Public report — TodoMVC-DDD-CQRS-EventSourcing, published 29 Jul 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
64findings with an exact file:lineof 112 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
57/103dimensions across the health lenses1302 LoC · 6 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
charlessolar/TodoMVC-DDD-CQRS-EventSourcing carries serious risk (43%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (32%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Security (44%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green)… (Deployment & Rollback); Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like… (Observability).
For scale: Hobby (~1,302 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€1,500 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 32% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.3) — microservices × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
At a glance — Code Health · 67% · Adequate · gated by X5
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
56
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
5
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, establish a continuous integration pipeline to automatically build and test every change. Next, implement automated deployment strategies and health checks to ensure releases are safe and easily reversible. Then, extend structured logging across all services to improve production diagnostics. After that, resolve the single deprecated dependency finding. Finally, enforce default-deny access controls and authorization checks on all endpoints.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 54 of 57 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 57 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 64 of 112 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.
When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D20, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Resolve the 1 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.
Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
11 test methods: 11 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 11 tests.
Mock framework: FakeItEasy
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.
Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Dependency Hygiene in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
The project's documentation is clear and complete for its small domain context: the READMEs cover instructions, an architecture overview of EventSourcing and CQRS with diagrams, a table of contents listing every Create React App task (updating releases, sending feedback), and a detailed guide on how to run scripts, add CSS preprocessors, import components, and use global variables. The two README files are well-structured but the visible content is mostly narrative rather than referenceable API docs; the absence of XML-doc coverage for Application/Domain/Infrastructure/Web suggests the project's main codebase remains undocumented.
XML-doc coverage: Language · ×5src/Language/Language.csproj
What to do
Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — The project's documentation is clear and complete for its small domain context: the READMEs cover instructions, an architecture overview of EventSourcing and CQRS with diagrams, a table of contents listing every Create React App task (updating releases, sending feedback), and a detailed guide on how to run scripts, add CSS preprocessors, import components, and use global variables. The two README files are well-structured but the visible content is mostly narrative rather than referenceable API docs; the absence of XML-doc coverage for Application/Domain/Infrastructure/Web suggests the project's main codebase remains undocumented.
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D24 · Comment Value / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
4 valuable / 1 redundant across 10 sampled comments; 1 shown with locations.
redundant commentsrc/Web/Program.cs:9
What to do
Resolve the 1 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Program.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
0 of 6 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D27 · Navigability6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
95 % of calls cross a namespace and 19 % go through an interface, but 50 % of collaborators are co-located — so following a call takes several hops. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
Scattered collaborators
What to do
Resolve the 1 Scattered collaborators finding(s) in Navigability. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×4src/Application/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026src/Web/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
7 of 7 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/Infrastructure/Extensions/BusExtensions.cs.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
What to do
Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×25src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×6src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] · ×2src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×17src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 25 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (25). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (25 issue-level).
Resolve the 6 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — index.html:2
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
An a11y linter is configured (Documented) but there's no automated a11y test or CI gate. Add jest-axe to verify at runtime, then gate it in CI.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y, assert with jest-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
`Domain` is a Domain project but references `Infrastructure`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
`Application` is a Application project but references `Infrastructure`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.
What to do
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — UnitOfWork.cs:59
What to do
Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
`Query` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — UnitOfWork.cs:57
What to do
Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 6 of 6 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Only 1/6 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.
What to do
Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
README omits the web frontend project (TodoMVC-React)
What to do
Reconcile the README with reality: README omits the web frontend project (TodoMVC-React).
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability5.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 0/5 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×5) — Handler.cs:54, Handler.cs:22, BusExtensions.cs:82, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
1/5 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 6 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (11%; ≈12% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 49 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 46 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AC2 Forms & labels — No form control/button found in the parsed markup — AC2 not applicable here.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No styled element found in the parsed markup — AC6 not applicable here.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — At only 1302 LoC the codebase is tiny despite six projects, so its small size alone makes it exempt from needing explicit boundaries.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not gated in TS source-only: aggregate-vs-value-object classification is not 0-FP-separable (every class-holding-class reads alike) — advisory (the Swift/Dart/Rust parity)
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: the branded-type idiom (`type Id = string & {__brand}`) is idiom-rare in TS (4 calibration carriers), so a bare-string-id gap is advisory — Stage-E diversification target (tsjs-stageC.md LESSON-A)
DM3 Integration-event coupling — not gated in TS source-only: a cross-package domain leak is not 0-FP-separable from a legitimate shared-kernel package, and most calibration repos are single-package — advisory (candidate-demote)
DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: the anemic-vs-rich gate is candidate-DETERMINISTIC for TS (behaviour + the component/DTO/readonly-VO exemptions) but the calibration corpus is high-quality (0 witnesses) — advisory, settled at the Stage-E holdout (the Rust/Swift/Dart precedent)
DM5 Encapsulated state — not gated in TS source-only for the Stage-D scaffold: TS idiom favours #private/private/readonly (idiom-rare public-mutable break), so DM5 is advisory pending Stage-E messier-repo witnesses (the Rust/Swift/Dart precedent)
DM7 Repository granularity — not gated in TS source-only: 'a repository per CHILD entity' needs the aggregate-root structure, which is not source-resolvable; the softest gated dim — advisory
ED1 Event-Driven — not run — only 1/3 markers (a message-bus package)
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present but no domain-layer files were identified (no /Domain//Aggregates/ paths)
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Issue — 43 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×25
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs 7.18.5: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs to 7.29.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— axios 0.21.4: [GHSA redacted] — axios is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin axios to 0.31.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 23 advisories this scan raises against axios 0.21.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.33.0 still leaves at least one of them open, so 0.33.0 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of axios 0.21.4 clears all 23 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— body-parser 1.20.0: [GHSA redacted] — body-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin body-parser to 1.20.3 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against body-parser 1.20.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.20.6 still leaves at least one of them open, so 1.20.6 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of body-parser 1.20.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.16 still leaves at least one of them open, so 1.1.16 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of brace-expansion 1.1.11 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— braces 2.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— decode-uri-component 0.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — decode-uri-component is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin decode-uri-component to 0.2.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— flatted 3.2.5: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.2.5, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open, so 3.4.2 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of flatted 3.2.5 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— http-proxy-middleware 0.19.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.0.7. This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 0.19.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.0.10 still leaves at least one of them open, so 2.0.10 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of http-proxy-middleware 0.19.2 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 3.15.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.15.0 still leaves at least one of them open, so 3.15.0 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of js-yaml 3.14.1 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— json5 1.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — json5 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin json5 to 1.0.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— loader-utils 3.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — loader-utils is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin loader-utils to 3.2.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). One upgrade of loader-utils 3.2.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — lodash is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash to 4.18.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open, so 4.18.0 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of lodash 4.17.21 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— minimatch 3.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.0.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open, so 3.1.4 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of minimatch 3.0.4 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— node-forge 1.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — node-forge is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin node-forge to 1.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 7 advisories this scan raises against node-forge 1.3.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.4.0 still leaves at least one of them open, so 1.4.0 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of node-forge 1.3.1 clears all 7 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— nth-check 1.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — nth-check is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.0.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.0.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.0.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— path-to-regexp 0.1.7: [GHSA redacted] — path-to-regexp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin path-to-regexp to 0.1.13 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against path-to-regexp 0.1.7, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.1.13 still leaves at least one of them open, so 0.1.13 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of path-to-regexp 0.1.7 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— picomatch 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — picomatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin picomatch to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). One upgrade of picomatch 2.3.1 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— postcss 7.0.39: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 8.5.12 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 7.0.39, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 7.0.39; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against postcss 7.0.39, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.18 still leaves at least one of them open, so 8.5.18 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of postcss 7.0.39 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— rollup 2.75.7: [GHSA redacted] — rollup is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin rollup to 2.79.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against rollup 2.75.7, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.80.0 still leaves at least one of them open, so 2.80.0 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of rollup 2.75.7 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— semver 6.3.0: [GHSA redacted] — semver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin semver to 6.3.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— svgo 2.8.0: [GHSA redacted] — svgo is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin svgo to 2.8.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against svgo 2.8.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.8.3 still leaves at least one of them open, so 2.8.3 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— tmp 0.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — tmp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin tmp to 0.2.6 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against tmp 0.2.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.2.6 still leaves at least one of them open, so 0.2.6 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of tmp 0.2.1 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— webpack-dev-middleware 5.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — webpack-dev-middleware is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin webpack-dev-middleware to 5.3.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— ws 7.5.8: [GHSA redacted] — ws is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ws to 7.5.10 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against ws 7.5.8, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.5.11 still leaves at least one of them open, so 7.5.11 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of ws 7.5.8 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: System.Formats.Asn1 6.0.0 — System.Formats.Asn1 6.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Pkcs 6.0.1 — System.Security.Cryptography.Pkcs 6.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 6 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.0.3
High CVE: System.Text.Json 7.0.0 — System.Text.Json 7.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 8.0.4
High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.Json 6.0.0 — System.Text.Json 6.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— @babel/traverse 7.18.5: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/traverse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/traverse to 7.23.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— crypto-js 4.1.1: [GHSA redacted] — crypto-js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin crypto-js to 4.2.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— form-data 2.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 2.5.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 2.3.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.5.6 still leaves at least one of them open, so 2.5.6 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of form-data 2.3.3 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— shell-quote 1.7.3: [GHSA redacted] — shell-quote is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin shell-quote to 1.8.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against shell-quote 1.7.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.0 still leaves at least one of them open, so 1.9.0 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of shell-quote 1.7.3 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— webpack 5.73.0: [GHSA redacted] — webpack is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin webpack to 5.76.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against webpack 5.73.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.104.1 still leaves at least one of them open, so 5.104.1 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of webpack 5.73.0 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— websocket-driver 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted] — websocket-driver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin websocket-driver to 0.7.5 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). One upgrade of websocket-driver 0.7.4 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High IaC: DS-0002 src/Application/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root'
High IaC: DS-0002 src/Domain/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root'
High IaC: DS-0002 src/Web/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root'
High IaC: DS-0029 src/Web/Dockerfile— 'apt-get' missing '--no-install-recommends'
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High vulnerability · ×2
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— serialize-javascript 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 4.0.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 4.0.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— svgo 1.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — svgo is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.8.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Warning — 23 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×17
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— @babel/helpers 7.18.2: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/helpers is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/helpers to 7.26.10 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— @cypress/request 2.88.10: [GHSA redacted] — @cypress/request is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.0.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.88.10, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.88.10; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— @sideway/formula 3.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — @sideway/formula is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @sideway/formula to 3.0.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— ajv 6.12.6: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.14.0
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— ejs 3.1.8: [GHSA redacted] — ejs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ejs to 3.1.10 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— express 4.18.1: [GHSA redacted] — express is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin express to 4.19.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against express 4.18.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.20.0 still leaves at least one of them open, so 4.20.0 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of express 4.18.1 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— follow-redirects 1.15.1: [GHSA redacted] — follow-redirects is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin follow-redirects to 1.15.6 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against follow-redirects 1.15.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.16.0 still leaves at least one of them open, so 1.16.0 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of follow-redirects 1.15.1 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— http-proxy-middleware 2.0.6: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares http-proxy-middleware ^0.19.1, but the vulnerable 2.0.6 is a SEPARATE copy on another release line, so editing your own http-proxy-middleware entry cannot move it: upgrade the dependency that pulls it in (or pin http-proxy-middleware to 2.0.8 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against http-proxy-middleware 2.0.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.0.10 still leaves at least one of them open, so 2.0.10 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of http-proxy-middleware 2.0.6 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— joi 17.6.0: [GHSA redacted] — joi is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin joi to 17.13.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— micromatch 3.1.10: [GHSA redacted] — micromatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 4.0.8 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.1.10, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.1.10; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— nanoid 3.3.4: [GHSA redacted] — nanoid is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin nanoid to 3.3.8 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— qs 6.10.3: [GHSA redacted] — qs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin qs to 6.14.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against qs 6.10.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.14.2 still leaves at least one of them open, so 6.14.2 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of qs 6.10.3 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— react-router 6.3.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.30.2 One upgrade of react-router 6.3.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— serialize-javascript 6.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — serialize-javascript is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin serialize-javascript to 6.0.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). One upgrade of serialize-javascript 6.0.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— tough-cookie 2.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — tough-cookie is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 4.1.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.5.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.5.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— uuid 8.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 11.1.1
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/Web/ClientApp/yarn.lock— webpack-dev-server 4.9.2: [GHSA redacted] — webpack-dev-server is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 5.2.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 4.9.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 4.9.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 6 advisories this scan raises against webpack-dev-server 4.9.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 5.2.6 still leaves at least one of them open, so 5.2.6 is the floor for this package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of webpack-dev-server 4.9.2 clears all 6 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate — All 6 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness).
UnitOfWork.End (cognitive 16) src/Application/UnitOfWork.cs:72— UnitOfWork.End has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
Change coupling: Endpoint.cs ↔ Endpoint.cs src/Application/Endpoint.cs— `src/Application/Endpoint.cs` and `src/Domain/Endpoint.cs` change together 81% of the time (13 of the 16 commits that touched the less-changed of the two, renames followed) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
Off the main sequence: Infrastructure — Infrastructure: abstractness 0.11, instability 0.00, distance 0.89 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
Scattered collaborators — 95 % of calls cross a namespace and only 50 % of collaborators are co-located — group each feature's code into a vertical slice so a call's collaborators sit together.
Low IaC: DS-0026 src/Web/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 7 of 7 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it. None is large enough to schedule a dedicated read-through on its own, so they are folded into the freshness score rather than raised individually — largest first: src/Infrastructure/Extensions/BusExtensions.cs, src/Application/UnitOfWork.cs, src/Infrastructure/Extensions/LoggingExtensions.cs (and 4 more).
Mock framework: FakeItEasy — Test references FakeItEasy.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
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Run 019faf49-e48d-73b9-937b-9a4be9f59191 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 43 · Warnings: 23 · Recommendations: 5 · Info: 41 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 29-07-2026 @ 19:11 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.