Event-driven media management Jellyfin plugin
Public report — JellyPy, published 19 Jun 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 19-06-2026 @ 21:44 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Caleb-Venner/JellyPy

45% Poor

Small · 7,364 LoC · 2 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Security (30%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

57/61dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 4 LLM-assisted, advisory
79findings with an exact file:lineof 123 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
61/91dimensions across the health lenses7364 LoC · 2 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

caleb-venner/JellyPy carries serious risk (45%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

The area that most needs attention is Security (30%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (54%) is the next concern — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Protect endpoints by default-deny (Access Controls); security response headers (Content-Security-Policy (Web-Security Posture); Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions… (Architecture documentation).

For scale: Small (~7,364 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 49%Plumbing 44%Tests 6%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €5,800–€30,000
Cost to rebuild€5,800–€30,000 (0.1–0.2 person-years (97–315 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 45% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 41% boilerplate · 7% straight-line · 53% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€18,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 30% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — service/app, high decision density × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
+5.6 pts · Medium effort · Access Controls
2
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
+3.1 pts · Medium effort · Web-Security Posture
3
Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
+2.7 pts · Medium effort · Architecture documentation

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 30%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (7,364 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 30%
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy JellyPy

At a glance — Code Health · 66% · Fair · gated by X5

At a glance — Architecture · 76% · Fair · gated by D26

At a glance — Maturity · 56% · Fair · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 54% · Fair · gated by D8, D14, P7

At a glance — Security · 30% · Poor · gated by D36, C2

At a glance — Accessibility · 63% · Fair

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components2High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures1Medium

Roadmap

First, secure all endpoints by implementing default-deny access controls and role-based authorization to protect against unauthorized access. Next, harden the web security posture by adding critical response headers and ensuring secure cookie configurations to defend against common vulnerabilities. Then, establish an architecture decision record to document significant technical choices and their rationale for future reference. Finally, enforce accessibility standards by integrating automated testing tools and gating them in the CI pipeline, while also correcting basic HTML structure and heading hierarchy.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.+5.6 ptsMediumAccess Controls
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.+3.1 ptsMediumWeb-Security Posture
Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.+2.7 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.+2.5 ptsMediumA11y enforcement
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.+2.4 ptsMediumPage structure
Resolve the 6 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance.+0.9 ptsLowLicense Compliance
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.+0.8 ptsLowADR Quality
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.+1.5 ptsMediumNullable reference types

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 15 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 40% mixed · 60% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ArrIntegrationService.cs7.4MixedCyclomatic Complexity: ArrIntegrationService.ProcessEpisodeAsync (cyclomatic 18)
Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ScriptExecutionService.cs7.4MixedCognitive Complexity: ScriptExecutionService.ExecuteScriptSettingAsync (cognitive 17)
Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.csproj7.6MixedExplicit Debt: NoWarnInCsproj
Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/SeriesEpisodesAddedHandler.cs7.8MixedCognitive Complexity: SeriesEpisodesAddedHandler.ExtractEventData (cognitive 17)
Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/PlaybackPauseHandler.cs7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (27 lines × 3)
Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/Helpers/EncryptionHelper.cs7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)
Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/JellyPyApiController.cs8.0Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (29 lines × 2)
Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: BareSuppressMessage
Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/DataAttributeProcessor.cs8.5Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: DataAttributeProcessor.GetAttributeValue (cyclomatic 25)
Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ConditionEvaluator.cs8.5Near-cleanCyclomatic Complexity: ConditionEvaluator.GetFieldValue (cyclomatic 21)
Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Arr/SonarrService.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (19 lines × 2)
Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/ItemAddedHandler.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (15 lines × 2)
Jellyfin.Plugin.Jellypy/Configuration/PluginConfiguration.cs8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: PluginConfiguration.cs ↔ ScriptExecutionService.cs
Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.Tests/AutoEncryptionTests.cs9.3Near-cleanComment Value: redundant comment
Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.Tests/TestFixtureBase.cs9.5Near-cleanComment Value: redundant comment

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 57 of 61 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 4 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 61 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D16D17D18D19D20D21D22D24D26D27D28D29D30D34D35D36AC2AC3AC6AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX8C2GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P6P7S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 79 of 123 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementQwen/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019ee1d7-e651-74cd-983d-eef26c6529b8.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
  • D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct, and component-wrapped fields (e.g. a <TextField>) are skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — only literal inline colours and in-repo <style>-block CSS are read; external stylesheets, CSS-in-JS, computed/runtime/theme colour, and image contrast are all out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the markup itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (6): D19, D20, D21, D22, D24, M4 (model: Qwen/Qwen3.5-35B-A3B). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

3 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was DataAttributeProcessor.GetAttributeValue at 25.

DataAttributeProcessor.GetAttributeValue (cyclomatic 25)Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/DataAttributeProcessor.cs:109
ConditionEvaluator.GetFieldValue (cyclomatic 21)Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ConditionEvaluator.cs:90
ArrIntegrationService.ProcessEpisodeAsync (cyclomatic 18)Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ArrIntegrationService.cs:85

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ArrIntegrationService.ProcessEpisodeAsync at 22.

ArrIntegrationService.ProcessEpisodeAsync (cognitive 22)Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ArrIntegrationService.cs:85
SeriesEpisodesAddedHandler.ExtractEventData (cognitive 17)Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/SeriesEpisodesAddedHandler.cs:96
ScriptExecutionService.ExecuteScriptSettingAsync (cognitive 17)Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ScriptExecutionService.cs:104
ArrIntegrationService.ProcessPlaybackStopAsync (cognitive 16)Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ArrIntegrationService.cs:310
ScriptExecutionService.IsExecutableAvailable (cognitive 16)Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ScriptExecutionService.cs:421

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

9 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (29 lines × 2) · ×2Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/JellyPyApiController.cs:473
Duplicated block (27 lines × 3)Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/PlaybackPauseHandler.cs:49
Duplicated block (20 lines × 2)Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/PlaybackPauseHandler.cs:102
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2)Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Arr/SonarrService.cs:199
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2)Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/ItemAddedHandler.cs:98

+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling6.0 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Off the main sequence: Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 24 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D8 · Code Coverage3.0 / 10Poor✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 3.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 11.7%, branch coverage 7.0%.

What to do

  1. Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

14 test methods: 14 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

Unit tests
Integration tests
BDD tests
E2E tests

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 14 tests.

Mock framework: Moq

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

11 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 1 deprecated packages.

Deprecated: xunit
Outdated: Jellyfin.Common · ×11

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

6 of 13 packages use a banned license.

Banned license: Jellyfin.Controller · ×6
Licenses scanned

What to do

  1. Resolve the 6 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
  2. Enforce License Compliance in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor8.4 / 10Healthy✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Notifications/NtfyService.cs, held by 142469824+caleb-venner@users.noreply.github.com.

Knowledge silo · ×2Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Notifications/NtfyService.cs
Knowledge silo · ×8Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/Helpers/EncryptionHelper.cs
Off-boarding risk: 142469824+caleb-venner@users.noreply.github.com

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Knowledge silo finding(s) in Bus Factor — start with ArrIntegrationService.cs, NtfyService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 8 Knowledge silo finding(s) in Bus Factor — start with ArrBaseService.cs, ConfigurationValidator.cs, EncryptionHelper.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 deducted debt markers + 1 dead symbols across 7364 LoC (0.2/KLoC) → score 9.6.

NoWarnInCsprojJellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.csproj:10
BareSuppressMessageJellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:8
Justified suppression · ×28Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/JellyPyApiController.cs:347

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 projects, 67 .cs files, 7844 hand-written lines of code (7364 production / 480 test), 1 inter-project edges.

Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy (Production)Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.csproj
Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.Tests (Test)Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.Tests/Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.Tests.csproj

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Healthy◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Healthy / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The documentation is generally well-structured and provides a clear overview of the plugin's features and installation methods. The inclusion of a testing harness for scripts is a strong positive, offering practical value to developers. However, the main README suffers from a significant formatting error where a sentence is abruptly cut off, and the overall structure could benefit from better visual hierarchy and more explicit configuration examples.

XML-doc coverage: Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPyJellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.csproj

What to do

  1. Improve Documentation Quality — currently 7.0/10. — The documentation is generally well-structured and provides a clear overview of the plugin's features and installation methods. The inclusion of a testing harness for scripts is a strong positive, offering practical value to developers. However, the main README suffers from a significant formatting error where a sentence is abruptly cut off, and the overall structure could benefit from better visual hierarchy and more explicit configuration examples.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D22 · Internal API Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No public API surface exposed; nothing to be inconsistent.

No exposed public API

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D24 · Comment Value / 10Fair◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Fair / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

28 valuable / 35 redundant across 200 sampled comments; 4 shown with locations.

redundant comment · ×4Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.Tests/AutoEncryptionTests.cs:17

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with AutoEncryptionTests.cs (2), JellyPyApiController.cs, TestFixtureBase.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion3.5 / 10Poor✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 3.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 2 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Split Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Split Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D27 · Navigability9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

83 % of calls cross a namespace and 5 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)6.0 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities8.8 / 10Healthy✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness5.3 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

14 of 30 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Notifications/NtfyService.cs.

Orphaned knowledge · ×2Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Notifications/NtfyService.cs
Orphaned knowledge · ×12Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Arr/SonarrService.cs

What to do

  1. Resolve the 12 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with ArrBaseService.cs, ConfigurationValidator.cs, DataAttributeProcessor.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Orphaned knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with ArrIntegrationService.cs, NtfyService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: PluginConfiguration.cs↔ScriptExecutionService.cs 55%

Change coupling: PluginConfiguration.cs ↔ ScriptExecutionService.csJellyfin.Plugin.Jellypy/Configuration/PluginConfiguration.cs

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC2 · Forms & labels10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, fieldsets have a legend, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

AC3 · Page structure4.3 / 10Poor✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language and title, expose a main landmark and a sane heading order, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

  • No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — configPage.html:2

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible, never computed or runtime colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Poor✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition7.1 / 10Healthy✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

  • The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons4.5 / 10Poor✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

  • `ItemAddedManager` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_cancellationTokenSource, _processingTask; e.g. `_cancellationTokenSource` at line 158). — ItemAddedManager.cs:26
  • `ItemDeletedManager` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_cancellationTokenSource, _processingTask; e.g. `_cancellationTokenSource` at line 53). — ItemDeletedManager.cs:19
  • `ScriptExecutionService` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_disposed; e.g. `_disposed` at line 656). — ScriptExecutionService.cs:22

What to do

  • Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

C2 · Access Controls0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

  • No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.

What to do

  • Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Healthy✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add a README to the 2 of 2 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
  • Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability7.0 / 10Healthy✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling4.0 / 10Poor✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback7.0 / 10Healthy✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

  • Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Poor✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

  • The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.

What to do

  • Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
S1 · Web-Security Posture4.5 / 10Poor✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
  • No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
  • Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
  • Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X2 · Cancellation propagation5.1 / 10Fair✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 9/48 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) — JellyPyApiController.cs:445, JellyPyApiController.cs:529, JellyPyApiController.cs:613, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types1.9 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 0/1 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
  • ~0.3 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 10 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria — partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health66%Fair — gated by X5Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture76%Fair — gated by D26Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Maturity56%Fair — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness54%Fair — gated by D8, D14, P7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security30%Poor — gated by D36, C2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility63%FairStrongest area.
Not included — 30 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — With only 7364 lines of code across a single project, the codebase is small enough that declaring explicit boundaries would be unnecessary overkill.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — Not applicable
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Not applicable
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not applicable
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — Not applicable
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not applicable
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — No checkable ADRs to assess
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present but no domain-layer files were identified (no /Domain//Aggregates/ paths)
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 13 finding(s)
D14 · License Compliance · Banned license · ×6
  • Banned license: Jellyfin.Controller — Jellyfin.Controller 10.10.6 is licensed GPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Jellyfin.Model — Jellyfin.Model 10.10.6 is licensed GPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Jellyfin.Common — Jellyfin.Common 10.10.6 is licensed GPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Jellyfin.Naming — Jellyfin.Naming 10.10.6 is licensed GPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Jellyfin.Extensions — Jellyfin.Extensions 10.10.6 is licensed GPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Jellyfin.Data — Jellyfin.Data 10.10.6 is licensed GPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
D16 · Bus Factor · Knowledge silo · ×2
  • Knowledge silo Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Notifications/NtfyService.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by 142469824+caleb-venner@users.noreply.github.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ArrIntegrationService.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by 142469824+caleb-venner@users.noreply.github.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×2
  • High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned knowledge · ×2
  • Orphaned knowledge Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Notifications/NtfyService.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ArrIntegrationService.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×1
  • NoWarnInCsproj Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.csproj:10 — CS8632
Warning — 42 finding(s)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned knowledge · ×12
  • Orphaned knowledge Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Arr/SonarrService.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/DataAttributeProcessor.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/Helpers/EncryptionHelper.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/LoggerExtensions.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Arr/ArrBaseService.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/Helpers/ConfigurationValidator.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Arr/RadarrService.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Models/EventData.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Models/SeriesEpisodeGroup.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Arr/Models/RadarrMovieDetails.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
  • Orphaned knowledge Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Arr/ISonarrService.cs — No living knowledge remains for this file — its last meaningful change has decayed away; if it breaks, no one currently understands it. Schedule a read-through / add characterisation tests before it bites.
D16 · Bus Factor · Knowledge silo · ×8
  • Knowledge silo Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/Helpers/EncryptionHelper.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by 142469824+caleb-venner@users.noreply.github.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by caleb.p.venner@student.uts.edu.au — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/LoggerExtensions.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by 142469824+caleb-venner@users.noreply.github.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Arr/ArrBaseService.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by 142469824+caleb-venner@users.noreply.github.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/Helpers/ConfigurationValidator.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by 142469824+caleb-venner@users.noreply.github.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Models/EventData.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by 142469824+caleb-venner@users.noreply.github.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Models/SeriesEpisodeGroup.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by 142469824+caleb-venner@users.noreply.github.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
  • Knowledge silo Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Arr/Models/RadarrMovieDetails.cs — 100 % of this file's living knowledge is held by 142469824+caleb-venner@users.noreply.github.com — if they are unavailable, no one else has recently worked it.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (29 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (29 lines × 2) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/JellyPyApiController.cs:473 — Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/JellyPyApiController.cs:473-501 | Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/JellyPyApiController.cs:557-585
  • Duplicated block (29 lines × 2) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ScriptExecutionService.cs:427 — Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ScriptExecutionService.cs:427-454 | Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ScriptExecutionService.cs:463-491
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · DataAttributeProcessor.GetAttributeValue (cyclomatic 25) · ×1
  • DataAttributeProcessor.GetAttributeValue (cyclomatic 25) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/DataAttributeProcessor.cs:109 — DataAttributeProcessor.GetAttributeValue has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · ConditionEvaluator.GetFieldValue (cyclomatic 21) · ×1
  • ConditionEvaluator.GetFieldValue (cyclomatic 21) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ConditionEvaluator.cs:90 — ConditionEvaluator.GetFieldValue has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15).
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · ArrIntegrationService.ProcessEpisodeAsync (cyclomatic 18) · ×1
  • ArrIntegrationService.ProcessEpisodeAsync (cyclomatic 18) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ArrIntegrationService.cs:85 — ArrIntegrationService.ProcessEpisodeAsync has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×1
  • Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.6.3 — Legacy xunit.v3 >= 0.0.0
D17 · Explicit Debt · BareSuppressMessage · ×1
  • BareSuppressMessage Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:8 — SuppressMessage
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ArrIntegrationService.ProcessEpisodeAsync (cognitive 22) · ×1
  • ArrIntegrationService.ProcessEpisodeAsync (cognitive 22) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ArrIntegrationService.cs:85 — ArrIntegrationService.ProcessEpisodeAsync has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · SeriesEpisodesAddedHandler.ExtractEventData (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • SeriesEpisodesAddedHandler.ExtractEventData (cognitive 17) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/SeriesEpisodesAddedHandler.cs:96 — SeriesEpisodesAddedHandler.ExtractEventData has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ScriptExecutionService.ExecuteScriptSettingAsync (cognitive 17) · ×1
  • ScriptExecutionService.ExecuteScriptSettingAsync (cognitive 17) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ScriptExecutionService.cs:104 — ScriptExecutionService.ExecuteScriptSettingAsync has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ArrIntegrationService.ProcessPlaybackStopAsync (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • ArrIntegrationService.ProcessPlaybackStopAsync (cognitive 16) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ArrIntegrationService.cs:310 — ArrIntegrationService.ProcessPlaybackStopAsync has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ScriptExecutionService.IsExecutableAvailable (cognitive 16) · ×1
  • ScriptExecutionService.IsExecutableAvailable (cognitive 16) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ScriptExecutionService.cs:421 — ScriptExecutionService.IsExecutableAvailable has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15).
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×1
  • Change coupling: PluginConfiguration.cs ↔ ScriptExecutionService.cs Jellyfin.Plugin.Jellypy/Configuration/PluginConfiguration.cs — `Jellyfin.Plugin.Jellypy/Configuration/PluginConfiguration.cs` and `Jellyfin.Plugin.Jellypy/Services/ScriptExecutionService.cs` change together 55% of the time (6 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (27 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (27 lines × 3) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/PlaybackPauseHandler.cs:49 — Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/PlaybackPauseHandler.cs:49-75 | Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/PlaybackResumeHandler.cs:49-75 | Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/PlaybackStartHandler.cs:51-77
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/PlaybackPauseHandler.cs:102 — Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/PlaybackPauseHandler.cs:102-121 | Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/PlaybackResumeHandler.cs:102-121
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Arr/SonarrService.cs:199 — Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Arr/SonarrService.cs:199-215 | Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/Arr/SonarrService.cs:236-254
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/ItemAddedHandler.cs:98 — Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/ItemAddedHandler.cs:98-112 | Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/ItemDeletedHandler.cs:92-106
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/Helpers/EncryptionHelper.cs:84 — Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/Helpers/EncryptionHelper.cs:84-97 | Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/Helpers/EncryptionHelper.cs:156-169
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/SeriesEpisodesAddedHandler.cs:139 — Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/SeriesEpisodesAddedHandler.cs:139-150 | Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Handlers/SeriesEpisodesAddedHandler.cs:154-165
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/Helpers/EncryptionHelper.cs:57 — Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/Helpers/EncryptionHelper.cs:57-65 | Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/Helpers/EncryptionHelper.cs:118-126
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1
  • Off the main sequence: Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy — Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy: abstractness 0.13, instability 0.00, distance 0.87 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Recommendation — 19 finding(s)
D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×4
  • redundant comment Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.Tests/AutoEncryptionTests.cs:17 — "// Arrange" — Remove. 'Arrange' is a standard test pattern label, not a code explanation.
  • redundant comment Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.Tests/AutoEncryptionTests.cs:24 — "// Assert" — Remove. Standard test pattern label.
  • redundant comment Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/JellyPyApiController.cs:345 — "// Check if file exists" — Remove. The code `File.Exists` or similar is self-explanatory.
  • redundant comment Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.Tests/TestFixtureBase.cs:25 — "// Initialize EncryptionHelper with the mock" — Remove. The code `new Mock<EncryptionHelper>()` is clear.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: 142469824+caleb-venner@users.noreply.github.com — If 142469824+caleb-venner@users.noreply.github.com becomes unavailable, 9 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner — the largest single-person knowledge concentration (weighted toward the domain core). Pair, review, or document these before any departure.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · With only 7364 lines of code across a single project, the codebase is small enough that declaring explicit boundaries would be unnecessary overkill. · ×1
  • With only 7364 lines of code across a single project, the codebase is small enough that declaring explicit boundaries would be unnecessary overkill. — With only 7364 lines of code across a single project, the codebase is small enough that declaring explicit boundaries would be unnecessary overkill. Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.
D25 · ADR Conformance · no ADRs to check · ×1
  • no ADRs to check — No ADRs found, so conformance can't be assessed.
D26 · Project Cohesion · Split Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy · ×1
  • Split Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy — The project contains a high number of public types spread across many namespaces, indicating a lack of single-responsibility focus. Suggested: by namespace: group related types into separate projects or namespaces
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Not applicable · ×1
  • Not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) · Not applicable · ×1
  • Not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities · Not applicable · ×1
  • Not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI (e.g. cosign / sigstore / gitsign).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy · Not applicable · ×1
  • Not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Not applicable · ×1
  • Not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
D7 · Architectural Integrity · No checkable ADRs to assess · ×1
  • No checkable ADRs to assess — No architecture decision records were found and the project graph is acyclic, so architectural integrity could not be assessed. Add ADRs (with `enforcement: analyzer|test`) to make the architecture's rules checkable.
Info — 49 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · Justified suppression · ×28
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/JellyPyApiController.cs:347 — #pragma warning disable CA2050, CA3003 // File path injection
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/JellyPyApiController.cs:362 — #pragma warning disable CA2050, CA3003 // File path injection
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Configuration/JellyPyApiController.cs:390 — #pragma warning disable CA3003 // File path injection
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Managers/ItemAddedManager.cs:174 — empty catch (OperationCanceledException) — narrow/filtered/commented, treated as intentional
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Events/Managers/ItemDeletedManager.cs:69 — empty catch (OperationCanceledException) — narrow/filtered/commented, treated as intentional
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:18 — SuppressMessage
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:24 — SuppressMessage
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:25 — SuppressMessage
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:31 — SuppressMessage
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:37 — SuppressMessage
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:43 — SuppressMessage
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:53 — SuppressMessage
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:59 — SuppressMessage
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:60 — SuppressMessage
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:66 — SuppressMessage
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:67 — SuppressMessage
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:76 — SuppressMessage
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:81 — SuppressMessage
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:85 — SuppressMessage
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/GlobalSuppressions.cs:90 — SuppressMessage
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/LoggerExtensions.cs:12 — SuppressMessage
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ScriptExecutionService.cs:450 — empty catch (InvalidOperationException) — narrow/filtered/commented, treated as intentional
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ScriptExecutionService.cs:454 — empty catch (System.ComponentModel.Win32Exception) — narrow/filtered/commented, treated as intentional
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ScriptExecutionService.cs:487 — empty catch (InvalidOperationException) — narrow/filtered/commented, treated as intentional
  • Justified suppression Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Services/ScriptExecutionService.cs:491 — empty catch (System.ComponentModel.Win32Exception) — narrow/filtered/commented, treated as intentional
  • + 3 more in this group — see findings.md.
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×11
  • Outdated: Jellyfin.Common — Jellyfin.Common 10.10.6 → 10.11.11 available.
  • Outdated: Jellyfin.Controller — Jellyfin.Controller 10.10.6 → 10.11.11 available.
  • Outdated: Jellyfin.Data — Jellyfin.Data 10.10.6 → 10.11.11 available.
  • Outdated: Jellyfin.Extensions — Jellyfin.Extensions 10.10.6 → 10.11.11 available.
  • Outdated: Jellyfin.Model — Jellyfin.Model 10.10.6 → 10.11.11 available.
  • Outdated: Jellyfin.Naming — Jellyfin.Naming 10.10.6 → 10.11.11 available.
  • Outdated: coverlet.collector — coverlet.collector 6.0.0 → 10.0.1 available.
  • Outdated: Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk — Microsoft.NET.Test.Sdk 17.8.0 → 18.6.0 available.
  • Outdated: Moq — Moq 4.20.70 → 4.20.72 available.
  • Outdated: xunit — xunit 2.6.3 → 2.9.3 available.
  • Outdated: xunit.runner.visualstudio — xunit.runner.visualstudio 2.5.3 → 3.1.5 available.
D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×1
  • Mock framework: Moq — Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.Tests references Moq.
D14 · License Compliance · Licenses scanned · ×1
  • Licenses scanned — 13 packages scanned; 4 distinct SPDX licenses.
D18 · Solution Shape · Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy (Production) · ×1
  • Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy (Production) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.csproj — 61 .cs files, 8488 LoC (5452 significant)
D18 · Solution Shape · Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.Tests (Test) · ×1
  • Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.Tests (Test) Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.Tests/Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.Tests.csproj — 6 .cs files, 574 LoC (397 significant)
D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×1
  • XML-doc coverage: Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy/Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.csproj — Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy: 95 % XML-doc coverage (382/404).
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
D9 · Test Distribution · Unit tests · ×1
  • Unit tests — 14 unit test method(s).
D9 · Test Distribution · Integration tests · ×1
  • Integration tests — 0 integration test method(s).
D9 · Test Distribution · BDD tests · ×1
  • BDD tests — 0 BDD test method(s).
D9 · Test Distribution · E2E tests · ×1
  • E2E tests — 0 end-to-end test method(s).

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .4artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list Jellyfin.Plugin.JellyPy.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json2artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.0

Run 019ee1d7-e651-74cd-983d-eef26c6529b8 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif