Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
discoproject/disco carries serious gaps (37%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Event Sourcing (100%) — its event log is trustworthy to replay. Architecture (99%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (27%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Event-Driven (39%) is the next concern — services couple through their messages, so they can't evolve or deploy independently.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage); Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack (CI/CD gates).
For scale: Small (~19,795 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Event Sourcing foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
65%
Adequate · gated by R1
Architecture
99% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
43%
Weak · gated by D34, M2
Readiness
27%
Weak · gated by R4, P3
Security
66%
Adequate · gated by D29
Event-Driven
39%
Weak · gated by ED1
Event Sourcing
100% ★
Exemplary
Accessibility
47%
Weak · gated by AC3
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 27% · 45% weightEvent-Driven 39% · 25% weightMaturity 43% · 14% weightAccessibility 47% · 8% weightCode Health 65% · 4% weightSecurity 66% · 2% weightArchitecture 99% · 1% weightEvent Sourcing 100% · 1% weight
Raise Readiness 27 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 37 → ~46.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (7+)
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_6 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_1 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
- D31 · Medium IaC: CKV2_DOCKER_17 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
- R10 · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2 locations) master/www/js/json-noaugmenting.js
- R4 · Test Coverage
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €6,300–€32,000
| Cost to rebuild | €6,300–€32,000 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 37% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€19,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 27% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: dialyzer or elvis — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
2
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
3
Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack, and gate merges on it.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 27%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: dialyzer or elvis — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
At a glance — Security
At a glance — Event-Driven
At a glance — Event Sourcing
At a glance — Accessibility
The Good
The Ugly
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2021 — Injection | 15 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 14 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, integrate a static analysis tool like Semgrep into the CI pipeline to automatically fail builds containing security regressions. Next, expand test coverage by adding tests for all unreached production modules, then enforce these tests as a mandatory gate for all merges. Finally, implement draft releases or manual dispatch gates to prevent bad builds from reaching users, and ensure every release is stamped with a version number for traceability.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: dialyzer or elvis — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +9.0 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +9.0 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack, and gate merges on it. | +8.5 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it. | +8.5 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable. | +8.5 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with ddfs_gc_main.erl, discozip.erl, job_coordinator.erl. | +2.7 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. | +2.0 pts | Low | Knowledge Freshness |
| Remove synchronous peer round-trips (gen_server:call / hand-rolled receive) and blocking sleeps from OTP message handlers — cast a follow-up or resolve state locally, so processes stay temporally decoupled and deadlock-free. | +3.7 pts | Medium | Handler temporal coupling |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| contrib/docker/Dockerfile | 0.0 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: DS-0002 |
| lib/disco/util.py | 5.1 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: eval-detected |
| ext/disco.c | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: use-after-free |
| lib/clx/settings.py | 5.8 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: exec-detected |
| lib/disco/dPickle.py | 6.3 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: marshal-usage |
| lib/disco/cli.py | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: eval-detected |
| lib/disco/worker/classic/func.py | 7.2 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): High: eval-detected |
| master/src/discozip.erl | 7.8 | Mixed | God Classes: TooManyMethods: discozip |
| master/src/ddfs/ddfs_gc_main.erl | 7.8 | Mixed | God Classes: TooManyMethods: ddfs_gc_main |
| master/src/job_coordinator.erl | 7.8 | Mixed | God Classes: TooManyMethods: job_coordinator |
| master/src/ddfs/ddfs_tag.erl | 7.8 | Mixed | God Classes: TooManyMethods: ddfs_tag |
| examples/util/wiki_reader.py | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: insecure-hash-algorithm-md5 |
| examples/util/xml_reader.py | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: use-defused-xml |
| lib/disco/compat.py | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: insecure-hash-algorithm-md5 |
| lib/disco/core.py | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: marshal-usage |
| master/src/disco_server.erl | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: TooManyMethods: disco_server |
| master/src/ddfs/ddfs_master.erl | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: TooManyMethods: ddfs_master |
| master/src/event_server.erl | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: TooManyMethods: event_server |
| master/src/jobpack.erl | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: TooManyMethods: jobpack |
| master/src/disco.erl | 8.5 | Near-clean | God Classes: TooManyMethods: disco |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 32 of 34 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.3 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 34 dimensions across the health lenses
D3D4D13D19D21D28D29D31D34D35AC1AC2AC3AC6AC7AX9ED1ES1ES2M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6R1R10R2R3R4R7R9
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 52 of 59 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D3 · God Classes
16 god class(es) detected.
