Public report — dependabot-core, published 7 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 07-08-2026 @ 07:41 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Dependabot/dependabot-Core

No baseline yet — first run coverage not measured
45% Provisional
Architecture 95% Exemplary Code Health 69% Adequate Maturity 69% Adequate Readiness 36% Weak Security 33% Weak

Small · 17,212 LoC · 23 projects · rebuild ~2.5 person-years · weakest lens: Security (33%)

Build did not compile — scores are provisional
The analysed solution did not compile (15 build error(s)). Dimensions that depend on the compiler — complexity, duplication, cohesion, dead code, API surface — ran on incomplete models, so the scores below are provisional. Fix the build, then re-run for a reliable grade. First errors: CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Common' does not exist in the namespace 'NuGet' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Frameworks' does not exist in the namespace 'NuGet' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Core' does not exist in the namespace 'NuGet.Packaging' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Signing' does not exist in the namespace 'NuGet.Packaging' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0246: The type or namespace name 'PackageReaderBase' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

51/52dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 1 LLM-assisted, advisory
139findings with an exact file:lineof 162 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
52/102dimensions across the health lenses17212 LoC · 23 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

dependabot/dependabot-core carries serious gaps (45%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.

It is strongest in Architecture (95%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Security (33%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (36%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across… (Observability); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene); Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup… (DR & Backup).

For scale: Small (~17,212 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~2.5 person-years (~1–5 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (95%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 69% Adequate · gated by D18 Architecture 95% ★ Exemplary Maturity 69% Adequate Readiness 36% Weak · gated by R8, P2 Security 33% Weak · gated by D28, D29, D31
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 33% · 47% weightReadiness 36% · 26% weightMaturity 69% · 14% weightCode Health 69% · 8% weightArchitecture 95% · 4% weight

Raise Security 33 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 45 → ~54.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 4%Plumbing 2%Tests 94%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €120,000–€600,000
Cost to rebuild€120,000–€600,000 (1.2–3.8 person-years (1,984–6,350 h), ~1–5 engineers)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 45% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 22% boilerplate · 15% straight-line · 63% branching logic
Dead frontend code~1344 LoC unreachable (20 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~2.5 person-years of build effort (about ~€360,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 33% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — high decision density × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source (the solution did not build in-analyzer). Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
+10.8 pts · Medium effort · Observability
2
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
+10.8 pts · Medium effort · Dependency Hygiene
3
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
+10.6 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move: fix the build · Critical · Leverage
The solution doesn't compile, so every Roslyn-derived dimension (complexity, duplication, cohesion, dead code, API surface) ran on incomplete models and is PROVISIONAL. Fixing the build is the single change that makes the rest of the report trustworthy — do it first. The compiler reported: CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Common' does not exist in the namespace 'NuGet' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Frameworks' does not exist in the namespace 'NuGet' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Core' does not exist in the namespace 'NuGet.Packaging' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Signing' does not exist in the namespace 'NuGet.Packaging' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0246: The type or namespace name 'PackageReaderBase' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?).
Evidence: D18 build: The compiler reported: CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Common' does not exist in the namespace 'NuGet' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Frameworks' does not exist in the namespace 'NuGet' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Core' does not exist in the namespace 'NuGet.Packaging' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Signing' does not exist in the namespace 'NuGet.Packaging' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0246: The type or namespace name 'PackageReaderBase' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?).
→ Fix the build, then re-run for a reliable grade.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~2.5 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 33%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~2.5 person-years rebuild (17,212 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 33%
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

arch DotNetPackageCorrelation DotNetPackageCorrelation DotNetPackageCorrelation.Cli Cli DotNetPackageCorrelation.Cli->DotNetPackageCorrelation NuGet.Build.Tasks Tasks NuGet.Build.Tasks.Pack Pack NuGet.Build.Tasks->NuGet.Build.Tasks.Pack NuGet.Commands Commands NuGet.Build.Tasks->NuGet.Commands NuGet.PackageManagement PackageManagement NuGet.Build.Tasks->NuGet.PackageManagement NuGet.Build.Tasks.Pack->NuGet.Commands NuGet.CommandLine CommandLine NuGet.CommandLine->NuGet.Build.Tasks NuGet.CommandLine->NuGet.PackageManagement NuGet.Credentials Credentials NuGet.Commands->NuGet.Credentials NuGet.ProjectModel ProjectModel NuGet.Commands->NuGet.ProjectModel NuGet.Common Common NuGet.Frameworks Frameworks NuGet.Common->NuGet.Frameworks NuGet.Configuration Configuration NuGet.Configuration->NuGet.Common NuGet.Protocol Protocol NuGet.Credentials->NuGet.Protocol NuGet.DependencyResolver.Core Core NuGet.DependencyResolver.Core->NuGet.Configuration NuGet.LibraryModel LibraryModel NuGet.DependencyResolver.Core->NuGet.LibraryModel NuGet.DependencyResolver.Core->NuGet.Protocol NuGet.LibraryModel->NuGet.Common NuGet.Versioning Versioning NuGet.LibraryModel->NuGet.Versioning NuGet.PackageManagement->NuGet.Commands NuGet.Resolver Resolver NuGet.PackageManagement->NuGet.Resolver NuGet.Packaging Packaging NuGet.Packaging->NuGet.Configuration NuGet.Packaging->NuGet.Versioning NuGet.ProjectModel->NuGet.DependencyResolver.Core NuGet.Protocol->NuGet.Packaging NuGet.Resolver->NuGet.Protocol NuGetUpdater.Cli Cli NuGetUpdater.Core Core NuGetUpdater.Cli->NuGetUpdater.Core NuGetUpdater.Core->DotNetPackageCorrelation NuGetUpdater.Core->NuGet.CommandLine

At a glance — Code Health · 69% · Adequate · gated by D18

The Good
D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 9.7 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 10.0 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 8.1 R3 · React / TS Large Files 9.1 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 7.9 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0
The Bad
D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 5.0 R1 · React / TS Type Safety 5.1 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 5.4
The Ugly
D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 3.0

At a glance — Architecture · 95% · Exemplary

The Good
D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0
The Bad
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 6.9 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 6.8

At a glance — Maturity · 69% · Adequate

The Good
D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D16 · .NET / C# Bus Factor 8.1 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 8.7 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 5.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 6.0
The Ugly
D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 36% · Weak · gated by R8, P2

The Good
D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 9.9 D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 10.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 7.0 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 10.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 10.0 R5 · React / TS Dependency Freshness 9.2
The Bad
R6 · React / TS Tooling 6.7
The Ugly
P2 · Repo Observability 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 4.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 4.8 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 0.0

At a glance — Security · 33% · Weak · gated by D28, D29, D31

The Good
D33 · .NET / C# JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities 10.0
The Bad
D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 5.0 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 5.0
The Ugly
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 0.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 0.0 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 0.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection50High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration50High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures8High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components8High / Critical

Roadmap

First, implement structured logging using ILogger or Serilog across all projects to establish baseline observability. Next, clean up the codebase by removing unused dependencies and explicitly declaring all imports to improve hygiene. Then, document disaster recovery procedures, including RTO/RPO and tested restore steps, to ensure resilience. After that, increase test coverage by adding tests for unreached modules to improve confidence in the codebase. Finally, add missing tooling such as eslint and tsc as package.json scripts and integrate them into the CI pipeline.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.+10.8 ptsMediumObservability
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+10.8 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene
Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).+10.6 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+10.1 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Resolve the 7 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with aws-sdk-core@3.254.0.rbi (6), octokit@10.0.0.rbi.+4.4 ptsLowSecrets (history)
Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.+8.6 ptsMediumTooling
Resolve the 8 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities.+2.7 ptsLowDependency Vulnerabilities
Resolve the 50 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with dependabot.yml (19), .npmrc (4), composite_action.yml (4).+4.9 ptsMediumStatic Analysis (SAST)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 67 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 69% mixed · 31% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/dependabot.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: dependabot-missing-cooldown
sorbet/rbi/gems/aws-sdk-core@3.254.0.rbi4.5MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/multiple-resources.yaml4.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/multiple.yaml4.6MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/multiple_identical.yaml4.6MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
github_actions/spec/fixtures/workflow_files/composite_action.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/images-branch.yml5.1MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: gha-workflow-env-secret
docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/bare.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/digest.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/digest_and_tag.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/hyphen.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/namespace.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/non-numeric.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/pod.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/private_digest.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/private_no_port.yaml5.1MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: KSV-0014
common/lib/dependabot/git_metadata_fetcher.rb5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: dangerous-exec
github_actions/spec/fixtures/workflow_files/inconsistent_case.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
github_actions/spec/fixtures/workflow_files/multiple_sources.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
github_actions/spec/fixtures/workflow_files/multiple_sources_matching_major.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 51 of 52 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 1 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 52 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D9D10D12D13D14D15D16D18D20D21D26D27D28D29D30D31D33D34D35D36AX3AX4AX5AX8M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P6R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9X1X3X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 139 of 162 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fdb2b-d006-72f0-9368-76d6b133db41.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations: 4 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (3): D20, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was findConflictingParentDependencies at 18.

findConflictingParentDependencies (cognitive 18)bun/helpers/lib/yarn/conflicting-dependency-parser.js:93

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D3 · God Classes5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 god class(es) detected.

FileTooLong: subdependency/.pnp.cjs · ×2npm_and_yarn/spec/fixtures/projects/yarn_berry/subdependency/.pnp.cjs:0

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with .pnp.cjs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  2. Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 duplicated block group(s) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md.

D5 · Coupling6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

23 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

What to do

  1. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

528 test methods: 528 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

Tests co-located / outside the solution

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D10 · Test Quality9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 5 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 528 tests.

No assertions: Run_Simple · ×5nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Cli.Test/EntryPointTests.Run.cs:19

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 27 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Updater/FileWriters/XmlFileWriter.cs.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

23 projects, 294 .cs files, 51991 hand-written lines of code (17212 production / 34779 test), 179 inter-project edges (build failed).

Build failed
Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository
Shell project: NuGet.Build.Tasks.Pack · ×14nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetProjects/NuGet.Build.Tasks.Pack/NuGet.Build.Tasks.Pack.csproj
Thin analysable surface across projects

What to do

  1. Resolve the 14 Shell project finding(s) in Solution Shape — start with NuGet.Build.Tasks.Pack.csproj, NuGet.Build.Tasks.csproj, NuGet.Commands.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (14 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Build failed finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No projects to assess.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D27 · Navigability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Too little code to assess navigability.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

22 finding(s): 0 critical, 22 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×7sorbet/rbi/gems/octokit@10.0.0.rbi:8001detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 7 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with aws-sdk-core@3.254.0.rbi (6), octokit@10.0.0.rbi. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

228 finding(s): 0 critical, 164 high, 44 medium, 20 low.

High: dependabot-missing-cooldown · ×50.github/dependabot.yml:10detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 50 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with dependabot.yml (19), .npmrc (4), composite_action.yml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (50 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

8 vulnerable package(s): 0 critical, 8 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 · ×8detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 8 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

555 finding(s): 2 critical, 133 high, 151 medium, 269 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×48.devcontainer/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Critical IaC: DS-0031 · ×2Dockerfile.developmentdetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 48 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with multiple-resources.yaml (6), multiple.yaml (5), multiple_identical.yaml (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (48 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Critical IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile.development, Dockerfile.updater-core. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness8.7 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.7 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

8 of 62 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetProjects/NuGet.CommandLine/AssemblyMetadataExtractor.cs.

Further orphaned files (smaller)

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Further orphaned files (smaller) finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling6.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: RefreshGroupUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs↔RefreshVersionUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs 95%; RefreshSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs↔RefreshVersionUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs 92%; RefreshGroupUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs↔RefreshSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs 90%

Change coupling: RefreshGroupUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs ↔ RefreshVersionUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs · ×10nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/RefreshGroupUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs

What to do

  1. Resolve the 10 Change coupling finding(s) in Change Coupling — start with CreateSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs (4), GroupUpdateAllVersionsHandler.cs (3), RefreshGroupUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

No build provenance
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No SBOM finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

M1 · Documentation (README)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
  • Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P2 · Observability0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No ILogger/Serilog usage found — production issues will be hard to diagnose.

