nodebr-meetup-ddd-demo — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

Read through the Template lens: this is a template / kata / sample / demo — code meant to be read or copied, not operated. The ship-it and operate-it dimensions (CI/CD, observability, ADRs, architecture docs, deployment security) are N/A, and the colour bands on what remains are relaxed to what an example needs. Code correctness stays near-strict; the score is absolute and comparable across repos.

danielbdias/nodebr-meetup-ddd-demo is sound in substance but carries real gaps (42%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.

It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Maturity (80%) is solid too.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (15%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Code Health (52%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene).

For scale: Hobby (~414 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Domain Modelling foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 52% Adequate · gated by R1, R7 Architecture 69% Strong Maturity 80% ★ Exemplary Readiness 15% Weak · gated by R4, R8, P1, P3 Security 79% Adequate · gated by D38 Domain Modelling 100% ★ Exemplary

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 15% · 46% weightCode Health 52% · 25% weightArchitecture 69% · 14% weightSecurity 79% · 8% weightMaturity 80% · 4% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 15 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 42 → ~63.

Code composition — where the lines go

Tests 100%

New since the last scan (27+)

27 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-20) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock
D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €120–€620

Cost to rebuild	€120–€620 (0.1 person-years (2–7 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	Standard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 42% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Hobby · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk)
Dead frontend code	~206 LoC unreachable (12 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.0) — standard service × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source · effort from total production LoC as straight-line logic (the tier split is a C#-only syntax walk), a conservative lower bound. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

+23.8 pts · Medium effort · CI/CD gates

Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).

+23.8 pts · Medium effort · Test Coverage

Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.

+23.8 pts · Medium effort · Dependency Hygiene

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

At a glance — Code Health · 52% · Adequate · gated by R1, R7

The Good

D1 · JavaScript Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · JavaScript Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D4 · JavaScript Code Duplication 10.0 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 10.0 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 10.0

The Ugly

R1 · React / TS Type Safety 0.0 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 2.3

At a glance — Architecture · 69% · Strong

The Good

D35 · JavaScript Change Coupling 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0

At a glance — Maturity · 80% · Exemplary

The Good

D15 · JavaScript Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · JavaScript Naming Consistency 10.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0

The Bad

D19 · JavaScript Documentation Quality 4.0

At a glance — Readiness · 15% · Weak · gated by R4, R8, P1, P3

The Good

D13 · JavaScript Secret Scanning 10.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 6.7

The Bad

P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0

The Ugly

P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 0.7 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 0.0

At a glance — Security · 79% · Adequate · gated by D38

The Good

D28 · JavaScript Secrets (history) 10.0 D29 · JavaScript Static Analysis (SAST) 10.0 D31 · JavaScript IaC & Container Security 9.7 D33 · JavaScript JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0

The Ugly

D38 · JavaScript OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

The Good

DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 10.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	50	High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration	1	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish a continuous integration workflow to automatically build the code and run the test suite on every push or pull request. Next, expand test coverage by adding tests for the currently unreached production modules to ensure broader validation. Then, clean up the project dependencies by removing unused packages, explicitly declaring all imports, and moving type- and test-only packages to development dependencies. Finally, improve deployment safety by adding readiness and liveness probes and implementing a rolling update strategy to automatically catch and roll back bad releases. Lastly, enforce type checking in the build process by adding and running a TypeScript no-emit script in CI.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.	+23.8 pts	Medium	CI/CD gates
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).	+23.8 pts	Medium	Test Coverage
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.	+23.8 pts	Medium	Dependency Hygiene
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.	+20.4 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback
Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.	+15.3 pts	Medium	Tooling
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.	+6.6 pts	Medium	Type Safety
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.	+6.6 pts	Medium	Dead Code
Resolve the 1 The README describes a single use case (get last ten tweets with… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md.	+0.9 pts	Low	Documentation Quality

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 3 files carrying findings, judged against the Template bar: 33% slop · 0% mixed · 67% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
yarn.lock	0.2	Slop	OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]
Dockerfile	7.2	Near-clean	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
README.md	9.5	Near-clean	Documentation Quality: The README describes a single use case (get last ten tweets with hashtag, sentiment analysis) and shows GraphiQL input but never explains what DDD domain model this code represents or how queries map to the database.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 27 of 29 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.4 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 29 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D4D13D15D19D21D28D29D31D33D35D38DM6M1M3M4P1P3P4R1R10R2R3R4R6R7R8R9

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 52 of 60 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fb014-2234-7082-b1a3-7f0967cca898.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D19, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

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D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Weak◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Weak / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

This single README is a real-world code sample documenting how to run and execute a GraphQL API for retrieving tweets with sentiment analysis. It states prerequisites (Node.js 8.1.4, Yarn, Docker), walks through installing dependencies, starting the app locally, and shows the GraphiQL console input for the use case. The document is practical but lacks any architecture or design documentation; it does not explain what DDD domain model this code represents, how queries map to the database, or how persistence is structured beyond the sample Docker setup.

The README describes a single use case (get last ten tweets with hashtag, sentiment analysis) and shows GraphiQL input but never explains what DDD domain model this code represents or how queries map to the database.README.md

What to do

Resolve the 1 The README describes a single use case (get last ten tweets with… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

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D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D31 · IaC & Container Security9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High IaC: DS-0002Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.

Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

69 finding(s): 12 critical, 31 high, 20 medium, 6 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×30yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×12yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×7yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

Resolve the 30 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (30). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (30 issue-level).
Resolve the 12 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (12). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 High vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies — a domain aggregate fused to a persistence ORM (TypeORM/Prisma/MikroORM/Sequelize/Mongoose) on its own declaration (active-record) couples the domain to infrastructure. The clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

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M1 · Documentation (README)6.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 7 of 7 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

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M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.

What to do

Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

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P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected (CodeQL, or your ecosystem's scanner — CodeQL's csharp pack (which analyses VB.NET too — F# is not a CodeQL language, so an F# project's option is `semgrep --config=auto`) or a security analyzer package for .NET, cargo-audit/cargo-deny (or clippy) for Rust, sobelow for Elixir/Phoenix, brakeman for Ruby/Rails, spotbugs/find-sec-bugs for Java/Kotlin, scalafix/scapegoat for Scala/sbt, bandit or `semgrep --config=p/python` (or CodeQL's python pack) for Python, phpstan/psalm for PHP, gosec/govulncheck (or golangci-lint) for Go, dialyzer/elvis for Erlang/OTP, CodeQL's Swift pack for Swift/Xcode, CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack or eslint-plugin-security for JS/TS, semgrep for any).

What to do

Add a SAST step running whatever your ecosystem ships: CodeQL, semgrep, CodeQL's csharp pack (C#/VB.NET, with `semgrep --config=auto` for F#), `cargo audit`/`cargo deny` or `cargo clippy -- -D warnings` (Rust), sobelow (Elixir/Phoenix), brakeman (Ruby/Rails), spotbugs/find-sec-bugs (Java/Kotlin), scalafix/scapegoat (Scala/sbt), bandit or `semgrep --config=p/python` (Python), phpstan/psalm (PHP), gosec/govulncheck or golangci-lint (Go), dialyzer/elvis via rebar3_lint (Erlang/OTP), CodeQL's Swift pack (Swift/Xcode), or a security analyzer package.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

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R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

0 typed · 31 plain JS

What to do

Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.

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R10 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

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R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

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R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

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R4 · Test Coverage0.7 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

No test imports this module directly or transitively. If it is a CLI, check whether a suite runs it as a child process; otherwise it has no test reaching it. (×8) — schema.js, express.js, twitter.js, …

What to do

Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).

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R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗

What to do

Add `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.

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R7 · Dead Code2.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

Unreachable from the 9 application, 1 tooling and 1 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (9 application, 1 tooling, 1 test roots considered) (×7) — schema.js, 20170613000800-create-tweet.js, database.js, …

What to do

Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.

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R8 · Dependency Hygiene0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — TweetMap.js:1, database.js:2, server.js:4
Declared in the root/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)

What to do

Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.

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R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

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Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	52%	Adequate — gated by R1, R7	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	69%	Strong	Solid.
Maturity	80%	Exemplary	Solid.
Readiness	15%	Weak — gated by R4, R8, P1, P3	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	79%	Adequate — gated by D38	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.

Not included — 83 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D10 Test Quality — ~0 lines of test source are present (.js) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — this repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo; a formal ADR log is deferred to a real application built from it.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D3 God Classes — God-class detection found no readable class surface — neither a C#/VB workspace nor a language-neutral code model — so class size could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — No tests — template/sample
D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.js) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
M2 Architecture documentation — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample / demo — formal architecture documentation (ADRs, C4 diagrams) is deferred to a real application built from it, so its absence is not a defect here.
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference (.NET: C#, VB.NET and F# alike), lcov — `swift test --enable-code-coverage` or `xcodebuild -enableCodeCoverage YES` then `xcrun llvm-cov export -format=lcov` (Swift/Xcode), `cargo llvm-cov --lcov`, `go test -coverprofile`, `rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` or covertool (Erlang/BEAM), `flutter test --coverage` or `dart test --coverage=coverage` then `dart run coverage:format_coverage --lcov` (Dart/Flutter), `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport` via sbt-scoverage (Scala/sbt), jest/nyc, JaCoCo/Cobertura XML, coverage.py … most ecosystems' coverage tools can emit one) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 44 finding(s)

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×30

High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — ansi-regex 3.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — ansi-regex is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ansi-regex to 3.0.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — axios 0.15.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.18.1. This is 1 of 25 advisories this scan raises against axios 0.15.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.33.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.33.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of axios 0.15.3 clears all 25 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — body-parser 1.17.2: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 1.20.3. This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against body-parser 1.17.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.20.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.20.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of body-parser 1.17.2 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — brace-expansion 1.1.8: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 4 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.8, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.16 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.16 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of brace-expansion 1.1.8 clears all 4 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — braces 1.8.5: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.8.5, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.8.5; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — cross-spawn 4.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 6.0.6 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 4.0.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 4.0.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — debug 2.6.0: [GHSA redacted] — debug is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin debug to 2.6.9 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). One upgrade of debug 2.6.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — dottie 1.1.1: [GHSA redacted] — dottie is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.0.4 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.1.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.1.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — follow-redirects 1.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — follow-redirects is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin follow-redirects to 1.14.7 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 5 advisories this scan raises against follow-redirects 1.0.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.16.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.16.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of follow-redirects 1.0.0 clears all 5 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — forwarded 0.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — forwarded is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin forwarded to 0.1.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — fresh 0.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — fresh is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fresh to 0.5.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — fstream 1.0.11: [GHSA redacted] — fstream is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fstream to 1.0.12 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — hawk 3.1.3: [GHSA redacted] — hawk is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 9.0.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.1.3, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.1.3; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — hoek 2.16.3: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace hoek if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands. One upgrade of hoek 2.16.3 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — ini 1.3.4: [GHSA redacted] — ini is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ini to 1.3.6 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — js-yaml 3.9.0: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 3.15.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 5 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.9.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.15.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.15.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of js-yaml 3.9.0 clears all 5 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — json5 0.5.1: [GHSA redacted] — json5 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 1.0.2 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.5.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.5.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — lodash 3.10.1: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares lodash ^4.17.4, but the vulnerable 3.10.1 is a SEPARATE copy on another release line, so editing your own lodash entry cannot move it: upgrade the dependency that pulls it in (— 4.17.19 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.10.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.10.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 6 advisories this scan raises against lodash 3.10.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — mime 1.3.4: [GHSA redacted] — mime is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin mime to 1.4.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — minimatch 0.2.14: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.1.4 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.2.14, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.2.14; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 5 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 0.2.14, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of minimatch 0.2.14 clears all 5 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — moment 2.18.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 2.19.3. This is 1 of 3 advisories this scan raises against moment 2.18.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.29.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.29.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of moment 2.18.1 clears all 3 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — no-case 2.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — no-case is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin no-case to 2.3.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — path-to-regexp 0.1.7: [GHSA redacted] — path-to-regexp is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin path-to-regexp to 0.1.13 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against path-to-regexp 0.1.7, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.1.13 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.1.13 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of path-to-regexp 0.1.7 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — qs 6.4.0: [GHSA redacted] — qs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin qs to 6.4.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against qs 6.4.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.14.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.14.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of qs 6.4.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — semver 4.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — semver is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 5.7.2 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 4.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 4.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
+ 5 more in this group — see findings.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×12

Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — babel-traverse 6.25.0: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory, and remove or replace babel-traverse if the exposure is not acceptable until one lands.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — deep-extend 0.4.2: [GHSA redacted] — deep-extend is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin deep-extend to 0.5.1 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — form-data 2.1.4: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 2.5.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 2.1.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.5.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.5.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of form-data 2.1.4 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — fsevents 1.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — fsevents is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fsevents to 1.2.11 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). One upgrade of fsevents 1.1.2 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], MAL-2023-462.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — growl 1.9.2: [GHSA redacted] — growl is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin growl to 1.10.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — handlebars 4.0.10: [GHSA redacted] — handlebars is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin handlebars to 4.7.9 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 17 advisories this scan raises against handlebars 4.0.10, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.7.9 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.7.9 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of handlebars 4.0.10 clears all 17 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — json-schema 0.2.3: [GHSA redacted] — json-schema is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin json-schema to 0.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — lodash 1.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares lodash ^4.17.4, but the vulnerable 1.0.2 is a SEPARATE copy on another release line, so editing your own lodash entry cannot move it: upgrade the dependency that pulls it in (— 4.17.12 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 1.0.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 1.0.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 5 advisories this scan raises against lodash 1.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of lodash 1.0.2 clears all 5 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — minimist 0.0.8: [GHSA redacted] — minimist is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimist to 0.2.4 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against minimist 0.0.8, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.2.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.2.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of minimist 0.0.8 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — pg 6.4.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 6.4.2
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — sequelize 3.30.4: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 3.35.1 One upgrade of sequelize 3.30.4 clears all 9 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — tar 2.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — tar is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 7.5.19 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.2.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.2.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). One upgrade of tar 2.2.1 clears all 16 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×1

High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×1

High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — diff 3.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — diff is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin diff to 3.5.0 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against diff 3.2.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.5.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.5.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of diff 3.2.0 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].

Warning — 8 finding(s)

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×7

Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — ajv 4.11.8: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 6.14.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 4.11.8, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 4.11.8; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against ajv 4.11.8, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.14.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.14.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of ajv 4.11.8 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — express 4.15.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 4.19.2. This is 1 of 2 advisories this scan raises against express 4.15.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.20.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.20.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. One upgrade of express 4.15.3 clears all 2 advisories it raises: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — extend 3.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — extend is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin extend to 3.0.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — got 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — got is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 11.8.5 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.3.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.3.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — hosted-git-info 2.5.0: [GHSA redacted] — hosted-git-info is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin hosted-git-info to 2.8.9 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — is-my-json-valid 2.16.0: [GHSA redacted] — is-my-json-valid is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin is-my-json-valid to 2.17.2 with an `overrides` entry (`resolutions` if you use Yarn)).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] yarn.lock — joi 9.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 17.13.4

D16 · Bus Factor · single-maintainer · ×1

single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk (1 author(s) across 12 commit(s) sampled).

Recommendation — 4 finding(s)

D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1

Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.js) but the built-in reliability runner does not support this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.

D19 · Documentation Quality · The README describes a single use case (get last ten tweets with hashtag, sentiment analysis) and shows GraphiQL input but never explains what DDD domain model this code represents or how queries map to the database. · ×1

The README describes a single use case (get last ten tweets with hashtag, sentiment analysis) and shows GraphiQL input but never explains what DDD domain model this code represents or how queries map to the database. README.md — Add an Architecture section covering the domain model (Tweet, Hashtag, Sentiment), query types, repository mapping, and persistence layer details.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1

early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (12 commit(s) sampled).

D8 · Code Coverage · No tests · ×1

No tests — template/sample — This repo declares itself a template / kata / sample; tests are deferred to the application built from it, so coverage is not scored here.

Info — 4 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1

Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene — This repository's dependency manifest (package.json) was found, but this pass cannot parse it for hygiene, so no package was assessed. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. This row is about dependency HYGIENE — outdated, deprecated or unmaintained direct dependencies; known CVEs in the same dependency graph are a separate question, reported under D38 wherever the manifest is OSV-readable. Your package.json IS read in this same run: the frontend dependency lens (R8) parses it for unused declarations, undeclared imports and misplaced production dependencies — what is missing here is the outdated/deprecated/unmaintained signal for those npm packages, not the manifest.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · git history depth insufficient · ×1

git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — install a full clone for reliable trend signal.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

D35 · Change Coupling · git history depth insufficient · ×1

git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — a full clone gives reliable change-coupling.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	0	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	none (no readable dependency manifest)	—	none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment	0	—
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet .	1	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs /bin/ --skip-dirs /obj/ . --skip-db-update	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner --format json --recursive .	69	artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019fb014-2234-7082-b1a3-7f0967cca898 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Danielbdias/nodebr-Meetup-Ddd-Demo

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

At a glance — Code Health · 52% · Adequate · gated by R1, R7

At a glance — Architecture · 69% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 80% · Exemplary

At a glance — Readiness · 15% · Weak · gated by R4, R8, P1, P3

At a glance — Security · 79% · Adequate · gated by D38

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 100% · Exemplary

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Downloadable artifacts