Inflow — Watchdog Audit

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

devmentors/Inflow carries serious risk (42%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (19%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Maturity (59%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates (Domain vs controller coverage).

For scale: Small (~11,646 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

Code Health 60% Adequate · gated by X4, X5 Architecture 78% Strong Maturity 59% Adequate · gated by M2 Readiness 19% ⚠ Critical · gated by D8, P1, P3, P5, P7, P9 Security 72% Adequate · gated by D30

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.

Readiness 19% · 47% weightMaturity 59% · 26% weightCode Health 60% · 14% weightSecurity 72% · 8% weightArchitecture 78% · 4% weight

Raise Readiness 19 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 42 → ~63.

Code composition — where the lines go

Business logic 18%Plumbing 65%Tests 5%Generated 12%

New since the last scan (12+)

12 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-07-29) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

D30 · High CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35
D30 · High CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35
D30 · Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €4,700–€23,000

Cost to rebuild	€4,700–€23,000 (0.1 person-years (78–246 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexity	High — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor	0.7× (at 42% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shape	Small · 50% boilerplate · 29% straight-line · 21% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€14,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 19% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain High (×1.4) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json.

+11.8 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

+22.4 pts · Medium effort · CI/CD gates

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

+22.4 pts · Medium effort · DR & Backup

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk

This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 19%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.

Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (11,646 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 19%

→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.

Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage

Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.

Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort

→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

Architecture — module dependency matrix

159 modules, 312 dependencies — every dependency points down the layering, so there are no cycles. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)

At a glance — Code Health · 60% · Adequate · gated by X4, X5

The Good

D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 10.0 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.8 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 9.1 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 10.0 D39 · .NET / C# IL Efficiency 9.9 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 X1 · Repo Async correctness 10.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 7.9 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0

The Ugly

X4 · Repo Structured logging 3.4 X5 · Repo Nullable reference types 2.0

At a glance — Architecture · 78% · Strong

The Good

D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 10.0 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D23 · .NET / C# Boundary Type-Coupling 10.0 D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 8.4 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX7 · Repo Slice cohesion 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0

The Bad

AX10 · Repo Code composition 5.0 AX2 · Repo Stateful singletons 5.7

At a glance — Maturity · 59% · Adequate · gated by M2

The Good

D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 7.5 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 8.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 8.0

The Bad

D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 5.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.7

The Ugly

D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 19% · Critical · gated by D8, P1, P3, P5, P7, P9

The Good

D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D11 · .NET / C# Test Reliability 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 9.2 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 10.0

The Bad

D12 · .NET / C# Dependency Hygiene 6.3 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 5.0 P2 · Repo Observability 5.4 P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0

The Ugly

D8 · .NET / C# Code Coverage 2.6 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 0.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P5 · Repo DR & Backup 0.0 P7 · Repo Outbound HTTP resilience 3.0 P9 · Repo Domain vs controller coverage 2.6

At a glance — Security · 72% · Adequate · gated by D30

The Good

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 8.0 D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 10.0 C2 · Repo Access Controls 10.0 C4 · Repo Data Retention 9.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 7.0

The Bad

C1 · Repo Data Protection 6.5

The Ugly

D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.3

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components	25	High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures	4	High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish a continuous integration pipeline to automatically build and test every change. Next, formalize disaster recovery and backup procedures by codifying them in infrastructure code and documenting recovery time objectives. Then, increase unit test coverage for the core domain logic to ensure correctness. After that, implement resilience policies for external HTTP calls to prevent cascading failures. Finally, improve deployment automation by adding health checks and enabling quick rollbacks using immutable image tags.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json.	+11.8 pts	Low	Secret Scanning
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.	+22.4 pts	Medium	CI/CD gates
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.	+22.4 pts	Medium	DR & Backup
Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates, value objects, domain services) — that's where correctness matters most.	+22.1 pts	Medium	Domain vs controller coverage
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.	+21.9 pts	Medium	Outbound HTTP resilience
Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.	+20.5 pts	Medium	Deployment & Rollback
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.	+20.0 pts	Medium	Observability
Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.	+9.5 pts	Low	Dependency Hygiene

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 31 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 3% slop · 0% mixed · 97% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
src/Bootstrapper/Inflow.Bootstrapper/appsettings.json	3.0	Slop	Secret Scanning: Leaked secret: signing-key
src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Shared/ValueObjects/Iban.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: AccountController
src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Api/Controllers/PasswordController.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: PasswordController
src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/Queries/Handlers/BrowseUsersHandler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: BrowseUsersHandler
src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/Queries/Handlers/GetUserByEmailHandler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: GetUserByEmailHandler
src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/Queries/Handlers/GetUserHandler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: GetUserHandler
src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Contracts/ContractRegistry.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: EmptyContract
src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Modules/MessagePackModuleSerializer.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: MessagePackModuleSerializer
src/Modules/Saga/Inflow.Modules.Saga.Api/Handlers/SagaEventHandler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: SagaEventHandler
src/Modules/Saga/Inflow.Modules.Saga.Api/Sagas/NewCustomerBonusFundsSaga.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: NewCustomerBonusFundsSaga
src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/Exceptions/CustomerLockedException.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: CustomerLockedException
src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/Queries/Handlers/BrowseCustomersHandler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: BrowseCustomersHandler
src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/Queries/Handlers/GetCustomerHandler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: GetCustomerHandler
src/Modules/Wallets/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Application/Wallets/Queries/Handlers/BrowseTransfersHandler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: BrowseTransfersHandler
src/Modules/Wallets/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Application/Wallets/Queries/Handlers/BrowseWalletsHandler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: BrowseWalletsHandler
src/Modules/Wallets/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Application/Wallets/Queries/Handlers/GetTransferHandler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: GetTransferHandler
src/Modules/Wallets/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Application/Wallets/Queries/Handlers/GetWalletHandler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: GetWalletHandler
src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core/Deposits/Queries/Handlers/BrowseDepositAccountsHandler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: BrowseDepositAccountsHandler
src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core/Deposits/Queries/Handlers/BrowseDepositsHandler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: Dead code: BrowseDepositsHandler

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 59 of 62 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.6 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 62 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D8D9D10D11D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D23D24D26D27D28D29D30D35D39AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6AX7AX8AX9C1C2C4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P7P8P9S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 48 of 118 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
jscpd	Code duplication	—	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.302	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fc8c4-e6b2-7cb4-8dac-9317baa843e6.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.

When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling: Boundary leakage is detected from type references across detected contexts — leaks that flow through primitives, serialization or shared infrastructure may not surface as a typed reference.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (6): D19, D20, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

5 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Messaging/Outbox/InboxCleanupProcessor.cs:35

Duplicated block (14 lines × 2)src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Services/AppInitializer.cs:24

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2)src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Messaging/Outbox/OutboxCleanupProcessor.cs:58

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2)src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Postgres/Decorators/TransactionalCommandHandlerDecorator.cs:30

Duplicated block (8 lines × 2)src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Logging/Decorators/LoggingCommandHandlerDecorator.cs:30

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

20 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

Layer violation: Domain → Infrastructure · ×3

Off the main sequence: Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 62 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D8 · Code Coverage2.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.

Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

Line coverage 9.8%, branch coverage 6.6%.

What to do

Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

9 test methods: 6 unit, 3 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 9 tests.

Mock framework: NSubstitute

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.

Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 flaky across 2 measured tier(s). unit: measured (0 flaky); integration: measured (0 flaky).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d11_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D12 · Dependency Hygiene6.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

31 outdated, 1 vulnerable, 1 deprecated packages.

Vulnerable: MessagePack

Deprecated: xunit

Outdated: NSubstitute · ×31

What to do

Resolve the 1 Vulnerable finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Dependency Hygiene in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: signing-keysrc/Bootstrapper/Inflow.Bootstrapper/appsettings.json:6

What to do

Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with appsettings.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Secret Scanning in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 32 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D17 · Explicit Debt9.1 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.1 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 deducted debt markers + 21 dead symbols across 10505 LoC (0.4/KLoC) → score 9.1.

Dead code: AccountController · ×21src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:15

CommentedOutCodesrc/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Shared/ValueObjects/Iban.cs:30

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

20 projects, 484 source files, 11149 hand-written lines of code (10505 production / 644 test), plus 1749 generated (machine-written code — designer, scaffolded and tool-emitted files — excluded from quality), 93 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Adequate / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The single README is a solid overview of what Inflow is (virtual payments app built as a modular monolith), its shared framework, and the two main starting steps. It describes the bootstrapper project's role, four autonomous modules with their responsibilities, and a brief mention of the Saga pattern before being cut by the scanner. The visible content is clear and complete for an initial README; the absence of architecture docs, XML doc coverage, and any further module detail in the clipped body means it is not yet fully self-contained.

XML-doc coverage: Inflow.Bootstrapper · ×15src/Bootstrapper/Inflow.Bootstrapper/Inflow.Bootstrapper.csproj

What to do

Improve Documentation Quality — currently 5.0/10. — The single README is a solid overview of what Inflow is (virtual payments app built as a modular monolith), its shared framework, and the two main starting steps. It describes the bootstrapper project's role, four autonomous modules with their responsibilities, and a brief mention of the Saga pattern before being cut by the scanner. The visible content is clear and complete for an initial README; the absence of architecture docs, XML doc coverage, and any further module detail in the clipped body means it is not yet fully self-contained.

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether domain types (IDs, enums, value objects) leak across bounded-context boundaries.

Method: Cross-context domain-type leakage via Roslyn structural classification (strongly-typed IDs / value objects) over every public surface. Exhaustive, deterministic, type-level aggregate-boundary check.

Coverage: Bounded contexts derived from NAMESPACE prefix (or graph-inferred where available); cross-boundary domain-type leakage then checked exhaustively over every public member of every type.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

No domain types leak across context boundaries (7 contexts).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d23_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D24 · Comment Value / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

12 valuable / 2 redundant across 27 sampled comments; 2 shown with locations.

redundant comment · ×2src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Messaging/Outbox/OutboxBroker.cs:24

What to do

Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with OutboxBroker.cs, QueryDispatcher.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 20 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D27 · Navigability8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

92 % of calls cross a namespace and 16 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

What to do

Improve Navigability — currently 8.4/10. — 92 % of calls cross a namespace and 16 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D28 · Secrets (history)8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×2src/Bootstrapper/Inflow.Bootstrapper/appsettings.json:6detected by gitleaks finding

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.3 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

25 vulnerable package(s): 1 critical, 9 high, 15 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35 · ×9detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 5.0.0detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35 · ×15detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

Resolve the 15 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 warning-level).
Resolve the 9 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

git history depth insufficient

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D39 · IL Efficiency9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

7 of 946 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.

IL efficiency: 7 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetsrc/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/DAL/Configurations/CustomerConfiguration.cs:13

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX10 · Code composition5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX2 · Stateful singletons5.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.

Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.

`ContractRegistry` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_types; e.g. `_types` at line 66). — ContractRegistry.cs:13
`InboxTypeRegistry` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_types; e.g. `_types` at line 10). — InboxTypeRegistry.cs:6
`OutboxTypeRegistry` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_types; e.g. `_types` at line 11). — OutboxTypeRegistry.cs:7
`UnitOfWorkTypeRegistry` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_types; e.g. `_types` at line 10). — UnitOfWorkTypeRegistry.cs:6

What to do

Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX7 · Slice cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether feature slices stay independent (no direct cross-slice references) — the discipline that makes vertical-slice architecture pay off.

Method: Roslyn scan (vertical-slice gated): feature slices resolved from namespaces (.Features.*, .Slices.*) or project names; cross-slice type references detected. Deterministic, traceable.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

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C1 · Data Protection6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

No in-app HTTPS enforcement, but ForwardedHeaders / 127.0.0.1 binding indicates a reverse-proxy topology — adding UseHttpsRedirection in the app would be wrong in this layout. Verify the reverse proxy enforces TLS. — Extensions.cs:129

What to do

Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.

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C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

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C4 · Data Retention9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).

Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.

A retention mechanism is present, but the data-lifecycle is not yet complete — missing: a documented retention period / data-expiry.

What to do

Complete the data-lifecycle story: an expiry limit (a declared maximum age for the stored data — a retention-age setting, or a store-level TTL where your storage offers one), a scheduled purge/cleanup job that enforces it, and a documented retention period covering the personal data.

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ED5 · Idempotency9.2 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

`Dispatchers.AsyncDispatcherJob.ExecuteAsync` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — AsyncDispatcherJob.cs:27
`Handlers.SignedUpHandler.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — SignedUpHandler.cs:29
`Handlers.TransferFundsHandler.HandleAsync` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — TransferFundsHandler.cs:32

What to do

Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.

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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×2) — Iban.cs:32, Extensions.cs:65

What to do

Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.

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M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 20 of 20 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

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M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).

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M3 · Folder & project structure8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

Tests aren't grouped in a dedicated test folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

Group tests in the folder your build system expects (tests/, test/, spec/, or your module's test source set) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy8.0 / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests

What to do

Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P2 · Observability5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Only 6/13 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 13, 1 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.

What to do

Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.

What to do

Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment is orchestrated by compose, but no service declares a `healthcheck:` and nothing pins a previous image to fall back to — the runtime can tell that the container is up, not that it is serving, so a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add a `healthcheck:` to the served compose service — probing the endpoint it already answers on where it has one — with `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on whatever waits for it, and keep the deployed image tag immutable and recorded so rolling back is re-pointing at the previous tag rather than rebuilding.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.

Do you agree with this assessment?

P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.

What to do

Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.

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P8 · Schema migrations10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

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P9 · Domain vs controller coverage2.6 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether test coverage concentrates on the domain (business rules) rather than the trivial web/controller layer — a focus check a generic tool can't make.

Method: Roslyn plus test-execution analysis: domain-layer versus trivial web/controller coverage ratio. Computed metric, deterministic.

Domain coverage is 18% — the layer carrying the business rules is under-tested.

What to do

Raise unit-test coverage of the domain (aggregates, value objects, domain services) — that's where correctness matters most.

Do you agree with this assessment?

S1 · Web-Security Posture7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

MD5/SHA1 is constructed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ for content integrity, or a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, a file or mutex name), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as `System.IO.Hashing.XxHash64`/`Crc32` says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. — Md5.cs:10
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (`System.IO.Hashing.XxHash64`/`Crc32`) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key or a mutex name.
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.

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X1 · Async correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X2 · Cancellation propagation7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 61/93 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×25) — AccountController.cs:32, AccountController.cs:40, AccountController.cs:50, …

What to do

Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

Do you agree with this assessment?

X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

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X4 · Structured logging3.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. (×25) — Startup.cs:39, ChangePasswordHandler.cs:40, SignInHandler.cs:63, …

What to do

Interpolated log message defeats structured logging

Do you agree with this assessment?

X5 · Nullable reference types2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

0/15 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.

What to do

Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

Do you agree with this assessment?

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	60%	Adequate — gated by X4, X5	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	78%	Strong	Strongest area.
Maturity	59%	Adequate — gated by M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	19%	Critical — gated by D8, P1, P3, P5, P7, P9	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	72%	Adequate — gated by D30	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.

Not included — 35 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 2 aggregate root(s) (AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 21 event handler(s); 52 CQRS handler(s)
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 17 finding(s)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×9

High CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35 — MessagePack 2.4.35 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35 — MessagePack 2.4.35 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 6.0.1 — Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory 6.0.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Npgsql 6.0.5 — Npgsql 6.0.5 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.1 — System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.1 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 — System.Formats.Asn1 5.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.Json 6.0.2 — System.Text.Json 6.0.2 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D5 · Coupling · Layer violation · ×3

Layer violation: Domain → Infrastructure — Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core (Domain) references Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) — dependencies must point inward (Web → Application → Domain; Infrastructure implements inner interfaces, nothing depends outward on it).
Layer violation: Domain → Infrastructure — Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core (Domain) references Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) — dependencies must point inward (Web → Application → Domain; Infrastructure implements inner interfaces, nothing depends outward on it).
Layer violation: Domain → Infrastructure — Inflow.Modules.Users.Core (Domain) references Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure (Infrastructure) — dependencies must point inward (Web → Application → Domain; Infrastructure implements inner interfaces, nothing depends outward on it).

D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×2

Secret: generic-api-key src/Bootstrapper/Inflow.Bootstrapper/appsettings.json:6 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
Secret: generic-api-key src/Bootstrapper/Inflow.Bootstrapper/appsettings.json:90 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Vulnerable · ×1

Vulnerable: MessagePack — MessagePack 2.4.35 — Moderate severity. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1

Leaked secret: signing-key src/Bootstrapper/Inflow.Bootstrapper/appsettings.json:6 — signing-key detected. Treat the value as compromised: it is readable by everyone who has ever had the repository, and deleting the line does not un-publish it. In order — (1) REVOKE it at whatever issued it and issue a replacement, which is the only step that actually closes the exposure; (2) load the replacement at run time from your platform's secret store or the process environment instead of from the tree, so no future value is committable; (3) remove the file or line and add its path to the repository's ignore rules, so it cannot come back; (4) if the value was ever live, purge it from the history as well, since a clone taken before the deletion still carries it. If this is instead a FIXTURE — key material generated for tests and valid nowhere — then the exposure is nil and the fix is to make that legible: generate it in test setup, or keep it under a test-data path, so a reader (and this scan) can tell it from the real thing.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×1

Critical CVE: System.Drawing.Common 5.0.0 — System.Drawing.Common 5.0.0 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

Warning — 45 finding(s)

D17 · Explicit Debt · Dead code · ×21

Dead code: AccountController src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Api/Controllers/AccountController.cs:15 — NamedType AccountController — no references found in solution.
Dead code: PasswordController src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Api/Controllers/PasswordController.cs:13 — NamedType PasswordController — no references found in solution.
Dead code: BrowseUsersHandler src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/Queries/Handlers/BrowseUsersHandler.cs:14 — NamedType BrowseUsersHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: GetUserByEmailHandler src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/Queries/Handlers/GetUserByEmailHandler.cs:10 — NamedType GetUserByEmailHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: GetUserHandler src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/Queries/Handlers/GetUserHandler.cs:10 — NamedType GetUserHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: EmptyContract src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Contracts/ContractRegistry.cs:218 — NamedType EmptyContract — no references found in solution.
Dead code: MessagePackModuleSerializer src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Modules/MessagePackModuleSerializer.cs:6 — NamedType MessagePackModuleSerializer — no references found in solution.
Dead code: SagaEventHandler src/Modules/Saga/Inflow.Modules.Saga.Api/Handlers/SagaEventHandler.cs:9 — NamedType SagaEventHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: NewCustomerBonusFundsSaga src/Modules/Saga/Inflow.Modules.Saga.Api/Sagas/NewCustomerBonusFundsSaga.cs:18 — NamedType NewCustomerBonusFundsSaga — no references found in solution.
Dead code: CustomerLockedException src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/Exceptions/CustomerLockedException.cs:6 — NamedType CustomerLockedException — no references found in solution.
Dead code: BrowseCustomersHandler src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/Queries/Handlers/BrowseCustomersHandler.cs:12 — NamedType BrowseCustomersHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: GetCustomerHandler src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/Queries/Handlers/GetCustomerHandler.cs:10 — NamedType GetCustomerHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: BrowseTransfersHandler src/Modules/Wallets/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Application/Wallets/Queries/Handlers/BrowseTransfersHandler.cs:14 — NamedType BrowseTransfersHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: BrowseWalletsHandler src/Modules/Wallets/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Application/Wallets/Queries/Handlers/BrowseWalletsHandler.cs:14 — NamedType BrowseWalletsHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: GetTransferHandler src/Modules/Wallets/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Application/Wallets/Queries/Handlers/GetTransferHandler.cs:9 — NamedType GetTransferHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: GetWalletHandler src/Modules/Wallets/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Application/Wallets/Queries/Handlers/GetWalletHandler.cs:10 — NamedType GetWalletHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: BrowseDepositAccountsHandler src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core/Deposits/Queries/Handlers/BrowseDepositAccountsHandler.cs:13 — NamedType BrowseDepositAccountsHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: BrowseDepositsHandler src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core/Deposits/Queries/Handlers/BrowseDepositsHandler.cs:15 — NamedType BrowseDepositsHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: DeductFundsRejectedHandler src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core/Withdrawals/Events/External/Handlers/DeductFundsRejectedHandler.cs:13 — NamedType DeductFundsRejectedHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: BrowseWithdrawalAccountsHandler src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core/Withdrawals/Queries/Handlers/BrowseWithdrawalAccountsHandler.cs:13 — NamedType BrowseWithdrawalAccountsHandler — no references found in solution.
Dead code: BrowseWithdrawalsHandler src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core/Withdrawals/Queries/Handlers/BrowseWithdrawalsHandler.cs:15 — NamedType BrowseWithdrawalsHandler — no references found in solution.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×15

Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35 — MessagePack 2.4.35 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35 — MessagePack 2.4.35 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35 — MessagePack 2.4.35 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35 — MessagePack 2.4.35 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35 — MessagePack 2.4.35 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35 — MessagePack 2.4.35 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35 — MessagePack 2.4.35 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35 — MessagePack 2.4.35 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35 — MessagePack 2.4.35 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.4.35 — MessagePack 2.4.35 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.10.0 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.10.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.1 — System.Data.SqlClient 4.8.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.DirectoryServices.Protocols 5.0.0 — System.DirectoryServices.Protocols 5.0.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.10.0 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.10.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 16 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 5.0.0 — System.Security.Cryptography.Xml 5.0.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Deprecated · ×1

Deprecated: xunit — xunit 2.4.1 — Legacy — the publisher's replacement is `xunit.v3`; migrate the reference to it.

D16 · Bus Factor · single-maintainer · ×1

single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk (1 author(s) across 3 commit(s) sampled).

D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×1

CommentedOutCode src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Shared/ValueObjects/Iban.cs:30 — 4 consecutive commented-code lines

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Messaging/Outbox/InboxCleanupProcessor.cs:35 — src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Messaging/Outbox/InboxCleanupProcessor.cs:35-50 | src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Messaging/Outbox/OutboxCleanupProcessor.cs:35-50 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Messaging/Outbox/InboxCleanupProcessor.cs:35` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Services/AppInitializer.cs:24 — src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Services/AppInitializer.cs:24-37 | src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Services/DbContextAppInitializer.cs:42-55 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Services/AppInitializer.cs:24` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Messaging/Outbox/OutboxCleanupProcessor.cs:58 — src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Messaging/Outbox/OutboxCleanupProcessor.cs:58-70 | src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Messaging/Outbox/OutboxProcessor.cs:57-69 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Messaging/Outbox/OutboxCleanupProcessor.cs:58` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Postgres/Decorators/TransactionalCommandHandlerDecorator.cs:30 — src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Postgres/Decorators/TransactionalCommandHandlerDecorator.cs:30-40 | src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Postgres/Decorators/TransactionalEventHandlerDecorator.cs:30-40 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (8 lines × 2) src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Logging/Decorators/LoggingCommandHandlerDecorator.cs:30 — src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Logging/Decorators/LoggingCommandHandlerDecorator.cs:30-37 | src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Logging/Decorators/LoggingEventHandlerDecorator.cs:30-37 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Logging/Decorators/LoggingCommandHandlerDecorator.cs:30` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.

D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×1

Off the main sequence: Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure — Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure: abstractness 0.16, instability 0.09, distance 0.75 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.

Recommendation — 6 finding(s)

D24 · Comment Value · redundant comment · ×2

redundant comment src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Messaging/Outbox/OutboxBroker.cs:24 — "Not possible to send messages from different modules at once" — weak keep; the 'not possible' is mostly restatement of SendAsync's contract, but the link adds value
redundant comment src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Queries/QueryDispatcher.cs:27 — "ReSharper disable once PossibleNullReferenceException" — delete - the comment is generated suppression, not documentation

D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1

No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.

D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1

Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · early-stage repository · ×1

early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness (3 commit(s) sampled).

D39 · IL Efficiency · IL efficiency · ×1

IL efficiency: 7 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/DAL/Configurations/CustomerConfiguration.cs:13 — 7 of 946 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core.DAL.Configurations.CustomerConfiguration.Configure @ src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/DAL/Configurations/CustomerConfiguration.cs:13, 443 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 9.9/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.

Info — 50 finding(s)

D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Outdated · ×31

Outdated: NSubstitute — NSubstitute 4.4.0 → 6.0.0 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Tests).
Outdated: Shouldly — Shouldly 4.0.3 → 4.3.0 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Tests).
Outdated: xunit — xunit 2.4.1 → 2.9.3 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Tests).
Outdated: Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design — Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design 6.0.7 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Inflow.Bootstrapper).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Abstractions 6.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Abstractions).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions — Microsoft.Extensions.DependencyInjection.Abstractions 6.0.0 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Abstractions).
Outdated: Humanizer — Humanizer 2.14.1 → 3.0.10 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: MessagePack — MessagePack 2.4.35 → 3.1.8 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.JwtBearer 6.0.7 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization — Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authorization 6.0.7 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.StackExchangeRedis — Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.StackExchangeRedis 6.0.7 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Microsoft.Extensions.Http.Polly — Microsoft.Extensions.Http.Polly 6.0.7 → 10.0.10 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL — Npgsql.EntityFrameworkCore.PostgreSQL 6.0.5 → 10.0.3 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Scrutor — Scrutor 4.2.0 → 7.0.0 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Serilog — Serilog 2.11.0 → 4.4.0 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Serilog.AspNetCore — Serilog.AspNetCore 6.0.1 → 10.0.0 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Serilog.Extensions.Logging — Serilog.Extensions.Logging 3.1.0 → 10.0.0 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.Console — Serilog.Sinks.Console 4.0.1 → 6.1.1 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.File — Serilog.Sinks.File 5.0.0 → 7.0.0 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Serilog.Sinks.Seq — Serilog.Sinks.Seq 5.1.1 → 9.1.0 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: SmartFormat.NET — SmartFormat.NET 3.1.0 → 3.6.1 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore 6.4.0 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Annotations — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Annotations 6.4.0 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.ReDoc — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.ReDoc 6.4.0 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
Outdated: Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Swagger — Swashbuckle.AspNetCore.Swagger 6.4.0 → 10.2.3 available (referenced by Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure).
+ 6 more in this group — see findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×15

XML-doc coverage: Inflow.Bootstrapper src/Bootstrapper/Inflow.Bootstrapper/Inflow.Bootstrapper.csproj — Inflow.Bootstrapper: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/7).
XML-doc coverage: Inflow.Modules.Users.Api src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Api/Inflow.Modules.Users.Api.csproj — Inflow.Modules.Users.Api: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/15).
XML-doc coverage: Inflow.Modules.Users.Core src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core.csproj — Inflow.Modules.Users.Core: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/92).
XML-doc coverage: Inflow.Modules.Customers.Api src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Api/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Api.csproj — Inflow.Modules.Customers.Api: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/12).
XML-doc coverage: Inflow.Modules.Payments.Api src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Api/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Api.csproj — Inflow.Modules.Payments.Api: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/16).
XML-doc coverage: Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Api src/Modules/Wallets/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Api/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Api.csproj — Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Api: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/13).
XML-doc coverage: Inflow.Shared.Abstractions src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Abstractions/Inflow.Shared.Abstractions.csproj — Inflow.Shared.Abstractions: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/182).
XML-doc coverage: Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure/Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure.csproj — Inflow.Shared.Infrastructure: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/364).
XML-doc coverage: Inflow.Modules.Saga.Api src/Modules/Saga/Inflow.Modules.Saga.Api/Inflow.Modules.Saga.Api.csproj — Inflow.Modules.Saga.Api: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/24).
XML-doc coverage: Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core.csproj — Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/127).
XML-doc coverage: Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Core src/Modules/Wallets/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Core/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Core.csproj — Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Core: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/109).
XML-doc coverage: Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Infrastructure src/Modules/Wallets/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Infrastructure/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Infrastructure.csproj — Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Infrastructure: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/38).
XML-doc coverage: Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Application src/Modules/Wallets/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Application/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Application.csproj — Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Application: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/56).
XML-doc coverage: Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core.csproj — Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/202).
XML-doc coverage: Inflow.Modules.Payments.Shared src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Shared/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Shared.csproj — Inflow.Modules.Payments.Shared: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/30).

D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×1

Mock framework: NSubstitute — Inflow.Shared.Tests references NSubstitute.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · git history depth insufficient · ×1

git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — install a full clone for reliable trend signal.

D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1

No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

D35 · Change Coupling · git history depth insufficient · ×1

git history depth insufficient — git history depth insufficient — a full clone gives reliable change-coupling.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .	2	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .	0	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet list Inflow.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json	25	artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.	0	—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.	0	—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities	trivy	—	trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.	0	—
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing	provenance	—	provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities	osv-scanner	—	osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—

Run 019fc8c4-e6b2-7cb4-8dac-9317baa843e6 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 35 field(s) across 4 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 18 field(s)

UserDto.Email src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/Clients/DTO/UserDto.cs:8
CreateCustomer.Email src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/Commands/CreateCustomer.cs:5
CustomerDto.Email src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/DTO/CustomerDto.cs:9
Customer.Email src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/Domain/Entities/Customer.cs:11
SignedUp.Email src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/Events/External/SignedUp.cs:8
UserNotFoundException.Email src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/Exceptions/UserNotFoundException.cs:7
SignIn.Email src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/Commands/SignIn.cs:7
SignUp.Email src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/Commands/SignUp.cs:7
UserDto.Email src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/DTO/UserDto.cs:8
User.Email src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/Entities/User.cs:9
SignedUp.Email src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/Events/SignedUp.cs:6
InvalidEmailException.Email src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/Exceptions/InvalidEmailException.cs:7
UserNotFoundException.Email src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/Exceptions/UserNotFoundException.cs:8
BrowseUsers.Email src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/Queries/BrowseUsers.cs:8
GetUserByEmail.Email src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/Queries/GetUserByEmail.cs:8
RegistrationOptions.InvalidEmailProviders src/Modules/Users/Inflow.Modules.Users.Core/RegistrationOptions.cs:8
JsonWebToken.Email src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Abstractions/Auth/JsonWebToken.cs:12
InvalidEmailException.Email src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Abstractions/Kernel/Exceptions/InvalidEmailException.cs:7

Name — 9 field(s)

CompleteCustomer.FullName src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/Commands/CompleteCustomer.cs:6
CustomerDto.FullName src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/DTO/CustomerDto.cs:11
Customer.FullName src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/Domain/Entities/Customer.cs:13
CustomerCompleted.FullName src/Modules/Customers/Inflow.Modules.Customers.Core/Events/CustomerCompleted.cs:6
CustomerCompleted.FullName src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core/Deposits/Events/External/CustomerCompleted.cs:6
Customer.FullName src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Shared/Entities/Customer.cs:11
CustomerCompleted.FullName src/Modules/Wallets/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Application/Owners/Events/External/CustomerCompleted.cs:8
IndividualOwner.FullName src/Modules/Wallets/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Core/Owners/Entities/IndividualOwner.cs:10
InvalidFullNameException.FullName src/Shared/Inflow.Shared.Abstractions/Kernel/Exceptions/InvalidFullNameException.cs:7

Financial (card / IBAN) — 6 field(s)

DepositAccountDto.Iban src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core/Deposits/DTO/DepositAccountDto.cs:10
DepositAccount.Iban src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core/Deposits/Domain/Entities/DepositAccount.cs:15
AddWithdrawalAccount.Iban src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core/Withdrawals/Commands/AddWithdrawalAccount.cs:6
WithdrawalAccountDto.Iban src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core/Withdrawals/DTO/WithdrawalAccountDto.cs:10
WithdrawalAccount.Iban src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Core/Withdrawals/Domain/Entities/WithdrawalAccount.cs:15
InvalidIbanException.Iban src/Modules/Payments/Inflow.Modules.Payments.Shared/Exceptions/InvalidIbanException.cs:7

Government ID (SSN / passport / tax) — 2 field(s)

CorporateOwner.TaxId src/Modules/Wallets/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Core/Owners/Entities/CorporateOwner.cs:9
InvalidTaxIdException.TaxId src/Modules/Wallets/Inflow.Modules.Wallets.Core/Owners/Exceptions/InvalidTaxIdException.cs:7

Devmentors/Inflow

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Architecture — module dependency matrix

At a glance — Code Health · 60% · Adequate · gated by X4, X5

At a glance — Architecture · 78% · Strong

At a glance — Maturity · 59% · Adequate · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 19% · Critical · gated by D8, P1, P3, P5, P7, P9

At a glance — Security · 72% · Adequate · gated by D30

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Downloadable artifacts