What to do

  • Adopt ILogger (or Serilog) and log at meaningful points across the projects.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • <NuGetAudit>false</NuGetAudit> in MSBuild suppresses NuGet's vulnerability audit project-wide. — Directory.Build.props:8

What to do

  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P5 · DR & Backup4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

What to do

  • Document RTO/RPO and a tested restore procedure (a backup config alone isn't disaster recovery).
  • Enable purge protection / soft-delete (and prevent_destroy on critical resources) so data stores can't be lost to an accidental or malicious delete.
P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

R1 · Type Safety5.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

  • 30 typed · 29 plain JS

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication8.1 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • npm_and_yarn/spec/fixtures/projects/yarn_berry/simple/.pnp.cjs:5 · npm_and_yarn/spec/fixtures/projects/yarn_berry/subdependency/.pnp.cjs:5 — .pnp.cjs:5
  • bun/helpers/lib/npm6/peer-dependency-checker.js:44 · npm_and_yarn/helpers/lib/npm6/peer-dependency-checker.ts:51 — peer-dependency-checker.js:44
  • bun/helpers/lib/yarn/conflicting-dependency-parser.js:147 · npm_and_yarn/helpers/lib/yarn/conflicting-dependency-parser.ts:189 — conflicting-dependency-parser.js:147
  • npm_and_yarn/helpers/lib/yarn/helpers.ts:26 · npm_and_yarn/helpers/lib/yarn/helpers.ts:55 — helpers.ts:26
  • npm_and_yarn/spec/fixtures/projects/yarn_berry/simple/.pnp.cjs:1704 · npm_and_yarn/spec/fixtures/projects/yarn_berry/subdependency/.pnp.cjs:1704 — .pnp.cjs:1704
  • npm_and_yarn/spec/fixtures/projects/yarn_berry/simple/.pnp.cjs:4183 · npm_and_yarn/spec/fixtures/projects/yarn_berry/subdependency/.pnp.cjs:4183 — .pnp.cjs:4183
  • npm_and_yarn/spec/fixtures/projects/yarn_berry/simple/.pnp.cjs:8950 · npm_and_yarn/spec/fixtures/projects/yarn_berry/subdependency/.pnp.cjs:8950 — .pnp.cjs:8950
  • bun/helpers/lib/npm6/subdependency-updater.js:24 · npm_and_yarn/helpers/lib/npm6/subdependency-updater.ts:33 — subdependency-updater.js:24

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

  • Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — .pnp.cjs:9351, .pnp.cjs:9351, .pnp.cjs:8751, …

What to do

  • Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
R3 · Large Files9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Split the oversized components into smaller, focused ones.
R4 · Test Coverage4.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — .pnp.cjs, .pnp.cjs, vulnerability-auditor.js, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R5 · Dependency Freshness9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D33). Deterministic.

What to do

  • Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
R6 · Tooling6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✓ · lint ✓ · typecheck ✗

What to do

  • Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • 1 file(s) (~9925 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. (×2) — simple, subdependency
  • Unreachable from the 1 application, 4 tooling and 17 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (1 application, 4 tooling, 17 test roots considered) (×5) — vulnerability-auditor.js, peer-dependency-checker.ts, peer-dependency-checker.js, …

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. — vulnerability-auditor.ts:35
  • Declared in bun/helpers/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.
  • Declared in bun/helpers/test/npm6/fixtures/conflicting-dependency-parser/deeply-nested/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.
  • Declared in bun/helpers/test/npm6/fixtures/conflicting-dependency-parser/nested/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health69%Adequate — gated by D18Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture95%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity69%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Readiness36%Weak — gated by R8, P2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security33%Weak — gated by D28, D29, D31Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 51 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — no source files detected — code composition not applicable
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX6 Interface segregation — no public interfaces
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C2 Access Controls — No access-control surface detected in the analyzed source — no web/app surface to authorize (no HTTP API or web-UI project) and no authorization code at all (no [Authorize]/policies, no imperative guard methods). Access control is therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI, which is authorized by its CALLER, not by itself. If this codebase grows request handlers, the dimension reactivates and a default-deny posture is expected then.
  • C3 Audit Trail — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C4 Data Retention — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — No personal data detected in the analyzed source — no PII-typed entity/column names (Email, FirstName, DateOfBirth, …), no ASP.NET Identity / user-account model, and no stored user credentials. GDPR data-protection controls are therefore N/A here. If this is intentional, record the no-PII posture in an ADR; if the app does process personal data, name those fields conventionally so this dimension activates.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Zero projects and zero LoC mean the codebase is trivial and has no structure to justify boundaries.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — Scanner failed to run — not a clean result
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — No web surface detected in the analyzed source — no HTTP API or web-UI project (no controllers/minimal-API endpoints, no Razor/Blazor views) and no web middleware (HTTPS redirection, HSTS, security headers, cookies). Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, CSRF/input-validation and middleware-order controls are therefore N/A here — this is a library/CLI/worker, not a web app. Crypto hygiene was still checked and found nothing to flag. If this codebase becomes web-facing, the dimension reactivates automatically.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no async methods found
  • X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 115 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×50
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:10 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:40 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:58 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:64 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:73 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:82 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:88 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:94 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:124 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:152 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:158 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:164 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:170 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:176 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:182 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:188 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:192 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:200 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: dependabot-missing-cooldown .github/dependabot.yml:211 — This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/gems-bump-version.yml:49 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
  • High: gha-workflow-env-secret .github/workflows/images-branch.yml:3 — A secret is exposed in the workflow-level `env:` block, making it available to every job and step in this workflow — including any untrusted code run in pull-request workflows. Scope secrets as narrowly as possible: prefer step-level `env:` so the secret is only available where it is actually needed.
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/images-branch.yml:45 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
  • High: run-shell-injection .github/workflows/images-branch.yml:124 — Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
  • High: gha-workflow-env-secret .github/workflows/smoke.yml:16 — A secret is exposed in the workflow-level `env:` block, making it available to every job and step in this workflow — including any untrusted code run in pull-request workflows. Scope secrets as narrowly as possible: prefer step-level `env:` so the secret is only available where it is actually needed.
  • High: dangerous-exec bin/spec/dry-run_spec.rb:20 — Detected non-static command inside Open3.capture3. Audit the input to 'Open3.capture3'. If unverified user data can reach this call site, this is a code injection vulnerability. A malicious actor can inject a malicious script to execute arbitrary code.
  • + 25 more in this group — see findings.md.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×48
  • High IaC: DS-0002 .devcontainer/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 Dockerfile.updater-core — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 common/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/bare.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/bare.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/bare.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/digest.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/digest.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/digest.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/digest_and_tag.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/digest_and_tag.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/digest_and_tag.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/hyphen.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/hyphen.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/hyphen.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/multiple-resources.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/multiple-resources.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/multiple-resources.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/multiple-resources.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/multiple-resources.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/multiple-resources.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/multiple.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0014 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/multiple.yaml — Root file system is not read-only
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/multiple.yaml — Default security context configured
