coil — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

The system holds an adequate standing with a health score of 53%, indicating a workable asset that carries real operational risk. While the underlying architecture is robust, the system’s readiness to operate safely in production is compromised, creating a gap between design intent and delivery reliability. This imbalance threatens delivery speed and increases the cost of maintaining stability over time.

The value at stake is moderate, with a rebuild effort estimated at roughly 0.2 person-years, costing approximately €33,000. This small footprint suggests the system is manageable, yet the concentration of risk in its operational readiness means that even minor changes could trigger significant delays or defects if not carefully controlled. The low volume of boilerplate code indicates that the logic is custom and specific, making it valuable but also sensitive to how it is maintained.

The primary theme is operational fragility. With a readiness score of 46%, the system lacks the safety nets required for confident deployment. This means changes are more likely to cause outages or regressions, directly impacting user experience and increasing the cost of fixing issues after they reach production. The absence of automated gates for releases further amplifies this risk, allowing potentially bad builds to reach users without human intervention.

A secondary concern is security exposure. Although the security score is 73%, there are confirmed findings, including a leaked secret and missing static analysis in the build pipeline. This creates a vulnerability where security regressions can slip through, exposing the business to data breaches or compliance failures. The lack of provenance tracking for dependencies adds another layer of uncertainty, making it difficult to verify the integrity of the software supply chain.

What is genuinely good is the strong architectural foundation and high code health, which ensure the system is maintainable and logical. The focus should be on adding a static analysis step to the continuous integration pipeline to catch security issues early. This single action offers the highest leverage, preventing regressions and stabilizing the release process with minimal effort.

Code Health 48% Weak · gated by R1, R7 Architecture 100% ★ Exemplary Maturity 63% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 46% Weak · gated by P3 Security 73% Adequate · gated by D30

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 46% · 47% weightCode Health 48% · 26% weightMaturity 63% · 14% weightSecurity 73% · 8% weightArchitecture 100% · 4% weight

Raise Readiness 46 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 53 → ~59.

Code composition — where the lines go

Tests 100%

New since the last scan (81+)

81 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-08-06) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D1 · UriKt.parseUri (cyclomatic 24) coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/Uri.kt
D1 · MemoryCacheService.isCacheValueValidForSize (cyclomatic 18) coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/memory/MemoryCacheService.kt
D2 · ErrorFunctionDetector.isInsideImageRequestBuilderLambda (cognitive 41) coil-lint/src/main/kotlin/coil3/lint/ErrorFunctionDetector.kt
D2 · UriKt.parseUri (cognitive 36) coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/Uri.kt
D2 · MemoryCacheService.isCacheValueValidForSize (cognitive 21) coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/memory/MemoryCacheService.kt
D2 · DiskLruCache.completeEdit (cognitive 20) coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/disk/DiskLruCache.kt
D2 · UtilsKt.transformOf (cognitive 19) coil-compose-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/compose/internal/utils.kt
D2 · AbstractContentPainterNode.modifyConstraints (cognitive 17) coil-compose-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/compose/internal/ContentPainterModifier.kt
D3 · TooManyMethods: Builder coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/request/ImageRequest.kt
D3 · ClassTooLong: DiskLruCache coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/disk/DiskLruCache.kt
D3 · MethodTooLong: ImageLoader.enqueue coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/ImageLoader.kt
D3 · MethodTooLong: ImageLoader.execute coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/ImageLoader.kt
D3 · MethodTooLong: ImageLoader.shutdown coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/ImageLoader.kt
D3 · MethodTooLong: ImageLoader.newBuilder coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/ImageLoader.kt
D4 · Duplicated block (33 lines × 2) coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/decode/StaticImageDecoder.kt
D4 · Duplicated block (23 lines × 2) coil-core/src/jsCommonMain/kotlin/coil3/decode/SkiaImageDecoder.jsCommon.kt
D4 · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/decode/DecodeUtils.kt
D4 · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/ColorImage.kt
D4 · Duplicated block (49 lines × 2) coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/EventListener.kt
D4 · Duplicated block (56 lines × 2) coil-network-ktor2/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor2/KtorNetworkFetcher.kt
D4 · Duplicated block (61 lines × 2) coil-network-ktor2/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor2/internal/utils.kt
D4 · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) coil-network-ktor2/src/jvmCommonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor2/internal/utils.jvmCommon.kt
D13 · REDACTED
D17 · TodoComment coil-core/src/androidDeviceTest/kotlin/coil3/decode/AndroidDecoderTest.kt
D17 · TodoComment coil-gif/src/androidTest/java/coil3/gif/AnimatedTransformationTest.kt
D17 · TodoComment coil-core/src/nonAndroidMain/kotlin/coil3/util/SystemCallbacks.kt
D17 · TodoComment coil-core/src/nonJvmCommonMain/kotlin/coil3/util/fileSystems.nonJvmCommon.kt
D17 · TodoComment coil-core/src/nonJvmCommonMain/kotlin/coil3/util/contexts.nonJvmCommon.kt
D17 · TodoComment coil-svg/src/nonAndroidMain/kotlin/coil3/svg/SvgImage.nonAndroid.kt
D28 · REDACTED
D29 · REDACTED
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D30 · REDACTED
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D30 · REDACTED
D35 · Change coupling: AsyncImage.kt ↔ SubcomposeAsyncImage.kt coil-compose-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/compose/AsyncImage.kt
D35 · Change coupling: ScaleDrawable.kt ↔ CrossfadeDrawable.kt coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/size/ScaleDrawable.kt
D36 · REDACTED

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €11,000–€55,000

Cost to rebuild	€11,000–€55,000 (0.1–0.3 person-years (184–582 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	Standard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 53% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	REDACTED · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€33,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 46% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED.

+8.3 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

+8.6 pts · REDACTED effort · Security & performance tooling

Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.

+8.3 pts · REDACTED effort · Deployment & Rollback

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · REDACTED · Value at risk

This is a REDACTED asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 46%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: REDACTED, ~0.2 person-years rebuild (20,708 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 46%

→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · REDACTED · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

150 modules, 386 dependencies. 6 dependency cycles across 39 modules, marked above the diagonal.

Showing the 40 most-connected modules; 110 more are not drawn.

Module dependency matrix. The row depends on the column; the number is how many type pairs create the dependency. A cell above the diagonal is part of a dependency cycle.
depends on →	1 disk	2 size	3 EventListener	4 Extras	5 fetch	6 network.CacheStrategy	7 fetch.Fetcher	8 request.ImageRequest	9 util	10 transform	11 intercept.EngineInterceptor	12 memory	13 RealImageLoader	14 ImageLoader	15 request	16 decode	17 intercept	18 transition	19 decode.Decoder	23 ComponentRegistry	24 coil3	25 compose.AsyncImagePainter	32 network	33 svg	34 svg.SvgDecoder	37 compose.internal	40 compose
1 disk
2 size
3 EventListener															1						2
4 Extras																					2
5 fetch															10	3					8
6 network.CacheStrategy																							4
7 fetch.Fetcher					1										1						1
8 request.ImageRequest		11		1			1								11				1		5
9 util		5					2								4				2	1	5
10 transform		3							1
11 intercept.EngineInterceptor									2	2					2	1					3
12 memory		2							1		1				4						8
13 RealImageLoader	1		1					1	1			1			6					6	4
14 ImageLoader	1	1	1	1				1	1			1	1		2					1	5
15 request		13		1			1	5	5	1				1		1			1		13
16 decode		2							1						5						3
17 intercept		1			2				3	1	2	1			9						6
18 transition		1													2
19 decode.Decoder					1										1	1					1
20 gif		1		1				1						1	2	6
21 transition.Transition															1			2
22 video		1		1	2			1							2	2
23 ComponentRegistry							1										1		1		1
24 coil3	2	2		5	4		1	3	1			2	2	3	16	3	1	1	1	2
25 compose.AsyncImagePainter															1						1						3
26 decode.BitmapFactoryDecoder					1										1	2			1		1
27 decode.BlackholeDecoder					1										1	1			1		2
28 decode.SkiaImageDecoder					1										4	4			1		1
29 decode.StaticImageDecoder					1										1	1			1		1
30 fetch.BlobUriFetcher					1		1								1						2
31 gif.AnimatedImageDecoder					1										1	1			1		1
32 network	1			1	5	2		1							2	1					2
33 svg															2	2					3
34 svg.SvgDecoder					1										1	1			1		3
35 video.MediaDataSourceFetcher					1		1								1						1
36 video.VideoFrameDecoder					1										1	1			1		1
37 compose.internal		3													2						3	2					7
38 network.NetworkFetcher					1		1								1						3		4
39 svg.internal									1						2						2			3	1
40 compose		4		1				1						1	3						10	9				3

Dependency, pointing down the layeringAbove the diagonal — part of a cycleThe module itself

At a glance — Code Health · 48% · Weak · gated by R1, R7 ·

The Good

D1 · Kotlin Cyclomatic Complexity 9.3 D2 · Kotlin Cognitive Complexity 8.5 D3 · Kotlin God Classes 9.3 D4 · Kotlin Code Duplication 9.8 D17 · Kotlin Explicit Debt 9.9 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 10.0 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 10.0

The Ugly

R1 · React / TS Type Safety 0.0 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 0.0

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good

D35 · Kotlin Change Coupling 9.9 AX10 · Repo Code composition 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 63% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

The Good

D15 · Kotlin Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · Kotlin Documentation Quality 9.0 D21 · Kotlin Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.1 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 8.0

The Ugly

M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 46% · Weak · gated by P3 ·

The Good

P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 10.0

The Bad

D13 · Kotlin Secret Scanning 5.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0

The Ugly

P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0

At a glance — Security · 73% · Adequate · gated by D30 ·

The Good

D28 · Kotlin Secrets (history) 9.0 D29 · Kotlin Static Analysis (SAST) 7.6 D37 · Kotlin Vulnerability-disclosure Policy 10.0 D43 · Kotlin Malicious Dependencies 10.0

The Ugly

D30 · Kotlin Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A03:2021 — Injection	27	REDACTED / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	24	REDACTED / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures	2	REDACTED / Critical

Roadmap

First, integrate automated security scanning into the CI pipeline to block regressions and immediately resolve the detected secret leak. Next, implement a draft release gate to prevent bad builds from reaching users, while simultaneously adopting TypeScript to enforce type safety in the frontend. Finally, remove dead code to reduce maintenance overhead and improve build efficiency.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED.	+8.3 pts	Low	Secret Scanning
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.	+8.6 pts	REDACTED	Security & performance tooling
Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.	+8.3 pts	REDACTED	Deployment & Rollback
Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.	+7.4 pts	REDACTED	Type Safety
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.	+7.4 pts	REDACTED	Dead Code
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).	+3.6 pts	REDACTED	Architecture documentation
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.	+2.9 pts	REDACTED	Documentation (README)
Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.	+2.2 pts	REDACTED	Documentation accuracy

