Public report — BambooErp, published 29 Jun 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdog 29-06-2026 @ 21:36 UTC Public

Small · 3,531 LoC · 21 projects · rebuild ~0.1 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (8%)

Build did not compile — scores are provisional
The analysed solution did not compile (1 build error(s)). Dimensions that depend on the compiler — complexity, duplication, cohesion, dead code, API surface — ran on incomplete models, so the scores below are provisional. Fix the build, then re-run for a reliable grade. First errors: CS0246: The type or namespace name 'DynamicGenericController' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

67/69dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
51findings with an exact file:lineof 207 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
69/104dimensions across the health lenses3531 LoC · 21 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

dinhduongha/BambooErp carries serious risk (25%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.

It is strongest in Architecture (100%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.

Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.

The area that most needs attention is Readiness (8%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Code Health (30%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO… (DR & Backup); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).

For scale: Small (~3,531 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 8% · 46% weightCode Health 30% · 25% weightAccessibility 33% · 14% weightMaturity 50% · 8% weightSecurity 73% · 4% weightArchitecture 100% · 2% weight

Raise Readiness 8 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 25 → ~40.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 12%Plumbing 62%Tests 26%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €1,600–€7,900
Cost to rebuild€1,600–€7,900 (0.1 person-years (27–83 h), ~1 engineer)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.7× (at 25% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeSmall · 54% boilerplate · 29% straight-line · 17% branching logic
Dead frontend code~2855 LoC unreachable (59 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)

This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€4,700 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 8% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — microservices, transaction-script/CRUD × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 2 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with SampleAppService_Tests.cs (2).
+11.0 pts · Low effort · Test Quality
2
Resolve the 2 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with SampleManager_Tests.cs, SampleRepository_Tests.cs.
+11.0 pts · Low effort · Test Quality
3
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with db-scaffold.sh.
+11.0 pts · Low effort · Secret Scanning

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Highest-leverage move: fix the build · Critical · Leverage
The solution doesn't compile, so every Roslyn-derived dimension (complexity, duplication, cohesion, dead code, API surface) ran on incomplete models and is PROVISIONAL. Fixing the build is the single change that makes the rest of the report trustworthy — do it first. The compiler reported: CS0246: The type or namespace name 'DynamicGenericController' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?).
Evidence: D18 build: The compiler reported: CS0246: The type or namespace name 'DynamicGenericController' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?).
→ Fix the build, then re-run for a reliable grade.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 8%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Small, ~0.1 person-years rebuild (3,531 LoC) · weakest lens: Readiness 8%
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Improving trajectory · Info · Trajectory
The headline is improving steadily (+10.5 pts/run over 5 runs) — whatever you're doing is working; keep the gate.
Evidence: trajectory: +10.5 pts/run over 5 runs

Trajectory

Where this codebase is heading — something a one-shot snapshot cannot show. 25, unchanged across 5 runs.

025507510029 Junnow
OverallCode HealthArchitectureMaturityReadinessSecurityAccessibility

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

arch Blazor.Client Blazor.Client ctx:Admin.HttpApi.Client (services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Client) Admin.HttpApi.Client (services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Client) Client) Blazor.Client->ctx:Admin.HttpApi.Client (services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Client) ctx:Shared.Common Shared.Common Common Blazor.Client->ctx:Shared.Common BlazorServer BlazorServer BlazorServer->ctx:Admin.HttpApi.Client (services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Client) BlazorServer->ctx:Shared.Common ctx:Admin Admin Application · Domain ctx:Admin.Application.Contracts (services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Application.Contracts) Admin.Application.Contracts (services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Application.Contracts) Contracts) ctx:Admin->ctx:Admin.Application.Contracts (services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Application.Contracts) ctx:Admin.EntityFrameworkCore Admin.EntityFrameworkCore EntityFrameworkCore ctx:Admin.EntityFrameworkCore->ctx:Admin ctx:Admin.HttpApi Admin.HttpApi Host · HttpApi ctx:Admin.HttpApi->ctx:Admin ctx:Admin.HttpApi->ctx:Admin.Application.Contracts (services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Application.Contracts) ctx:Admin.HttpApi->ctx:Admin.EntityFrameworkCore ctx:AdminExtensions AdminExtensions AdminExtensions ctx:Admin.HttpApi->ctx:AdminExtensions ctx:Admin.HttpApi.Client (services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Client)->ctx:Admin.Application.Contracts (services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Application.Contracts) ctx:Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle Bundle ctx:Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle->ctx:Admin ctx:Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle->ctx:Admin.EntityFrameworkCore ctx:Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle->ctx:Admin.HttpApi ctx:Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle->ctx:AdminExtensions ctx:AuthExtensions AuthExtensions AuthExtensions ctx:Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle->ctx:AuthExtensions ctx:AdminExtensions->ctx:Admin ctx:AuthExtensions->ctx:Admin ctx:AuthExtensions->ctx:Admin.Application.Contracts (services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Application.Contracts) ctx:Core Core Application · Domain · Web ctx:Core.Application Core.Application Contracts ctx:Core->ctx:Core.Application ctx:Core.Blazor.Server Core.Blazor.Server Host ctx:Core.Blazor.Server->ctx:Core ctx:Core.EntityFrameworkCore Core.EntityFrameworkCore EntityFrameworkCore ctx:Core.Blazor.Server->ctx:Core.EntityFrameworkCore ctx:Core.HttpApi Core.HttpApi Client · Host · HttpApi ctx:Core.Blazor.Server->ctx:Core.HttpApi ctx:Core.EntityFrameworkCore->ctx:Core ctx:Core.HttpApi->ctx:Core ctx:Core.HttpApi->ctx:Core.Application ctx:Core.HttpApi->ctx:Core.EntityFrameworkCore __more__ +24 more contexts

At a glance — Code Health · 30% · Weak · gated by D18, R1, R7, X1

At a glance — Architecture · 100% · Exemplary

At a glance — Maturity · 50% · Weak · gated by M2

At a glance — Readiness · 8% · Critical · gated by D10, D14, R4, R6, R8, P1, P3, P5, P7

At a glance — Security · 73% · Adequate · gated by D28

At a glance — Accessibility · 33% · Weak · gated by AC1, AC4

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration19High / Critical
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components14High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures5High / Critical

Roadmap

First, establish a continuous integration pipeline to automatically build and test every change. Next, implement disaster recovery by codifying backups and documenting recovery procedures. Then, expand test coverage to include all production modules. After that, configure linting and type checking in the build process. Finally, clean up dependencies by removing unused packages and correctly categorizing development tools.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 2 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with SampleAppService_Tests.cs (2).+11.0 ptsLowTest Quality
Resolve the 2 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with SampleManager_Tests.cs, SampleRepository_Tests.cs.+11.0 ptsLowTest Quality
Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with db-scaffold.sh.+11.0 ptsLowSecret Scanning
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.+16.4 ptsMediumCI/CD gates
Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.+16.4 ptsMediumDR & Backup
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).+16.4 ptsMediumTest Coverage
Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.+16.4 ptsMediumTooling
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.+16.1 ptsMediumDependency Hygiene

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 26 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 8% slop · 46% mixed · 46% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle/yarn.lock2.7SlopOSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: [GHSA redacted]
scripts/db-scaffold.sh3.0SlopSecret Scanning: Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential
dockerfiles/ApplicationAdmin.Dockerfile4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
dockerfiles/ApplicationCore.Dockerfile4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
dockerfiles/AuthServer.Dockerfile4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
dockerfiles/DbMigrator.Dockerfile4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
services/core/database/Dockerfile4.4MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
dockerfiles/Dockerfile.base6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
services/core/host/Bamboo.Core.HttpApi.Host/Dockerfile6.5MixedIaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002
shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Utils/Utils.cs6.7MixedExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
services/core/test/Bamboo.Core.Application.Tests/Samples/SampleAppService_Tests.cs7.0MixedTest Quality: No assertions (empty test): GetAsync
services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.DbMigrator/appsettings.json7.2MixedSecrets (history): Secret: generic-api-key
shared/common/Bamboo.Shared.Common/Guids/UuidV7Generator.cs7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (21 lines × 3)
shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Filter/Filter.cs7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (16 lines × 2)
services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Application.Contracts/Dtos/TenantMemberDto.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Utils/Utils.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Application.Contracts/Dtos/TenantMemberDto.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
shared/common/Bamboo.Shared.Common/Utils/Utils.cs8.2Near-cleanExplicit Debt: CommentedOutCode
shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Guids/UuidV7Generator.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (37 lines × 2)
shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/AdminDomainSharedModule.cs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (22 lines × 2)

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 67 of 69 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 69 dimensions across the health lenses
D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D12D13D14D15D17D18D20D21D22D26D28D29D30D31D33D35D38AC1AC2AC3AC4AC5AC6AC7AX1AX10AX3AX5AX6AX8C1C2C3GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P5P7P8R1R10R2R3R4R6R7R8R9S1X1X2X3X4X5

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 51 of 207 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.301✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.301✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019f1550-0a62-7ffc-92f5-7aff86c57386.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D16 Bus Factor — git history too condensed for a reliable signal — The history looks squashed or freshly imported, so per-file ownership reflects those commits rather than real maintenance. This dimension is reported as a low-confidence advisory and is not scored.
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — git history too condensed for a reliable signal — The history looks squashed or freshly imported, so per-file ownership reflects those commits rather than real maintenance. This dimension is reported as a low-confidence advisory and is not scored.
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations: 2 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
  • D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
  • D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (EF migrations, designer files, snapshots) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
  • D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency: API-surface coherence is an LLM judgement over a sample of the public surface — consistency of intent across the whole API is approximated, not exhaustively verified.
  • D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
  • AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
  • AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
  • AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
  • C3 Audit Trail: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — a working control configured outside the repository leaves no signal a static scan can credit.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P5 DR & Backup: Backup/restore and disaster-recovery readiness is judged from in-repo evidence — a config that exists is not a tested restore, so the absence of positive evidence is reported as "not evidenced", never scored as present.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D20, D21, D22, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 god class(es) detected.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md.

D4 · Code Duplication9.2 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.2 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

9 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×2shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Filter/Filter.cs:73
Duplicated block (37 lines × 2)shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Guids/UuidV7Generator.cs:65
Duplicated block (22 lines × 2)shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/AdminDomainSharedModule.cs:41
Duplicated block (21 lines × 3)shared/common/Bamboo.Shared.Common/Guids/UuidV7Generator.cs:91
Duplicated block (14 lines × 3)shared/common/Bamboo.Shared.Common/Extensions/Extensions.cs:38

+ 3 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

15 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 1 unstable depended-on project(s).

Layer violation: Domain → Application · ×4
Off the main sequence: Bamboo.Shared.Common · ×3
Unstable project Bamboo.Blazor.Client

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 5 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 test methods: 7 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

Tests co-located / outside the solution

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D10 · Test Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 4 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 7 tests.

No assertions (empty test): GetAsync · ×2services/core/test/Bamboo.Core.Application.Tests/Samples/SampleAppService_Tests.cs:18
No assertions: Method1Async · ×2services/core/test/Bamboo.Core.Domain.Tests/Samples/SampleManager_Tests.cs:17

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 No assertions (empty test) finding(s) in Test Quality — start with SampleAppService_Tests.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 No assertions finding(s) in Test Quality — start with SampleManager_Tests.cs, SampleRepository_Tests.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
  3. Enforce Test Quality in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

1 secret(s) detected.

Leaked secret: hardcoded-credentialscripts/db-scaffold.sh:12

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with db-scaffold.sh. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Enforce Secret Scanning in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D14 · License Compliance0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

129 of 198 packages use a banned license.

Banned license: Volo.Abp.Autofac · ×129

What to do

  1. Resolve the 129 Banned license finding(s) in License Compliance. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (129 issue-level).
  2. Enforce License Compliance in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

5 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 3531 LoC (0.2/KLoC) → score 9.5.

CommentedOutCode · ×5services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Application.Contracts/Dtos/TenantMemberDto.cs:24

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D18 · Solution Shape3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 3.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

21 projects, 4332 .cs files, 577048 hand-written lines of code (576273 production / 775 test), 63 inter-project edges (build failed).

Build failed
Monorepo: only 1 of 6 solutions was scored
Shell project: Bamboo.Core.Host.Shared · ×2services/core/host/Bamboo.Core.Host.Shared/Bamboo.Core.Host.Shared.csproj
Thin analysable surface across projects

What to do

  1. Resolve the 2 Shell project finding(s) in Solution Shape — start with Bamboo.Core.Host.Shared.csproj, Bamboo.Shared.Localization.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Build failed finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Monorepo finding(s) in Solution Shape. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D22 · Internal API Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the internal API surface is consistent and coherent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature over a sample of the public API surface (IsPackable or .Contracts types). Sampled, advisory; confidence discounted by model uncertainty.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 API inconsistencies across a 400-member sample of 88 exposed types.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d22_recommendation.md.

D26 · Project Cohesion10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0 of 9 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

11 finding(s): 0 critical, 11 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

Secret: generic-api-key · ×3services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.DbMigrator/appsettings.json:53detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with db-scaffold.sh (2), appsettings.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep --config auto across the repo; severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a 0-10 wide normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

semgrep found no security issues.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.

Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 5.4 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 vulnerable package(s): 2 critical, 3 high, 1 medium, 0 low.

High CVE: AutoMapper 14.0.0 · ×3detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Critical CVE: LiteDB 5.0.9 · ×2detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable
Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.30.1detected by dotnet list package --vulnerable

What to do

  1. Resolve the 3 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 2 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 Medium CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security7.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 7.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

19 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 5 medium, 7 low.

High IaC: DS-0002 · ×7dockerfiles/ApplicationAdmin.Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: DS-0001 · ×5dockerfiles/ApplicationAdmin.Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×7dockerfiles/ApplicationAdmin.Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 7 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2), ApplicationAdmin.Dockerfile, ApplicationCore.Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 7 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2), ApplicationAdmin.Dockerfile, ApplicationCore.Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 5 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with ApplicationAdmin.Dockerfile, ApplicationCore.Dockerfile, AuthServer.Dockerfile. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether JavaScript/npm dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) — the npm ecosystem's biggest risk.

Method: JS/npm CVE scan via trivy fs --scanners vuln over JS manifests (package.json/yarn.lock/pnpm-lock/bun.lockb); 0-10 tight normalizer. NotApplicable without JS manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d33_recommendation.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — npm and other lockfile ecosystems, parsed natively. Complements D33 (npm via trivy) and D30 (.NET via dotnet).

Method: npm/multi-ecosystem CVE scan via osv-scanner (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively: package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable without a JS lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.

Maturity: DocumentedVerifiedPrevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

8 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 2 medium, 5 low.

High CVE: [GHSA redacted]services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×2services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×5services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle/yarn.lockdetected by osv-scanner finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
  2. Resolve the 5 Low CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 2 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with yarn.lock (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AC1 · Text alternatives1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×24) — Index.cshtml:40, Index.cshtml:55, Index.cshtml:70, …

What to do

  • Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, and a captions <track> on video.
AC2 · Forms & labels4.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.

  • A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label. (×11) — Index.cshtml:113, Index.cshtml:128, Index.cshtml:143, …
  • This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×2) — Index.cshtml:23, Index.cshtml:63

What to do

  • Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
AC3 · Page structure4.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.

  • The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×2) — App.razor:2, App.razor:2
  • user-scalable=no/0 or a maximum-scale below 2 stops low-vision users zooming to 200%. Remove the zoom restriction from the viewport meta. (×2) — App.razor:6, App.razor:6
  • The lang value isn't a well-formed BCP-47 language tag (use e.g. "en" or "en-US", not "english"/"en_US"), so assistive tech may apply the wrong language. Use a valid language subtag. (×2) — App.razor:0, App.razor:0
  • A page with no <title> gives no name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Add a descriptive <title> in <head>. (×2) — App.razor:0, App.razor:0
  • A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). (×2) — Index.cshtml:103, Index.cshtml:224
  • Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×3) — Index.razor:13, Index.cshtml:98, SiWXSignIn.cshtml:170

What to do

  • Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.

  • An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×2) — App.razor:42, App.razor:42

What to do

  • Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
AC5 · ARIA correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.

AC6 · Visual & motion safety10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.

Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.

AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse wired into tests or CI — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.

Method: Repo config/CI scan: an a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) configured, and axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI, graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.

  • No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.

What to do

  • Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y (or vuejs-accessibility), assert with jest-axe / playwright-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX10 · Code composition10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

C1 · Data Protection6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

What to do

  • Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — [Authorize]/policies or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

C3 · Audit Trail7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether changes to sensitive data are recorded (who, what, when) for compliance + incident response.

Method: Roslyn scan: audit-trail mechanism graded (SaveChanges interceptor/immutable AuditLog/[Audited] strong; bare IAuditable/AddAuditing weak). Deterministic.

  • An audit mechanism is present, but the trail is not yet complete — missing: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent write-side hook), [Audited] per-entity coverage.

What to do

  • Back the audit convention with a structural mechanism: an EF SaveChanges interceptor (or equivalent) writing every sensitive change to an immutable audit log, and apply [Audited] to the entities that need a who-changed-what trail.
GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

  • A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×30) — BambooBlazorClientModule.cs:69, BambooBlazorModule.cs:199, BambooBlazorModule.cs:260, …

What to do

  • Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Add a README to the 9 of 9 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
  • No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
  • Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
M3 · Folder & project structure6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

  • Projects aren't grouped under a src/ folder — production and tooling code are mixed at the root.
  • Test projects aren't grouped under a tests/ folder — the test surface isn't separable from production code at a glance.

What to do

  • Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
  • Group test projects under tests/ (or test/, spec/) so the test surface is discoverable and CI can scope it.
M4 · Documentation accuracy9.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.

What to do

  • Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
P2 · Observability4.1 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • Only 1/26 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log).

What to do

  • Extend structured logging to the remaining service-like projects so the whole executable surface is diagnosable in production.
  • Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No static application security testing (CodeQL / security analyzers / codehealth) detected.

What to do

  • Add a SAST step (e.g. CodeQL) or a security analyzer package.
  • Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
P5 · DR & Backup0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether disaster recovery is planned and codified — backups, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees — from IaC + container manifests + docs, never the live cloud.

Method: Filesystem scan: disaster recovery, backup, geo-recovery, RTO/RPO, persistence guarantees from IaC, manifests, and docs. Exhaustive, deterministic, never a live environment.

  • A persistence guard (data volume / purge-protection) was found, but no backup, geo-recovery or RTO/RPO controls were evidenced — a volume that survives a container recreate is not a tested restore from catastrophic loss.

What to do

  • Codify backups + geo-recovery in IaC and document RTO/RPO and the restore procedure — a persistence guard alone is not disaster recovery.
P7 · Outbound HTTP resilience3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.

Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.

  • The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.

What to do

  • Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
P8 · Schema migrations6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage. Exhaustive per project, deterministic.

  • EF Core is used but neither migrations nor EnsureCreated were detected — confirm how the production schema is created and evolved.

What to do

  • Adopt EF migrations (dotnet ef migrations add + Migrate() on startup) as the explicit, versioned schema strategy — no migration mechanism was detected.
R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

  • 0 typed · 78 plain JS

What to do

  • Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
R10 · Code Duplication5.4 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).

Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.

