Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
desenvolvedor-io/dev-store carries serious risk (42%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Event-Driven (85%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Architecture (82%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (33%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Accessibility (44%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); 15 Leaked secret finding(s) (Secret Scanning); readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green)… (Deployment & Rollback).
For scale: Small (~8,648 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (85%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Raise Readiness 33 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 42 → ~49.
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €3,800–€19,000
| Cost to rebuild | €3,800–€19,000 |
| Domain complexity | Very high |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 42% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · 42% boilerplate · 46% straight-line · 12% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€11,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 33% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Trajectory
Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph
At a glance — Code Health
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
At a glance — Readiness
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Domain Modelling
At a glance — Event-Driven
At a glance — Accessibility
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 29 | High / Critical |
| A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures | 25 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, codify disaster recovery by documenting RTO/RPO and restore procedures in IaC, as current backups lack a formal recovery plan. Next, immediately resolve 15 leaked secrets, particularly in appsettings files and certificate keys. Then, implement readiness probes and automated rollback strategies to catch and reverse bad releases. Ensure every release is traceable by stamping versions or tags, and finally, extend structured logging across all service projects to improve production diagnostics.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance. | +4.5 pts | Low | License Compliance |
| Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery. | +7.7 pts | Medium | DR & Backup |
| Resolve the 15 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.Docker.json (7), appsettings.Production.json (7), nerdstore-certificate.key. | +7.6 pts | Medium | Secret Scanning |
| Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically. | +7.6 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable. | +7.6 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production. | +7.4 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply. | +6.9 pts | Medium | Idempotency |
| Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +1.6 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| docker/nginx/nerdstore-certificate.key | 4.4 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: private-key |
| src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/appsettings.Production.json | 4.4 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/appsettings.Docker.json | 4.4 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| src/api-gateways/DevStore.Bff.Checkout/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/services/DevStore.Catalog.API/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/services/DevStore.Customers.API/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/services/DevStore.Identity.API/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/services/DevStore.Orders.API/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/services/DevStore.ShoppingCart.API/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/web/DevStore.WebApp.MVC/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/web/DevStore.WebApp.Status/Dockerfile | 5.1 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/web/DevStore.WebApp.Status/Dockerfile.original | 6.5 | Mixed | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| src/web/DevStore.WebApp.Status/appsettings.Production.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| src/web/DevStore.WebApp.Status/appsettings.Docker.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| src/services/DevStore.ShoppingCart.API/appsettings.Production.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| src/services/DevStore.ShoppingCart.API/appsettings.Docker.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| src/services/DevStore.Orders.API/appsettings.Production.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| src/services/DevStore.Orders.API/appsettings.Docker.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
| src/services/DevStore.Identity.API/appsettings.Production.json | 7.2 | Mixed | Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 72 of 75 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 75 dimensions across the health lenses
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 76 of 95 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.301 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
- D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity
0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity
1 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15; the worst was rangeWithString at 17.
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
D4 · Code Duplication
3 duplicated block group(s) detected.
D5 · Coupling
16 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
0 of 32 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
D9 · Test Distribution
1 test methods: 1 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
D10 · Test Quality
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 1 tests.
D11 · Test Reliability
0 flaky across 1 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky).
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
D13 · Secret Scanning
15 secret(s) detected.
What to do
- Resolve the 15 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.Docker.json (7), appsettings.Production.json (7), nerdstore-certificate.key. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 issue-level).
- Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
D14 · License Compliance
1 of 60 packages use a banned license.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
- Enforce License Compliance in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
D16 · Bus Factor
66 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/services/DevStore.Catalog.API/Configuration/DbMigrationHelpers.cs.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Off-boarding risk finding(s) in Bus Factor. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D17 · Explicit Debt
2 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 7377 LoC (0.1/KLoC) → score 9.7.
D18 · Solution Shape
16 projects, 224 .cs files, 7510 hand-written lines of code (7377 production / 133 test), plus 1962 generated (EF migrations / designer / snapshots, excluded from quality), 41 inter-project edges (build failed).
D19 · Documentation Quality
The README is a strong branding/README document that gives the project's purpose (a microservices e-commerce reference built with ASP.NET 9), motivation (inspired by EShopOnContainers but written 'by our way'), and links to online courses for learning. It also shows how to run the application in Docker, local VS/VSCodes, and a star-giving callout. However, it is the only document present across all projects, with no architecture or XML documentation coverage (0/114), leaving the core domain, infrastructure, and API surfaces unexplained for readers who want to build on top of this reference.
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 4.0/10. — The README is a strong branding/README document that gives the project's purpose (a microservices e-commerce reference built with ASP.NET 9), motivation (inspired by EShopOnContainers but written 'by our way'), and links to online courses for learning. It also shows how to run the application in Docker, local VS/VSCodes, and a star-giving callout. However, it is the only document present across all projects, with no architecture or XML documentation coverage (0/114), leaving the core domain, infrastructure, and API surfaces unexplained for readers who want to build on top of this reference.
D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D21 · Naming Consistency
6 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for the same concept (address building number). One… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 The IPagedList interface defines pagination properties. While consistent… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 The concept of a product identifier is named 'ProductId' in both places,… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D24 · Comment Value
16 valuable / 2 redundant across 82 sampled comments; 2 shown with locations.
What to do
- Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with Email.cs, OrderViewModel.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 16 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
D27 · Navigability
94 % of calls cross a namespace and 6 % go through an interface, but 99 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.
D28 · Secrets (history)
13 finding(s): 0 critical, 13 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
What to do
- Resolve the 9 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.Development.json (2), appsettings.Production.json (2), appsettings.Docker.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
D31 · IaC & Container Security
29 finding(s): 0 critical, 19 high, 0 medium, 10 low.
What to do
- Resolve the 19 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (18), Dockerfile.original. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (19 issue-level).
- Resolve the 10 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (9), Dockerfile.original. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 recommendation-level).
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
73 of 73 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/services/DevStore.Catalog.API/Configuration/DbMigrationHelpers.cs.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
- An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×5) — Index.cshtml:11, _Layout.cshtml:64, _Layout.cshtml:100, …
What to do
- Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels
- A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label. (×2) — ProductDetails.cshtml:51, Default.cshtml:4
- This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×2) — Payment.cshtml:203, _Layout.cshtml:33
- This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×2) — Payment.cshtml:222, Payment.cshtml:236
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure
- Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. — ProductDetails.cshtml:44
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — _Layout.cshtml:2
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC5 · ARIA correctness
- aria-hidden="true" here hides the subtree from assistive tech, but a focusable descendant stays in the tab order — a keyboard user can land on a control screen readers can't see. Add inert, take the descendants out of the tab order (tabindex="-1"), or drop aria-hidden. — _NewAddress.cshtml:4
What to do
- Use valid, non-abstract roles, supply the ARIA state each role requires, and never put aria-hidden on a focusable element.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- A CSS rule's foreground/background colour pair falls below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. (×2) — svg-with-js.css:0, ui.css:0
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 · Captive dependencies
AX10 · Code composition
What to do
- The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
AX2 · Stateful singletons
AX3 · Project dependency cycles
AX5 · Architecture & structure
AX6 · Interface segregation
- `IPagedList` declares 17 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — PagedViewModel.cs:17
What to do
- Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
AX8 · Test isolation
C1 · Data Protection
What to do
- Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
C2 · Access Controls
DM1 · Aggregate boundaries
- `Order` references the aggregate root `Voucher` directly (via `Voucher`) — hold its `VoucherId` instead. — Order.cs:43
What to do
- Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.
DM2 · Strongly-typed ids
- `Payment.OrderId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrderId { Guid Value }`). — Payment.cs:14
- `Transaction.PaymentId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct PaymentId { Guid Value }`). — Transaction.cs:17
- `Address.CustomerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CustomerId { Guid Value }`). — Address.cs:33
- `OrderDoneEvent.OrderId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrderId { Guid Value }`). — OrderDoneEvent.cs:14
- `OrderDoneEvent.CustomerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CustomerId { Guid Value }`). — OrderDoneEvent.cs:15
- `Order.CustomerId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct CustomerId { Guid Value }`). — Order.cs:31
- `Order.VoucherId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct VoucherId { Guid Value }`). — Order.cs:32
- `OrderItem.OrderId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct OrderId { Guid Value }`). — OrderItem.cs:23
- `OrderItem.ProductId` is a raw `Guid` — give it a strongly-typed id (`readonly record struct ProductId { Guid Value }`). — OrderItem.cs:24
What to do
- Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
DM3 · Integration-event coupling
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model
- `Payment` is an aggregate/entity with 5 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Payment.cs:7
- `Transaction` is an aggregate/entity with 10 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Transaction.cs:6
- `Address` is an aggregate/entity with 9 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Address.cs:6
- `OrderItem` is an aggregate/entity with 7 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — OrderItem.cs:6
What to do
- Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
DM5 · Encapsulated state
- `Payment` exposes public setter(s) (OrderId, PaymentType, Amount, CreditCard, Transactions). — Payment.cs:7
- `Transaction` exposes public setter(s) (AuthorizationCode, CreditCardCompany, TransactionDate, Amount, TransactionCost, TransactionStatus, …). — Transaction.cs:6
- `Product` exposes public setter(s) (Name, Description, Active, Price, DateAdded, Image, …). — Product.cs:6
- `OrderItem` exposes public setter(s) (ProductImage, Order). — OrderItem.cs:6
What to do
- Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
DM7 · Repository granularity
- `OrderRepository` is a repository over `Order`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Order` through its owning aggregate instead. — OrderRepository.cs:13
- `VoucherRepository` is a repository over `Voucher`, which is an entity but not an aggregate root. Repositories should be per aggregate ROOT — loading/saving a child entity independently lets callers bypass the root's invariants. Access `Voucher` through its owning aggregate instead. — VoucherRepository.cs:9
What to do
- Define repositories per aggregate root; reach child entities through their root so invariants can't be bypassed.
DM8 · Value-object opportunities
ED1 · Handler temporal coupling
ED2 · Event/command shape
ED3 · Event naming
- `Event` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — Event.cs:6
- `IntegrationEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — IntegrationEvent.cs:3
- `OrderDoneIntegrationEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — OrderDoneIntegrationEvent.cs:5
- `OrderDoneEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — OrderDoneEvent.cs:6
What to do
- Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
ED4 · Outbox / dual-write
- `CatalogIntegrationHandler.WriteDownInventory` writes to the database AND publishes to the message bus in the same flow, with no outbox referenced in this path. These two writes aren't atomic — a crash between them either loses the message (DB committed, publish failed) or emits a phantom event (publish succeeded, DB rolled back). Use the transactional outbox pattern (e.g. MassTransit's EF/Marten outbox) so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — CatalogIntegrationHandler.cs:29
What to do
- Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
ED5 · Idempotency
- `Commands.OrderCommandHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — OrderCommandHandler.cs:33
What to do
- Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- `AddMessageBusConfiguration` takes parameters but its body is empty — it accepts inputs and does nothing. Either implement it or remove it. — MessageBusConfig.cs:8
- A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — CustomerContext.cs:70
What to do
- Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
- Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add a README to the 16 of 16 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure
- Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.
What to do
- Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
P1 · CI/CD gates
P2 · Observability
- Only 4/14 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).
What to do
- Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
- Add OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics (ActivitySource / AddMetrics) so requests are traceable across the system, not just health-probable.
P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.
What to do
- Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup
- A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.
What to do
- Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P6 · Release Hygiene
What to do
- Stamp a version (csproj <Version>, a VERSION file, or GitVersion) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience
P8 · Schema migrations
S1 · Web-Security Posture
- MD5/SHA1 is broken for security purposes (collision-vulnerable). Use SHA-256+ for content integrity; for password storage, use a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt). — RazorHelpers.cs:12
- `RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — JwtConfig.cs:28
- No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
- No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)
What to do
- Replace MD5/SHA1 with SHA-256+ for content hashing; switch to a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt) for password storage.
- Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
- Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
- Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
X1 · Async correctness
- Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. (×5) — Program.cs:22, Program.cs:27, Program.cs:19, …
- `async void` can't be awaited and its exceptions crash the process instead of propagating. Return `Task` unless this is a top-level event handler. — OrderOrchestratorIntegrationHandler.cs:51
What to do
- Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 4/160 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×25) — OrderController.cs:33, OrderController.cs:48, OrderController.cs:61, …
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling
X4 · Structured logging
- Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. — OrderOrchestratorIntegrationHandler.cs:67
What to do
- Interpolated log message defeats structured logging
X5 · Nullable reference types
- 1/15 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
- ~1.1 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
- Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC5 · ARIA correctness | 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 54% | Adequate — gated by X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 82% | Strong | Solid. |
| Maturity | 48% | Weak — gated by D16, D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 33% | Weak — gated by D13, P3, P5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 60% | Adequate — gated by D28, D31 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 55% | Adequate — gated by DM2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Event-Driven | 85% | Strong | Strongest area. |
| Accessibility | 44% | Weak — gated by AC1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 30 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
- C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release).
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data
- X8 JS interop contract — no data
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 45 finding(s)
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/api-gateways/DevStore.Bff.Checkout/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0009 src/api-gateways/DevStore.Bff.Checkout/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0009 src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/services/DevStore.Catalog.API/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0009 src/services/DevStore.Catalog.API/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/services/DevStore.Customers.API/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0009 src/services/DevStore.Customers.API/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/services/DevStore.Identity.API/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0009 src/services/DevStore.Identity.API/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/services/DevStore.Orders.API/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0009 src/services/DevStore.Orders.API/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/services/DevStore.ShoppingCart.API/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0009 src/services/DevStore.ShoppingCart.API/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/web/DevStore.WebApp.MVC/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0009 src/web/DevStore.WebApp.MVC/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/web/DevStore.WebApp.Status/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0009 src/web/DevStore.WebApp.Status/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0002 src/web/DevStore.WebApp.Status/Dockerfile.original
- Leaked secret: private-key docker/nginx/nerdstore-certificate.key:1
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/web/DevStore.WebApp.Status/appsettings.Production.json:26
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/web/DevStore.WebApp.Status/appsettings.Docker.json:26
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/services/DevStore.ShoppingCart.API/appsettings.Production.json:33
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/services/DevStore.ShoppingCart.API/appsettings.Docker.json:33
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/services/DevStore.Orders.API/appsettings.Production.json:33
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/services/DevStore.Orders.API/appsettings.Docker.json:33
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/services/DevStore.Identity.API/appsettings.Production.json:33
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/services/DevStore.Identity.API/appsettings.Docker.json:33
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/services/DevStore.Customers.API/appsettings.Production.json:33
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/services/DevStore.Customers.API/appsettings.Docker.json:33
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/services/DevStore.Catalog.API/appsettings.Production.json:33
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/services/DevStore.Catalog.API/appsettings.Docker.json:33
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/appsettings.Production.json:33
- Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/appsettings.Docker.json:33
- Secret: generic-api-key docker/docker-compose-local.yml:6
- Secret: generic-api-key docker/docker-common-resources.yml:69
- Secret: generic-api-key docker/docker-compose.yml:6
- Secret: private-key docker/nginx/nerdstore-certificate.key:1
- Secret: generic-api-key src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/appsettings.Development.json:59
- Secret: generic-api-key src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/appsettings.Production.json:42
- Secret: generic-api-key src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/appsettings.Docker.json:49
- Secret: generic-api-key src/services/NSE.Pagamentos.API/appsettings.Production.json:20
- Secret: generic-api-key src/services/NSE.Pagamentos.API/appsettings.Development.json:20
- Banned license: MySql.EntityFrameworkCore
- NoWarnInCsproj src/web/DevStore.WebApp.Status/DevStore.WebApp.Status.csproj:10
Warning — 9 finding(s)
- Off the main sequence: DevStore.MessageBus
- Off the main sequence: DevStore.Billing.DevsPay
- Off the main sequence: DevStore.WebAPI.Core
- CommentedOutCode src/services/DevStore.Customers.API/Data/CustomerContext.cs:68
- rangeWithString (cognitive 17) src/web/DevStore.WebApp.MVC/wwwroot/js/creditcardvalidator.js:66
- Duplicated block (37 lines × 5) src/services/DevStore.Catalog.API/Configuration/DbMigrationHelpers.cs:48
- Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/Services/BillingService.cs:70
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/Data/BillingContext.cs:30
- Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
Recommendation — 24 finding(s)
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/api-gateways/DevStore.Bff.Checkout/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/services/DevStore.Catalog.API/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/services/DevStore.Customers.API/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/services/DevStore.Identity.API/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/services/DevStore.Orders.API/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/services/DevStore.ShoppingCart.API/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/web/DevStore.WebApp.MVC/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/web/DevStore.WebApp.Status/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 src/web/DevStore.WebApp.Status/Dockerfile.original
- redundant comment src/building-blocks/DevStore.Core/DomainObjects/Email.cs:10
- redundant comment src/web/DevStore.WebApp.MVC/Models/OrderViewModel.cs:13
- Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
- Thin analysable surface across projects
- No ADRs found
- Inconsistent naming for the same concept (address building number). One uses 'BuildingNumber' while the other uses 'BuildingNumber' (consistent), but let's look for actual inconsistencies. Ah, looking closer at the list, I see 'BuildingNumber' used in both. Let's look for other inconsistencies.
- The IPagedList interface defines pagination properties. While consistent within itself, it's worth noting that 'Page' is often used instead of 'PageIndex' in other libraries, but here it is consistent. Let's look for actual mismatches.
- The concept of a product identifier is named 'ProductId' in both places, which is consistent. However, let's look for actual inconsistencies.
- The concept of a discount or voucher is represented by 'Discount' in one place and 'Voucher' in another. While related, they might be distinct concepts (the value vs the code). However, 'Voucher' is also used in 'DevStore.Orders.API.Application.DTO.VoucherDTO.Code' and 'DevStore.Bff.Checkout.Models.VoucherDTO.DiscountType'. The inconsistency is between 'Discount' (a value/amount) and 'Voucher' (the entity/code). This is likely a domain distinction, but 'Discount' and 'Voucher' are often used interchangeably in UI vs DTOs.
- The term 'SocialNumber' is used for what is likely a Social Security Number or similar ID. It is used in 'UserRegister', 'SocialNumberValidationAttributeAdapterProvider', and 'SocialNumberAttribute'. This is consistent.
- The property 'ProductId' is used consistently.
- Bounded contexts not declared
- Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
- Dormant codebase
Info — 17 finding(s)
- XML-doc coverage: DevStore.Bff.Checkout src/api-gateways/DevStore.Bff.Checkout/DevStore.Bff.Checkout.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DevStore.Core src/building-blocks/DevStore.Core/DevStore.Core.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DevStore.MessageBus src/building-blocks/DevStore.MessageBus/DevStore.MessageBus.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DevStore.WebAPI.Core src/building-blocks/DevStore.WebAPI.Core/DevStore.WebAPI.Core.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DevStore.Billing.API src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/DevStore.Billing.API.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DevStore.Billing.DevsPay src/services/DevStore.Billing.DevsPay/DevStore.Billing.DevsPay.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DevStore.Catalog.API src/services/DevStore.Catalog.API/DevStore.Catalog.API.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DevStore.Customers.API src/services/DevStore.Customers.API/DevStore.Customers.API.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DevStore.Identity.API src/services/DevStore.Identity.API/DevStore.Identity.API.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DevStore.Orders.API src/services/DevStore.Orders.API/DevStore.Orders.API.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DevStore.Orders.Domain src/services/DevStore.Orders.Domain/DevStore.Orders.Domain.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DevStore.Orders.Infra src/services/DevStore.Orders.Infra/DevStore.Orders.Infra.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DevStore.ShoppingCart.API src/services/DevStore.ShoppingCart.API/DevStore.ShoppingCart.API.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DevStore.WebApp.Status src/web/DevStore.WebApp.Status/DevStore.WebApp.Status.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: DevStore.WebApp.MVC src/web/DevStore.WebApp.MVC/DevStore.WebApp.MVC.csproj
- Build did not complete in the analyzer
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 13 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | — |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 29 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a NuGet package, a container image, a GitHub release). | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan. | 0 | — |
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Address — 12 field(s)
- AddressDto.StreetAddress src/api-gateways/DevStore.Bff.Checkout/Models/AddressDto.cs:5
- AddressDto.ZipCode src/api-gateways/DevStore.Bff.Checkout/Models/AddressDto.cs:9
- AddAddressCommand.StreetAddress src/services/DevStore.Customers.API/Application/Commands/AddAddressCommand.cs:28
- AddAddressCommand.ZipCode src/services/DevStore.Customers.API/Application/Commands/AddAddressCommand.cs:32
- Address.StreetAddress src/services/DevStore.Customers.API/Models/Address.cs:26
- Address.ZipCode src/services/DevStore.Customers.API/Models/Address.cs:30
- AddressDto.StreetAddress src/services/DevStore.Orders.API/Application/DTO/AddressDto.cs:5
- AddressDto.ZipCode src/services/DevStore.Orders.API/Application/DTO/AddressDto.cs:9
- Address.StreetAddress src/services/DevStore.Orders.Domain/Orders/Address.cs:5
- Address.ZipCode src/services/DevStore.Orders.Domain/Orders/Address.cs:9
- AddressViewModel.StreetAddress src/web/DevStore.WebApp.MVC/Models/AddressViewModel.cs:10
- AddressViewModel.ZipCode src/web/DevStore.WebApp.MVC/Models/AddressViewModel.cs:20
Email — 10 field(s)
- UserRegisteredIntegrationEvent.Email src/building-blocks/DevStore.Core/Messages/Integration/UserRegisteredIntegrationEvent.cs:17
- NewCustomerCommand.Email src/services/DevStore.Customers.API/Application/Commands/NewCustomerCommand.cs:20
- NewCustomerAddedEvent.Email src/services/DevStore.Customers.API/Application/Events/NewCustomerAddedEvent.cs:19
- Customer.Email src/services/DevStore.Customers.API/Models/Customer.cs:23
- NewUser.Email src/services/DevStore.Identity.API/Models/UserViewModels.cs:16
- UserLogin.Email src/services/DevStore.Identity.API/Models/UserViewModels.cs:30
- UserToken.Email src/services/DevStore.Identity.API/Models/UserViewModels.cs:48
- UserRegister.Email src/web/DevStore.WebApp.MVC/Models/UserViewModel.cs:23
- UserLogin.Email src/web/DevStore.WebApp.MVC/Models/UserViewModel.cs:38
- UserToken.Email src/web/DevStore.WebApp.MVC/Models/UserViewModel.cs:57
Financial (card / IBAN) — 9 field(s)
- OrderDto.CardNumber src/api-gateways/DevStore.Bff.Checkout/Models/OrderDto.cs:34
- OrderInitiatedIntegrationEvent.CardNumber src/building-blocks/DevStore.Core/Messages/Integration/OrderInitiatedIntegrationEvent.cs:13
- CreditCard.CardNumber src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/Models/CreditCard.cs:18
- Payment.CreditCard src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/Models/Payment.cs:18
- Transaction.CreditCardCompany src/services/DevStore.Billing.API/Models/Transaction.cs:9
- CardHash.CardNumber src/services/DevStore.Billing.DevsPay/Card.cs:17
- Transaction.CardNumber src/services/DevStore.Billing.DevsPay/Transaction.cs:35
- AddOrderCommand.CardNumber src/services/DevStore.Orders.API/Application/Commands/AddOrderCommand.cs:25
- TransactionViewModel.CardNumber src/web/DevStore.WebApp.MVC/Models/TransactionViewModel.cs:23