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 32 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 3% slop · 28% mixed · 69% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
REDACTED	0.0	Slop	Dependency Vulnerabilities: REDACTED CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	4.4	Mixed	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: REDACTED
REDACTED	4.4	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED	6.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): REDACTED: REDACTED
coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/ImageLoader.kt	7.2	Mixed	God Classes: MethodTooLong: ImageLoader.enqueue
REDACTED	7.2	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): REDACTED: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.2	Mixed	Dependency Vulnerabilities: REDACTED CVE: REDACTED
coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/Uri.kt	7.8	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: UriKt.parseUri (cyclomatic 24)
coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/memory/MemoryCacheService.kt	7.8	Mixed	Cyclomatic Complexity: MemoryCacheService.isCacheValueValidForSize (cyclomatic 18)
coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/disk/DiskLruCache.kt	7.8	Mixed	Cognitive Complexity: DiskLruCache.completeEdit (cognitive 20)
coil-core/src/androidDeviceTest/kotlin/coil3/decode/AndroidDecoderTest.kt	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
coil-gif/src/androidTest/java/coil3/gif/AnimatedTransformationTest.kt	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
coil-core/src/nonAndroidMain/kotlin/coil3/util/SystemCallbacks.kt	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
coil-core/src/nonJvmCommonMain/kotlin/coil3/util/fileSystems.nonJvmCommon.kt	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
coil-core/src/nonJvmCommonMain/kotlin/coil3/util/contexts.nonJvmCommon.kt	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
coil-svg/src/nonAndroidMain/kotlin/coil3/svg/SvgImage.nonAndroid.kt	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
coil-lint/src/main/kotlin/coil3/lint/ErrorFunctionDetector.kt	8.5	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: ErrorFunctionDetector.isInsideImageRequestBuilderLambda (cognitive 41)
coil-compose-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/compose/internal/utils.kt	8.5	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: UtilsKt.transformOf (cognitive 19)
coil-compose-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/compose/internal/ContentPainterModifier.kt	8.5	Near-clean	Cognitive Complexity: AbstractContentPainterNode.modifyConstraints (cognitive 17)
coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/request/ImageRequest.kt	8.5	Near-clean	God Classes: TooManyMethods: Builder

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 46

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 41

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 10

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 45

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 27 of 30 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 30 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D13D15D17D19D21D28D29D30D35D37D43AX10M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6R1R10R2R3R7R9

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 91 of 97 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)	Code duplication	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a0d954-cee8-7a0e-8c41-132b36c440ab.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: test source is present (.kt) but the built-in coverage collector has no runner for this repository's ecosystem — so this suite was never executed by it. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a defect in the repo. To have real coverage read, produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — the Gradle `jacocoTestReport` task) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures. You can widen what we reach: optional: produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — the Gradle `jacocoTestReport` task) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures — then the real number is read on the next scan.
D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test source is present (.kt) and this repository declares a JVM test suite (repository root, Gradle), but it was not re-run: no test result was produced. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Dependency Hygiene ran out of its 5-minute budget before it had finished, so what it reports here is a floor rather than a complete count. The rows above are real and stand; what is not known is how many more there are. This is a limit of the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D14 License Compliance — evaluation did not complete — License Compliance not included (check did not complete) — excluded from the score.
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (117 contributor(s) across 2464 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 88% of the history; the other 116 hold 0.1% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. D22 identifies the intentionally-exposed surface from `IsPackable` and `.Contracts` project names, MSBuild conventions read off the loaded project set. This target exposed no such projects, so the probe never ran; this says nothing about whether the repository has a public API. This repository commits no C#/VB source at all, so there was never an MSBuild project set to read these conventions off. That is OUR side and it is a COLLECTOR gap, not an environment fault: D22 has no public-API collector for any other ecosystem, and the remedy is to write one — no change to the scan image can close it.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. File-level freshness contradicts repo activity: 95 commits in the last 90 days, yet 53 of 91 significant files carry no living knowledge. Those two readings cannot both be true, so the per-file recency signal is treated as unreliable here and freshness is not scored for this run.
D44 Platform End-of-Life — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This dimension reads a project's own statement about the platform it runs on: a TargetFramework in a .NET project file, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a capped requires-python, or a framework major pinned by a dependency constraint. This repository carries none of them, so nothing about its platform was established. That is a gap in this analyzer's coverage, NOT a finding that the platform is supported — a language whose runtime is declared elsewhere (go.mod, a Gemfile's ruby directive, a Dockerfile) is simply not read here yet.
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over which project references which — facts that live in .csproj references. This repository either commits no MSBuild project at all (its C# may still have been parsed as syntax-only projects, which carry no references between them) or its projects failed to load, so there was no graph to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
AX4 Dependency direction — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the direction each project reference points — facts that live in .csproj references. This repository either commits no MSBuild project at all (its C# may still have been parsed as syntax-only projects, which carry no references between them) or its projects failed to load, so there was no graph to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
AX6 Interface segregation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over the public interfaces this run's compilations declare, and none was loaded, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
AX8 Test isolation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is computed over which projects are test projects, and what they reference — facts that live in .csproj references. This repository either commits no MSBuild project at all (its C# may still have been parsed as syntax-only projects, which carry no references between them) or its projects failed to load, so there was no graph to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
C1 Data Protection — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These personal data controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks personal data controls.
C2 Access Controls — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These authorization controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks authorization controls.
C3 Audit Trail — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These audit controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks audit controls.
C4 Data Retention — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These retention controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks retention controls.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These data-subject rights controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks data-subject rights controls.
ED5 Idempotency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check finds retry-prone mutations by walking the repository's declared types, and NONE was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to look at. That is a limit of the analyzer's reach — it reads .NET projects — not a finding that this repository has no command handlers or message consumers.
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
P5 DR & Backup — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. No backup/snapshot/replication config, RTO/RPO or restore-procedure documentation was found — and no production persistence was detected either (no data-access packages, no data-store services, no database resources), so there is nothing in this repository whose loss a DR control would recover. If this system's data lives in a platform or ops repo we can't see, that's where the DR evidence belongs.
S1 Web-Security Posture — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. These web-security controls are read from declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names and guard methods in a C# source model, and none was loaded on this run, so there was nothing to gather. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository lacks web-security controls.
X1 Async correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X12 Unreachable branch — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X13 Undrained process stream — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X14 Bypassable address classification — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X16 Unfloored truncation loop — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X19 Unrestored process-global state — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X2 Cancellation propagation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X20 Mistyped argument guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X22 Contradicted release guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X25 Inert configuration knob — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X3 Exception handling — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X4 Structured logging — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.
X5 Nullable reference types — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. This check is implemented over the C# syntax tree, and no C# was loaded on this run, so it had nothing to read. That is a gap in this analyzer's language reach — not a finding that the repository is free of what this check looks for.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity9.3 / 10Stronggated by 2 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was UriKt.parseUri at 24.

UriKt.parseUri (cyclomatic 24)coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/Uri.kt:196

MemoryCacheService.isCacheValueValidForSize (cyclomatic 18)coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/memory/MemoryCacheService.kt:104

What to do

Resolve the 1 UriKt.parseUri (cyclomatic 24) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with Uri.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 MemoryCacheService.isCacheValueValidForSize (cyclomatic 18) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with MemoryCacheService.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was ErrorFunctionDetector.isInsideImageRequestBuilderLambda at 41.

ErrorFunctionDetector.isInsideImageRequestBuilderLambda (cognitive 41)coil-lint/src/main/kotlin/coil3/lint/ErrorFunctionDetector.kt:66

UriKt.parseUri (cognitive 36)coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/Uri.kt:196

MemoryCacheService.isCacheValueValidForSize (cognitive 21)coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/memory/MemoryCacheService.kt:104

DiskLruCache.completeEdit (cognitive 20)coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/disk/DiskLruCache.kt:447

UtilsKt.transformOf (cognitive 19)coil-compose-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/compose/internal/utils.kt:101

+ 1 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 1 ErrorFunctionDetector.isInsideImageRequestBuilderLambda (cognitive 41) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with ErrorFunctionDetector.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 UriKt.parseUri (cognitive 36) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with Uri.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 MemoryCacheService.isCacheValueValidForSize (cognitive 21) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with MemoryCacheService.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D3 · God Classes9.3 / 10Stronggated by 6 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 god class(es) detected.

MethodTooLong: ImageLoader.enqueue · ×4coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/ImageLoader.kt:59

TooManyMethods: Buildercoil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/request/ImageRequest.kt:299

ClassTooLong: DiskLruCachecoil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/disk/DiskLruCache.kt:86

What to do

Resolve the 4 MethodTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with ImageLoader.kt (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with ImageRequest.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 ClassTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with DiskLruCache.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Stronggated by 8 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

8 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (33 lines × 2)coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/decode/StaticImageDecoder.kt:47

Duplicated block (23 lines × 2)coil-core/src/jsCommonMain/kotlin/coil3/decode/SkiaImageDecoder.jsCommon.kt:18

Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/decode/DecodeUtils.kt:103

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2)coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/ColorImage.kt:17

Duplicated block (49 lines × 2)coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/EventListener.kt:20

+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (33 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with StaticImageDecoder.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (23 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with SkiaImageDecoder.jsCommon.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with DecodeUtils.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

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D17 · Explicit Debt9.9 / 10Stronggated by 6 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 deducted task-comment markers across 20708 LoC (0.0/KLoC) → score 9.9. Task comments only: this repository's language is read without a compiler, so D17's suppression, dead-code and commented-out-code arms did not run and this score counts fewer marker kinds than a .NET repository's would.

TodoComment · ×6coil-core/src/androidDeviceTest/kotlin/coil3/decode/AndroidDecoderTest.kt:368

What to do

Resolve the 6 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with AndroidDecoderTest.kt, AnimatedTransformationTest.kt, SystemCallbacks.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation QualityExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Coil's documentation is clear and complete for an image-loading library. It includes a well-written README covering features (fastness, lightweight, ease of use, modern API), a quick start with Compose integration, a license section, and cross-lingual translations. The architecture/Docs set provides detailed coverage: coil-video, coil-test, coil-svg, coil-network-core, coil-gif, coil-compose, works-with-coil, upgrading-to-coil3, upgrading-to-coil2, recipes, and migrating-from Glide/Picasso. All the outlined sections are present in the visible text. Coil's documentation is clear and complete for a library project. It includes an overview (Java compatibility with Kotlin-first API, suspend-function limitations), usage examples (enqueueing ImageRequest in Java and Kotlin), architecture docs (pluggable image pipeline components like Interceptors, Mappers, Keyers, Fetchers, Decoders), installation guides (import statements, singleton loader configuration), a getting-started section covering Compose and Android View usage, an FAQ addressing Java compatibility, preloading, logging, targeting Java 8/11, and a Code of Conduct. The document is well-structured with headings and the outline is present for every named section.

Documentation: no installation or build instructions · ×4README.md

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

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D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Adequategated by 1 critical finding✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged REDACTED. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 REDACTED secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)7.6 / 10Adequategated by 25 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

27 finding(s): 0 critical, 25 high, 2 medium, 0 low. 24 unpinned-GitHub-Actions row(s) are reported here but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which measures that posture as `pinned_actions` — one pinning decision is charged once, not once per lens. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `gradlew` (line 74, line 178) — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them. Separately, one or more rules could not re-parse an embedded snippet in 1 file(s) (e.g. a workflow `run:` block read as shell). Those files WERE scanned and their other rows are unaffected; only those rules' view of those snippets is missing.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) charged to Static Analysis (SAST) — the other 24 are reported here at file:line but scored by D36 (supply-chain provenance), which charges them once. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (25 issue-level, 1 of them charged here).
Resolve the 2 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir/Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex, Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

24 finding(s): 0 critical, 19 high, 3 medium, 2 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 18 REDACTED CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (18). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (18 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 REDACTED CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling9.9 / 10Stronggated by 2 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: AsyncImage.kt↔SubcomposeAsyncImage.kt 67%; ScaleDrawable.kt↔CrossfadeDrawable.kt 50%

Change coupling: AsyncImage.kt ↔ SubcomposeAsyncImage.kt · ×2coil-compose-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/compose/AsyncImage.kt

What to do

Resolve the 2 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with AsyncImage.kt, ScaleDrawable.kt. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D43 · Malicious Dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No dependency in any ecosystem this repository declares is published as malicious.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX10 · Code composition10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does. On this repository the split was taken from the source tree on disk rather than from a loaded .NET workspace, so a file's role is decided by its PATH segments alone — no declared namespace was available to add to the evidence — and generated output is excluded from the census entirely rather than counted as a generated share.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

What to do

The domain core is a small share of production code, but most of the rest matched no layer vocabulary at all — so this is not yet an anemic-domain finding. The namespace/path convention could not place that code, which makes the composition above a statement about the naming, not about the design. Name the layers (or check that the repository's conventions differ from the ones this check knows) before reading a thin domain into it.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M1 · Documentation (README)7.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 21 of 27 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 1.6 pts.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree, with each file named `NNNN-title` in whatever markup those docs already use, is the most discoverable form).

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M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

M4 · Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists — searched for: `rag`, `langchain`, `llamaindex`, `pinecone`, `weaviate`, `qdrant`, `embeddings`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest files (package.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.slnx, *.yml, Dockerfile); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong.

What to do

Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 7846 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

What to do

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: spotbugs with find-sec-bugs — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.

What to do

Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

0 typed · 6 plain JS — the untyped files are coil-core/karma.config.d/karma.conf.js, coil-core/karma.config.d/timeout.js, gradle/nodejs/registerSkikoMjsWorkaround.cjs, karma.browser.d/00-disable-wasm-streaming.js, karma.config.d/00-disable-wasm-streaming.js, karma.config.d/10-timeouts.js.

What to do

Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.

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R10 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.

Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Deterministic.

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R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

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R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

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R7 · Dead Code0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

Unreachable from the 1 application, 1 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. This repository declares no build, type-check or test script, so nothing here would fail on a wrong deletion — confirm by hand that nothing loads each file (including by a path built at runtime) before removing it. An undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make (×4) — gradle/nodejs/registerSkikoMjsWorkaround.cjs, karma.config.d/10-timeouts.js, coil-core/karma.config.d/timeout.js, …

What to do

Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.

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R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

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Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	48%	Weak — gated by R1, R7	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Maturity	63%	Adequate — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	46%	Weak — gated by P3	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	73%	Adequate — gated by D30	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Not evidenced — 4 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control

Not included — 91 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~13288 lines of test source are present (.kt) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included — no .kt test runner
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency Hygiene incomplete (time budget)
D14 License Compliance — License Compliance not included (check did not complete)
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — The exposed public-API surface could not be collected — no C#/VB projects loaded.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.kt, .swift) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — knowledge concentrated in recent work — freshness signal contradicted by repo activity
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D44 Platform End-of-Life — Platform end-of-life not assessed — this repository declares no platform this pass reads
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a CS/VB/GO/SCALA/SWIFT/DART class graph, and this repository's production source is .kt, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.kt) but no test cases reached the test census for this repository — no test root we could resolve declared them, or the files we read declare no cases in a test framework we recognise — so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 39 value object(s); 1 domain event(s)
ED2 Event/command shape — not scored — deciding whether a command has more than one competing handler requires resolving the call graph, and this analysis resolves a call's owner only where the receiver's type is written down in the source. Reported as guidance rather than measured
ED5 Idempotency — This check finds retry-prone mutations (command handlers and message/event consumers) by walking the repository's declared types, and none was loaded here, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files were read — this check reads C# syntax, and none was loaded for this repository. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, and the automatic-re-run check to any GitHub-Actions workflow, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (JaCoCo XML — the Gradle `jacocoTestReport` task) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R4 Test Coverage — the JS/TS workspace (5 production file(s)) has no JavaScript/TypeScript test, but it is 0.66% of this repository's production source and the other 99.34% carries 13,288 line(s) of test code this pass cannot read — an incidental frontend's reachability is not the repository's test posture, so it is not scored as one
R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D30 (Dependency Vulnerabilities), which answers every ecosystem
R6 Tooling — no package.json in the repository — test/lint/typecheck wiring is read from package.json scripts (corroborated against CI), so this project's own toolchain isn't measured here
R8 Dependency Hygiene — Not measured — no package.json declares any dependency, so there is nothing to check imports against (imports may resolve through a host runtime rather than node).
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X12 Unreachable branch — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X13 Undrained process stream — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X14 Bypassable address classification — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X15 Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X16 Unfloored truncation loop — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X17 Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X18 Disposal-pattern correctness — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X19 Unrestored process-global state — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X20 Mistyped argument guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X21 Side-effecting pattern guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X22 Contradicted release guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X23 Unguarded diagnostic materialisation — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X24 Document value interpolated into markup unescaped — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X25 Inert configuration knob — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X26 Unsynchronised callback handoff — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X27 Collection changed while being enumerated — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X28 Index access outside its own emptiness guard — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X29 Per-element action decided by a fixed element — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X30 Support guard that admits what it rejects — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X32 Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly — This check reads C# syntax; no C# was loaded for this repository, so it has nothing to report. That is a limit of the analyzer, not a finding about your code.
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 46 finding(s)

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×25

REDACTED
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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED CVE · ×18

REDACTED
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D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1

REDACTED

D28 · Secrets (history) · REDACTED secret · ×1

REDACTED

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED vulnerability · ×1

REDACTED

Serious — 41 finding(s)

D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×6

TodoComment coil-core/src/androidDeviceTest/kotlin/coil3/decode/AndroidDecoderTest.kt:368 — // TODO: Figure out why this fails on recent emulators. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment coil-gif/src/androidTest/java/coil3/gif/AnimatedTransformationTest.kt:61 — // TODO: Figure out why this fails on recent emulators. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment coil-core/src/nonAndroidMain/kotlin/coil3/util/SystemCallbacks.kt:10 — // TODO: Listen for memory-pressure events to trim the memory cache on non-Android platforms. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment coil-core/src/nonJvmCommonMain/kotlin/coil3/util/fileSystems.nonJvmCommon.kt:7 — // TODO: Figure out how to compute remaining free space. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment coil-core/src/nonJvmCommonMain/kotlin/coil3/util/contexts.nonJvmCommon.kt:6 — // TODO: Figure out how to compute the total available memory on non-JVM platforms. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment coil-svg/src/nonAndroidMain/kotlin/coil3/svg/SvgImage.nonAndroid.kt:17 — // TODO: Use `canvas.width/height` in `draw` once it's public. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.