  • mobile/react-native/src/screens/CreateUpdateTenant/CreateUpdateTenantScreen.js:51 · mobile/react-native/src/screens/CreateUpdateUser/CreateUpdateUserScreen.js:43 — CreateUpdateTenantScreen.js:51
  • mobile/react-native/src/screens/ChangePassword/ChangePasswordForm.js:103 · mobile/react-native/src/screens/ManageProfile/ManageProfileForm.js:134 — ChangePasswordForm.js:103
  • mobile/react-native/src/screens/CreateUpdateTenant/CreateUpdateTenantForm.js:107 · mobile/react-native/src/screens/CreateUpdateUser/CreateUpdateUserForm.js:211 — CreateUpdateTenantForm.js:107
  • mobile/react-native/src/screens/ChangePassword/ChangePasswordForm.js:66 · mobile/react-native/src/screens/ChangePassword/ChangePasswordForm.js:95 · mobile/react-native/src/screens/CreateUpdateTenant/CreateUpdateTenantForm.js:111 · mobile/react-native/src/screens/CreateUpdateUser/CreateUpdateUserForm.js:215 — ChangePasswordForm.js:66
  • mobile/react-native/src/screens/CreateUpdateUser/CreateUpdateUserForm.js:2 · mobile/react-native/src/screens/Login/LoginScreen.js:1 — CreateUpdateUserForm.js:2
  • mobile/react-native/src/screens/CreateUpdateUser/CreateUpdateUserForm.js:125 · mobile/react-native/src/screens/CreateUpdateUser/CreateUpdateUserForm.js:177 — CreateUpdateUserForm.js:125
  • mobile/react-native/src/screens/ChangePassword/ChangePasswordScreen.js:19 · mobile/react-native/src/screens/ManageProfile/ManageProfileScreen.js:36 — ChangePasswordScreen.js:19
  • mobile/react-native/src/screens/CreateUpdateTenant/CreateUpdateTenantForm.js:131 · mobile/react-native/src/screens/CreateUpdateUser/CreateUpdateUserForm.js:259 — CreateUpdateTenantForm.js:131

What to do

  • Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many components/modules exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

  • No test imports this module directly or transitively — its behavior is unverified. (×8) — CreateUpdateUserForm.js, LoginScreen.js, ManageProfileForm.js, …

What to do

  • Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
R6 · Tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

  • test ✗ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗

What to do

  • Add the missing tooling (eslint, tsc) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
R7 · Dead Code0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

  • 11 file(s) (~404 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package.
  • 1 file(s) (~11 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — Bamboo.BlazorServer
  • 2 file(s) (~14 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package. — Bamboo.Web
  • Unreachable from the 0 application, 1 tooling and 0 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
  • no import path from any entry point (0 application, 1 tooling, 0 test roots considered) (×4) — CreateUpdateUserForm.js, LoginScreen.js, ManageProfileForm.js, …

What to do

  • Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
R8 · Dependency Hygiene1.5 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

  • Declared in apps/Bamboo.BlazorServer/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×2)
  • Declared in apps/Bamboo.Web/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing.

What to do

  • Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

S1 · Web-Security Posture8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. Deterministic.

  • No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)

What to do

  • Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
X1 · Async correctness1.3 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

  • Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Make the caller `async` and `await` instead. (×18) — Filter.cs:22, Filter.cs:30, Filter.cs:20, …

What to do

  • Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
X2 · Cancellation propagation4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

  • Only 0/4 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so requests can't be cancelled cleanly under load or on client disconnect. In Blazor Server circuits and other short-write hosts, omitting it can be an accepted convention — judge against your hosting model.
  • No CancellationToken parameter — work can't be cancelled cleanly on disconnect/shutdown. (×4) — BambooMenuContributor.cs:24, Program.cs:8, BambooMenuContributor.cs:24, …

What to do

  • Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.

X5 · Nullable reference types7.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.

Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.

  • 2/3 projects enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable>. NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
  • ~0.1 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.

What to do

  • Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.

WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed

Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).

DimensionWCAG 2.2 A/AA criteriaCoverage
AC1 · Text alternatives1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5Partial signal
AC2 · Forms & labels1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC3 · Page structure1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2Partial signal
AC4 · Keyboard semantics2.1.1, 2.4.3Partial signal
AC5 · ARIA correctness4.1.2Partial signal
AC6 · Visual & motion safety1.4.3, 2.4.7Partial — literal CSS only
AC7 · A11y enforcementenforcement — no page criterionEnforcement posture (process)

Not statically assessed — these 40 Level A/AA criteria need runtime or manual evaluation (WCAG-EM): 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.12, 1.4.13, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.4.11, 2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.7, 2.5.8, 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 3.2.6, 3.3.1, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.3.7, 3.3.8, 4.1.3.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health30%Weak — gated by D18, R1, R7, X1Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity50%Weak — gated by M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness8%Critical — gated by D10, D14, R4, R6, R8, P1, P3, P5, P7Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security73%Adequate — gated by D28Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Accessibility33%Weak — gated by AC1, AC4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 36 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a transaction-script/CRUD architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D16 Bus Factor — history too condensed for a reliable bus-factor signal
  • D19 Documentation Quality — LLM evaluation failed
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
  • D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D27 Navigability — symbol resolution incomplete — navigability not assessed
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — history too condensed to judge knowledge freshness
  • D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not run — only 1/3 markers (a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer)
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — only 1/3 markers (a message-bus package)
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
  • P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — run tests with `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` (or in CI) to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
  • R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
  • R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a yarn lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — no data
  • X7 Silent fallback defaults — no data

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 152 finding(s)
D14 · License Compliance · Banned license · ×129
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.Autofac — Volo.Abp.Autofac 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.Caching.StackExchangeRedis — Volo.Abp.Caching.StackExchangeRedis 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.DistributedLocking — Volo.Abp.DistributedLocking 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.AspNetCore.Mvc.Client — Volo.Abp.AspNetCore.Mvc.Client 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.AspNetCore.Authentication.OpenIdConnect — Volo.Abp.AspNetCore.Authentication.OpenIdConnect 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.Http.Client.Web — Volo.Abp.Http.Client.Web 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.AspNetCore.Serilog — Volo.Abp.AspNetCore.Serilog 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.Http.Client.IdentityModel.Web — Volo.Abp.Http.Client.IdentityModel.Web 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.Swashbuckle — Volo.Abp.Swashbuckle 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.Identity.Web — Volo.Abp.Identity.Web 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.TenantManagement.Web — Volo.Abp.TenantManagement.Web 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.SettingManagement.Web — Volo.Abp.SettingManagement.Web 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.AspNetCore.Components.Server.MudBlazorBasicTheme — Volo.Abp.AspNetCore.Components.Server.MudBlazorBasicTheme 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.Identity.Blazor.MudBlazor.Server — Volo.Abp.Identity.Blazor.MudBlazor.Server 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.TenantManagement.Blazor.MudBlazor.Server — Volo.Abp.TenantManagement.Blazor.MudBlazor.Server 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.SettingManagement.Blazor.MudBlazor.Server — Volo.Abp.SettingManagement.Blazor.MudBlazor.Server 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.AspNetCore.Mvc.UI.Bundling — Volo.Abp.AspNetCore.Mvc.UI.Bundling 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.MudBlazorBasicTheme.Bundling — Volo.Abp.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.MudBlazorBasicTheme.Bundling 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.MudBlazorBasicTheme — Volo.Abp.AspNetCore.Components.WebAssembly.MudBlazorBasicTheme 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.Autofac.WebAssembly — Volo.Abp.Autofac.WebAssembly 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.Identity.Blazor.MudBlazor.WebAssembly — Volo.Abp.Identity.Blazor.MudBlazor.WebAssembly 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.TenantManagement.Blazor.MudBlazor.WebAssembly — Volo.Abp.TenantManagement.Blazor.MudBlazor.WebAssembly 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.SettingManagement.Blazor.MudBlazor.WebAssembly — Volo.Abp.SettingManagement.Blazor.MudBlazor.WebAssembly 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.Http.Client — Volo.Abp.Http.Client 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • Banned license: Volo.Abp.Validation — Volo.Abp.Validation 10.4.0-rc.1 is licensed LGPL-3.0-only (banned by policy).
  • + 104 more in this group — see findings.md.
D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×7
  • High IaC: DS-0002 dockerfiles/ApplicationAdmin.Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 dockerfiles/ApplicationCore.Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 dockerfiles/AuthServer.Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 dockerfiles/DbMigrator.Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 dockerfiles/Dockerfile.base — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 services/core/database/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
  • High IaC: DS-0002 services/core/host/Bamboo.Core.HttpApi.Host/Dockerfile — Image user should not be 'root'
D5 · Coupling · Layer violation · ×4
  • Layer violation: Domain → Application — Bamboo.Admin.Domain (Domain) references Bamboo.Admin.Application.Contracts (services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Application.Contracts) (Application) — dependencies must point inward (Web → Application → Domain; Infrastructure implements inner interfaces, nothing depends outward on it).
  • Layer violation: Domain → Application — Bamboo.Core.Blazor (Domain) references Bamboo.Core.Application.Contracts (Application) — dependencies must point inward (Web → Application → Domain; Infrastructure implements inner interfaces, nothing depends outward on it).
  • Layer violation: Domain → Application — Bamboo.Core.HttpApi (Domain) references Bamboo.Core.Application.Contracts (Application) — dependencies must point inward (Web → Application → Domain; Infrastructure implements inner interfaces, nothing depends outward on it).
  • Layer violation: Domain → Application — Bamboo.Core.HttpApi.Client (Domain) references Bamboo.Core.Application.Contracts (Application) — dependencies must point inward (Web → Application → Domain; Infrastructure implements inner interfaces, nothing depends outward on it).
D28 · Secrets (history) · Secret · ×3
  • Secret: generic-api-key services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.DbMigrator/appsettings.json:53 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key scripts/db-scaffold.sh:12 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
  • Secret: generic-api-key scripts/db-scaffold.sh:18 — matched rule 'generic-api-key'
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×3
  • High CVE: AutoMapper 14.0.0 — AutoMapper 14.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: Snappier 1.0.0 — Snappier 1.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.11 — SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.11 (transitive) has a High advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D10 · Test Quality · No assertions (empty test) · ×2
  • No assertions (empty test): GetAsync services/core/test/Bamboo.Core.Application.Tests/Samples/SampleAppService_Tests.cs:18 — Test method has an empty body — it asserts nothing and exercises no code.
  • No assertions (empty test): GetAuthorizedAsync services/core/test/Bamboo.Core.Application.Tests/Samples/SampleAppService_Tests.cs:25 — Test method has an empty body — it asserts nothing and exercises no code.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×2
  • Critical CVE: LiteDB 5.0.9 — LiteDB 5.0.9 (transitive) has a Critical advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
  • Critical CVE: Microsoft.AspNetCore.DataProtection 10.0.2 — Microsoft.AspNetCore.DataProtection 10.0.2 (transitive) has a Critical advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D13 · Secret Scanning · Leaked secret · ×1
  • Leaked secret: hardcoded-credential scripts/db-scaffold.sh:12 — hardcoded-credential detected.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×1
  • High CVE: [GHSA redacted] services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle/yarn.lock — lodash: [GHSA redacted]
Warning — 33 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt · CommentedOutCode · ×5
  • CommentedOutCode services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Application.Contracts/Dtos/TenantMemberDto.cs:24 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Utils/Utils.cs:50 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Application.Contracts/Dtos/TenantMemberDto.cs:24 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Utils/Utils.cs:50 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
  • CommentedOutCode shared/common/Bamboo.Shared.Common/Utils/Utils.cs:36 — 3 consecutive commented-code lines
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×5
  • Medium IaC: DS-0001 dockerfiles/ApplicationAdmin.Dockerfile — ':latest' tag used
  • Medium IaC: DS-0001 dockerfiles/ApplicationCore.Dockerfile — ':latest' tag used
  • Medium IaC: DS-0001 dockerfiles/AuthServer.Dockerfile — ':latest' tag used
  • Medium IaC: DS-0001 dockerfiles/DbMigrator.Dockerfile — ':latest' tag used
  • Medium IaC: DS-0001 services/core/database/Dockerfile — ':latest' tag used
D5 · Coupling · Off the main sequence · ×3
  • Off the main sequence: Bamboo.Shared.Common — Bamboo.Shared.Common: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared(netstandard2.0) — Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared(netstandard2.0): abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
  • Off the main sequence: Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared(netstandard2.0) — Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared(netstandard2.0): abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and heavily depended-on, so it's rigid to change.
D10 · Test Quality · No assertions · ×2
  • No assertions: Method1Async services/core/test/Bamboo.Core.Domain.Tests/Samples/SampleManager_Tests.cs:17 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: Method1Async services/core/test/Bamboo.Core.TestBase/Samples/SampleRepository_Tests.cs:21 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×2
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle/yarn.lock — lodash: [GHSA redacted]
  • Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle/yarn.lock — lodash: [GHSA redacted]
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Filter/Filter.cs:73 — shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Filter/Filter.cs:73-88 | services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Filter/Filter.cs:73-88
  • Duplicated block (16 lines × 2) apps/Bamboo.Blazor.Client/Menus/BambooMenuContributor.cs:50 — apps/Bamboo.Blazor.Client/Menus/BambooMenuContributor.cs:50-65 | apps/Bamboo.BlazorServer/Menus/BambooMenuContributor.cs:50-65
D18 · Solution Shape · Build failed · ×1
  • Build failed — The target solution did not build cleanly (errors: 1), which caps Solution Shape at 3/10 — the most basic shape signal is that it compiles. First errors: CS0246: The type or namespace name 'DynamicGenericController' could not be found (are you missing a using directive or an assembly reference?).
D18 · Solution Shape · Monorepo · ×1
  • Monorepo: only 1 of 6 solutions was scored — This repository contains 6 .NET solutions, but a scan analyzes ONE. Every score, lens, and finding here reflects only `services/core/Bamboo.Core.slnx` — the other 5 (`apps/Bamboo.Web.Blazor.sln`, `apps/Bamboo.Web.BlazorServer.sln`, `apps/Bamboo.Web.MVC.sln`, `mobile/maui/Bamboo.App.sln`, `services/admin/Bamboo.Admin.slnx`) were not analyzed and are not represented in the headline. To cover them, scan each solution as its own target and group them in a Solution or Product for a portfolio roll-up. If a secondary solution is an archived or vendored tree, declare it — `.gitattributes` (`path/** linguist-vendored`) or `.editorconfig` (`[path/**] generated_code = true`) — to exclude it from discovery the same way generated code is.
D19 · Documentation Quality · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.findings[1].docPath | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1178.
D24 · Comment Value · LLM evaluation failed · ×1
  • LLM evaluation failed — JSON parse error: Expected end of string, but instead reached end of data. Path: $.notable[4].comment | LineNumber: 0 | BytePositionInLine: 1008.
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×1
  • Medium CVE: SharpCompress 0.30.1 — SharpCompress 0.30.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 3 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (37 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (37 lines × 2) shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Guids/UuidV7Generator.cs:65 — shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Guids/UuidV7Generator.cs:65-101 | services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Guids/UuidV7Generator.cs:65-101
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/AdminDomainSharedModule.cs:41 — shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/AdminDomainSharedModule.cs:41-62 | services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/AdminDomainSharedModule.cs:41-62
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (21 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (21 lines × 3) shared/common/Bamboo.Shared.Common/Guids/UuidV7Generator.cs:91 — shared/common/Bamboo.Shared.Common/Guids/UuidV7Generator.cs:91-110 | shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Guids/UuidV7Generator.cs:91-111 | services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Guids/UuidV7Generator.cs:91-111
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (14 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (14 lines × 3) shared/common/Bamboo.Shared.Common/Extensions/Extensions.cs:38 — shared/common/Bamboo.Shared.Common/Extensions/Extensions.cs:38-51 | shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Extensions/Extensions.cs:38-51 | services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Extensions/Extensions.cs:38-51
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) shared/common/Bamboo.Shared.Common/Guids/UuidV7Generator.cs:45 — shared/common/Bamboo.Shared.Common/Guids/UuidV7Generator.cs:45-56 | shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Guids/UuidV7Generator.cs:45-56 | services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Guids/UuidV7Generator.cs:45-56
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Filter/Filter.cs:91 — shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Filter/Filter.cs:91-102 | services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Filter/Filter.cs:91-102
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Utils/Utils.cs:63 — shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Utils/Utils.cs:63-71 | services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Domain.Shared/Utils/Utils.cs:63-71
D5 · Coupling · Unstable project Bamboo.Blazor.Client · ×1
  • Unstable project Bamboo.Blazor.Client — Bamboo.Blazor.Client has instability 1.00 with 0 dependents.
D8 · Code Coverage · Coverage not measured · ×1
  • Coverage not measured — test suite did not build — Coverage NOT MEASURED: the repo's own test suite did not build (a C#/MSBuild compiler error in the test code), so no coverage could be collected. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect. Fix the test build, or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, and real coverage will be measured.
Recommendation — 21 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×7
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 dockerfiles/ApplicationAdmin.Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 dockerfiles/ApplicationCore.Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 dockerfiles/AuthServer.Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 dockerfiles/DbMigrator.Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 dockerfiles/Dockerfile.base — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 services/core/database/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
  • Low IaC: DS-0026 services/core/host/Bamboo.Core.HttpApi.Host/Dockerfile — No HEALTHCHECK defined
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×5
  • Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle/yarn.lock — sweetalert2: [GHSA redacted]
  • Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle/yarn.lock — sweetalert2: [GHSA redacted]
  • Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle/yarn.lock — sweetalert2: [GHSA redacted]
  • Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle/yarn.lock — sweetalert2: [GHSA redacted]
  • Low CVE: [GHSA redacted] services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.HttpApi.Host.Bundle/yarn.lock — sweetalert2: [GHSA redacted]
D18 · Solution Shape · Shell project · ×2
  • Shell project: Bamboo.Core.Host.Shared services/core/host/Bamboo.Core.Host.Shared/Bamboo.Core.Host.Shared.csproj — `Bamboo.Core.Host.Shared` contributes only 5 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
  • Shell project: Bamboo.Shared.Localization shared/common/Bamboo.Shared.Localization/Bamboo.Shared.Localization.csproj — `Bamboo.Shared.Localization` contributes only 0 significant line(s) — an empty/placeholder project is structural noise. Remove it or fold its contents into a real project.
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test projects found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D16 · Bus Factor · history too condensed for a reliable bus-factor signal · ×1
  • history too condensed for a reliable bus-factor signal — Only 221 commits cover 2313 analysed files, and nearly all concentrate to one author — the history looks squashed/imported, so per-file ownership reflects those commits, not real day-to-day maintenance. The bus-factor signal is unreliable for this repo and is not scored.
D18 · Solution Shape · Thin analysable surface across projects · ×1
  • Thin analysable surface across projects — 5 project(s) carry only a thin slice of real code (e.g. `Bamboo.Core.HttpApi.Client` with 22 significant line(s)). The mean analysable-surface weight is 81 %, lowering Solution Shape by about 1.5 point(s). Consolidate thin projects or grow them into substantial, well-scoped assemblies.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling · Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
  • Bounded contexts not declared — At 3531 LoC across 27 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.
D28 · Secrets (history) · Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
  • Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · history too condensed to judge knowledge freshness · ×1
  • history too condensed to judge knowledge freshness — Only 221 commits cover 2313 analysed files, so per-file recency reflects those few broad commits, not real day-to-day maintenance. The freshness signal is unreliable for this repo and is not scored.
Info — 1 finding(s)
D9 · Test Distribution · Tests co-located / outside the solution · ×1
  • Tests co-located / outside the solution — 7 test method(s) were found on disk (co-located in feature projects, or outside the analyzed solution) rather than in dedicated test projects, so the unit/integration/E2E pyramid can't be classified — they're counted as one undifferentiated suite.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaksgitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .11artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrepsemgrep --config auto --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .0
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnetdotnet list services/core/Bamboo.Core.slnx package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json6artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivytrivy config --format json --quiet .19artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrepsemgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.0
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivytrivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update0
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signingprovenanceprovenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.0
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosuredisclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scannerosv-scanner --format json --recursive .8artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json

Run 019f1550-0a62-7ffc-92f5-7aff86c57386 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 2 field(s) across 1 category, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.

Email — 2 field(s)
  • MemberDto.Email services/admin/src/Bamboo.Admin.Application.Contracts/Dtos/TenantMemberDto.cs:42
  • MemberDto.Email shared/admin/Bamboo.Admin.Application.Contracts/Dtos/TenantMemberDto.cs:42

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md