  • High IaC: KSV-0118 docker/spec/fixtures/kubernetes/yaml/multiple.yaml — Default security context configured
  • + 23 more in this group — see findings.md.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×8
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 9.0.11 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×7
  • Secret: generic-api-key sorbet/rbi/gems/octokit@10.0.0.rbi:8001 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key sorbet/rbi/gems/aws-sdk-core@3.254.0.rbi:8991 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: jwt sorbet/rbi/gems/aws-sdk-core@3.254.0.rbi:9227 — matched rule 'jwt'
  • Secret: jwt sorbet/rbi/gems/aws-sdk-core@3.254.0.rbi:9239 — matched rule 'jwt'
  • Secret: jwt sorbet/rbi/gems/aws-sdk-core@3.254.0.rbi:9267 — matched rule 'jwt'
  • Secret: aws-access-token sorbet/rbi/gems/aws-sdk-core@3.254.0.rbi:12885 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
  • Secret: aws-access-token sorbet/rbi/gems/aws-sdk-core@3.254.0.rbi:13101 — matched rule 'aws-access-token'
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Critical IaC · ×2
  • Critical IaC: DS-0031 Dockerfile.development — Secrets passed via `build-args` or envs or copied secret files
  • Critical IaC: DS-0011 Dockerfile.updater-core — COPY with more than two arguments not ending with slash
Warning — 22 finding(s)
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×10
  • Change coupling: RefreshGroupUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs ↔ RefreshVersionUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/RefreshGroupUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs — `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/RefreshGroupUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs` and `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/RefreshVersionUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs` change together 95% of the time (38 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: RefreshSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs ↔ RefreshVersionUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/RefreshSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs — `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/RefreshSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs` and `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/RefreshVersionUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs` change together 92% of the time (37 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: RefreshGroupUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs ↔ RefreshSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/RefreshGroupUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs — `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/RefreshGroupUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs` and `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/RefreshSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs` change together 90% of the time (37 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: GroupUpdateAllVersionsHandler.cs ↔ RefreshVersionUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/GroupUpdateAllVersionsHandler.cs — `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/GroupUpdateAllVersionsHandler.cs` and `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/RefreshVersionUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs` change together 90% of the time (36 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: CreateSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs ↔ RefreshSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/CreateSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs — `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/CreateSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs` and `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/RefreshSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs` change together 90% of the time (35 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: CreateSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs ↔ RefreshGroupUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/CreateSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs — `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/CreateSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs` and `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/RefreshGroupUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs` change together 87% of the time (34 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: CreateSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs ↔ GroupUpdateAllVersionsHandler.cs nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/CreateSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs — `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/CreateSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs` and `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/GroupUpdateAllVersionsHandler.cs` change together 87% of the time (34 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: CreateSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs ↔ RefreshVersionUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/CreateSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs — `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/CreateSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs` and `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/RefreshVersionUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs` change together 87% of the time (34 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: GroupUpdateAllVersionsHandler.cs ↔ RefreshSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/GroupUpdateAllVersionsHandler.cs — `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/GroupUpdateAllVersionsHandler.cs` and `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/RefreshSecurityUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs` change together 85% of the time (35 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: GroupUpdateAllVersionsHandler.cs ↔ RefreshGroupUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/GroupUpdateAllVersionsHandler.cs — `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/GroupUpdateAllVersionsHandler.cs` and `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Run/UpdateHandlers/RefreshGroupUpdatePullRequestHandler.cs` change together 84% of the time (37 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
D10 · Test Quality · No assertions · ×5
  • No assertions: Run_Simple nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Cli.Test/EntryPointTests.Run.cs:19 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: Run_ExitCodeIsSet nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Cli.Test/EntryPointTests.Run.cs:70 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: Graph_Simple nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Cli.Test/EntryPointTests.Graph.cs:14 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: ApiCallsAreAutomaticallyRetriedWhenTheServerThrowsAnError nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core.Test/Run/HttpApiHandlerTests.cs:58 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: GetAllPackageDependencies_NugetConfigInvalid_DoesNotThrow nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core.Test/Utilities/MSBuildHelperTests.cs:218 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
D3 · God Classes · FileTooLong · ×2
  • FileTooLong: subdependency/.pnp.cjs npm_and_yarn/spec/fixtures/projects/yarn_berry/subdependency/.pnp.cjs:0 — FileTooLong — 9925 lines.
  • FileTooLong: simple/.pnp.cjs npm_and_yarn/spec/fixtures/projects/yarn_berry/simple/.pnp.cjs:0 — FileTooLong — 9925 lines.
D18 · Solution Shape · Build failed · ×1
  • Build failed — The target solution did not build cleanly (errors: 15), which caps Solution Shape at 3/10 — the most basic shape signal is that it compiles. First errors: CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Common' does not exist in the namespace 'NuGet' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Frameworks' does not exist in the namespace 'NuGet' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Core' does not exist in the namespace 'NuGet.Packaging' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0234: The type or namespace name 'Signing' does not exist in the namespace 'NuGet.Packaging' (are you missing an assembly reference?); CS0246: The type or namespace name 'PackageReaderBase' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?).
D18 · Solution Shape · Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository · ×1
  • Analyzed solution does not cover the bulk of the repository — The scored solution `nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.slnx` is not representative of this repository — it references only 290 of 2082 discovered C# files (14 %). Lenses that need the product's source (domain modelling, event-driven, event sourcing) abstain because the aggregates, EF configs, and domain events under the product tree were not loaded. Point the scan at the product solution (or scan its directory directly) so the whole codebase is analyzed, not a build-tooling sub-solution.
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[0].suggestion | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1037.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity · findConflictingParentDependencies (cognitive 18) · ×1
  • findConflictingParentDependencies (cognitive 18) bun/helpers/lib/yarn/conflicting-dependency-parser.js:93 — findConflictingParentDependencies has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15).
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the repo's own test suite did not build (a C#/MSBuild compiler error in the test code), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. Fix the test build, or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 23 finding(s)
D18 · Solution Shape · Shell project · ×14
  • Shell project: NuGet.Build.Tasks.Pack nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetProjects/NuGet.Build.Tasks.Pack/NuGet.Build.Tasks.Pack.csproj — `NuGet.Build.Tasks.Pack` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: NuGet.Build.Tasks nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetProjects/NuGet.Build.Tasks/NuGet.Build.Tasks.csproj — `NuGet.Build.Tasks` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: NuGet.Commands nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetProjects/NuGet.Commands/NuGet.Commands.csproj — `NuGet.Commands` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: NuGet.Common nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetProjects/NuGet.Common/NuGet.Common.csproj — `NuGet.Common` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: NuGet.Configuration nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetProjects/NuGet.Configuration/NuGet.Configuration.csproj — `NuGet.Configuration` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: NuGet.Credentials nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetProjects/NuGet.Credentials/NuGet.Credentials.csproj — `NuGet.Credentials` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: NuGet.DependencyResolver.Core nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetProjects/NuGet.DependencyResolver.Core/NuGet.DependencyResolver.Core.csproj — `NuGet.DependencyResolver.Core` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: NuGet.Frameworks nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetProjects/NuGet.Frameworks/NuGet.Frameworks.csproj — `NuGet.Frameworks` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: NuGet.LibraryModel nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetProjects/NuGet.LibraryModel/NuGet.LibraryModel.csproj — `NuGet.LibraryModel` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: NuGet.PackageManagement nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetProjects/NuGet.PackageManagement/NuGet.PackageManagement.csproj — `NuGet.PackageManagement` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: NuGet.ProjectModel nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetProjects/NuGet.ProjectModel/NuGet.ProjectModel.csproj — `NuGet.ProjectModel` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: NuGet.Protocol nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetProjects/NuGet.Protocol/NuGet.Protocol.csproj — `NuGet.Protocol` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: NuGet.Resolver nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetProjects/NuGet.Resolver/NuGet.Resolver.csproj — `NuGet.Resolver` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: NuGet.Versioning nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetProjects/NuGet.Versioning/NuGet.Versioning.csproj — `NuGet.Versioning` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test projects found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 12 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner (largest: nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.Core/Updater/FileWriters/XmlFileWriter.cs). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects — 1 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `DotNetPackageCorrelation.Cli` with 40 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 38 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 5.0 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
  • Further orphaned files (smaller) — 8 smaller file(s) also have no living knowledge — folded into the freshness score and metrics rather than listed individually (8 orphaned of 62 analysed files in total).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Scanner failed to run · ×1
  • Scanner failed to run — not a clean result — osv-scanner exited 127 with no findings — the advisory database was likely unreachable. The scanner exited non-zero and produced no findings (typically the advisory DB was unreachable), so this is reported as a measurement gap rather than a clean pass.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
D9 · Test Distribution · Tests co-located / outside the solution · ×1
  • Tests co-located / outside the solution — 528 test method(s) were found on disk (co-located in feature projects, or outside the analyzed solution) rather than in dedicated test projects, so the unit/integration/E2E pyramid can't be classified — they're counted as one undifferentiated suite.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .22artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .228artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet list nuget/helpers/lib/NuGetUpdater/NuGetUpdater.slnx package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json8artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .555artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner --format json --recursive .0—

Run 019fdb2b-d006-72f0-9368-76d6b133db41 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 115 · Warnings: 22 · Recommendations: 23 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 07-08-2026 @ 07:41 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md