D3 · God Classes · MethodTooLong · ×4

MethodTooLong: ImageLoader.enqueue coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/ImageLoader.kt:59 — MethodTooLong — enqueue runs 104 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 4 over it, 1.04× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
MethodTooLong: ImageLoader.execute coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/ImageLoader.kt:68 — MethodTooLong — execute runs 103 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 3 over it, 1.03× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
MethodTooLong: ImageLoader.shutdown coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/ImageLoader.kt:74 — MethodTooLong — shutdown runs 102 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 2 over it, 1.02× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
MethodTooLong: ImageLoader.newBuilder coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/ImageLoader.kt:80 — MethodTooLong — newBuilder runs 101 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 1 over it, 1.01× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED CVE · ×3

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×2

REDACTED
REDACTED

D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×2

Change coupling: AsyncImage.kt ↔ SubcomposeAsyncImage.kt coil-compose-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/compose/AsyncImage.kt — `coil-compose-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/compose/AsyncImage.kt` and `coil-compose-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/compose/SubcomposeAsyncImage.kt` change together 67% of the time (12 of the 18 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 12 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `66aa0e5b` Simplify DeferredDispatch implementation and improve tests. (#2806); `5fdcabbf` Remove remaining deprecated methods. (#2607); `a96545e2` Make ConstraintsSizeResolver public. (#2505) — run `git show` on any of them.
Change coupling: ScaleDrawable.kt ↔ CrossfadeDrawable.kt coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/size/ScaleDrawable.kt — `coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/size/ScaleDrawable.kt` and `coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/transition/CrossfadeDrawable.kt` change together 50% of the time (6 of the 12 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well — a repo-wide or module-wide sweep is evidence about the sweep rather than about any pair inside it and is left out of BOTH sides of this ratio, while a dependency bump, a formatter/rename sweep, or a commit whose edit to one of the two files was a tool directive such as //go:generate or whitespace only is left out of the shared count ONLY, so the two sides are not taken over identical commit sets) with no explicit dependency — the edge is real but nothing declares it. Read the pair before acting: if one registers itself into the other through a hook or an initialiser, the missing dependency is DELIBERATE — the registration is the link, and it is meant not to be an import — and the thing to add is a comment on each side naming the other, not a merge; if they simply belong together, co-locate them; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking. You can check this without leaving the row: of the 6 shared commits counted here, the most recent 3 are `5db062d5` Fix DecodeUtils binary compatibility and guard against more maxSize c…; `ce00eabc` Fix ScaleDrawable and CrossfadeDrawable not respecting tint states. (…; `37df8209` Inline Build.VERSION_CODES constants. (#318) (at that commit the files were still `coil-gif/src/main/java/coil/drawable/ScaleDrawable.kt` and `coil-base/src/main/java/coil/drawable/CrossfadeDrawable.kt`) — run `git show` on any of them.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · UriKt.parseUri (cyclomatic 24) · ×1

UriKt.parseUri (cyclomatic 24) coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/Uri.kt:196 — UriKt.parseUri has cyclomatic complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity · MemoryCacheService.isCacheValueValidForSize (cyclomatic 18) · ×1

MemoryCacheService.isCacheValueValidForSize (cyclomatic 18) coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/memory/MemoryCacheService.kt:104 — MemoryCacheService.isCacheValueValidForSize has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · ErrorFunctionDetector.isInsideImageRequestBuilderLambda (cognitive 41) · ×1

ErrorFunctionDetector.isInsideImageRequestBuilderLambda (cognitive 41) coil-lint/src/main/kotlin/coil3/lint/ErrorFunctionDetector.kt:66 — ErrorFunctionDetector.isInsideImageRequestBuilderLambda has cognitive complexity 41 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (32 pts), loops 2 (6 pts), boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 28). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · UriKt.parseUri (cognitive 36) · ×1

UriKt.parseUri (cognitive 36) coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/Uri.kt:196 — UriKt.parseUri has cognitive complexity 36 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14 (29 pts), boolean chains 4, match/switch 1 (2 pts), loops 1 (nesting depth added 16). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · MemoryCacheService.isCacheValueValidForSize (cognitive 21) · ×1

MemoryCacheService.isCacheValueValidForSize (cognitive 21) coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/memory/MemoryCacheService.kt:104 — MemoryCacheService.isCacheValueValidForSize has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (16 pts), boolean chains 3, match/switch 2 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · DiskLruCache.completeEdit (cognitive 20) · ×1

DiskLruCache.completeEdit (cognitive 20) coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/disk/DiskLruCache.kt:447 — DiskLruCache.completeEdit has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (10 pts), loops 3 (6 pts), boolean chains 4 (nesting depth added 7). This file's own header attributes it to another copyright holder, so it is code this repository carries rather than code it wrote: restructuring the body in place forks it from upstream and turns every future re-sync into a manual merge. The performable moves are to leave the body as close to its upstream form as possible and keep it behind a narrow interface of your own, and to re-sync it when upstream changes — or, if it has already diverged far enough that you maintain it here, adopt it deliberately and then split the body into named stages.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · UtilsKt.transformOf (cognitive 19) · ×1

UtilsKt.transformOf (cognitive 19) coil-compose-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/compose/internal/utils.kt:101 — UtilsKt.transformOf has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (16 pts), match/switch 1 (2 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity · AbstractContentPainterNode.modifyConstraints (cognitive 17) · ×1

AbstractContentPainterNode.modifyConstraints (cognitive 17) coil-compose-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/compose/internal/ContentPainterModifier.kt:381 — AbstractContentPainterNode.modifyConstraints has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (7 pts), boolean chains 6, match/switch 2 (4 pts) (nesting depth added 3). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.

D3 · God Classes · TooManyMethods · ×1

TooManyMethods: Builder coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/request/ImageRequest.kt:299 — TooManyMethods — 40 methods. The bar is 30 methods; this is 10 over it, 1.33× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.

D3 · God Classes · ClassTooLong · ×1

ClassTooLong: DiskLruCache coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/disk/DiskLruCache.kt:86 — ClassTooLong — 419 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded), 23 methods. The bar is 400 significant lines; this is 19 over it, 1.05× the bar. To reduce it, group the members that share the same data into a smaller type of their own and delegate to it, so no single type carries every responsibility.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (33 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (33 lines × 2) coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/decode/StaticImageDecoder.kt:47 — coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/decode/StaticImageDecoder.kt:47-79 | coil-gif/src/main/java/coil3/gif/AnimatedImageDecoder.kt:65-97 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/decode/StaticImageDecoder.kt:47` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (23 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (23 lines × 2) coil-core/src/jsCommonMain/kotlin/coil3/decode/SkiaImageDecoder.jsCommon.kt:18 — coil-core/src/jsCommonMain/kotlin/coil3/decode/SkiaImageDecoder.jsCommon.kt:18-40 | coil-core/src/nonAndroidMain/kotlin/coil3/util/utils.nonAndroid.kt:30-52 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/decode/DecodeUtils.kt:103 — coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/decode/DecodeUtils.kt:103-118 | coil-core/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/decode/DecodeUtils.kt:144-159 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/ColorImage.kt:17 — coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/ColorImage.kt:17-27 | coil-core/src/nonAndroidMain/kotlin/coil3/ColorImage.kt:17-27 — before extracting anything, compare `coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/ColorImage.kt` and `coil-core/src/nonAndroidMain/kotlin/coil3/ColorImage.kt` as WHOLE FILES: 85% of the shorter file's lines also appear in the other, so this reads as one file having been copied from the other rather than as a helper waiting to be extracted. The 1 duplicated block(s) this scan matched between them are fragments of that copy, not the extent of it — treat the file pair as the unit. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit. Note first that the copies are not typed on the same thing: `Paint` names `android.graphics.Paint` in one and `org.jetbrains.skia.Paint` in another — different types that share a simple name, which is why the text matched. A single extracted unit cannot be given a parameter type that fits both, so unifying those types (or introducing a shared abstraction over them) is the step that has to come BEFORE the extraction above; if they are deliberately separate, the duplication is the price of that separation and the honest resolution is to record the decision rather than to extract.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (49 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (49 lines × 2) coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/EventListener.kt:20 — coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/EventListener.kt:20-84 | coil-core/src/nonAndroidMain/kotlin/coil3/EventListener.kt:17-65 — before extracting anything, compare `coil-core/src/androidMain/kotlin/coil3/EventListener.kt` and `coil-core/src/nonAndroidMain/kotlin/coil3/EventListener.kt` as WHOLE FILES: 96% of the shorter file's lines also appear in the other, so this reads as one file having been copied from the other rather than as a helper waiting to be extracted. The 1 duplicated block(s) this scan matched between them are fragments of that copy, not the extent of it — treat the file pair as the unit. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (56 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (56 lines × 2) coil-network-ktor2/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor2/KtorNetworkFetcher.kt:16 — coil-network-ktor2/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor2/KtorNetworkFetcher.kt:16-71 | coil-network-ktor3/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor3/KtorNetworkFetcher.kt:16-71 — before extracting anything, compare `coil-network-ktor2/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor2/KtorNetworkFetcher.kt` and `coil-network-ktor3/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor3/KtorNetworkFetcher.kt` as WHOLE FILES: 94% of the shorter file's lines also appear in the other, so this reads as one file having been copied from the other rather than as a helper waiting to be extracted. The 1 duplicated block(s) this scan matched between them are fragments of that copy, not the extent of it — treat the file pair as the unit. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Note first that the copies are not typed on the same thing: `KtorNetworkClient` names `coil3.network.ktor2.internal.KtorNetworkClient` in one and `coil3.network.ktor3.internal.KtorNetworkClient` in another — different types that share a simple name, which is why the text matched. A single extracted unit cannot be given a parameter type that fits both, so unifying those types (or introducing a shared abstraction over them) is the step that has to come BEFORE the extraction above; if they are deliberately separate, the duplication is the price of that separation and the honest resolution is to record the decision rather than to extract.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (61 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (61 lines × 2) coil-network-ktor2/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor2/internal/utils.kt:34 — coil-network-ktor2/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor2/internal/utils.kt:34-94 | coil-network-ktor3/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor3/internal/utils.kt:34-94 — before extracting anything, compare `coil-network-ktor2/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor2/internal/utils.kt` and `coil-network-ktor3/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor3/internal/utils.kt` as WHOLE FILES: 98% of the shorter file's lines also appear in the other, so this reads as one file having been copied from the other rather than as a helper waiting to be extracted. The 1 duplicated block(s) this scan matched between them are fragments of that copy, not the extent of it — treat the file pair as the unit. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `coil-network-ktor2/src/commonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor2/internal/utils.kt:34` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) coil-network-ktor2/src/jvmCommonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor2/internal/utils.jvmCommon.kt:10 — coil-network-ktor2/src/jvmCommonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor2/internal/utils.jvmCommon.kt:10-26 | coil-network-ktor3/src/jvmCommonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor3/internal/utils.jvmCommon.kt:10-26 — before extracting anything, compare `coil-network-ktor2/src/jvmCommonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor2/internal/utils.jvmCommon.kt` and `coil-network-ktor3/src/jvmCommonMain/kotlin/coil3/network/ktor3/internal/utils.jvmCommon.kt` as WHOLE FILES: 83% of the shorter file's lines also appear in the other, so this reads as one file having been copied from the other rather than as a helper waiting to be extracted. The 1 duplicated block(s) this scan matched between them are fragments of that copy, not the extent of it — treat the file pair as the unit. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.

R1 · Type Safety · Type Safety · ×1

Type Safety — 0 typed · 6 plain JS — the untyped files are coil-core/karma.config.d/karma.conf.js, coil-core/karma.config.d/timeout.js, gradle/nodejs/registerSkikoMjsWorkaround.cjs, karma.browser.d/00-disable-wasm-streaming.js, karma.config.d/00-disable-wasm-streaming.js, karma.config.d/10-timeouts.js.

R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~53 LoC) · ×1

Dead file (~53 LoC) gradle/nodejs/registerSkikoMjsWorkaround.cjs — no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make

R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~33 LoC) · ×1

Dead file (~33 LoC) karma.config.d/10-timeouts.js — no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make

R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~20 LoC) · ×1

Dead file (~20 LoC) coil-core/karma.config.d/timeout.js — no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make

R7 · Dead Code · Dead file (~19 LoC) · ×1

Dead file (~19 LoC) karma.browser.d/00-disable-wasm-streaming.js — no import path from any entry point (1 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered), and no other file in the scanned tree imports it — nothing in-repo names this module at all, which is the strongest form of this claim the import graph can make

Minor — 10 finding(s)

D19 · Documentation Quality · Documentation · ×4

Documentation: no installation or build instructions README.md — The README does not state how to install Coil (the Compose library dependency is shown but no build or setup steps). Add a one-line 'Build' instruction for Gradle and an optional 'Setup' note on adding the Compose dependency.
Documentation: no usage examples README.md — The README has a Quick Start section but no usage examples (e.g. how to load a video frame or use `AsyncImage` with placeholder/fallback painters). Add an inline Usage example showing the full AsyncImage call plus placeholder/error painter code.
Documentation: no licence statement README.md — The license is present in the text but not captured by the visible documentation (the License section ends before the end of file). Ensure a dedicated 'License' entry notes the Apache 2.0 license and links to the full license text.
Documentation: written for insiders docs/java_compatibility.md — The 'Java Compatibility' note refers to Kotlin language features not available in Java, but it does not explain what a Java developer can do with Coil despite the limitations (e.g. how to load images without Kotlin). Add a brief 'What you can do from Java' section covering the API surface and any supported constructs that are usable from Java.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×2

REDACTED
REDACTED

M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1

No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

M4 · Documentation accuracy · README/code drift · ×1

README/code drift — README advertises a RAG / ML engine, but no ML/RAG code or dependency exists — searched for: `rag`, `langchain`, `llamaindex`, `pinecone`, `weaviate`, `qdrant`, `embeddings`. Each was matched case- and separator-insensitively against file and directory NAMES anywhere in the tree, and against the CONTENTS of manifest files (package.json, *.csproj, *.props, *.slnx, *.yml, Dockerfile); the README's own prose never counts, so a claim is never refuted by merely being made. Nothing outside that search was read — a footprint living only in a submodule, in a file type not listed here, or under a name none of those terms matches is not seen, and this row is then wrong.

P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1

No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add spotbugs with find-sec-bugs (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 7846 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No release approval gate · ×1

No release approval gate — The release is automated and no gate that pauses it for a human is DECLARED IN THIS REPOSITORY'S PIPELINE FILES. What was read: every file under `.github/workflows/`, `.forgejo/workflows/`, `.gitea/workflows/`, `.azuredevops/` and `.azure-pipelines/`, plus `.gitlab-ci*` and `azure-pipelines*` — with comment text stripped, so documenting a gate is not declaring one. What would have counted: GitLab's `when: manual`, CircleCI's `type: approval`, an Azure `ManualValidation@` task or an `approvals:` block, a Jenkins `input` step, a `uses:` step naming an approval action, an `environment:` paired with `reviewers` / `required_reviewers` / `protection` / `wait-timer` / `deployment_branch_policy`, a draft-release step, a `workflow_dispatch` promotion, or a release-event gate. ★ What this cannot see, because none of it is a file: a GitHub environment whose required reviewers are configured in repo SETTINGS, a branch protection rule, or an organisation deployment policy — all of them real, enforced gates that live outside the repository. If yours is one of those, this row is wrong and nothing in the tree could have told us. Otherwise: whatever the release trigger points at is published to users unreviewed, so a mistagged or unverified commit ships and the only remedy is a follow-up release.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-7c2417b413f5476086dbfd2374139c84/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-7c2417b413f5476086dbfd2374139c84/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .	27	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs /bin/ --skip-dirs /obj/ . --skip-db-update	24	artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.	0	—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D43 · Malicious Dependencies	trivy	—	trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs /bin/ --skip-dirs /obj/ . --skip-db-update	0	artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json

Run 01a0d954-cee8-7a0e-8c41-132b36c440ab · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Coil-Kt/coil

Findings by grade

This survey was produced by

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — module dependency matrix

At a glance — Code Health · 48% · Weak · gated by R1, R7 ·

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Maturity · 63% · Adequate · gated by M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 46% · Weak · gated by P3 ·

At a glance — Security · 73% · Adequate · gated by D30 ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

How the grades work

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts