Public report — xs, published 30 Jul 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 30-07-2026 @ 01:13 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Cablehead/xs

66% At Risk
Architecture 100% Exemplary Domain Modelling 100% Exemplary Event Sourcing 100% Exemplary Code Health 81% Strong Maturity 76% Adequate Readiness 71% Strong Security 51% Adequate

Small · 10,030 LoC · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Security (51%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

31/34dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 3 LLM-assisted, advisory
80findings with an exact file:lineof 91 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
34/102dimensions across the health lenses10030 LoC — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Preview lens: this repo is pre-1.0 / in development, so the colour bands are relaxed to what a preview needs — *green* means good enough for a preview, not yet production-stable. Code correctness and security stay near-strict even here; the score itself is absolute and comparable across repos.

cablehead/xs is in good overall health (66%), but at least one category below sits in Adequate-or-worse territory — most items are improvements, and the weakest category contains work to schedule, not shelve.

It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Domain Modelling (100%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Security (51%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: 19 High finding(s) (Static Analysis (SAST)); Nothing pauses a release for a human (Deployment & Rollback); 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor (Bus Factor).

For scale: Small (~10,030 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 81% Strong Architecture 100% ★ Exemplary Maturity 76% Adequate · gated by D16 Readiness 71% Strong Security 51% Adequate · gated by D29, D36, D38 Domain Modelling 100% ★ Exemplary Event Sourcing 100% ★ Exemplary
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 51% · 46% weightReadiness 71% · 25% weightMaturity 76% · 14% weightCode Health 81% · 8% weightArchitecture 100% · 4% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 2% weightEvent Sourcing 100% · 1% weight

Raise Security 51 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 66 → ~74.

Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (39+)

39 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D3 · FileTooLong: store/mod.rs src/store/mod.rs
  • D3 · FileTooLong: src/main.rs src/main.rs
  • D3 · FileTooLong: src/api.rs src/api.rs
  • D19 · LLM evaluation failed
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-binaries.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-binaries.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-binaries.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-binaries.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-binaries.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-binaries.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-binaries.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-docker.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-docker.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/tmate.yml
  • D29 · High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/tmate.yml
  • D36 · PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block
  • D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock
  • D38 · Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0190 Cargo.lock
  • D38 · Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2023-0089 Cargo.lock
  • D38 · Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2025-0141 Cargo.lock
  • D38 · Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0183 Cargo.lock
  • D38 · Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0184 Cargo.lock
  • D38 · Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2024-0384 Cargo.lock
  • D38 · Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0002 Cargo.lock
  • D38 · Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0186 Cargo.lock
  • D38 · Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2024-0436 Cargo.lock
  • D38 · Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2026-0173 Cargo.lock
  • D38 · Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0097 Cargo.lock
  • D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock
  • D38 · Medium vulnerability: RUSTSEC-2026-0204 Cargo.lock
  • D38 · Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 .dagger/go.mod
  • D38 · Medium vulnerability: RUSTSEC-2026-0194 Cargo.lock

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €6,400–€32,000
Cost to rebuild€6,400–€32,000 (0.1–0.2 person-years (107–341 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.9× (at 66% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€19,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 51% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.9× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 19 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release-binaries.yml (8), ci.yml (4), deploy-docs.yml (3).
+7.3 pts · Medium effort · Static Analysis (SAST)
2
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor.
+2.1 pts · Low effort · Bus Factor
3
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
+3.4 pts · Medium effort · Deployment & Rollback

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 51%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (10,030 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 51%
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 19 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release-binaries.yml (8), ci.yml (4), deploy-docs.yml (3). The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 19 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release-binaries.yml (8), ci.yml (4), deploy-docs.yml (3).

At a glance — Code Health · 81% · Strong

The Good
D1 · Rust Cyclomatic Complexity 8.6 D3 · Rust God Classes 8.8 D4 · Rust Code Duplication 10.0
The Bad
D2 · Rust Cognitive Complexity 5.2

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
D7 · Rust Architectural Integrity 10.0 D35 · Rust Change Coupling 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 76% · Adequate · gated by D16

The Good
D15 · Rust Churn × Complexity Hotspots 9.7 D20 · Rust ADR Quality 8.4 D21 · Rust Naming Consistency 10.0 D25 · Rust ADR Conformance 10.0 D34 · Rust Knowledge Freshness 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.7 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 8.5 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 7.0
The Ugly
D16 · Rust Bus Factor 1.0

At a glance — Readiness · 71% · Strong

The Good
D13 · Rust Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 10.0
The Bad
P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 5.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0

At a glance — Security · 51% · Adequate · gated by D29, D36, D38

The Good
D28 · Rust Secrets (history) 10.0 D31 · Rust IaC & Container Security 9.2 D33 · Rust JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0
The Ugly
D29 · Rust Static Analysis (SAST) 0.4 D36 · Rust Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0 D38 · Rust OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.8

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
DM2 · Repo Strongly-typed ids 10.0 DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic domain model 10.0 DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 10.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0

At a glance — Event Sourcing · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
ES1 · Repo Fold determinism 10.0 ES2 · Repo Immutable events 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components27High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection19High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration3High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by resolving the 19 high-priority static analysis findings, prioritizing the release-binaries, ci, and deploy-docs workflows. Next, implement a draft release or approval gate to prevent bad builds from reaching users, and address the single off-boarding risk to improve team resilience. Finally, update the README to accurately reflect the project's current state and add a testing section to clarify how to run the test suite.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 19 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release-binaries.yml (8), ci.yml (4), deploy-docs.yml (3).+7.3 ptsMediumStatic Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor.+2.1 ptsLowBus Factor
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.+3.4 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile.release-docker (2).+1.5 ptsLowIaC & Container Security
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+1.5 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+1.5 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+1.5 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod.+1.5 ptsLowOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 18 files carrying findings, judged against the Preview bar: 11% slop · 33% mixed · 56% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
Cargo.lock0.4SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]
.dagger/go.mod1.0SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
.github/workflows/Dockerfile.release-docker3.7MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
.github/workflows/release-binaries.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/ci.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/release-docker.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/tmate.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/api.rs7.1Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: api::match_route (cyclomatic 20)
src/store/mod.rs7.2Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: Store::read (cyclomatic 31)
src/processor/service/service.rs7.2Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: service::run_loop (cyclomatic 18)
src/processor/action/serve.rs7.4Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: serve::run (cyclomatic 20)
src/main.rs7.4Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: main::main (cyclomatic 17)
src/client/types.rs7.8Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: RequestParts::parse (cyclomatic 18)
src/processor/service/serve.rs7.8Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: serve::run (cyclomatic 17)
src/processor/actor/serve.rs8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: serve::run (cognitive 49)
src/nu/commands/cat_stream_command.rs8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: CatStreamCommand::run (cognitive 16)
src/client/commands.rs8.5Near-cleanCognitive Complexity: commands::cat (cognitive 16)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 31 of 34 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 34 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D7D13D15D16D20D21D25D28D29D31D33D34D35D36D38AX9DM2DM4DM5DM6ES1ES2M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 80 of 91 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fb095-df92-7262-a1c7-a93df0eececc.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations: 4 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity: Layering is checked against detected/declared rules — an architecture whose boundaries live in convention or in code review, not in a rule a scanner can read, is not enforced here.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D25 ADR Conformance: ADR conformance is the LLM-scored fraction of sampled code that follows recorded decisions — it checks the decisions that were written down and the slices it sampled, not unrecorded rules or the whole tree.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
  • DM4 Rich vs anemic domain model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
  • DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D20, D21, D25, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity8.6 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

8 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Store::read at 31.

api::match_route (cyclomatic 20) · ×2src/api.rs:105
serve::run (cyclomatic 20) · ×2src/processor/action/serve.rs:278
Store::read (cyclomatic 31)src/store/mod.rs:592
RequestParts::parse (cyclomatic 18)src/client/types.rs:31
service::run_loop (cyclomatic 18)src/processor/service/service.rs:266

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 api finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with api.rs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 serve finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with serve.rs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Store finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with mod.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity5.2 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

14 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was Store::read at 97.

serve::run (cognitive 66) · ×4src/processor/action/serve.rs:278
service::build_input_pipeline (cognitive 23) · ×3src/processor/service/service.rs:484
api::handle_eval (cognitive 30) · ×2src/api.rs:650
Store::read (cognitive 97)src/store/mod.rs:592
RequestParts::parse (cognitive 29)src/client/types.rs:31

+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 serve finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with serve.rs (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 service finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with service.rs (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 api finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with api.rs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  4. Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

4 god class(es) detected.

FileTooLong: store/mod.rs · ×3src/store/mod.rs:0
TooManyMethods: Storesrc/store/mod.rs:454

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with mod.rs, main.rs, api.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with mod.rs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D7 · Architectural Integrity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the code respects its intended layering / architecture rules.

Method: Enforcement rung (Prevented/Verified/Documented) per checkable ADR via Roslyn, plus dependency cycles via the engine shared with D5/AX3. Deterministic, exact.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Of 4 mechanizable ADRs, 3 are prevented by analyzers, 1 by tests, 0 exist only in prose. Coverage: 100 %. Cycles found: 0.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d7_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Top hotspots: src/store/mod.rs (4×31=124); src/processor/service/service.rs (4×18=72); src/processor/action/serve.rs (3×20=60)

Hotspot: src/store/mod.rs · ×5src/store/mod.rs

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D16 · Bus Factor1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 1.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

28 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/store/mod.rs.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Evaluated 7 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 8.4/10 (consistently complete and clear). 0 flagged with a specific gap.

What to do

  1. Improve ADR Quality — currently 8.4/10. — Evaluated 7 ADR(s) individually; mean quality 8.4/10 (consistently complete and clear). 0 flagged with a specific gap.

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D25 · ADR Conformance / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the code actually follows the decisions recorded in the project's ADRs.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature against ADRs plus a deterministic structural code summary; findings linked to repo-rooted ADR paths for traceability. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 conform / 0 violate across 7 ADRs.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d25_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.4 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

19 finding(s): 0 critical, 19 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×19.github/workflows/ci.yml:20detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 19 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with release-binaries.yml (8), ci.yml (4), deploy-docs.yml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (19 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×2.github/workflows/Dockerfile.release-dockerdetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0001.github/workflows/Dockerfile.release-dockerdetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.8 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

27 finding(s): 1 critical, 7 high, 19 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×4.dagger/go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×3Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted].dagger/go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0190 · ×6Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×6Cargo.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (2), Cargo.lock (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 3 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with Cargo.lock (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

DM2 · Strongly-typed ids10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain identifiers are strongly typed (a newtype wrapper) rather than raw primitives — consistency once an idiom exists.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.

DM4 · Rich vs anemic domain model10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain entities own their behaviour (invariant-enforcing commands) rather than being data-only structs driven by a foreign service.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

DM5 · Encapsulated state10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether a domain type's identity-bearing field stays immutable — a `pub` mutable field under a hand-rolled Hash/PartialEq breaks the value-identity invariant.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (diesel/sea-orm/sqlx) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

ES1 · Fold determinism10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event Sourcing — Whether the recovery-replay fold is deterministic — state derived purely from each event's own fields, no clock/random/IO on the replay path.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan (event-sourcing gated): Apply/When folds checked for forbidden tokens (DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random, IO), stripped of comments/strings. Deterministic, hard fact per fold.

ES2 · Immutable events10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event Sourcing — Whether domain events stay immutable (private fields, set once) rather than carrying mutable state.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-sourcing gated): persisted events checked for public setters; immutability verified per property/field. Deterministic, hard fact.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 1 of 2 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation8.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Grow the ADR log (currently 8) — reach 20 to raise the maturity tier; document significant decisions as they're made.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy7.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

  • README claims a CLI tool but no installation guide exists
  • README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists

What to do

  • Reconcile the README with reality: README claims a CLI tool but no installation guide exists; README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.
P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health81%StrongSolid.
Architecture100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity76%Adequate — gated by D16Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness71%StrongSolid.
Security51%Adequate — gated by D29, D36, D38Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling100%ExemplarySolid.
Event Sourcing100%ExemplarySolid.
Not included — 68 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~6282 lines of test source are present (.rs) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
  • D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Cargo manifest, package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
  • D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.rs, .ts, .tsx) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Cargo manifest, package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .rs, .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
  • D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.rs) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for Rust: aggregate-vs-value-object classification cannot be told apart in source (every struct-holding-struct reads alike), and a child COLLECTION (legitimate membership) vs a single embedded aggregate is indistinguishable — advisory (the Swift/Dart parity)
  • DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for Rust: a cross-crate domain leak cannot be told apart in source from a legitimate shared-kernel crate, and most repositories ship a single crate — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for Rust: 'a repository per CHILD entity' needs the aggregate-root structure, which is not source-resolvable — reported as guidance rather than measured
  • ED2 Event/command shape — not gated in Rust source-only: a command with >1 competing handler needs a dispatch/call graph the source-only frontend cannot resolve (inferred/generic call owners decline) — advisory
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 29 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×19
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:20 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:64 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:68 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: cachix/install-nix-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `cachix/install-nix-action@v27`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/cachix/install-nix-action/commits/v27 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/ci.yml:71 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: cachix/cachix-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `cachix/cachix-action@v15`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/cachix/cachix-action/commits/v15 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml:14 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs.yml:30 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: peaceiris/actions-gh-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `peaceiris/actions-gh-pages@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/peaceiris/actions-gh-pages/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-binaries.yml:41 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/release-binaries.yml:46 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Reference it as a shell VARIABLE rather than a `${{ }}` interpolation, using your shell's own syntax (`"$ENVVAR"` in bash, `$env:ENVVAR` in PowerShell), so the value is passed as data and never re-expanded as code.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-binaries.yml:60 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/cache@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/cache@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/cache/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-binaries.yml:69 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: dagger/dagger-for-github@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `dagger/dagger-for-github@8.0.0`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/dagger/dagger-for-github/commits/8.0.0 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-binaries.yml:94 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/upload-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/upload-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/upload-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-binaries.yml:109 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-binaries.yml:112 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/download-artifact@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/download-artifact@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/download-artifact/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-binaries.yml:132 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: softprops/action-gh-release@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `softprops/action-gh-release@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/softprops/action-gh-release/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-docker.yml:21 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/release-docker.yml:25 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions-rs/toolchain@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions-rs/toolchain@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions-rs/toolchain/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/tmate.yml:15 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/tmate.yml:18 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: mxschmitt/action-tmate@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `mxschmitt/action-tmate@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/mxschmitt/action-tmate/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×4
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] .dagger/go.mod — go.opentelemetry.io/otel 1.36.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.41.0
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] .dagger/go.mod — go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk 1.36.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.40.0 One upgrade of go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk 1.36.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — lz4_flex 0.11.5: [GHSA redacted] — lz4_flex is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by fjall 3.0.1 and lsm-tree 3.0.1, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p lz4_flex@0.11.5 --precise 0.11.6`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — quinn-proto 0.11.13: [GHSA redacted] — quinn-proto is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by quinn 0.11.9, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p quinn-proto@0.11.13 --precise 0.11.15`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against quinn-proto 0.11.13, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.11.15 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.11.15 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of quinn-proto 0.11.13 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×3
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — aws-lc-sys 0.35.0: [GHSA redacted] — aws-lc-sys is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by aws-lc-rs 1.15.2, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or add a `[patch.crates-io]` entry for aws-lc-sys — 0.39.0 is not semver-compatible with the resolved 0.35.0, so `cargo update --precise` cannot select it). This is 1 of 5 advisories this scan raises against aws-lc-sys 0.35.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.39.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.39.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of aws-lc-sys 0.35.0 clears all 5 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — hickory-proto 0.25.2: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace hickory-proto if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands. One upgrade of hickory-proto 0.25.2 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
  • High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — rustls-webpki 0.103.8: [GHSA redacted] — rustls-webpki is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by iroh 0.91.2 and iroh-relay 0.91.2 and 2 others, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p rustls-webpki@0.103.8 --precise 0.103.13`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against rustls-webpki 0.103.8, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.103.13 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.103.13 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of rustls-webpki 0.103.8 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], RUSTSEC-2026-0098, RUSTSEC-2026-0099.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×2
  • High IaC: DS-0002 .github/workflows/Dockerfile.release-docker — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0029 .github/workflows/Dockerfile.release-docker — 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×1
  • Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] .dagger/go.mod — google.golang.org/grpc 1.73.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.79.3 One upgrade of google.golang.org/grpc 1.73.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Warning — 54 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium advisory (unsound) · ×6
  • Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0190 Cargo.lock — anyhow 1.0.100: RUSTSEC-2026-0190 — anyhow is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by n0-snafu 0.2.2 and netlink-packet-core 0.7.0 and 9 others, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p anyhow@1.0.100 --precise 1.0.103`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
  • Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0183 Cargo.lock — git2 0.20.4: RUSTSEC-2026-0183 — git2 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by fff-search 0.8.4, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or add a `[patch.crates-io]` entry for git2 — 0.21.0 is not semver-compatible with the resolved 0.20.4, so `cargo update --precise` cannot select it).
  • Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0184 Cargo.lock — git2 0.20.4: RUSTSEC-2026-0184 — git2 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by fff-search 0.8.4, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or add a `[patch.crates-io]` entry for git2 — 0.21.0 is not semver-compatible with the resolved 0.20.4, so `cargo update --precise` cannot select it).
  • Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0002 Cargo.lock — lru 0.13.0: RUSTSEC-2026-0002 — lru is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by iroh-relay 0.91.2 and pkarr 3.10.0, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or add a `[patch.crates-io]` entry for lru — 0.16.3 is not semver-compatible with the resolved 0.13.0, so `cargo update --precise` cannot select it).
  • Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0186 Cargo.lock — memmap2 0.5.10: RUSTSEC-2026-0186 — memmap2 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by cacache 13.1.0, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or add a `[patch.crates-io]` entry for memmap2 — 0.9.11 is not semver-compatible with the resolved 0.5.10, so `cargo update --precise` cannot select it).
  • Medium advisory (unsound): RUSTSEC-2026-0097 Cargo.lock — rand 0.8.5: RUSTSEC-2026-0097 — upgrade to 0.8.6
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×6
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] Cargo.lock — bytes 1.11.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.11.1
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] .dagger/go.mod — go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlplog/otlploghttp 0.12.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.19.0
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] .dagger/go.mod — golang.org/x/net 0.41.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/net is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/net@v0.55.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). One upgrade of golang.org/x/net 0.41.0 clears all 10 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], GO-2026-4440, GO-2026-4441, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-5025, GO-2026-5026, GO-2026-5027, GO-2026-5029, GO-2026-5030, GO-2026-5942.
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 .dagger/go.mod — golang.org/x/sys 0.33.0 (golang.org/x/sys/windows): GO-2026-5024 — golang.org/x/sys is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/sys@v0.44.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
  • Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 .dagger/go.mod — golang.org/x/text 0.26.0 (golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm): GO-2026-5970 — golang.org/x/text is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/text@v0.39.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
  • Medium CVE: GO-2025-3849 .dagger/go.mod — stdlib 1.24.4 (database/sql): GO-2025-3849 — fixed in Go 1.24.6; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. One upgrade of stdlib 1.24.4 clears all 39 advisories it raises: GO-2025-3849, GO-2025-3956, GO-2025-4006, GO-2025-4007, GO-2025-4008, GO-2025-4009, GO-2025-4010, GO-2025-4011, GO-2025-4012, GO-2025-4013, GO-2025-4014, GO-2025-4015, GO-2025-4155, GO-2025-4175, GO-2026-4337, GO-2026-4340, GO-2026-4341, GO-2026-4342, GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · Hotspot · ×5
  • Hotspot: src/store/mod.rs src/store/mod.rs — src/store/mod.rs changed 4 times in last 90 days, max complexity 31.
  • Hotspot: src/processor/service/service.rs src/processor/service/service.rs — src/processor/service/service.rs changed 4 times in last 90 days, max complexity 18. 2 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: src/processor/action/serve.rs src/processor/action/serve.rs — src/processor/action/serve.rs changed 3 times in last 90 days, max complexity 20. 1 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: src/api.rs src/api.rs — src/api.rs changed 2 times in last 90 days, max complexity 20. 1 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
  • Hotspot: src/processor/actor/serve.rs src/processor/actor/serve.rs — src/processor/actor/serve.rs changed 2 times in last 90 days, max complexity 15. 1 of those changes were fix/bug commits — a defect-dense hotspot worth prioritising.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium advisory (unmaintained) · ×5
  • Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2023-0089 Cargo.lock — atomic-polyfill 1.0.3: RUSTSEC-2023-0089 — no fixed version exists: the advisory reports the package as unmaintained. atomic-polyfill is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by heapless 0.7.17, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
  • Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2025-0141 Cargo.lock — bincode 1.3.3: RUSTSEC-2025-0141 — no fixed version exists: the advisory reports the package as unmaintained. bincode is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by heed-types 0.21.0, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
  • Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2024-0384 Cargo.lock — instant 0.1.13: RUSTSEC-2024-0384 — no fixed version exists: the advisory reports the package as unmaintained. instant is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by iroh 0.91.2, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
  • Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2024-0436 Cargo.lock — paste 1.0.15: RUSTSEC-2024-0436 — no fixed version exists: the advisory reports the package as unmaintained. paste is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by netlink-packet-utils 0.5.2 and stun-rs 0.1.11, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
  • Medium advisory (unmaintained): RUSTSEC-2026-0173 Cargo.lock — proc-macro-error2 2.0.1: RUSTSEC-2026-0173 — no fixed version exists: the advisory reports the package as unmaintained. proc-macro-error2 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by nu-derive-value 0.113.1, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · serve · ×4
  • serve::run (cognitive 66) src/processor/action/serve.rs:278 — serve::run has cognitive complexity 66 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 57, match/switch 5, loops 4 (nesting depth added 48). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • serve::run (cognitive 49) src/processor/actor/serve.rs:129 — serve::run has cognitive complexity 49 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 40, match/switch 5, loops 4 (nesting depth added 36). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • serve::run (cognitive 47) src/processor/service/serve.rs:108 — serve::run has cognitive complexity 47 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 37, loops 5, match/switch 5 (nesting depth added 32). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • serve::execute_action (cognitive 23) src/processor/action/serve.rs:92 — serve::execute_action has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12, loops 6, match/switch 5 (nesting depth added 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · service · ×3
  • service::build_input_pipeline (cognitive 23) src/processor/service/service.rs:484 — service::build_input_pipeline has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20, match/switch 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 16). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • service::run_loop (cognitive 18) src/processor/service/service.rs:266 — service::run_loop has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9, match/switch 6, loops 3 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • service::run_pipeline (cognitive 17) src/processor/service/service.rs:543 — service::run_pipeline has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7, loops 5, match/switch 5 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×3
  • FileTooLong: store/mod.rs src/store/mod.rs:0 — FileTooLong — 711 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted).
  • FileTooLong: src/main.rs src/main.rs:0 — FileTooLong — 564 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted).
  • FileTooLong: src/api.rs src/api.rs:0 — FileTooLong — 528 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded, and inline test code — #[cfg(test)] modules and bare #[test] functions — not counted).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · api · ×2
  • api::match_route (cyclomatic 20) src/api.rs:105 — api::match_route has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
  • api::handle_eval (cyclomatic 17) src/api.rs:650 — api::handle_eval has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · serve · ×2
  • serve::run (cyclomatic 20) src/processor/action/serve.rs:278 — serve::run has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
  • serve::run (cyclomatic 17) src/processor/service/serve.rs:108 — serve::run has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · api · ×2
  • api::handle_eval (cognitive 30) src/api.rs:650 — api::handle_eval has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 13, if/else 12, loops 5 (nesting depth added 19). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
  • api::match_route (cognitive 21) src/api.rs:105 — api::match_route has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: match/switch 13, if/else 8 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium vulnerability · ×2
  • Medium vulnerability: RUSTSEC-2026-0204 Cargo.lock — crossbeam-epoch 0.9.18: RUSTSEC-2026-0204 — crossbeam-epoch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by crossbeam-deque 0.8.6 and crossbeam-skiplist 0.1.3 and 1 other, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or force it with `cargo update -p crossbeam-epoch@0.9.18 --precise 0.9.20`, or a `[patch.crates-io]` entry).
  • Medium vulnerability: RUSTSEC-2026-0194 Cargo.lock — quick-xml 0.38.4: RUSTSEC-2026-0194 — quick-xml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively by wayland-scanner 0.31.8, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or add a `[patch.crates-io]` entry for quick-xml — 0.41.0 is not semver-compatible with the resolved 0.38.4, so `cargo update --precise` cannot select it). One upgrade of quick-xml 0.38.4 clears all 2 advisories it raises: RUSTSEC-2026-0194, RUSTSEC-2026-0195.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Store · ×1
  • Store::read (cyclomatic 31) src/store/mod.rs:592 — Store::read has cyclomatic complexity 31 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · RequestParts · ×1
  • RequestParts::parse (cyclomatic 18) src/client/types.rs:31 — RequestParts::parse has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · service · ×1
  • service::run_loop (cyclomatic 18) src/processor/service/service.rs:266 — service::run_loop has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · main · ×1
  • main::main (cyclomatic 17) src/main.rs:264 — main::main has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Where every arm is uniform — the same kind of value, with no behaviour of its own — a table keyed by the case is the shorter form; wherever the arms carry different data or different behaviour, keep them as cases, because collapsing those trades an explicit, reviewable set of cases for nothing.
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1116.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · Store · ×1
  • Store::read (cognitive 97) src/store/mod.rs:592 — Store::read has cognitive complexity 97 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 78, loops 14, match/switch 5 (nesting depth added 64). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · RequestParts · ×1
  • RequestParts::parse (cognitive 29) src/client/types.rs:31 — RequestParts::parse has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 25, boolean chains 4 (nesting depth added 3). To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · CatStreamCommand · ×1
  • CatStreamCommand::run (cognitive 16) src/nu/commands/cat_stream_command.rs:84 — CatStreamCommand::run has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9, match/switch 5, loops 2 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · commands · ×1
  • commands::cat (cognitive 16) src/client/commands.rs:16 — commands::cat has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, match/switch 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · main · ×1
  • main::find_paths (cognitive 16) src/main.rs:750 — main::find_paths has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10, loops 5, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×1
  • TooManyMethods: Store src/store/mod.rs:454 — TooManyMethods — 31 methods.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×1
  • Medium IaC: DS-0001 .github/workflows/Dockerfile.release-docker — ':latest' tag used
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 18 floating ref(s) across 5 workflow file(s): `actions/checkout@v4` (.github/workflows/tmate.yml:15), `mxschmitt/action-tmate@v3` (.github/workflows/tmate.yml:18), `actions/checkout@v4` (.github/workflows/release-docker.yml:21), `actions-rs/toolchain@v1` (.github/workflows/release-docker.yml:25), `actions/checkout@v4` (.github/workflows/release-binaries.yml:41), `actions/cache@v4` (.github/workflows/release-binaries.yml:60), `dagger/dagger-for-github@8.0.0` (.github/workflows/release-binaries.yml:69), `actions/upload-artifact@v4` (.github/workflows/release-binaries.yml:94), … (+10 more)
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block · ×1
  • PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block — 1 workflow(s) triggered by pull_request declare no `permissions:` block (ci.yml) and so run with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, while sibling workflows in the same repository are already scoped. Pull-request runs build the least-trusted code in the repository; give each of these workflows its own least-privilege block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of the workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
Recommendation — 6 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.rs) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 28 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/store/mod.rs, src/api.rs, src/main.rs, src/processor/service/service.rs, src/nu/test_commands.rs, src/processor/actor/actor.rs, src/nu/engine.rs, src/listener.rs (+20 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, `cargo publish` from CI under crates.io trusted publishing (OIDC) rather than a long-lived token for crates) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`cargo sbom` or `cargo cyclonedx` for the Cargo dependency graph — or `cargo auditable build`, which embeds it in the shipped binary, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not included · ×1
  • Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.rs) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `cargo llvm-cov --lcov --output-path lcov.info`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Cargo manifest, package.json) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .19artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesnone (no readable dependency manifest)—none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .3artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .27artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019fb095-df92-7262-a1c7-a93df0eececc · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 29 · Warnings: 54 · Recommendations: 6 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 30-07-2026 @ 01:13 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md