Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
dlydiard/ddd-cqrs-es-aws-sam carries serious gaps (48%). Several issues below can materially affect correctness, security, or the cost of changing it — and propagate to everything that depends on it.
It is strongest in Domain Modelling (100%) — the domain model is expressive and well-guarded. Code Health (90%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (17%) — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade. Maturity (68%) is the next concern — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene); tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through… (Test Coverage).
For scale: Small (~2,506 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
Encouragingly, the gaps are in documentation and release process — not in the code's correctness, structure or security, which are strong. They're low-risk to close, and doing so would lift the grade without re-engineering anything that already works.
Code Health
90%
Strong
Architecture
77%
Strong
Maturity
68%
Adequate · gated by M2
Readiness
17% ⚠
Critical · gated by R4, R6, R8, P1, P3
Security
74%
Adequate · gated by D38
Domain Modelling
100% ★
Exemplary
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 17% · 46% weightMaturity 68% · 25% weightSecurity 74% · 14% weightArchitecture 77% · 8% weightCode Health 90% · 4% weightDomain Modelling 100% · 2% weight
Raise Readiness 17 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 48 → ~72.
Code composition — where the lines go
Tests 100%
New since the last scan (19+)
- D38 · Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- D38 · Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- R10 · Duplicated block (15 lines × 3 locations) src/iam/user/events/user-registered.ts
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €780–€3,900
| Cost to rebuild | €780–€3,900 |
| Domain complexity | Standard |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 48% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · effort split not classified (source measured from disk; the effort-tier breakdown is a C#-only syntax walk) |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€2,300 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 17% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
2
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
3
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 17%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Good
At a glance — Domain Modelling
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components | 50 | High / Critical |
| A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration | 10 | High / Critical |
Roadmap
First, establish a CI workflow to build and run tests on every push or pull request. Next, clean up the project by removing unused dependencies, explicitly declaring imports, and moving type- and test-only packages to devDependencies. Then, expand test coverage to include all production modules. Finally, integrate linting and type-checking into the CI pipeline and implement automated rollback strategies for deployments.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +27.0 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies. | +27.0 pts | Medium | Dependency Hygiene |
| Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry). | +26.8 pts | Medium | Test Coverage |
| Add eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI. | +26.1 pts | Medium | Tooling |
| Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically. | +23.1 pts | Medium | Deployment & Rollback |
| Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt. | +6.0 pts | Medium | Dependency Freshness |
| Resolve the 1 The .env file example ends in an unshown clip marker, so the full `.env`… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. | +1.9 pts | Low | Documentation Quality |
| Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale. | +3.2 pts | Medium | Architecture documentation |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| template.yaml | 0.0 | Slop | IaC & Container Security: High IaC: AWS-0064 |
| package-lock.json | 0.2 | Slop | OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] |
| README.md | 9.5 | Near-clean | Documentation Quality: The .env file example ends in an unshown clip marker, so the full `.env` configuration is not visible. |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 28 of 30 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.4 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 30 dimensions across the health lenses
D3D4D13D15D19D21D28D29D31D33D35D38DM6M1M2M3M4P1P3P4R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 61 of 69 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D3 · God Classes
0 god class(es) detected.
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D4 · Code Duplication
0 duplicated block group(s) detected.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
git history depth insufficient
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D19 · Documentation Quality
The ddd-cqrs-es-aws-sam README is comprehensive: it names the referenced standards (DDD/node-ts/ddd, CQRS, Event Sourcing), lists features including CI/CD compatibility with AWS CodeStar, Docker, Postman endpoint collection, and a full installation guide that clones the repo, installs SAM CLI, AWS Toolkit, VS Code, Docker, Postman, and runs `npm install`, while showing an example .env file. It also outlines a feature-rich architecture section covering cloud-native microservices, queue types (Kinesis/SQS FIFO), DynamoDB event log, software architecture, IoC, DDD, validation, commands/handlers, and projections with links to external resources such as the concurrency post and Event Enrichment blog.
The .env file example ends in an unshown clip marker, so the full `.env` configuration is not visible.README.md
What to do
- Resolve the 1 The .env file example ends in an unshown clip marker, so the full `.env`… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D21 · Naming Consistency
0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
semgrep found no security issues.
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D31 · IaC & Container Security
27 finding(s): 0 critical, 7 high, 3 medium, 17 low.
High IaC: AWS-0064 template.yaml
Medium IaC: AWS-0024 template.yaml
Low IaC: AWS-0025 template.yaml
What to do
- Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with template.yaml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
- Resolve the 3 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with template.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
- Resolve the 3 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with template.yaml (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).
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D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities
No known-vulnerable JS/npm dependencies.
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
git history depth insufficient
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D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
59 finding(s): 14 critical, 25 high, 16 medium, 4 low.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]package-lock.json
High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]package-lock.json
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
What to do
- Resolve the 24 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (24). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (24 issue-level).
- Resolve the 13 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (13). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 issue-level).
- Resolve the 1 Critical vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary
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M1 · Documentation (README)
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.
What to do
- Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
- README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests
What to do
- Reconcile the README with reality: README advertises a microservices architecture, but the repo is a single project with no service manifests.
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P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security as a CI step.
What to do
- Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P4 · Deployment & Rollback
- Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
- Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
- Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
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R1 · Type Safety
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R10 · Code Duplication
- src/iam/role/models/role.ts:43 · src/iam/user/models/user.ts:100 — role.ts:43
- src/iam/role/controllers/role-controller.ts:19 · src/iam/user/controllers/user-controller.ts:28 — role-controller.ts:19
- src/iam/role/events/role-disabled.ts:1 · src/iam/user/events/user-disabled.ts:1 — role-disabled.ts:1
- src/iam/role/events/role-created.ts:1 · src/iam/user/events/user-registered.ts:1 · src/iam/user/events/user-role-added.ts:1 · src/iam/user/events/user-role-removed.ts:1 — role-created.ts:1
- src/iam/role/services/role.service.ts:31 · src/iam/user/services/user.service.ts:45 — role.service.ts:31
- src/iam/user/events/user-registered.ts:1 · src/iam/user/events/user-role-added.ts:1 · src/iam/user/events/user-role-removed.ts:1 — user-registered.ts:1
- src/iam/role/commands/create-role.handler.ts:2 · src/iam/role/commands/disable-role.handler.ts:2 · src/iam/user/commands/add-user-role.handler.ts:2 · src/iam/user/commands/disable-user.handler.ts:2 — create-role.handler.ts:2
- src/iam/user/events/user-role-added.enricher.ts:3 · src/iam/user/events/user-role-removed.enricher.ts:3 — user-role-added.enricher.ts:3
What to do
- Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
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R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity
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R3 · Large Files
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R4 · Test Coverage
- No test imports this module directly or transitively. If it is a CLI, check whether a suite runs it as a child process; otherwise it has no test reaching it. (×8) — user-controller.ts, role-controller.ts, application-container.ts, …
What to do
- Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).
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R5 · Dependency Freshness
What to do
- Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.
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R6 · Tooling
- test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗
What to do
- Add eslint and `tsc --noEmit` as package.json scripts and run them in CI.
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R7 · Dead Code
- 77 file(s) (~3037 LoC) were excluded from dead-code analysis — declare main/module/exports or a conventional entry (src/index.*, an index.html script) so reachability can see this package.
- Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. — role.validator.ts:12
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R8 · Dependency Hygiene
- Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×3) — event.ts:1, service.interface.ts:2, event-source-broker.ts:4
- Declared in the root/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
What to do
- Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
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R9 · Circular Imports
- src/iam/role/events/role-created.ts → src/iam/role/events/role-events.ts → src/iam/role/models/role.ts → src/iam/role/events/role-created.ts — role-created.ts
- src/iam/user/events/user-disabled.ts → src/iam/user/events/user-events.ts → src/iam/user/models/user.ts → src/iam/user/events/user-disabled.ts — user-disabled.ts
What to do
- Break each cycle by extracting the shared piece into a module both sides can import.
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Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 90% | Strong | Solid. |
| Architecture | 77% | Strong | Solid. |
| Maturity | 68% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 17% | Critical — gated by R4, R6, R8, P1, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 74% | Adequate — gated by D38 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Domain Modelling | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
Not included — 82 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
- AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
- AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
- AX3 Project dependency cycles — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX4 Dependency direction — not assessed — project cycles and dependency direction are computed over the .NET project-reference graph and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — not assessed — test isolation is computed from the .NET project graph (which projects are test projects, and what they reference) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
- C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~73 lines of test source are present (.ts) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
- D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
- D14 License Compliance — Not scored — this repository's package manifest is not parsed for licence data yet. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository's licenses are compliant (package.json), which this pass does not parse yet — so this dimension asserts nothing about this repository's licensing in either direction.
- D16 Bus Factor — early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
- D17 Explicit Debt — explicit-debt markers are read through a C# workspace today, so they were not read for this repository's language — this asserts nothing about how many markers the code carries. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a .NET solution; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.ts) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.ts) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["Acme.Catalog"]`.
- D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — Not scored — no dependency manifest in a supported ecosystem was read for this repository. A gap in the analyzer's language coverage, NOT a finding that the repository is free of vulnerable dependencies (package.json — not scanned yet) — where an OSV-supported manifest exists, dependency vulnerabilities for this repository are reported under D38 instead.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
- D34 Knowledge Freshness — early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D39 IL Efficiency — D39 measures the IL emitted by a .NET build; this repository has no .NET solution or project files, so the dimension does not apply.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D5 Coupling — Inter-project coupling could not be assessed — no analyzable project graph was found for this repository. Not scored: a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository. (Coupling here is Martin afferent/efferent/instability plus reference cycles across a project-reference graph, read today from .NET project files; other ecosystems' module graphs are not read yet.)
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .ts, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
- D9 Test Distribution — Test source is present (.ts) but the test-pyramid classifier reads C# only, so its unit/integration/BDD/E2E split couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- DM1 Aggregate boundaries — not scored for TypeScript: a class holding another class reads the same whether the inner type is an aggregate or a value object, so this cannot be decided from source without guessing — reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM2 Strongly-typed ids — not scored for TypeScript: branded ids (`type Id = string & { __brand }`) are an uncommon idiom, so a bare-string id is not on its own evidence of a missing typed id — reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM3 Integration-event coupling — not scored for TypeScript: a domain type used across packages is indistinguishable in source from a deliberate shared-kernel package, so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM4 Rich vs anemic model — not scored for TypeScript: telling a rich domain entity from an anemic data holder needs the behaviour a source-only read cannot always attribute (components, DTOs and readonly value objects are all legitimately data-shaped), so this is reported as guidance rather than measured
- DM5 Encapsulated state — not scored for TypeScript: the language already steers state behind #private/private/readonly, so a mutable public field is rare enough that we report this as guidance rather than measuring it
- DM7 Repository granularity — not scored for TypeScript: deciding whether a repository belongs to an aggregate root needs the aggregate structure, which source alone does not state — reported as guidance rather than measured
- ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
- IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
- P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (lcov — `vitest --coverage`, `jest --coverage`, `bun test --coverage --coverage-reporter=lcov`, or `nyc`) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
- R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
- S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
- X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
- X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks are read from C# source and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 43 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- High CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- High IaC: AWS-0064 template.yaml
- High IaC: AWS-0096 template.yaml
- High IaC: AWS-0112 template.yaml
- High IaC: AWS-0121 template.yaml
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- High vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
Warning — 14 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
- Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Medium IaC: AWS-0024 template.yaml
- Medium IaC: AWS-0110 template.yaml
- Medium IaC: AWS-0113 template.yaml
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities
- Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] package-lock.json
Recommendation — 8 finding(s)
D31 · IaC & Container Security
- Low IaC: AWS-0025 template.yaml
- Low IaC: AWS-0111 template.yaml
- Low IaC: AWS-0125 template.yaml
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not included
D16 · Bus Factor
- early-stage repository — too few commits for a meaningful bus factor
D19 · Documentation Quality
- The .env file example ends in an unshown clip marker, so the full `.env` configuration is not visible. README.md
D34 · Knowledge Freshness
- early-stage repository — too little history to judge knowledge freshness
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not included — suite not readable by the collector
Info — 4 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene
- Dependency hygiene not measured — dependency manifest found but not parsed for hygiene
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
- git history depth insufficient
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
D35 · Change Coupling
- git history depth insufficient
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 0 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | none (no readable dependency manifest) | — | none (no readable dependency manifest): not present in this environment | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy config --format json --quiet . | 27 | artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs **/bin/** --skip-dirs **/obj/** . --skip-db-update | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner --format json --recursive . | 59 | artifacts/raw/osv-scanner.json |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |