Public report — threadr, published 4 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
229findings with an exact file:lineof 239 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
36/106dimensions across the health lenses35373 LoC — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
carverauto/threadr carries serious gaps (38%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (27%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Code Health (32%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 2 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage); Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency… (Security & performance tooling).
For scale: Medium (~35,373 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.3 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
0.7× (at 38% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape
Medium · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.3 person-years of build effort (about ~€42,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 27% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with test.exs, dev.exs.
Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.3 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 27%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with test.exs, dev.exs. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with test.exs, dev.exs.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
63 modules, 22 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
At a glance — Code Health · 32% · Weak · gated by R1, R2, R3
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
39
High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
34
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
28
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
5
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, resolve the two leaked secrets in test.exs and dev.exs to secure the codebase. Next, establish a required static analysis step in CI to prevent regressions, while also adding eslint and type checking to the build process. Then, increase test coverage by writing tests for the currently unreachable production modules. Finally, document the RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure to ensure a robust disaster recovery plan.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with test.exs, dev.exs.
Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally.
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 35 of 36 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 36 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 229 of 239 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D40 Network Egress Confinement: Egress confinement is read from committed Kubernetes manifests — a policy applied out-of-band (cluster-default deny, a service mesh, or a cloud firewall/security group off-repo) is invisible, and a present NetworkPolicy is declared config, not proof the cluster admission-controller actually enforces it at runtime.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement: Syscall/MAC confinement is read from committed manifests — a profile applied by a cluster-wide PodSecurity default or a mutating webhook off-repo isn't seen, and a declared seccomp/AppArmor profile is config presence, not proof the node's kernel actually loaded and enforced it.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement: Runtime enforcement is read from committed policy files — a Tetragon/Falco/Kyverno stack installed cluster-wide (Helm release, platform add-on) with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a committed policy is declared intent, not proof the engine is running and blocking in the live cluster.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (2): D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 updateSelectionDetails (cyclomatic 26) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with rendering_selection_methods.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 tooltipText (cyclomatic 25) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with rendering_graph_methods.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 nodeLabel (cyclomatic 22) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with rendering_graph_methods.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 decodeArrowGraph (cognitive 24) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with lifecycle_stream_methods.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 edgeColor (cognitive 22) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with rendering_graph_methods.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 updateSelectionDetails (cognitive 21) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with rendering_selection_methods.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
Resolve the 17 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with service.ex, constrained_qa.ex, consumer.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (17 warning-level).
Resolve the 15 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with index.ex (3), service.ex, constrained_qa.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 21 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 10 Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with constrained_qa.ex (2), graph_inspector.ex (2), threadr.generation.answer.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).
Resolve the 9 Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with ingest.ex (2), analysis.ex, service.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
Resolve the 8 Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with actor_qa.ex (2), compare_delta.ex, constrained_qa.ex. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 2 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with test.exs, dev.exs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
35 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/service.ex.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
What to do
Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
7 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×2elixir/threadr/config/dev.exs:62detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with dev.exs, 03-secret.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×6.github/workflows/threadr-control-plane-image.yml:36detected by semgrep finding
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext · ×21k8s/cert-manager/azure/deployment.yaml:20detected by semgrep finding
Low: missing-ssl-minversionpkg/adapters/messages/irc.go:42detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 21 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with deployment.yaml (4), ingress-nginx-0.48.1.yaml (3), image-patch.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (21 warning-level).
Resolve the 6 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with threadr-control-plane-image.yml (3), threadr-operator-smoke.yml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Low finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with irc.go. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×33elixir/threadr/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Critical IaC: KSV-0041 · ×5k8s/argocd/base/argocd-install.yamldetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: KSV-0013k8s/argocd/base/argocd-install.yamldetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 33 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (4), Dockerfile (3), gpu-feature-discovery-job.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (33 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with argocd-install.yaml (3), ingress-nginx-0.48.1.yaml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with argocd-install.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×14elixir/threadr/mix.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×4go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] · ×15elixir/threadr/mix.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841go.moddetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 15 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (10), mix.lock (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 warning-level).
Resolve the 14 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with mix.lock (11), go.mod (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with go.mod (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads restrict network EGRESS with a NetworkPolicy (or Cilium policy), limiting where a compromised pod can send data or reach a command-and-control server. Presence of committed egress-restricting policy, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn — language-agnostic): Kubernetes workloads gate applicability; credits a NetworkPolicy / Cilium policy that restricts egress (policyTypes: [Egress] / egress rules). Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10, never a deduction — baseline misconfigs stay with D31). Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether Kubernetes workloads confine the kernel boundary — a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) plus an AppArmor/SELinux mandatory-access-control layer — shrinking the syscall attack surface a container escape would use. Presence of committed confinement config, not runtime enforcement.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a seccomp profile (RuntimeDefault/Localhost) and an AppArmor/SELinux MAC layer. Reward-leaning (neutral floor climbing to 10); NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 No AppArmor/SELinux confinement finding(s) in Kernel & Syscall Confinement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d41_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the Kubernetes deployment wires runtime threat enforcement — a detection engine (Tetragon/Falco) and/or an admission-control policy gate (Kyverno / OPA Gatekeeper / PodSecurity). Presence of committed policy, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Deterministic YAML-manifest inspection (no external tool, no Roslyn): on Kubernetes workloads, credits a runtime threat-detection engine (Tetragon TracingPolicy / Falco) and an admission-control policy (Kyverno / OPA Gatekeeper / PodSecurity). Reward-leaning; NotApplicable without workloads. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 No runtime threat detection finding(s) in Runtime Threat Enforcement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 No admission-control policy finding(s) in Runtime Threat Enforcement. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d42_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 3 of 5 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Your ecosystem's static analyzer is declared as a dependency but is not wired into CI — run it as a required step on push/PR (e.g. `composer phpstan` / `mix sobelow` / `bundle exec brakeman` / the spotbugs Gradle task / `sbt scalafixAll --check` / `golangci-lint run` / `rebar3 lint`) so a regression fails the build instead of relying on someone running it locally.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
The pipeline declares a deployment environment, but whether required reviewers / protection rules are attached to it lives in repository settings we cannot read — confirm the gate is enforced before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P5 · DR & Backup4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.
Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.
What to do
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
Enable purge protection / soft-delete (and prevent_destroy on critical resources) so data stores can't be lost to an accidental or malicious delete.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
0 typed · 11 plain JS — the untyped files are elixir/threadr/assets/js/app.js, elixir/threadr/assets/js/hooks/index.js, elixir/threadr/assets/js/hooks/tenant_graph_explorer.js, elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/ThreadrGraphRenderer.js, elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/layout_cluster_methods.js, elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/lifecycle_stream_methods.js (+5 more).
What to do
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:501 · elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:723 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — rendering_graph_methods.js:501
elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:756 · elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:787 · elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:830 — all 3 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — rendering_graph_methods.js:756
elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:40 · elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:170 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — rendering_graph_methods.js:40
elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:830 · elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:871 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — rendering_graph_methods.js:830
elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:68 · elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:104 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — rendering_graph_methods.js:68
elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/ThreadrGraphRenderer.js:63 · elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/ThreadrGraphRenderer.js:73 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — ThreadrGraphRenderer.js:63
elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/ThreadrGraphRenderer.js:225 · elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_selection_methods.js:182 — the 2 copies sit in sibling files in one directory, so check first whether one of them (or an existing module there) already owns this behaviour and the others should call it; otherwise extract it into one module in that directory and have each site call it. — ThreadrGraphRenderer.js:225
elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:738 · elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:770 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. — rendering_graph_methods.js:738
What to do
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — rendering_selection_methods.js:18, rendering_graph_methods.js:515, rendering_graph_methods.js:629, …
What to do
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files2.7 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
2 file(s) over 400 lines (counted as significant lines — blank lines excluded — over production source only, tests excluded), largest first: elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js (736), elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_selection_methods.js (632).
What to do
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.
Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.
0% of 10 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph
What to do
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).
Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.
What to do
Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling3.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗
What to do
Add eslint and type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
11 file(s) (~2443 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis. This package's entry point(s) resolved, but the walk stopped one hop in: elixir/threadr/assets/js/utils/window_events.js imports '../../vendor/topbar', which is not in the scanned tree. That is usually a generated or build-output module, so reachability cannot see past it and no dead-code claim is made about this package. Nothing is necessarily wrong here. — assets
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. — live_socket.js:3
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
Reference — by lens
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 70 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~14463 lines of test source are present (.exs) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ex, .exs, .go, .rs) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ex, .exs, .go, .rs, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.exs) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (1 of 2 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 2 aggregate root(s) (types guarding their own state behind command methods — this language has no AggregateRoot base to inherit)
ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and a call made through an inferred or generic receiver has no resolvable owner in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (3 Go aggregate(s) recording domain events (own events-slice append / raise-record))
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
High IaC: DS-0002 elixir/threadr/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/cert-manager/azure/deployment.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/cloudflared/app.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/cloudflared/cloudflared.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: DS-0002 k8s/jupyterhub/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN adduser --system --no-create-home app`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0029 k8s/jupyterhub/Dockerfile— 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/linkerd/patch-injector.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/nginx/ingress-nginx-0.48.1.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/nvidia/foo.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/nvidia/gpu-feature-discovery-job.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0017 k8s/nvidia/gpu-feature-discovery-job.yaml— Privileged
High IaC: KSV-0121 k8s/nvidia/gpu-feature-discovery-job.yaml— Kubernetes resource with disallowed volumes mounted
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/nvidia/nvidia-device-plugin.yml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/ollama/gpu.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0056 k8s/operators/ircbot-operator/config/default/cluster_role.yaml— Manage Kubernetes networking
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/operators/ircbot-operator/config/default/manager_auth_proxy_patch.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/operators/ircbot-operator/config/default/manager_config_patch.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/operators/ircbot-operator/config/manager/manager.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0056 k8s/operators/ircbot-operator/config/rbac/cluster_role.yaml— Manage Kubernetes networking
High IaC: KSV-0056 k8s/operators/yaml/cluster_role.yaml— Manage Kubernetes networking
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/threadr/base/threadr-discord.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/threadr/base/threadr-embeds.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/threadr/base/threadr-irc.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/threadr/base/threadr-messages.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
High IaC: KSV-0014 k8s/threadr/bot-operator/manager_env_patch.yaml— Root file system is not read-only
+ 8 more in this group — see findings.md.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×14
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] elixir/threadr/mix.lock— ash 3.19.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.22.0. This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against ash 3.19.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.29.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.29.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against ash 3.19.3: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] elixir/threadr/mix.lock— bandit 1.10.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.11.1. This is 1 of 7 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against bandit 1.10.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.11.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.11.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against bandit 1.10.3: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] elixir/threadr/mix.lock— cowboy 2.14.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.15.0. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against cowboy 2.14.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against cowboy 2.14.2: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] elixir/threadr/mix.lock— cowlib 2.16.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.16.1. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against cowlib 2.16.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.19.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.19.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against cowlib 2.16.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4 4.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4 is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4@v4.5.2`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4 4.5.0: [GHSA redacted], GO-2024-3250.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— golang.org/x/oauth2 0.19.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/oauth2 is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/oauth2@v0.27.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] k8s/operators/ircbot-operator/go.mod— golang.org/x/oauth2 0.8.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/oauth2 is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C k8s/operators/ircbot-operator get golang.org/x/oauth2@v0.27.0`, which updates the require line k8s/operators/ircbot-operator/go.mod already holds for it).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] elixir/threadr/mix.lock— gun 2.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.4.0. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against gun 2.2.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.16.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.16.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against gun 2.2.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] elixir/threadr/mix.lock— mint 1.7.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.9.0. This is 1 of 8 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against mint 1.7.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 8 advisories this scan raises against mint 1.7.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] elixir/threadr/mix.lock— phoenix 1.8.5: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.8.6. This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against phoenix 1.8.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.8.9 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.8.9 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against phoenix 1.8.5: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] elixir/threadr/mix.lock— plug 1.19.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.19.2. This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against plug 1.19.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.19.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.19.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against plug 1.19.1: EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] elixir/threadr/mix.lock— plug_cowboy 2.8.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.8.1
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] elixir/threadr/mix.lock— postgrex 0.22.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.22.2. This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postgrex 0.22.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.22.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.22.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against postgrex 0.22.0: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] elixir/threadr/mix.lock— req 0.5.17: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.6.1. This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against req 0.5.17, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.6.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.6.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against req 0.5.17: EEF-[CVE redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/threadr-control-plane-image.yml:36— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/threadr-control-plane-image.yml:39— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/threadr-control-plane-image.yml:51— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: bazelbuild/setup-bazelisk@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `bazelbuild/setup-bazelisk@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/bazelbuild/setup-bazelisk/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/threadr-operator-smoke.yml:34— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v4`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v4 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/threadr-operator-smoke.yml:37— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: erlef/setup-beam@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `erlef/setup-beam@v1`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/erlef/setup-beam/commits/v1 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/threadr-operator-smoke.yml:43— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-go@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-go@v5`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-go/commits/v5 --jq .sha`.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2 2.52.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.52.11. This one row stands for the 6 advisories this scan raises against github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2 2.52.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/nats-io/jwt 1.2.2: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace github.com/nats-io/jwt if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— golang.org/x/crypto 0.22.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/crypto is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.52.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 19 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/crypto 0.22.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2025-4116, GO-2026-5932.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— google.golang.org/grpc 1.63.2: [GHSA redacted] — google.golang.org/grpc is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get google.golang.org/grpc@v1.79.3`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against google.golang.org/grpc 1.63.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret elixir/threadr/config/test.exs:29— high-entropy-secret detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Leaked secret: high-entropy-secret elixir/threadr/config/dev.exs:62— high-entropy-secret detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/cert-manager/azure/deployment.yaml:20— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/cloudflared/app.yaml:17— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/cloudflared/cloudflared.yaml:17— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-true k8s/nginx/ingress-nginx-0.48.1.yaml:353— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. In the container `controller` this parameter is set to `true` which makes this container much more vulnerable to privelege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/nginx/ingress-nginx-0.48.1.yaml:594— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/nginx/ingress-nginx-0.48.1.yaml:642— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/nvidia/foo.yaml:7— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation k8s/nvidia/gpu-feature-discovery-job.yaml:28— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding the `allowPrivilegeEscalation` parameter to your the `securityContext`, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/ollama/gpu.yaml:24— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/threadr/base/threadr-discord.yaml:28— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/threadr/base/threadr-embeds.yaml:19— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/threadr/base/threadr-irc.yaml:28— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/threadr/base/threadr-messages.yaml:22— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/threadr/control-plane/bootstrap-job.yaml:97— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/threadr/control-plane/deployment.yaml:20— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/threadr/nats/deployment.yaml:28— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/threadr/overlays/control-plane/production/image-patch.yaml:12— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/threadr/overlays/control-plane/production/image-patch.yaml:26— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/threadr/overlays/worker/production/image-patch.yaml:12— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/threadr/worker/deployment.yaml:89— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Medium: allow-privilege-escalation-no-securitycontext k8s/vllm/kserve.yaml:21— In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
TooManyMethods: Service elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/service.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 120 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: ConstrainedQA elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 68 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Consumer elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/discord/consumer.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 55 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: ActorQA elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 51 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: BotQA elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/bot_qa.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 48 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: HybridRetriever elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/hybrid_retriever.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 47 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Index elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_qa_live/index.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 43 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: ConversationSummaryQA elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_summary_qa.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 39 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: GraphSnapshot elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_snapshot.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 39 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Graph elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 38 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Ingest elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 37 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: ReconstructionCandidates elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/reconstruction_candidates.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 35 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Analysis elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/analysis.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 33 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: ConversationAttachment elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/conversation_attachment.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 32 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: GraphInspector elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_inspector.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 32 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: Show elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_dossier_live/show.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 32 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
TooManyMethods: History elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/history.ex:1— TooManyMethods — 31 methods. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.
FileTooLong: control_plane/service.ex elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/service.ex:0— FileTooLong — 1159 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: ml/constrained_qa.ex elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:0— FileTooLong — 960 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: tenant_qa_live/index.ex elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_qa_live/index.ex:0— FileTooLong — 924 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: tenant_data/ingest.ex elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:0— FileTooLong — 837 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: tenant_history_live/index.ex elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_history_live/index.ex:0— FileTooLong — 710 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: tenant_dossier_live/show.ex elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_dossier_live/show.ex:0— FileTooLong — 689 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: discord/consumer.ex elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/discord/consumer.ex:0— FileTooLong — 673 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: tenant_bot_live/index.ex elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_bot_live/index.ex:0— FileTooLong — 668 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: tenant_data/graph_snapshot.ex elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_snapshot.ex:0— FileTooLong — 609 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: ml/actor_qa.ex elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:0— FileTooLong — 594 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: tenant_data/graph.ex elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph.ex:0— FileTooLong — 582 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: ingest/bot_qa.ex elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/bot_qa.ex:0— FileTooLong — 545 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: tenant_data/graph_inspector.ex elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_inspector.ex:0— FileTooLong — 540 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: control_plane/analysis.ex elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/analysis.ex:0— FileTooLong — 501 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: ml/hybrid_retriever.ex elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/hybrid_retriever.ex:0— FileTooLong — 501 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×15
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] elixir/threadr/mix.lock— ash_authentication 4.13.7: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 4.14.0
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] elixir/threadr/mix.lock— decimal 2.3.0: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 3.0.0
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— github.com/golang/glog 1.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — github.com/golang/glog is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/golang/glog@v1.2.4`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] k8s/operators/ircbot-operator/go.mod— golang.org/x/net 0.17.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/net is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C k8s/operators/ircbot-operator get golang.org/x/net@v0.23.0`, which updates the require line k8s/operators/ircbot-operator/go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 14 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/net 0.17.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2024-3333, GO-2026-4440, GO-2026-4441, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-5025, GO-2026-5026, GO-2026-5027, GO-2026-5029, GO-2026-5030, GO-2026-5942.
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] go.mod— golang.org/x/net 0.24.0: [GHSA redacted] — golang.org/x/net is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/net@v0.55.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it). This one row stands for the 13 advisories this scan raises against golang.org/x/net 0.24.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], GO-2024-3333, GO-2026-4440, GO-2026-4441, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-5025, GO-2026-5026, GO-2026-5027, GO-2026-5029, GO-2026-5030, GO-2026-5942.
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 k8s/operators/ircbot-operator/go.mod— golang.org/x/sys 0.13.0 (golang.org/x/sys/windows): GO-2026-5024 — golang.org/x/sys is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C k8s/operators/ircbot-operator get golang.org/x/sys@v0.44.0`, which updates the require line k8s/operators/ircbot-operator/go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5024 go.mod— golang.org/x/sys 0.19.0 (golang.org/x/sys/windows): GO-2026-5024 — golang.org/x/sys is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/sys@v0.44.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 k8s/operators/ircbot-operator/go.mod— golang.org/x/text 0.13.0 (golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm): GO-2026-5970 — golang.org/x/text is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C k8s/operators/ircbot-operator get golang.org/x/text@v0.39.0`, which updates the require line k8s/operators/ircbot-operator/go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: GO-2026-5970 go.mod— golang.org/x/text 0.14.0 (golang.org/x/text/unicode/norm): GO-2026-5970 — golang.org/x/text is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get golang.org/x/text@v0.39.0`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] k8s/operators/ircbot-operator/go.mod— google.golang.org/protobuf 1.30.0: [GHSA redacted] — google.golang.org/protobuf is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go -C k8s/operators/ircbot-operator get google.golang.org/protobuf@v1.33.0`, which updates the require line k8s/operators/ircbot-operator/go.mod already holds for it).
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] elixir/threadr/mix.lock— hpax 1.0.3: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 1.0.4
Medium CVE: GO-2026-4601 k8s/operators/ircbot-operator/go.mod— stdlib 1.20.99 (net/url): GO-2026-4601 — fixed in Go 1.25.8; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. This one row stands for the 22 advisories this scan raises against stdlib 1.20.99: GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.
Medium CVE: GO-2026-4601 go.mod— stdlib 1.21.3 (net/url): GO-2026-4601 — fixed in Go 1.25.8; pin a build toolchain at or above it (go.mod `toolchain` directive, or your CI's Go version) — the `go` directive is a minimum language version, not the compiler that builds your binaries. This one row stands for the 22 advisories this scan raises against stdlib 1.21.3: GO-2026-4601, GO-2026-4602, GO-2026-4603, GO-2026-4864, GO-2026-4865, GO-2026-4869, GO-2026-4870, GO-2026-4918, GO-2026-4946, GO-2026-4947, GO-2026-4970, GO-2026-4971, GO-2026-4976, GO-2026-4977, GO-2026-4980, GO-2026-4981, GO-2026-4982, GO-2026-4986, GO-2026-5037, GO-2026-5038, GO-2026-5039, GO-2026-5856.
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] elixir/threadr/mix.lock— swoosh 1.23.0: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 1.26.3
Medium CVE: EEF-[CVE redacted] elixir/threadr/mix.lock— ymlr 5.1.4: EEF-[CVE redacted] — upgrade to 5.1.6
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/mix/tasks/threadr.generation.answer.ex:24— elixir/threadr/lib/mix/tasks/threadr.generation.answer.ex:24-31 | elixir/threadr/lib/mix/tasks/threadr.generation.complete.ex:22-29 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/service.ex:1180— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/service.ex:1180-1187 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/service.ex:1216-1223 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/history_request.ex:64— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/history_request.ex:64-71 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/history_request.ex:80-87 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:366— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:366-373 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:396-403 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:469— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:469-476 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:546-553 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_inspector.ex:283— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_inspector.ex:283-290 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_inspector.ex:297-304 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_inspector.ex:315— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_inspector.ex:315-322 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_inspector.ex:340-347 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:133— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:133-143 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:172-179 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_dossier_live/show.ex:59— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_dossier_live/show.ex:59-66 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_qa_live/index.ex:49-56 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_history_live/index.ex:60— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_history_live/index.ex:60-67 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_history_live/index.ex:100-107 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/analysis.ex:528— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/analysis.ex:528-538 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/service.ex:1273-1283 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/service.ex:1193— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/service.ex:1193-1203 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/service.ex:1226-1236 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/smoke_server.ex:142— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/smoke_server.ex:142-152 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/bot_controller_contract_controller.ex:40-50 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:504— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:504-514 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/semantic_qa.ex:229-239 — before extracting anything, compare `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex` and `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/semantic_qa.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 51 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_qa.ex:140— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_qa.ex:140-150 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_summary_qa.ex:94-104 — before extracting anything, compare `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_qa.ex` and `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_summary_qa.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 45 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:247— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:247-257 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:334-344 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:365— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:365-375 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:414-424 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/system_llm_settings_live/index.ex:56— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/system_llm_settings_live/index.ex:56-66 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_llm_settings_live/index.ex:65-76 — `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/system_llm_settings_live/index.ex` and `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_llm_settings_live/index.ex` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 33 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_dossier_live/show.ex:40— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_dossier_live/show.ex:40-50 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_history_live/index.ex:42-52 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/compare_delta.ex:15— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/compare_delta.ex:15-26 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/compare_delta.ex:44-55 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:479— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:479-490 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/semantic_qa.ex:204-215 — before extracting anything, compare `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex` and `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/semantic_qa.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 51 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:526— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:526-537 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/semantic_qa.ex:251-262 — before extracting anything, compare `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex` and `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/semantic_qa.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 51 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:449— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:449-460 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:477-488 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_qa.ex:169— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_qa.ex:169-180 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_summary_qa.ex:159-170 — before extracting anything, compare `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_qa.ex` and `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_summary_qa.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 45 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_inspector.ex:504— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_inspector.ex:504-515 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/history.ex:227-238 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/history.ex:227— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/history.ex:227-238 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/reconstruction_candidates.ex:229-240 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/history_controller.ex:34— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/history_controller.ex:34-45 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/qa_controller.ex:71-85 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/mix/tasks/threadr.smoke.discord_message.ex:270— elixir/threadr/lib/mix/tasks/threadr.smoke.discord_message.ex:270-282 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/messaging/smoke.ex:84-96 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_reference.ex:127— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_reference.ex:127-139 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_reference.ex:149-161 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_qa.ex:85— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_qa.ex:85-97 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_summary_qa.ex:122-134 — before extracting anything, compare `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_qa.ex` and `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_summary_qa.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 45 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/conversation_attachment.ex:288— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/conversation_attachment.ex:288-300 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/pending_item_tracking.ex:194-206 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/history.ex:252— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/history.ex:252-264 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/reconstruction_candidates.ex:260-272 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/reconstruction_candidates.ex:235— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/reconstruction_candidates.ex:235-247 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/reconstruction_candidates.ex:268-280 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/discord/consumer.ex:385— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/discord/consumer.ex:385-389 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/discord/consumer.ex:619-623 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/discord/consumer.ex:520— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/discord/consumer.ex:520-524 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/discord/consumer.ex:542-546 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:35— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:35-39 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:48-52 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/system_llm_settings_live/index.ex:232— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/system_llm_settings_live/index.ex:232-236 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_llm_settings_live/index.ex:300-304 — `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/system_llm_settings_live/index.ex` and `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_llm_settings_live/index.ex` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 33 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_dossier_live/show.ex:82— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_dossier_live/show.ex:82-86 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_graph_live/index.ex:143-147 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_dossier_live/show.ex:617— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_dossier_live/show.ex:617-621 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_qa_live/index.ex:788-792 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/bot_qa.ex:594— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/bot_qa.ex:594-602 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/bot_qa.ex:635-643 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_qa_intent.ex:86— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_qa_intent.ex:86-94 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/qa_intent.ex:95-103 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:448— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:448-456 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:469-477 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:534— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:534-542 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:576-586 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/discord/consumer.ex:601— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/discord/consumer.ex:601-607 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/discord/consumer.ex:629-635 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:511— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:511-517 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_qa.ex:203-209 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/extraction.ex:99— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/extraction.ex:99-105 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/extraction.ex:153-159 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/dossier_controller.ex:87— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/dossier_controller.ex:87-93 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/history_controller.ex:64-70 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 4) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/analysis.ex:471— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/analysis.ex:471-480 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/analysis.ex:511-520 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/service.ex:1079-1088 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/service.ex:1096-1105 — there are 4 copies across 2 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 4 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 4) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/bot_controller.ex:73— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/bot_controller.ex:73-82 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/bot_controller.ex:105-114 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/bot_controller_contract_controller.ex:23-32 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/bot_status_controller.ex:12-21 — there are 4 copies across 3 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 4 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 4) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/me_controller.ex:16— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/me_controller.ex:16-26 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/tenant_controller.ex:10-19 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/tenant_controller.ex:29-38 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/tenant_controller.ex:10-19 — there are 4 copies across 3 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 4 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:222— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:222-231 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:258-267 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:482— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:482-491 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:559-568 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/generation/chat_completions_provider.ex:59— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/generation/chat_completions_provider.ex:59-68 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/generation/gemini_provider.ex:96-105 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest.ex:70— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest.ex:70-84 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest.ex:100-114 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:377— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:377-391 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex:426-440 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/generation/anthropic_provider.ex:20— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/generation/anthropic_provider.ex:20-31 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/generation/chat_completions_provider.ex:27-38 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/generation/gemini_provider.ex:19-30 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/conversation_cluster_review_dispatcher.ex:77— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/conversation_cluster_review_dispatcher.ex:77-88 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/conversation_relationship_dispatcher.ex:77-88 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/conversation_summary_dispatcher.ex:78-89 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/smoke_server.ex:157— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/smoke_server.ex:157-167 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/bot_controller.ex:130-140 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/bot_status_controller.ex:39-49 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 3) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:560— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:560-570 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/semantic_qa.ex:352-362 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/history.ex:295-305 — before extracting anything, compare `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex` and `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/semantic_qa.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 51 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_qa.ex:48— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_qa.ex:48-56 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_summary_qa.ex:54-62 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/interaction_qa.ex:50-58 — before extracting anything, compare `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_qa.ex` and `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_summary_qa.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 4 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 45 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 3) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_layout.ex:118— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_layout.ex:118-126 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_layout.ex:141-149 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_layout.ex:164-172 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/membership_controller.ex:43— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/membership_controller.ex:43-48 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/membership_controller.ex:56-61 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_dossier_live/show.ex:589— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_dossier_live/show.ex:589-594 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_dossier_live/show.ex:626-631 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 3) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:686— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:686-690 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/conversation_qa.ex:357-361 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/semantic_qa.ex:299-303 — before extracting anything, compare `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex` and `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/semantic_qa.ex` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 51 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. If that is what happened, the fix is to keep one copy and have the other call it (or delete it), which resolves this row and its siblings together — extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 3) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_dossier_live/show.ex:608— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_dossier_live/show.ex:608-612 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_history_live/index.ex:759-763 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_qa_live/index.ex:779-783 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere all 3 call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made 3 times.
updateSelectionDetails (cyclomatic 26) elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_selection_methods.js:18— updateSelectionDetails has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
tooltipText (cyclomatic 25) elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:515— tooltipText has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
nodeLabel (cyclomatic 22) elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:629— nodeLabel has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
decodeArrowGraph (cyclomatic 19) elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/lifecycle_stream_methods.js:41— decodeArrowGraph has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
constructor (cyclomatic 17) elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/ThreadrGraphRenderer.js:10— constructor has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
Index.bot_form (cyclomatic 16) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_bot_live/index.ex:598— Index.bot_form has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
renderNodeDossier (cyclomatic 16) elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_selection_methods.js:412— renderNodeDossier has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 16) elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_selection_methods.js:625— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the branches: extract each independent case into its own named function so the top-level body reads as a short sequence of named decisions.
LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].issue | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 999.
decodeArrowGraph (cognitive 24) elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/lifecycle_stream_methods.js:41— decodeArrowGraph has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
edgeColor (cognitive 22) elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:265— edgeColor has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
updateSelectionDetails (cognitive 21) elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_selection_methods.js:18— updateSelectionDetails has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
tooltipText (cognitive 20) elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:515— tooltipText has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
ConversationRelationshipRecompute.recompute_conversation_relationships (cognitive 18) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/conversation_relationship_recompute.ex:25— ConversationRelationshipRecompute.recompute_conversation_relationships has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13, match/switch 5 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
nodeLabel (cognitive 17) elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/rendering_graph_methods.js:629— nodeLabel has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
constructor (cognitive 16) elixir/threadr/assets/js/lib/threadr_graph/ThreadrGraphRenderer.js:10— constructor has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Change coupling: config.exs ↔ service.ex elixir/threadr/config/config.exs— `elixir/threadr/config/config.exs` and `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/service.ex` change together 50% of the time (6 of the 12 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium vulnerability · ×1
Medium vulnerability: GO-2026-5841 go.mod— github.com/klauspost/compress 1.17.8 (github.com/klauspost/compress/s2): GO-2026-5841 — github.com/klauspost/compress is not a DIRECT requirement of this module: go.mod records it as `// indirect`, pulled in transitively, so raise it in place (run `go get github.com/klauspost/compress@v1.18.7`, which updates the require line go.mod already holds for it).
Duplicated block (16 lines × 3) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph.ex:241— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph.ex:241-256 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph.ex:284-299 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph.ex:326-341 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/system_llm_settings_live/index.ex:255— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/system_llm_settings_live/index.ex:255-270 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_llm_settings_live/index.ex:326-341 — `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/system_llm_settings_live/index.ex` and `elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_llm_settings_live/index.ex` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 33 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 5) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/qa_controller.ex:16— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/qa_controller.ex:16-30 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/qa_controller.ex:43-57 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/qa_controller.ex:77-91 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/qa_controller.ex:105-119 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/qa_controller.ex:132-146 — all 5 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 3) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:202— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:202-215 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:237-250 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex:273-286 — all 3 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/dossier_controller.ex:16— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/dossier_controller.ex:16-29 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/dossier_controller.ex:56-69 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 4) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:375— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:375-386 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:405-416 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:523-534 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex:554-565 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 4) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_inspector.ex:90— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_inspector.ex:90-100 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_inspector.ex:121-131 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_inspector.ex:154-164 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/graph_inspector.ex:185-195 — all 4 copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from every one of those sites — resolving only two of them leaves the rest to drift apart the first time one is edited.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 5) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/bot_controller.ex:10— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/bot_controller.ex:10-19 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/bot_controller.ex:39-48 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/bot_controller.ex:66-75 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/api/v1/tenant_controller.ex:46-55 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/controllers/tenant_controller.ex:27-36 — there are 5 copies across 3 file(s) — more copies than files, so at least one file holds the block twice. Extract it once into a single shared function every call site can reach and call it from all 5 sites; resolving a subset leaves the remainder to drift apart.
Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/conversation_cluster_review.ex:35— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/conversation_cluster_review.ex:35-47 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/conversation_relationship_recompute.ex:56-68 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/conversation_summarizer.ex:44-51 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 4) elixir/threadr/lib/mix/tasks/threadr.generation.answer_tenant.ex:25— elixir/threadr/lib/mix/tasks/threadr.generation.answer_tenant.ex:25-30 | elixir/threadr/lib/mix/tasks/threadr.seed.demo.ex:266-271 | elixir/threadr/lib/mix/tasks/threadr.smoke.ingest.ex:85-90 | elixir/threadr/lib/mix/tasks/threadr.smoke.operator.ex:72-77 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 3) elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/conversation_cluster_review.ex:53— elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/conversation_cluster_review.ex:53-58 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/conversation_relationship_recompute.ex:75-80 | elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/conversation_summarizer.ex:57-62 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.
Recommendation — 8 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability· Test reliability not included · ×1
Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.exs) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 35 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/control_plane/service.ex, elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_qa_live/index.ex, elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/constrained_qa.ex, elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_history_live/index.ex, elixir/threadr/lib/threadr_web/live/tenant_dossier_live/show.ex, elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/tenant_data/ingest.ex, elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ingest/discord/consumer.ex, elixir/threadr/lib/threadr/ml/actor_qa.ex (+27 more). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
Low: missing-ssl-minversion pkg/adapters/messages/irc.go:42— `MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. Set `MinVersion` EXPLICITLY so the floor is a decision in your code rather than whatever the toolchain currently defaults to. Which version depends on who the peer is: for a server, or for a client that talks only to endpoints you control, `tls.VersionTLS13`; for a client that must reach third-party servers (a package registry, a webhook target, an on-prem service), `tls.VersionTLS12` — pinning 1.3 there refuses to connect to peers that still terminate at 1.2. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive pattern is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether the flagged value reaches a security decision — a credential, token, nonce, key, salt or session id, or an externally reachable surface — and apply the change where it does; where it provably does not (cosmetic, simulation, or deliberately reproducible use), record the review and leave the code as it is.
No AppArmor/SELinux confinement — Workloads declare no AppArmor or SELinux profile. A mandatory-access-control profile confines what a compromised container can touch on the host, complementing seccomp's syscall filter.
No runtime threat detection — No runtime threat-detection engine (Tetragon TracingPolicy / Falco) is committed. These observe process, file and network activity in-kernel and can alert or kill on malicious behaviour a static scan cannot catch.
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement· No admission-control policy · ×1
No admission-control policy — No policy-enforcement gate (Kyverno / OPA Gatekeeper / PodSecurity admission) is committed. Admission control keeps workloads that violate your security baseline from ever reaching the cluster.
Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector — Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.exs) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `mix test --cover` with `excoveralls` (`mix coveralls.lcov`)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene· Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (a Go module (go.mod/go.sum)) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release).
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
Run 019fce70-fa43-7d8a-a544-18b647189d2d · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 66 · Warnings: 163 · Recommendations: 8 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 04-08-2026 @ 20:22 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.