging.rs — FileTooLong — 544 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 44 over it, 1.09× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
  • FileTooLong: src/main.rs src/main.rs — FileTooLong — 509 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 9 over it, 1.02× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
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C2 · Access Controls · No authorization · ×1
  • No authorization src/main.rs:409 — This repository serves requests — a server (.serve_connection_with_upgrades) (src/main.rs:409) — and no route guard, auth-gate middleware, global guard or imperative check that refuses a caller (401/403, an Unauthorized/Forbidden error) was found: its endpoints may be unprotected.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · ReverseProxyCommand · ×1
  • ReverseProxyCommand::run (cyclomatic 24) src/commands.rs:460 — ReverseProxyCommand::run has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot · ×1
  • Hotspot: src/main.rs src/main.rs:530 — src/main.rs changed 2 times in last 90 days, and the most complex body those changes touched has cyclomatic complexity 25 in http_nu::main at line 530. 1 of those changes was a fix/bug commit, and the other 1 changed it for other reasons — this file is under both repair and feature pressure. Before the next change lands here, make sure the area it touches is under test, then split that area out of the file so the following change is smaller than this one — a file this often edited pays the complexity back every time. Counted over 2026-07-23..2026-10-21, the 90 days ending at the analysed commit. Reproduce with `git log --since='2026-07-23 11:34:14 -04:00' --until='2026-10-21 11:34:14 -04:00' --full-history --no-merges -- src/main.rs`: merges are excluded because a merge re-states changes already counted at their own commits, and history is NOT path-simplified because a change that reached the file through a merged branch is still a change to it. That command counts raw commits and can read HIGHER than this row, which counts a cherry-picked re-land, and a revert together with the commit it undoes, once each — a difference of several commits on a file whose history was re-landed or reverted inside the window.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ReverseProxyCommand · ×1
  • ReverseProxyCommand::run (cognitive 64) src/commands.rs:460 — ReverseProxyCommand::run has cognitive complexity 64 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13 (40 pts), loops 3 (13 pts), match/switch 3 (11 pts) (nesting depth added 45). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · BrotliStream · ×1
  • BrotliStream::poll_next (cognitive 24) src/compression.rs:118 — BrotliStream::poll_next has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 5 (13 pts), if/else 4 (10 pts), loops 1 (nesting depth added 14). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · MdCommand · ×1
  • MdCommand::run (cognitive 22) src/commands.rs:1367 — MdCommand::run has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (18 pts), match/switch 3 (4 pts) (nesting depth added 8). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · MjCompileCommand · ×1
  • MjCompileCommand::run (cognitive 19) src/commands.rs:859 — MjCompileCommand::run has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (12 pts), match/switch 3 (7 pts) (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · Duplicate method signature with different parameter names (one uses 'engine', the other '_engine'). This suggests a copy-paste error or unresolved conflict in the API surface. · ×1
  • Duplicate method signature with different parameter names (one uses 'engine', the other '_engine'). This suggests a copy-paste error or unresolved conflict in the API surface. — Remove the duplicate signature. Keep only one version. (signatures: Store.configure_engine(engine: Engine): Result | Store.configure_engine(_engine: Engine): Result)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · Duplicate method signature with different parameter names (prefixed with underscores in the second). This indicates a copy-paste error or unresolved conflict. · ×1
  • Duplicate method signature with different parameter names (prefixed with underscores in the second). This indicates a copy-paste error or unresolved conflict. — Remove the duplicate signature. Keep only one version. (signatures: Store.topic_source(topic: str, watch: bool, base_engine: Engine, tx: Sender) | Store.topic_source(_topic: str, _watch: bool, _base_engine: Engine, _tx: Sender))
D22 · Internal API Consistency · Inconsistent naming convention for command registration. 'add_store_commands' and 'add_processor_commands' follow a generic pattern, while 'add_store_mj_commands' is specific to 'mj' (Midjourney?). If these are distinct domains, the naming is inconsistent with the generic 'add_*_commands' pattern used for others. It implies 'mj' is a special case of 'store' commands, breaking the symmetry. · ×1
  • Inconsistent naming convention for command registration. 'add_store_commands' and 'add_processor_commands' follow a generic pattern, while 'add_store_mj_commands' is specific to 'mj' (Midjourney?). If these are distinct domains, the naming is inconsistent with the generic 'add_*_commands' pattern used for others. It implies 'mj' is a special case of 'store' commands, breaking the symmetry. — Rename 'add_store_mj_commands' to 'add_mj_commands' if MJ is a separate domain, or rename the others to 'add_store_generic_commands' and 'add_processor_generic_commands' if they are generic. Alternatively, use a single 'add_commands' method with a type discriminator if the distinction is internal. (signatures: Engine.add_store_commands(store: Store): Result | Engine.add_store_mj_commands(store: Store): Result | Engine.add_processor_commands(store: Store): Result)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · Inconsistent parameter structure for logging lifecycle events. 'log_request' takes the full Request object, while 'log_response' and 'log_complete' take specific fields (status, headers, bytes, times). This makes it difficult to implement a uniform logging handler that expects a consistent 'event' structure. · ×1
  • Inconsistent parameter structure for logging lifecycle events. 'log_request' takes the full Request object, while 'log_response' and 'log_complete' take specific fields (status, headers, bytes, times). This makes it difficult to implement a uniform logging handler that expects a consistent 'event' structure. — Create a unified 'LogEvent' enum or struct that encapsulates the data for request, response, and completion, and change the logging methods to accept this single event type. (signatures: logging.log_request(request_id: Scru128Id, request: Request) | logging.log_response(request_id: Scru128Id, status: u16, headers: HeaderMap, start_time: Instant) | logging.log_complete(request_id: Scru128Id, bytes: u64, response_time: Instant))
D3 · God Classes · MethodTooLong · ×1
  • MethodTooLong: MjCommand.run src/commands.rs:652 — MethodTooLong — run runs 106 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 6 over it, 1.06× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (28–30 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (28–30 lines × 2) src/engine.rs:167 — src/engine.rs:167-196 | src/engine.rs:274-301 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) src/commands.rs:185 — src/commands.rs:185-204 | src/commands.rs:576-595 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) src/commands.rs:717 — src/commands.rs:717-735 | src/commands.rs:939-957 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/main.rs:684 — src/main.rs:684-699 | src/main.rs:763-778 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/commands.rs:664 — src/commands.rs:664-678 | src/commands.rs:906-920 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12–13 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12–13 lines × 2) src/commands.rs:780 — src/commands.rs:780-791 | src/commands.rs:1067-1079 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/listener.rs:231 — src/listener.rs:231-243 | src/listener.rs:256-268 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/commands.rs:681 — src/commands.rs:681-690 | src/commands.rs:1058-1067 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/commands.rs:1661 — src/commands.rs:1661-1667 | src/commands.rs:1674-1680 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) src/logging.rs:505 — src/logging.rs:505-509 | src/logging.rs:530-534 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
P3 · Security & performance tooling · SAST runs, but gates no merge · ×1
  • SAST runs, but gates no merge — `REDACTED` run(s) a static-analysis scan, but no workflow that runs one is triggered by a pull request (or a merge queue, or an unfiltered push) — the scan fires on a schedule or a manual dispatch only. A vulnerable change therefore merges clean and is reported on the next scheduled run, by which time it is on the default branch and the only remedy is a follow-up fix. Add the pull-request trigger to the workflow that runs the scan so the finding arrives before the merge rather than after it.
SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene · JavaScript dependencies are not locked · ×1
  • JavaScript dependencies are not locked — No package-lock.json / yarn.lock / pnpm-lock.yaml / bun.lock — JS installs aren't reproducible (SSDF PW.4.4). Commit your package manager's lockfile and install from it (`npm ci`, `yarn --immutable`, `pnpm i --frozen-lockfile` or `bun i --frozen-lockfile`). Advisory — never scored.
Minor — 19 finding(s)
M4 · Documentation accuracy · README/code drift · ×4
  • README/code drift README.md:1 — Embedded cross.stream Persistent Event Stream — searched for: `embedded-crossstream`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest and configuration files (package.json and other *.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.sln/*.slnx, *.yml, *.toml, *.config, tool configs such as eslint.config.js, Dockerfile); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift README.md:1 — Embedded modules (Routing/HTML DSL/Datastar SDK/Cookies) — searched for: `embedded-modules`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest and configuration files (package.json and other *.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.sln/*.slnx, *.yml, *.toml, *.config, tool configs such as eslint.config.js, Dockerfile); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift README.md:1298 — README advertises Docker containerisation, but no Dockerfile/compose file exists — searched for: `dockerfile`, `docker-compose`, `compose.yaml`, `compose.yml`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest and configuration files (package.json and other *.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.sln/*.slnx, *.yml, *.toml, *.config, tool configs such as eslint.config.js, Dockerfile); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
  • README/code drift docs/how-to/refresh-datastar-sdk.md:24 — docs/how-to/refresh-datastar-sdk.md names `.js.br`, but no file or folder `.js.br` exists. Checked without a model against the repository: its files and folders, the scripts and dependencies of every package.json, the projects, namespaces, package references and target frameworks of the .NET build, the SDK and Node pins, and the identifiers of every file that is not a document; the documents' own text never counts. A footprint generated at build time, read only by a platform, or living outside this repository is not seen, and this row is then wrong.
D20 · ADR Quality · ADR has no Consequences section · ×2
  • ADR has no Consequences section docs/adr/0003-html-dsl-design.md:1 — docs/adr/0003-html-dsl-design.md has no Consequences section (a heading such as `## Consequences`, or the MADR equivalent). A decision record states the context that forced it, the decision and its consequences, so a reader can tell later whether it still holds.
  • ADR has no Consequences section docs/adr/0001-explicit-append-html-dsl.md:4 — docs/adr/0001-explicit-append-html-dsl.md has no Consequences section (a heading such as `## Consequences`, or the MADR equivalent). A decision record states the context that forced it, the decision and its consequences, so a reader can tell later whether it still holds.
D20 · ADR Quality · ADR has no Decision and Consequences section · ×1
  • ADR has no Decision and Consequences section docs/adr/0002-html-escaping-strategy.md:4 — docs/adr/0002-html-escaping-strategy.md has no Decision and Consequences section (a heading such as `## Decision`, or the MADR equivalent). A decision record states the context that forced it, the decision and its consequences, so a reader can tell later whether it still holds.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low vulnerability · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1
  • REDACTED
P10 · Library API & versioning · Large public API surface · ×1
  • Large public API surface — 38/48 types (79%) declared in the published library are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — keep implementation types off the surface and expose only the intended API.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No release approval gate · ×1
  • No release approval gate — The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×1
  • No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is set on a response this repository's Rust server sends — defense in depth, even when a proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: `.serve_connection_with_upgrades(` (src/main.rs:409).
S1 · Web-Security Posture · No inbound request validation detected · ×1
  • No inbound request validation detected — No handler of this repository's Rust server answers 400, 413 or 422 (`StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST`, `HttpResponse::BadRequest()`, `Status::BadRequest`, tonic `Status::invalid_argument`), and nothing declares validation — no `validator`/`garde` derive, no body limit (`DefaultBodyLimit::max`, `RequestBodyLimitLayer`, `JsonConfig::default().limit(…)`, Rocket `Limits`) — nothing shows inbound requests being checked, and refused, before a handler acts on them. A check that answers its failure with 200 and an error body is not seen. (−2.0 on this card.) The server: `.serve_connection_with_upgrades(` (src/main.rs:409).
X6 · Hand-rolled structured-format parsing · Hand-rolled JSON/XML parsing via regex · ×1
  • Hand-rolled JSON/XML parsing via regex src/stdlib/datastar/datastar@1.0.4.js:9 — A regex whose pattern encodes JSON/XML syntax is parsing a structured format by hand — malformed or differently-typed content (e.g. `"amount": "5"` as a string) silently mis-parses instead of failing validation. This JavaScript/TypeScript code already uses a real parser in the same package; use it here too.
X7 · Silent fallback defaults · Silent fallback default on Err · ×1
  • Silent fallback default on Err src/response.rs:92 — `extract_http_response_meta` turns every `Err` into `HttpResponseMeta::default()` — a failure becomes a plausible value and a silent behavior change with no trail. Log the error or propagate it with `?`. If that constant is the correct answer rather than a stand-in for a value that could not be read, say so in a comment on the arm or in the doc comment, and the row stops firing.
Minor — 27 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×27
  • Outdated: arc-swap — `arc-swap` is locked at 1.9.2 but 1.9.3 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"1.7"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p arc-swap` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: clap — `clap` is locked at 4.5.54 but 4.6.7 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"4"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p clap` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: ctrlc — `ctrlc` is locked at 3.5.1 but 3.5.2 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"3.4"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p ctrlc` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: headers — `headers` is locked at 0.4.1 but 0.4.2 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.4.1"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p headers` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: http-body-util — `http-body-util` is locked at 0.1.3 but 0.1.5 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.1"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p http-body-util` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: hyper — `hyper` is locked at 1.8.1 but 1.12.0 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"1"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p hyper` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: hyper-util — `hyper-util` is locked at 0.1.19 but 0.1.21 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.1"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p hyper-util` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: nu-cli — `nu-cli` is locked at 0.116.0 but 0.116.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.116.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p nu-cli` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: nu-cmd-extra — `nu-cmd-extra` is locked at 0.116.0 but 0.116.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.116.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p nu-cmd-extra` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: nu-cmd-lang — `nu-cmd-lang` is locked at 0.116.0 but 0.116.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.116.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p nu-cmd-lang` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: nu-cmd-plugin — `nu-cmd-plugin` is locked at 0.116.0 but 0.116.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.116.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p nu-cmd-plugin` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: nu-command — `nu-command` is locked at 0.116.0 but 0.116.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.116.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p nu-command` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: nu-engine — `nu-engine` is locked at 0.116.0 but 0.116.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.116.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p nu-engine` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: nu-parser — `nu-parser` is locked at 0.116.0 but 0.116.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.116.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p nu-parser` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: nu-plugin — `nu-plugin` is locked at 0.116.0 but 0.116.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.116.0"` requirement declared in tests/test_plugin/Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p nu-plugin` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: nu-plugin-engine — `nu-plugin-engine` is locked at 0.116.0 but 0.116.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.116.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p nu-plugin-engine` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: nu-protocol — `nu-protocol` is locked at 0.116.0 but 0.116.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.116.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p nu-protocol` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: nu-std — `nu-std` is locked at 0.116.0 but 0.116.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.116.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p nu-std` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: nu-utils — `nu-utils` is locked at 0.116.0 but 0.116.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.116.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p nu-utils` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: rustls — `rustls` is locked at 0.23.45 but 0.23.46 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.23.28"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p rustls` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: serde_json — `serde_json` is locked at 1.0.149 but 1.0.154 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"1"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p serde_json` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: tokio — `tokio` is locked at 1.49.0 but 1.54.1 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"1"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p tokio` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: tokio-rustls — `tokio-rustls` is locked at 0.26.4 but 0.26.6 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.26.0"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p tokio-rustls` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: tokio-stream — `tokio-stream` is locked at 0.1.18 but 0.1.19 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.1"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p tokio-stream` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • Outdated: tokio-util — `tokio-util` is locked at 0.7.18 but 0.7.20 is the current stable release on crates.io, and it already satisfies the `"0.7"` requirement declared in Cargo.toml — so the lockfile is behind this repository's own declared range. Run `cargo update -p tokio-util` and commit the updated REDACTED.
  • + 2 more in this group — see findings.md.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-e5a3edf583024bfc8fd67db1cdf26a24/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-e5a3edf583024bfc8fd67db1cdf26a24/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .23artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update34artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D43 · Malicious Dependenciestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json

Run 01a160b6-6af9-7658-951c-a9b5e8eec327 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 19 · Warnings: 89 · Recommendations: 19 · Info: 27 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 21-10-2026 @ 23:05 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md