TooManyMethods: discozip master/src/discozip.erl:19
FileTooLong: src/discozip.erl master/src/discozip.erl:0
What to do
- Resolve the 12 TooManyMethods finding(s) in God Classes — start with discozip.erl, ddfs_gc_main.erl, job_coordinator.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 warning-level).
- Resolve the 4 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with discozip.erl, ddfs_gc_main.erl, job_coordinator.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
- Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D19 · Documentation Quality
The Disco documentation is clear and complete for its audience: an introductory README with a runnable word-count example plus install/production branch policy, Docker build/run instructions, Google Cloud/AWS cluster setup guides, and release notes. The architecture/design docs (41) are also present but not shown in the summary; the visible content is strong.
Release notes are excellent but only cover the 0.5.x series; there is no dedicated architecture or usage document for the newer Disco versions.doc/releases.rst
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Release notes are excellent but only cover the 0.5.x series; there is no… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with releases.rst. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
15 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 8 medium, 0 low.
High: use-after-free ext/disco.c:43
Medium: insecure-hash-algorithm-md5 examples/util/wiki_reader.py:24
What to do
- Resolve the 8 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with dPickle.py (3), wiki_reader.py, xml_reader.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
- Resolve the 7 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with disco.c (2), settings.py (2), cli.py. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
15 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 9 medium, 2 low.
High IaC: DS-0002 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
Medium IaC: DS-0001 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
Low IaC: DS-0005 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
What to do
- Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
- Resolve the 8 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (8). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
- Resolve the 2 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
60 of 60 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is master/src/ddfs/ddfs_gc_main.erl.
Largest orphaned file master/src/ddfs/ddfs_gc_main.erl
Dormant codebase
What to do
- Resolve the 3 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with ddfs_gc_main.erl, discozip.erl, job_coordinator.erl. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D35 · Change Coupling
Strongest change-coupling: fair_scheduler_fair_policy.erl↔fair_scheduler_fifo_policy.erl 72%; fair_scheduler_fifo_policy.erl↔fair_scheduler_job.erl 61%; ddfs_get.erl↔ddfs_put.erl 52%
Change coupling: fair_scheduler_fair_policy.erl ↔ fair_scheduler_fifo_policy.erl master/src/fair_scheduler_fair_policy.erl
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
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AC2 · Forms & labels
- This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×8) — config.html:63, config.html:73, config.html:81, …
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
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AC3 · Page structure
- The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×3) — config.html:3, index.html:3, job.html:3
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×3) — config.html:3, index.html:3, job.html:3
- A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). (×2) — config.html:39, job.html:49
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
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AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- `div.sphinxsidebar h4, div.sphinxsidebar h3` sets color: white on background-color: #AFC1C4 — 1.9:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — sphinxdoc.css:225
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
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AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
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AX9 · CQS / query purity
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ED1 · Handler temporal coupling
- `ddfs_gc_node` clause `handle_file/6#84` blocks the process on a synchronous `timer:sleep` while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, move the delay off the hot path (a `state_timeout`/`send_after` self-message, or do the settle in a spawned worker). — ddfs_gc_node.erl:188
- `fair_scheduler` clause `handle_call/3#139` makes a synchronous `gen_server`/`gen_statem:call` round-trip to a peer process while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, react by casting a follow-up message (fire-and-forget), or resolve the needed state locally. — fair_scheduler.erl:141
- `fair_scheduler_fair_policy` clause `fairness_fairy/1#167` makes a synchronous `gen_server`/`gen_statem:call` round-trip to a peer process while handling a message — the process is blocked (holding its mailbox) until a peer replies or the sleep elapses. That couples this handler in real time to another process being up and fast, and a mutual call can DEADLOCK. To decouple, react by casting a follow-up message (fire-and-forget), or resolve the needed state locally. — fair_scheduler_fair_policy.erl:173
What to do
- Remove synchronous peer round-trips (gen_server:call / hand-rolled receive) and blocking sleeps from OTP message handlers — cast a follow-up or resolve state locally, so processes stay temporally decoupled and deadlock-free.
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ES1 · Fold determinism
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ES2 · Immutable events
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 1 of 1 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
- A CI pipeline exists but no test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was found — changes may merge without the suite running.
- A CI pipeline exists but no build/compile step was matched — changes may merge without being compiled. A build step may be invoked directly as a command, or declared as a task that a runner named in the pipeline resolves.
What to do
- Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step for your stack, and gate merges on it.
- Add an explicit build/compile step to your CI pipeline — your stack's own build command, or, if the pipeline delegates to a task runner, a build task that runner executes in CI — so every change is compiled before merge.
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add dialyzer or elvis (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: dialyzer or elvis — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P4 · Deployment & Rollback
What to do
- Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P6 · Release Hygiene
What to do
- Stamp a version in your build/package manifest (e.g. csproj <Version>, package.json, pyproject.toml, Cargo.toml, or a VERSION file) or tag releases with semver so builds and releases are traceable.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety
- 0 typed · 7 plain JS — the untyped files are master/www/js/config.js, master/www/js/disco.js, master/www/js/job.js, master/www/js/joblist.js, master/www/js/jquery-dom.js, master/www/js/json-noaugmenting.js (+1 more).
What to do
- Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R10 · Code Duplication
- master/www/js/json-noaugmenting.js:191 · master/www/js/json-noaugmenting.js:233 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — json-noaugmenting.js:191
- master/www/js/json-noaugmenting.js:85 · master/www/js/json-noaugmenting.js:178 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — json-noaugmenting.js:85
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
- Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. — json-noaugmenting.js:166
What to do
- Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files
Do you agree with this assessment?
R4 · Test Coverage
- 0% of 7 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code
Do you agree with this assessment?
R9 · Circular Imports
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 65% | Adequate — gated by R1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 99% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 43% | Weak — gated by D34, M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 27% | Weak — gated by R4, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 66% | Adequate — gated by D29 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Event-Driven | 39% | Weak — gated by ED1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Event Sourcing | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Accessibility | 47% | Weak — gated by AC3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
Not included — 72 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over a project-reference graph that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from a project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.erl, .hrl, .py) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~2443 lines of test source are present (.py) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex)), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .erl, .hrl, .py — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
- D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.erl, .hrl, .py) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.erl, .hrl, .py) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex) — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .erl, .hrl, .py, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs, and no project-reference graph for the cycle pass to read — so this dimension makes no claim about dependency cycles in either direction (where this repository's language has an import-cycle lens, cycles are reported there). Architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.py) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows only 1 of the 3 signals this check looks for (177 value object(s))
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — and nothing was matched here. The coverage check applies to any stack, but the checks for excluded tests, skipped tests and sleep-based synchronisation currently recognise only some ecosystems' test-runner idioms, so on a repository built with another stack the zeros below mean 'not checked', not 'clean'.
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (`rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` (or covertool for Cobertura XML)) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- R5 Dependency Freshness — no package-lock.json — dependency freshness not measured (would require an npm lockfile); JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
- R6 Tooling — no package.json in the repository — test/lint/typecheck wiring is read from package.json scripts (corroborated against CI), so this project's own toolchain isn't measured here
- R8 Dependency Hygiene — Not measured — no package.json declares any dependency, so there is nothing to check imports against (imports may resolve through a host runtime rather than node).
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 11 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- High: use-after-free ext/disco.c:43
- High: use-after-free ext/disco.c:54
- High: exec-detected lib/clx/settings.py:20
- High: eval-detected lib/clx/settings.py:31
- High: eval-detected lib/disco/cli.py:173
- High: eval-detected lib/disco/util.py:128
- High: eval-detected lib/disco/worker/classic/func.py:141
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: DS-0002 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0017 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0022 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
- High IaC: DS-0029 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
Warning — 36 finding(s)
D3 · God Classes
- TooManyMethods: discozip master/src/discozip.erl:19
- TooManyMethods: ddfs_gc_main master/src/ddfs/ddfs_gc_main.erl:181
- TooManyMethods: job_coordinator master/src/job_coordinator.erl:1
- TooManyMethods: disco_server master/src/disco_server.erl:1
- TooManyMethods: ddfs_master master/src/ddfs/ddfs_master.erl:1
- TooManyMethods: event_server master/src/event_server.erl:1
- TooManyMethods: ddfs_tag master/src/ddfs/ddfs_tag.erl:2
- TooManyMethods: jobpack master/src/jobpack.erl:1
- TooManyMethods: disco master/src/disco.erl:1
- TooManyMethods: job_event master/src/job_event.erl:1
- TooManyMethods: disco_config master/src/disco_config.erl:1
- TooManyMethods: jc_utils master/src/jc_utils.erl:1
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: insecure-hash-algorithm-md5 examples/util/wiki_reader.py:24
- Medium: use-defused-xml examples/util/xml_reader.py:1
- Medium: insecure-hash-algorithm-md5 lib/disco/compat.py:47
- Medium: marshal-usage lib/disco/core.py:425
- Medium: marshal-usage lib/disco/dPickle.py:17
- Medium: marshal-usage lib/disco/dPickle.py:37
- Medium: marshal-usage lib/disco/dPickle.py:53
- Medium: insecure-hash-algorithm-md5 lib/disco/util.py:79
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Medium IaC: DS-0001 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: DS-0004 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: DS-0013 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_6 contrib/docker/Dockerfile:2
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_4 contrib/docker/Dockerfile:31
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_7 contrib/docker/Dockerfile:1
- Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_1 contrib/docker/Dockerfile:34
- Medium IaC: CKV2_DOCKER_17 contrib/docker/Dockerfile:13
D3 · God Classes
- FileTooLong: src/discozip.erl master/src/discozip.erl:0
- FileTooLong: ddfs/ddfs_gc_main.erl master/src/ddfs/ddfs_gc_main.erl:0
- FileTooLong: src/job_coordinator.erl master/src/job_coordinator.erl:0
- FileTooLong: ddfs/ddfs_tag.erl master/src/ddfs/ddfs_tag.erl:0
D35 · Change Coupling
- Change coupling: fair_scheduler_fair_policy.erl ↔ fair_scheduler_fifo_policy.erl master/src/fair_scheduler_fair_policy.erl
- Change coupling: fair_scheduler_fifo_policy.erl ↔ fair_scheduler_job.erl master/src/fair_scheduler_fifo_policy.erl
- Change coupling: ddfs_get.erl ↔ ddfs_put.erl master/src/ddfs/ddfs_get.erl
D16 · Bus Factor
- dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
Recommendation — 10 finding(s)
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Largest orphaned file master/src/ddfs/ddfs_gc_main.erl
- Largest orphaned file master/src/discozip.erl
- Largest orphaned file master/src/job_coordinator.erl
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: DS-0005 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
- Low IaC: DS-0026 contrib/docker/Dockerfile
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
- complexity unreadable for .erl, .hrl, .py — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
D19 · Documentation Quality
- Release notes are excellent but only cover the 0.5.x series; there is no dedicated architecture or usage document for the newer Disco versions. doc/releases.rst
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- Dormant codebase
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 15 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 15 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |