Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
coder/code-server carries serious gaps (50%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Code Health (86%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (35%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (54%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene); 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage (Code Coverage).
For scale: — (~0 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly — (—). Approximate, ±~30%.
Encouragingly, the gaps are in documentation and release process — not in the code's correctness, structure or security, which are strong. They're low-risk to close, and doing so would lift the grade without re-engineering anything that already works.
Code Health
86%
Strong
Maturity
54%
Adequate · gated by M2
Readiness
35%
Weak · gated by D8, D9, P2
Security
74%
Adequate · gated by D36
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 35% · 50% weightMaturity 54% · 27% weightSecurity 74% · 15% weightCode Health 86% · 8% weight
Raise Readiness 35 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 50 → ~64.
New since the last scan (36+)
- D8 · No automated tests
- D16 · single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- D18 · Dimension evaluation failed
- D29 · High: detect-child-process src/node/util.ts
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] test/package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] test/package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] test/package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] test/package-lock.json
- R10 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2 locations) test/unit/node/cli.test.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2 locations) test/unit/node/http.test.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (19 lines × 4 locations) test/unit/node/vscodeSocket.test.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 3 locations) test/unit/node/cli.test.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (18 lines × 2 locations) test/unit/node/cli.test.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) test/unit/node/cli.test.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2 locations) test/unit/common/util.test.ts
- R10 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2 locations) test/unit/node/vscodeSocket.test.ts
- R11 · Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] test/e2e/appName.test.ts
- R11 · Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] test/e2e/models/CodeServer.ts
- R11 · Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] test/e2e/models/CodeServer.ts
- R11 · Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] test/e2e/openHelpAbout.test.ts
- R11 · Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] test/unit/common/emitter.test.ts
- R11 · Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] test/unit/common/http.test.ts
- R11 · Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] test/unit/common/util.test.ts
- R11 · Boundary violation [package:relative-cross-package] test/unit/node/app.test.ts
- R2 · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 39, cognitive 77) src/node/cli.ts
- R2 · Complex function (anonymous) (cyclomatic 22, cognitive 26) src/node/main.ts
- R2 · Complex function OnLineCallback (cyclomatic 20, cognitive 17) src/node/util.ts
- R7 · Dead file (~66 LoC) src/node/entry.ts
- R8 · Unlisted import 'vscode' test/e2e/extensions/test-extension/extension.ts
- R8 · Unused dependency 'doctoc'
- R8 · Unused dependency 'typescript-eslint'
- R9 · Import cycle (5 files) src/node/app.ts
- P2 · No structured logging
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage.
2
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
3
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
D3 · .NET / C#
God Classes
10.0
D4 · .NET / C#
Code Duplication
10.0
R1 · React / TS
Type Safety
9.9
R10 · React / TS
Code Duplication
7.1
R2 · React / TS
Cyclomatic Complexity
9.8
R3 · React / TS
Large Files
7.2
R7 · React / TS
Dead Code
9.6
X1 · Repo
Async correctness
10.0
X3 · Repo
Exception handling
10.0
X4 · Repo
Structured logging
10.0
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
The Bad
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 39 | High / Critical |
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 11 | High / Critical |
| A03:2021 — Injection | 4 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, improve observability by adopting a structured logging approach and implementing health checks to ensure system visibility. Next, clean up the dependency tree by removing unused packages and explicitly declaring all imports to maintain a healthy codebase. Then, address the single gap in automated testing to ensure code coverage is complete. Finally, establish a consistent release process by stamping versions or tagging releases to ensure build traceability.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. | +16.7 pts | Low | Code Coverage |
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +16.7 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects. | +18.0 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies. | +17.6 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
| Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable. | +16.7 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI. | +13.4 pts | Medium | Tooling |
| Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt. | +9.8 pts | Medium | Dependency Freshness |
| Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale. | +8.3 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml | 0.2 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014 |
| test/package-lock.json | 2.3 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| ci/release-image/Dockerfile.opensuse | 4.4 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0020 |
| package-lock.json | 4.8 | Mixed | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| ci/release-image/Dockerfile | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0029 |
| ci/release-image/Dockerfile.fedora | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0019 |
| renovate.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: renovate-missing-minimum-release-age |
| src/node/util.ts | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: detect-child-process |
| src/browser/pages/error.html | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: var-in-href |
| src/node/routes/index.ts | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: express-open-redirect |
| README.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Documentation Quality: The Getting started section lists five ways to get started but only four items appear in the visible text; the fifth is cut off mid-sentence ('Using our one-click buttons...') before being confirmed. |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 40 of 42 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 42 dimensions across the health lenses
D3D4D5D8D9D12D13D19D21D26D27D28D29D31D33D36D37D38AX5M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P6R1R10R11R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9X1X3X4
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 55 of 66 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the suite (`dotnet test --collect`) inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D5 · Coupling
0 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D8 · Code Coverage
No automated tests — the solution has no test code.
No automated tests
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No automated tests finding(s) in Code Coverage. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D9 · Test Distribution
No test projects found.
No tests found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D19 · Documentation Quality
The code-server documentation is clear and complete for a monorepo project: an informative README with requirements, getting started, highlights, and a clipped but fully outlined architecture section (Highlights; Requirements; Getting started; Questions?; Want to help?; Hiring; For Teams), plus the dedicated Contributor Covenant Code of Conduct covering Pledge, Standards, Responsibilities, Scope, Enforcement, and Attribution. The main gap is that the README's 'Getting started' list clips mid-sentence ('Using our one-click buttons...') before the full five options are shown, so each item in the numbered list must be verified against the published content.
The Getting started section lists five ways to get started but only four items appear in the visible text; the fifth is cut off mid-sentence ('Using our one-click buttons...') before being confirmed.README.md
What to do
- Resolve the 1 The Getting started section lists five ways to get started but only four… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D26 · Project Cohesion
No projects to assess.
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D27 · Navigability
Too little code to assess navigability.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
4 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 2 medium, 0 low.
High: renovate-missing-minimum-release-age renovate.json:10
Medium: var-in-href src/browser/pages/error.html:30
What to do
- Resolve the 2 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with renovate.json, util.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
- Resolve the 2 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with error.html, index.ts. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
39 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 9 medium, 25 low.
High IaC: KSV-0014 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
Medium IaC: KSV-0001 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
Low IaC: KSV-0003 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
What to do
- Resolve the 25 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (22), Dockerfile, Dockerfile.fedora. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (25 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 5 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (2), Dockerfile, Dockerfile.fedora. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
- Resolve the 9 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with deployment.yaml (8), Dockerfile.opensuse. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
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D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
1/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy
A vulnerability-disclosure policy (docs/SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.
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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
11 finding(s): 0 critical, 5 high, 3 medium, 3 low.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] test/package-lock.json
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] test/package-lock.json
What to do
- Resolve the 5 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 Low CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AX5 · Architecture & structure
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
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P2 · Observability
- No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.
What to do
- Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
What to do
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
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P6 · Release Hygiene
What to do
- Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
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R1 · Type Safety
What to do
- Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
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R10 · Code Duplication
- test/unit/node/cli.test.ts:658 · test/unit/node/cli.test.ts:696 — cli.test.ts:658
- test/unit/node/http.test.ts:64 · test/unit/node/util.test.ts:594 — http.test.ts:64
- test/unit/node/vscodeSocket.test.ts:60 · test/unit/node/vscodeSocket.test.ts:111 · test/unit/node/vscodeSocket.test.ts:146 · test/unit/node/vscodeSocket.test.ts:250 — vscodeSocket.test.ts:60
- test/unit/node/cli.test.ts:824 · test/unit/node/cli.test.ts:843 · test/unit/node/cli.test.ts:927 — cli.test.ts:824
- test/unit/node/cli.test.ts:883 · test/unit/node/cli.test.ts:946 — cli.test.ts:883
- test/unit/node/cli.test.ts:621 · test/unit/node/cli.test.ts:657 — cli.test.ts:621
- test/unit/common/util.test.ts:46 · test/unit/node/app.test.ts:168 — util.test.ts:46
- test/unit/node/vscodeSocket.test.ts:176 · test/unit/node/vscodeSocket.test.ts:215 — vscodeSocket.test.ts:176
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
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R11 · Import Boundaries
- test/e2e/appName.test.ts:1 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../src/node/constants) — import the package by name instead. — appName.test.ts:1
- test/e2e/models/CodeServer.ts:7 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../src/common/util) — import the package by name instead. — CodeServer.ts:7
- test/e2e/models/CodeServer.ts:8 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../src/node/util) — import the package by name instead. — CodeServer.ts:8
- test/e2e/openHelpAbout.test.ts:1 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../src/node/constants) — import the package by name instead. — openHelpAbout.test.ts:1
- test/unit/common/emitter.test.ts:2 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../src/common/emitter) — import the package by name instead. — emitter.test.ts:2
- test/unit/common/http.test.ts:1 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../src/common/http) — import the package by name instead. — http.test.ts:1
- test/unit/common/util.test.ts:3 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../src/common/util) — import the package by name instead. — util.test.ts:3
- test/unit/node/app.test.ts:6 reaches into another package with a relative path (../../../src/node/app) — import the package by name instead. — app.test.ts:6
What to do
- Fix the listed violations: import through public entries (package exports / slice index), never reach into another layer or package's internals.
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R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×5) — cli.ts:365, main.ts:124, util.ts:26, …
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
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R3 · Large Files
What to do
- Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
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R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×4) — watch.ts, entry.ts, serviceWorker.ts, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
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R5 · Dependency Freshness
What to do
- Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
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R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗
What to do
- Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
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R7 · Dead Code
- Unreachable from the 3 application, 3 tooling and 50 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
- no import path from any entry point (3 application, 3 tooling, 50 test roots considered) (×2) — entry.ts, serviceWorker.ts
- Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. (×2) — globalE2eSetup.ts:11, globalUnitSetup.ts:7
What to do
- Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
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R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×2) — wsRouter.ts:2, extension.ts:1
- Declared in the root/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×2)
- Declared in test/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
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R9 · Circular Imports
- src/node/app.ts → src/node/cli.ts → src/node/http.ts → src/node/routes/errors.ts → src/node/vscodeSocket.ts → src/node/app.ts — app.ts
- test/e2e/models/CodeServer.ts → test/utils/helpers.ts → test/e2e/models/CodeServer.ts — CodeServer.ts
What to do
- Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
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X1 · Async correctness
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X3 · Exception handling
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X4 · Structured logging
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 86% | Strong | Strongest area. |
| Maturity | 54% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 35% | Weak — gated by D8, D9, P2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 74% | Adequate — gated by D36 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 61 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC3 Page structure — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No user-facing web UI (the repo is a library/CLI/worker/headless service) — accessibility is not applicable.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — no csproj graph available
- AX4 Dependency direction — no csproj graph available
- AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
- C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — No production methods were analyzable, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D10 Test Quality — No tests in the analyzed solution to assess for quality.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots
- D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
- D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
- D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — No production methods were analyzable, so cognitive complexity was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — No .NET solution found; no NuGet dependencies to scan for vulnerabilities.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
- D35 Change Coupling — no production change history to mine for change-coupling
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
- X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 14 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: KSV-0014 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- High IaC: KSV-0014 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- High IaC: DS-0029 ci/release-image/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0019 ci/release-image/Dockerfile.fedora
- High IaC: DS-0020 ci/release-image/Dockerfile.opensuse
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] test/package-lock.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: renovate-missing-minimum-release-age renovate.json:10
- High: detect-child-process src/node/util.ts:438
D18 · Solution Shape
- Dimension evaluation failed
D8 · Code Coverage
- No automated tests
Warning — 15 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Medium IaC: KSV-0001 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0001 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0012 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0012 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0013 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0104 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0104 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: KSV-0125 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 ci/release-image/Dockerfile.opensuse
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] test/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] test/package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] test/package-lock.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: var-in-href src/browser/pages/error.html:30
- Medium: express-open-redirect src/node/routes/index.ts:93
D16 · Bus Factor
- single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
Recommendation — 36 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: KSV-0003 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0003 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0004 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0004 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0011 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0011 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0015 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0015 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0016 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0016 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0018 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0018 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0020 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0020 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0021 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0021 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0030 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0030 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0105 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0106 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0106 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: KSV-0110 ci/helm-chart/templates/deployment.yaml
- Low IaC: DS-0026 ci/release-image/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 ci/release-image/Dockerfile.fedora
- Low IaC: DS-0026 ci/release-image/Dockerfile.opensuse
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] test/package-lock.json
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] test/package-lock.json
- Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] test/package-lock.json
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
- single-commit history — no usable git history window to measure hotspots
D19 · Documentation Quality
- The Getting started section lists five ways to get started but only four items appear in the visible text; the fifth is cut off mid-sentence ('Using our one-click buttons...') before being confirmed. README.md
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No build provenance
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No artifact signing
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
- No SBOM
D9 · Test Distribution
- No tests found
Info — 1 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 4 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet (no .NET solution) | — | dotnet (no .NET solution): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 39 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 11 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |