dnikolovv/cafe

Executive summary

dnikolovv/cafe scores 39 out of 100, but it is rated At risk while a critical security finding is open; the score itself is unchanged.

The weakest lens counts most in the score, and here that is Production Readiness, which scores 24 and is rated Critical. Its Test Coverage dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Production Readiness can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality and to add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry), and if Production Readiness rose to 70, the score would rise from 39 to about 52.

143 findings are critical: 119 in Dependency Vulnerabilities, ten in Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary, five in Explicit Debt, five in Immutable events, two in IaC & Container Security, one in Dependency Hygiene and one in Project dependency cycles.

Watchdog couldn't measure 5 dimensions in this code, among them Code Coverage, Test Reliability and Dependency Hygiene, so they are left out of the score. The product code is 9,435 lines, which would take an estimated 0.1 person-years, around €19,000, to rebuild.

Code Health 56 Adequate, capped by Type Safety Architecture 85 Strong Maturity 44 Weak, capped by Knowledge Freshness and Architecture documentation Production Readiness 24 ⚠ Critical, capped by Test Coverage, Tooling, CI/CD gates, Security & performance tooling and Schema migrations Security and Compliance 54 Adequate, capped by Dependency Vulnerabilities, Malicious Dependencies and Data Protection Domain Modelling 64 Adequate, capped by Rich vs anemic model Event-Driven 100 ★ Exemplary Event Sourcing 65 Adequate, capped by Immutable events Performance 70 Strong

A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.

How the score is built: what each lens counts for The lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.

Production Readiness 24 · counts for 45%Maturity 44 · counts for 25%Security and Compliance 54 · counts for 14%Code Health 56 · counts for 8%Domain Modelling 64 · counts for 4%Event Sourcing 65 · counts for 2%Performance 70 · counts for 1%Architecture 85 · counts for 1%Event-Driven 100 · counts for 0%

If Production Readiness rose from 24 to 70, the lowest score rated Strong, the score would rise from 39 to about 52.

Code composition: what the lines of code are

Business logic 2%Supporting code 50%Tests 47%

New since the last survey: 18 findings

These 18 critical or serious findings weren't in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026.

Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · REDACTED
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: IUserRepository server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Repositories/IUserRepository.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: IUserRepository server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Repositories/IUserRepository.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: IUserRepository server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Repositories/IUserRepository.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: IUserRepository server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Repositories/IUserRepository.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: IUserRepository server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Repositories/IUserRepository.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: IUserRepository server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Repositories/IUserRepository.cs
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: Cafe.Domain REDACTED
Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure: Cafe.Domain REDACTED
Async & latency hygiene · Sync-over-async blocking
Async & latency hygiene · Sync-over-async blocking server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Startup.cs
Async & latency hygiene · Sync-over-async blocking server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Startup.cs

Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.

Fixed since the last survey: 2 findings

These 2 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026, and are gone from this one.

Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE: REDACTED REDACTED
Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE: REDACTED REDACTED

Rebuild cost: about €19,000 · Estimate

Cost to rebuild	€6,300 to €31,000, for 105 to 327 hours of work, about 0.1 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem	Very high, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor	×0.7 at a score of 39. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size	Small: 9,435 lines of product code
Comment lines	The estimate prices 9,266 lines. Comment lines count towards the size of 9,435 lines but aren't priced as work.

How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty.

Top priorities

The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.

Raises the score by about 4 points · Low effort · ADR Quality

Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).

Raises the score by about 4 points · Medium effort · Test Coverage

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.

Raises the score by about 4 points · Medium effort · Security & performance tooling

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.

Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk

This code would cost about €19,000 to build again, about 0.1 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 24 (Critical). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.

Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts

What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.

If you do one thing first · First action

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 4 points for low effort, because it clears the 1 ADR Quality findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.

Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort

Architecture — module dependency graph

Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.

99 modules, with 175 dependencies between them. One loop runs through 3 of the modules, marked above the diagonal.

The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 59 more are left out to keep it readable.

Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
uses →	1 Api.Hateoas.Resources	2 Domain	3 Domain.Views	4 Domain.Events	5 Domain.Entities	7 Core	8 Domain.Repositories	9 Persistance.EntityFramework	10 Api.Configuration	12 Business	21 Core.AuthContext.Commands	22 Core.BaristaContext.Commands	23 Core.CashierContext.Commands	24 Core.ManagerContext.Commands	25 Core.MenuContext.Commands	26 Core.OrderContext.Commands	27 Core.OrderContext.Queries
1 Api.Hateoas.Resources
2 Domain
3 Domain.Views				5	2
4 Domain.Events			2		3
5 Domain.Entities		1		5
6 Api.Hateoas.Resources.Order	10		1		1
7 Core		1			1
8 Domain.Repositories		1	9		10
9 Persistance.EntityFramework					8
10 Api.Configuration					8			1
11 Api.Dispatchers				4				1
12 Business		2		3	1	2	1
13 Business.AuthContext.QueryHandlers		1	2			2	2
14 Business.BaristaContext.QueryHandlers			1			1	1
15 Business.CashierContext.QueryHandlers			1			1	1
16 Business.ManagerContext.QueryHandlers			1			1	1
17 Business.MenuContext.QueryHandlers			1			1	1
18 Business.TabContext.QueryHandlers		1	3			3	3
19 Business.TableContext.QueryHandlers			1			1	1
20 Business.WaiterContext.QueryHandlers			1			1	1
21 Core.AuthContext.Commands						6
22 Core.BaristaContext.Commands						1
23 Core.CashierContext.Commands						1
24 Core.ManagerContext.Commands						1
25 Core.MenuContext.Commands			1			1
26 Core.OrderContext.Commands						3
27 Core.OrderContext.Queries					1	3
28 Persistance.Repositories		1	9		11		18	15
29 Api					1			1	1
30 Api.Controllers	11	1			1	1					6	1	1	1	1	3
31 Business.AuthContext.CommandHandlers		7	1	6	6	1	11			1	6
32 Business.BaristaContext.CommandHandlers		1		1	1		1			1		1
33 Business.CashierContext.CommandHandlers		1		1			1			1			1
34 Business.ManagerContext.CommandHandlers		1		1			1			1				1
35 Business.MenuContext.CommandHandlers		1	1	1			1			1					1
36 Business.OrderContext.CommandHandlers		4		4	6	1	5			2						3
37 Business.OrderContext.QueryHandlers		1	3			3	3										3
38 Business.TabContext.CommandHandlers		6		6	4	6	8			1
39 Business.TableContext.CommandHandlers		4		4	3		4			1
40 Business.WaiterContext.CommandHandlers		2		2	2		3			2

Uses a module listed above itPart of a loopThe module itself

At a glance — Code Health · 56% · Adequate · gated by R1 ·

The Good

D1 · .NET / C# Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 D2 · .NET / C# Cognitive Complexity 10.0 D3 · .NET / C# God Classes 8.8 D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 9.8 D17 · .NET / C# Explicit Debt 8.6 D18 · .NET / C# Solution Shape 10.0 GD1 · Repo Unfinished & placeholder code 10.0 IC1 · Repo Incompleteness & stubs 10.0 R10 · React / TS Code Duplication 9.0 R2 · React / TS Cyclomatic Complexity 10.0 R3 · React / TS Large Files 10.0 R7 · React / TS Dead Code 9.6 X1 · Repo Async correctness 7.2 X12 · Repo Unreachable branch 10.0 X13 · Repo Undrained process stream 10.0 X16 · Repo Unfloored truncation loop 10.0 X18 · Repo Disposal-pattern correctness 10.0 X19 · Repo Unrestored process-global state 10.0 X20 · Repo Mistyped argument guard 10.0 X21 · Repo Side-effecting pattern guard 10.0 X22 · Repo Contradicted release guard 10.0 X23 · Repo Unguarded diagnostic materialisation 10.0 X25 · Repo Inert configuration knob 10.0 X26 · Repo Unsynchronised callback handoff 10.0 X27 · Repo Collection changed while being enumerated 10.0 X28 · Repo Index access outside its own emptiness guard 10.0 X29 · Repo Per-element action decided by a fixed element 10.0 X3 · Repo Exception handling 10.0 X30 · Repo Support guard that admits what it rejects 10.0 X32 · Repo Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly 10.0 X4 · Repo Structured logging 10.0

The Ugly

R1 · React / TS Type Safety 0.0 X2 · Repo Cancellation propagation 4.2

At a glance — Architecture · 85% · Strong ·

The Good

D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 10.0 D6 · .NET / C# Cohesion (LCOM4) 10.0 D27 · .NET / C# Navigability 9.5 D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 10.0 AX1 · Repo Captive dependencies 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX5 · Repo Architecture & structure 10.0 AX6 · Repo Interface segregation 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0 AX9 · Repo CQS / query purity 10.0 R9 · React / TS Circular Imports 10.0

The Bad

D26 · .NET / C# Project Cohesion 6.9 AX10 · Repo Code composition 5.0

At a glance — Maturity · 44% · Weak · gated by D34, M2 ·

The Good

D15 · .NET / C# Churn × Complexity Hotspots 10.0 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 7.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 9.0 D24 · .NET / C# Comment Value 9.0 M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 7.3 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 9.0

The Ugly

D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0 D34 · .NET / C# Knowledge Freshness 0.0 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 24% · Critical · gated by R4, R6, P1, P3, P8 ·

The Good

D9 · .NET / C# Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · .NET / C# Test Quality 10.0 D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 ED5 · Repo Idempotency 10.0 R5 · React / TS Dependency Freshness 8.4

The Bad

P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 R8 · React / TS Dependency Hygiene 6.5

The Ugly

P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 3.0 P2 · Repo Observability 4.8 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 0.0 P8 · Repo Schema migrations 3.0 R4 · React / TS Test Coverage 0.0 R6 · React / TS Tooling 3.4

At a glance — Security · 54% · Adequate · gated by D30, D43, C1 ·

The Good

D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0 D31 · .NET / C# IaC & Container Security 8.9 C2 · Repo Access Controls 10.0 X14 · Repo Bypassable address classification 10.0 X15 · Repo Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader 10.0 X17 · Repo Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document 10.0 X24 · Repo Document value interpolated into markup unescaped 10.0

The Bad

D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 7.0 D44 · .NET / C# Platform End-of-Life 6.0 S1 · Repo Web-Security Posture 6.5

The Ugly

D30 · .NET / C# Dependency Vulnerabilities 0.0 D43 · .NET / C# Malicious Dependencies 0.0 C1 · Repo Data Protection 3.0

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 64% · Adequate · gated by DM4 ·

The Good

DM1 · Repo Aggregate boundaries 10.0 DM10 · Repo One transaction, one aggregate 10.0 DM11 · Repo Constructible invalid state 10.0 DM12 · Repo Ambient inputs in the domain 10.0 DM7 · Repo Repository granularity 10.0 DM8 · Repo Value-object opportunities 10.0 DM9 · Repo Scattered domain decisions 10.0

The Bad

DM5 · Repo Encapsulated state 6.0 DM6 · Repo Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary 5.1

The Ugly

DM4 · Repo Rich vs anemic model 3.0

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary ·

The Good

ED1 · Repo Handler temporal coupling 10.0 ED4 · Repo Outbox / dual-write 10.0

At a glance — Event Sourcing · 65% · Adequate · gated by ES2 ·

The Good

ES1 · Repo Fold determinism 10.0 ES3 · Repo PII in the event store 10.0

The Ugly

ES2 · Repo Immutable events 1.8

At a glance — Performance · 70% · Strong ·

The Good

PF3 · Repo Async & latency hygiene 7.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP category	Findings	Severity
A03:2025 — Software Supply Chain Failures	170	High / Critical
A05:2025 — Injection	7	Medium
A02:2025 — Security Misconfiguration	7	High / Critical
A08:2025 — Software or Data Integrity Failures	2	Medium

Roadmap

First, establish test coverage by adding tests for all unreached production modules to ensure code reliability. Next, integrate a security analysis step into the CI pipeline to automatically block regressions and resolve orphaned files to keep the codebase current. Finally, document significant design decisions in a dedicated folder to preserve architectural knowledge and guide future development.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do this	Helps	Effort	Dimension
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.	+3.5 pts	Low	ADR Quality
Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).	+4.2 pts	Medium	Test Coverage
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.	+4.2 pts	Medium	Security & performance tooling
Resolve the 13 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with REDACTED, DatabaseSeeder.cs, REDACTED.	+3.7 pts	Medium	Knowledge Freshness
Resolve the 3 Documentation finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md (3).	+1.9 pts	Low	Documentation Quality
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.	+3.6 pts	Medium	Architecture documentation
Resolve the 2 Malicious package finding(s) in Malicious Dependencies — start with REDACTED (2).	+1.0 pts	Low	Malicious Dependencies
Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.	+0.9 pts	Low	Knowledge Freshness

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 29 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 14% slop · 38% mixed · 48% near-clean.

File	Score	Band	Worst signal
REDACTED	0.0	Slop	Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	0.0	Slop	Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	0.3	Slop	Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	3.4	Slop	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	4.1	Mixed	Dependency Vulnerabilities: Critical CVE: REDACTED
REDACTED	4.1	Mixed	IaC & Container Security: High IaC: REDACTED
REDACTED	5.8	Mixed	Dependency Vulnerabilities: High CVE: REDACTED
server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Hateoas/Resources/Auth/UserResource.cs	6.7	Mixed	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
REDACTED	6.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
server/tests/Cafe.Tests/Api/Controllers/MenuControllerTests.cs	7.6	Mixed	Explicit Debt: WriteOnlyPrivateField
REDACTED	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
REDACTED	7.9	Mixed	Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: REDACTED
server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/OrderController.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Views/UserView.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
server/src/server/Cafe.Persistance/Repositories/UserViewRepository.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
server/src/server/Cafe.Business/AuthContext/CommandHandlers/LoginHandler.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment
server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Entities/Tab.cs	8.2	Near-clean	Explicit Debt: TodoComment

How the grades work

Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.

Critical — 143

A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here tends to cause failures elsewhere.

Serious — 133

Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to carry for two years either.

Minor — 61

Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions. Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.

Could not be resolved — 10

Something this survey could not settle from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each one is named under Limitations.

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 94 of 99 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 5 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.9 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 99 dimensions across the health lenses

D1D2D3D4D5D6D9D10D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D24D26D27D28D29D30D31D34D35D43D44AX1AX10AX3AX5AX6AX8AX9C1C2DM1DM10DM11DM12DM4DM5DM6DM7DM8DM9ED1ED4ED5ES1ES2ES3GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P2P3P4P8PF3R1R10R2R3R4R5R6R7R8R9S1X1X12X13X14X15X16X17X18X19X2X20X21X22X23X24X25X26X27X28X29X3X30X32X4

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions

Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 311 of 337 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

Method	Backs	Version	Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis	Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering	5.3.0	✓ deterministic
Native secret scanner	Hardcoded secrets / credentials	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Watchdog duplication detector (in-process)	Code duplication	1.0.0	✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)	Line & branch coverage	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnet	Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies	10.0.400	✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2Sharp	Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history	2.43.0 · 0.31.0	✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov	Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR	1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533	✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)	Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement	Local LLM	◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 01a160ee-96f0-7b63-817f-41f9af39f7c5.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

D8 Code Coverage — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Coverage NOT MEASURED: the analyzer environment could not build/run the test suite (a target framework / SDK band or targeting pack the analyzer image doesn't carry). This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo — coverage is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero. We track the analyzer-image gap so it can be closed; in the meantime, commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces and real coverage will be read. You can widen what we reach: optional: commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI already produces, and the real number is read on the next scan.
D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test reliability not scored — the test tier(s) ran but surfaced none of this repository's 178 test method(s) to the runner, so flakiness couldn't be exercised. This is an analysis-environment limitation, not a finding about the tests.
D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `dotnet list package` did not return usable output (restore or query failed); no outdated/vulnerable/deprecated data to assess. The tool said: `dotnet list package` exited 1 with no output.
D14 License Compliance — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. This repository declares package.json, but the licence verdict published here was taken over its NuGet package dependencies. Nothing was read about its npm dependencies' licensing in either direction, and a clean score on this card must not be read as covering them.
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. Single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable (2 contributor(s) across 328 commit(s) sampled, automation and bot accounts excluded). One of them holds 100% of the history; the other 1 hold 0% each on average, below the 5% at which there is somebody to hand the work to. That is a single maintainer with drive-by contributors, not a team whose knowledge has concentrated — so the bus factor is not applicable and there is nothing here for the owner to act on.
D17 Explicit Debt — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The C# workspace loaded this repository's projects but reported a load failure, and the dead-code reference search is unreliable over a graph that did not load cleanly, so it was skipped. The other debt markers on this row were read; dead symbols were not, and their absence from the score is not a finding that the code has none. First load diagnostic: Failure: Msbuild failed when processing the file 'REDACTED' with message: Package 'Microsoft.AspNet.SignalR.Core 2.4.1' was restored using '.NETFramework,Version=v4.6.1, .NETFramework,Version=v4.6.2, .NETFramework,Version=v4.7, .NETFramework,Version=v4.7.1, .NETFramework,Version=v4.7.2, .NETFramework,Version=v4.….
D21 Naming Consistency — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The model returned its reasoning in place of a described inconsistency, so those symbols were not assessed. The sampled symbols they name carry no naming verdict this run.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The loaded project set declares no packable project and no `.Contracts` project, so there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
D28 Secrets (history) — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. D28's config-credential rule (WD-SECRET-0002) parses each committed `.json` config as a document and reads credential-named values; `server/src/server/Cafe.Api/appsettings.json`, `server/src/server/Cafe.Api/appsettings.Development.json` did not parse (JSON5, a template, several concatenated documents), so a credential bound there is UNMEASURED by that rule. gitleaks still scanned the same files as text.
D39 IL Efficiency — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. IL NOT MEASURED: the analyzer's own build of this repository failed for an ENVIRONMENT reason (exit 1) — MSBuild's engine or the CLR gave up, or our image does not carry the SDK band/targeting pack this repository needs. This is OUR limitation, not a defect in the repo, and it is not a statement that this repository fails to build. D18 owns the question of whether this repository builds; it was not answered here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Render strategy: boot via REDACTED (REDACTED). docker build failed (exit 1) — DEPRECATED: The legacy builder is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Install the buildx component to build images with BuildKit: https://docs.docker.com/go/bui…; runtime evidence skipped.
X2 Cancellation propagation — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. 47 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 87.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a REDACTED (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.

Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md.

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D2 · Cognitive Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.

Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 method(s) exceeded the cognitive complexity threshold of 15.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md.

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D3 · God Classes8.8 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").

Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

2 over-large unit(s) detected — types, modules or files that carry too much.

FunctionTooLong: ManageTabPage.ManageTabPage · ×2client/src/components/waiter/ManageTabPage.js:13

What to do

Resolve the 2 FunctionTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with ManageTabPage.js, ManageUserPage.js. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Enforce God Classes in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D4 · Code Duplication9.8 / 10Stronggated by 4 serious findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

4 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×2server/src/server/Cafe.Core/CashierContext/Commands/HireCashierValidator.cs:8

Duplicated block (23 lines × 2)server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Hateoas/Resources/Tab/TabResource.cs:9

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Hateoas/Resources/Auth/UserResource.cs:7

What to do

Resolve the 2 Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with HireCashierValidator.cs, RejectMenuItemsValidator.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (23 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with TabResource.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with UserResource.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Code Duplication in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D5 · Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

6 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.

Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 19 classes have LCOM4 above 3.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md.

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D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

178 test methods: 178 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.

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D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 2 mock references across 178 tests.

Mock framework: Moq · ×2

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

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D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 266 packages use a banned license. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 40 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 212 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution. ★ COVERAGE OF THIS VERDICT: it grades this repository's NuGet package dependencies and nothing else. The repository also declares package.json, and the licences of those dependencies were NOT read by this pass — a gap in this engine's coverage, not a statement about them. So this result says the graded closure carries no banned licence; it does NOT say this repository's licensing is clear.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.

Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d15_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D17 · Explicit Debt8.6 / 10Adequategated by 5 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.

Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

14 deducted debt markers + unmeasured dead symbols across 6648 LoC in the .NET projects (0.7/KLoC) → score 8.6. Dead code not measured: the solution did not load cleanly, so the reference search was skipped.

NoWarnInCsproj · ×4REDACTED:7

WriteOnlyPrivateFieldserver/tests/Cafe.Tests/Api/Controllers/MenuControllerTests.cs:21

TodoComment · ×9server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/OrderController.cs:43

What to do

Resolve the 4 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 WriteOnlyPrivateField finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with MenuControllerTests.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 9 TodoComment finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with OrderController.cs, UserResource.cs, UserView.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (9 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D18 · Solution Shape10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.

Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

6 projects, 386 source files, 12462 hand-written lines of code (6648 production / 5814 test — the split is derived per file: test is what its project, its own path, or a compile-guarded region marks as test, and a file carrying no test signal counts as production), 12 inter-project edges.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d18_recommendation.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D19 · Documentation QualityStrong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The repository's root README is excellent: it states what the project is (an enterprise DDD example combining functional programming and HATEOAS), lists features, gives a one-line URL for continuous deployment, and opens with an overview that would be a strong missing-overview finding. The client/README documents its own directory (the React app) rather than the repository root; it is clean and complete within scope. There are no architecture/design docs present in the visible content, so the absence of architecture documentation is not yet flagged.

Documentation: no installation or build instructions · ×3README.md

XML-doc coverage: Cafe.Api · ×5REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 3 Documentation finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Do you agree with this assessment?

D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D21 · Naming ConsistencyExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

2 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.

Inconsistent naming for test helper fields: some use the class name as a prefix (e.g., `_apiHelper`, `_authTestsHelper`) while others use a generic `_helper` suffix, and the class names themselves vary between `ApiTestsHelper` and `AuthTestsHelper` for similar purposes. · ×2

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D24 · Comment ValueExemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

42 valuable / 0 redundant across 200 sampled comments.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md.

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D26 · Project Cohesion6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether each project is a focused, coherent unit rather than an oversized grab-bag.

Method: Project size overshoot penalties (LoC / public-type count / namespace count, 2-of-3 flag) weighted by log magnitude. Exhaustive across projects, deterministic, LLM-independent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 of 6 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.

Projects may be oversized for their cohesion

What to do

Resolve the 1 Projects may be oversized for their cohesion finding(s) in Project Cohesion. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D27 · Navigability9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.

Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.

Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

86 % of calls cross a namespace and 11 % go through an interface, but 100 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: small — navigation cost is tolerated.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d27_recommendation.md.

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D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)7.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 7.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 7 medium, 0 low. semgrep hit a parse error in 1 file(s) — `codecov.yml` — so no absence of findings in them is evidence of anything, and nothing in them was analysed. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 6 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (6 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.

Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

170 finding(s): 34 critical, 85 high, 40 medium, 11 low.

REDACTED

+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

What to do

Resolve the 84 High CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (67), REDACTED (8), REDACTED (6). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (84 issue-level).
Resolve the 33 Critical CVE finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED (30), REDACTED (2), REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (33 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical vulnerability finding(s) in Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d30_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D31 · IaC & Container Security8.9 / 10Adequategated by 2 critical findings✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (REDACTED/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 8.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

7 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 4 medium, 1 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 2 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D34 · Knowledge Freshness0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

13 of 13 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is REDACTED. Counted over 13 of the 316 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.

Orphaned file · ×13REDACTED:1

Orphaned files with no living knowledge

What to do

Resolve the 13 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with REDACTED, DatabaseSeeder.cs, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (13 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Orphaned files with no living knowledge finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md.

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D43 · Malicious Dependencies0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.

Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

2 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 0 low.

REDACTED

What to do

Resolve the 2 Malicious package finding(s) in Malicious Dependencies — start with REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d43_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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D44 · Platform End-of-Life6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.

Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 6 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.

End-of-life runtime: .NET netcoreapp2.2REDACTED:4

What to do

Resolve the 1 End-of-life runtime finding(s) in Platform End-of-Life — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).

Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX1 · Captive dependencies10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.

Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.

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AX10 · Code composition5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does.

Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.

Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.

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AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

The namespaces Cafe.Domain.Entities ↔ Cafe.Domain.Events ↔ Cafe.Domain.Views depend on each other. The lightest dependency in the cycle is Cafe.Domain.Events → Cafe.Domain.Views (Cafe.Domain.Events.OrderConfirmed → Cafe.Domain.Views.ToGoOrderView, 2 type pair(s)); cut that one first, e.g. by moving the shared type to a namespace both can use or inverting it behind an interface. — server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Events/OrderConfirmed.cs:1

What to do

Break namespace cycles inside a project by moving the shared type to a namespace both sides can use, or by inverting the back edge behind an interface.

Do you agree with this assessment?

AX5 · Architecture & structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.

Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.

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AX6 · Interface segregation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').

Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.

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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

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AX9 · CQS / query purity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.

Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.

Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.

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C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.

No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

What to do

Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).

Do you agree with this assessment?

C2 · Access Controls10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.

Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.

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DM1 · Aggregate boundaries10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.

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DM10 · One transaction, one aggregate10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether a single operation mutates more than one aggregate root. An aggregate is a consistency boundary, so saving two together fuses them into one — the second's invariants come to depend on the first's transaction, and the pair can no longer be separated. Reads of other aggregates are not counted.

Method: Neutral body surface (DDD-gated): every method body scanned for repository WRITE calls (Add/Update/Save/Remove/Delete/Insert/Store and their async forms), keyed on the ARGUMENT type rather than the repository type — three `IRepository<T>` writes collapse to one repository but are three distinct aggregates. Reads (Get/Find/Load/Query) are excluded, so loading another aggregate for context never counts. Score is offending methods over methods that write at all. Deterministic.

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DM11 · Constructible invalid state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether an aggregate can be constructed in a state its own rules forbid — a public constructor that takes a raw primitive, stores it, and validates nothing, with no factory beside it. A constructor taking only value objects is not counted: each parameter has already validated itself.

Method: Neutral surface (DDD-gated): each non-abstract entity/aggregate checked for a PUBLIC constructor taking at least one RAW PRIMITIVE parameter whose body contains no guard token (throw / Guard. / Ensure. / ArgumentException / CheckRule), on a type that also offers no static Create/Of/From/New factory. A constructor taking only value objects is never charged -- measured: 64 of 87 unguarded public constructors on the C# corpus take value objects only, so ignoring parameter types would be 73% false positives. One finding per entity. Deterministic.

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DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain types receive the time and randomness their rules depend on, rather than reading the process clock or a global random source directly — an ambient read makes the rule it feeds untestable at the instant that matters and lets two reads inside one operation disagree.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated, C#/VB only): domain-layer types scanned for ambient reads — DateTime/DateTimeOffset.Now/UtcNow/Today, Random.Shared, new Random(), Stopwatch.GetTimestamp — resolved against the semantic model, with a comment/string-stripped token fallback only where resolution fails. Body reads are scored; field/property initialisers are surfaced unscored. Apply/When folds excluded (ES1 owns them). Deterministic, symbol-resolved.

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DM4 · Rich vs anemic model3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.

Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.

`Tab` is an aggregate/entity with 8 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Entities/Tab.cs:8

What to do

Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM5 · Encapsulated state6.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state — private/init-only setters, and collections handed out as read-only views rather than the mutable backing collection — instead of exposing writable state that bypasses invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entities scanned for publicly writable state — public setters, and (C#/VB) own mutable collections handed out through an auto-property, a public field or a bare-field expression getter, where a computed/copying getter is never charged. One finding per entity; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.

Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.

`Tab` exposes publicly writable state (Id, CustomerName, WaiterName, IsOpen, ServedItemsValue, TableNumber, and 2 more). — server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Entities/Tab.cs:8
`MenuItem` exposes publicly writable state (Id, Number, Description, Price). — server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Entities/MenuItem.cs:5

What to do

Make entity setters private/init-only and hand collections out as IReadOnlyList/IReadOnlyCollection over a private backing field; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).

Do you agree with this assessment?

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary5.1 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.

Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.

`User` (domain layer) names `IdentityUser` from `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity` — a persistence type (as a base type). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it. — server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Entities/User.cs:6
`IUserRepository` (domain layer) names `User` from `Cafe.Domain.Entities` — a persistence/infrastructure type (in a member signature). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it. (×6) — server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Repositories/IUserRepository.cs:13, server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Repositories/IUserRepository.cs:15, server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Repositories/IUserRepository.cs:17, …
`TabViewProjection` (domain layer) names `ViewProjection` from `Marten.Events.Projections` — a persistence type (as a base type). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it. — server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Views/TabViewProjection.cs:7
The domain project `Cafe.Domain` references `Marten` — a persistence dependency; the domain should own a port and let an infrastructure project reference it. — REDACTED:14
The domain project `Cafe.Domain` references `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore` — a persistence dependency; the domain should own a port and let an infrastructure project reference it. — REDACTED:16

What to do

Invert domain→infrastructure dependencies: declare interfaces in the domain, implement them in infrastructure (Dependency Inversion).

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DM7 · Repository granularity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether repositories are per aggregate root (not per child entity) and keep the persistence query handle behind the contract, so the root's invariants can't be bypassed.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): repository abstraction detection; repositories over non-aggregate-root entities flagged, and (C#/VB) repository INTERFACES whose members return a live persistence query handle (IQueryable/DbSet/IMongoQueryable) — implementations and specification evaluators are out of population by design, since composing a query internally is what an implementation is for. Deterministic, DDD-native.

Coverage: Population: repositories + aggregate roots by NAME convention; per-root repository rule checked within the set.

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DM8 · Value-object opportunities10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.

Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.

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DM9 · Scattered domain decisions10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Domain Modelling — Whether one domain rule is decided — or one measurement produced — in more than one place, rather than living on the type that owns it.

Method: Neutral body surface plus Roslyn (DDD-gated), two arms. DECISION (Roslyn only): a predicate over a domain type's members judged in two or more types, where none of those decisions live on the owning type — operands of comparisons and relational property patterns only, so a member merely passed as an argument is not judged. DERIVATION: a plain all-numeric carrier of ≥2 members, with no base type and exactly one constructor, CONSTRUCTED as the result of a method (returned or assigned, never inline as an argument) in two or more types other than its own — the same measurement produced twice, which centralising the judgement does not fix. DERIVATION runs on every language whose frontend declares the produced-or-passed fact per construction (Roslyn and the Java sidecar today); a target with only the derivation arm carries an engine gap naming the decision arm as not assessed, and a frontend that declares nothing keeps the dimension not measured rather than clean. Single-member rules, test code and generated code are out of population for both. Advisory.

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ED1 · Handler temporal coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

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ED4 · Outbox / dual-write10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.

Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.

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ED5 · Idempotency10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.

Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.

Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.

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ES1 · Fold determinism10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event Sourcing — Whether Apply/When folds reconstruct state purely from the event (no DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random or IO) so replay is reproducible.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan (event-sourcing gated): Apply/When folds checked for forbidden tokens (DateTime.Now, Guid.NewGuid, Random, IO), stripped of comments/strings. Deterministic, hard fact per fold.

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ES2 · Immutable events1.8 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Other · Event Sourcing — Whether persisted events are immutable facts (init-only/readonly) — a settable event member lets stored history be rewritten.

Method: Roslyn scan (event-sourcing gated): persisted events checked for public setters; immutability verified per property/field. Deterministic, hard fact.

This persisted event exposes settable member(s) (TabId, CustomerName, WaiterName, TableNumber) — an event is an immutable historical fact. A public setter lets stored history be rewritten after the fact. Use `{ get; init; }` (records) or readonly fields. — server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Events/TabOpened.cs:5
This persisted event exposes settable member(s) (TabId, AmountPaid, TipValue, OrderValue, WaiterName, TableNumber) — an event is an immutable historical fact. A public setter lets stored history be rewritten after the fact. Use `{ get; init; }` (records) or readonly fields. — server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Events/TabClosed.cs:5
This persisted event exposes settable member(s) (TabId, MenuItems) — an event is an immutable historical fact. A public setter lets stored history be rewritten after the fact. Use `{ get; init; }` (records) or readonly fields. (×3) — server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Events/MenuItemsOrdered.cs:7, server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Events/MenuItemsServed.cs:7, server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Events/MenuItemsRejected.cs:7

What to do

Make every event type immutable: records with init-only properties, or classes with readonly fields set only in the constructor.

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ES3 · PII in the event store10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Event Sourcing — Whether the append-only event log avoids un-erasable personal data (or has a crypto-shredding strategy) — a GDPR right-to-erasure risk.

Method: Roslyn (event-sourcing gated): high-confidence PII flagged Warning; ambiguous name-like fields adjudicated by language model as person versus fictional. Advisory without model, definitive with.

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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.

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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.

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M1 · Documentation (README)7.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 6 of 6 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.

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M2 · Architecture documentation0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.

What to do

Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.

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M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

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M4 · Documentation accuracy9.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

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P1 · CI/CD gates3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

The pipeline is well-formed, but the only CI definition is `.travis.yml`, and its `README.md` build badge still points at `travis-ci.org` — a service shut down in June 2021. No other CI is configured in this repository, so nothing has been building or testing changes here since that shutdown — the steps below describe a gate that is not running. Porting it is mostly mechanical: the build and test commands already written here are what a replacement pipeline would run.

What to do

Port the existing pipeline to a CI service that is still operating — the build and test steps are already specified — and remove the dead configuration and its badge so the repository stops advertising a gate that no longer exists.

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P2 · Observability4.8 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: structured-logging frameworks (Serilog, NLog), OpenTelemetry, and health-check endpoint patterns. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.

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P3 · Security & performance tooling0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 195 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

What to do

Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.

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P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

What to do

Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.

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P8 · Schema migrations3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether EF Core schema changes go through versioned migrations rather than the un-evolvable EnsureCreated().

Method: Roslyn scan: EF Core DbContext for a versioned migrations directory versus bare EnsureCreated usage; off .NET, a file scan of dependency manifests, migration histories (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Django, Rails, Prisma, TypeORM, Knex/Sequelize, golang-migrate, goose, Laravel, Doctrine, Diesel/sqlx) and schema auto-create in production source or config. Exhaustive, deterministic.

`EnsureCreated()` builds the schema once and can't evolve it — there's no upgrade path for an existing production database, and it bypasses the migrations history. Adopt a versioned schema-migration mechanism (with EF Core: `dotnet ef migrations add` + `Migrate()` on startup) so schema changes are versioned and applied safely. — server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Startup.cs:95

What to do

Replace EnsureCreated() with a versioned schema-migration mechanism (EF Core migrations) so the production schema can evolve safely and reproducibly.

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PF3 · Async & latency hygiene7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.

Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.

2 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
`.Wait()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one). (×2) — server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Startup.cs:100, server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Startup.cs:101

What to do

Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult().

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R1 · Type Safety0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.

Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.

0 typed · 80 plain JS — the untyped files are client/src/api/apiClient.js, client/src/api/authService.js, client/src/api/baristaService.js, client/src/api/cashierService.js, client/src/api/managerService.js, client/src/api/menuItemsService.js (+74 more).

What to do

Adopt TypeScript for the frontend: add a typecheck step to the build, then either type-check the existing JavaScript in place (`checkJs`/JSDoc types) or convert the highest-traffic modules first — no file is typed today, so this is an adoption, not a clean-up.

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R10 · Code Duplication9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386): a block is reported only where its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or were renamed as they were pasted but kept most of their constants, and where the copies carry enough code to stand on their own or the copied extent reaches 30 lines — so a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are both found and deliberately not reported, and a clean R10 is not a claim that nothing was copied.

Method: Near-exact copy-pasted blocks of substantial extent across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Masking finds the candidates; a block is reported when its copies still agree on most of their own identifiers and literals, or when a renamed copy still agrees on most of its constants, AND the copies carry enough code to stand on their own — or when the copied extent reaches 30 lines. So a re-implementation sharing neither names nor values, and a small pasted declaration, are deliberately not counted. Deterministic.

9 duplicated blocks under client/src/components/ have copies in at least two of the sibling directories admin, auth, barista, cashier, manager, waiter — 3 of them are reported below, and 6 are counted here but not reported individually: those copies match on shape but no longer clear R10's bar for an individually reported row — either they kept neither their own names nor their values, or what was copied is too small to stand on its own (it reports near-exact duplication only, and only of substantial extent). What this row states is the concentration, which the detector measured over all 9 and which does not depend on how exactly each block's copies still match. That concentration is one structural fact, not 9 local ones: the siblings replicate behaviour none of them owns, which is the shape of a missing shared module — a common library every sibling imports — rather than 9 separate extractions. Check first whether the siblings are deliberately standalone deliverables (scaffold templates, demo apps that must stay copy-pasteable); where they are, the duplication is the design and the per-block rows are the ones to act on. — client/src/components/cashier/ToGoOrderForm.js:5
client/src/components/common/FiniteSelectableMenu.js:4 · client/src/components/common/SelectableMenuDisplay.js:4 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 472 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one. — client/src/components/common/FiniteSelectableMenu.js:4
client/src/components/admin/ManageUserPage.js:85 · client/src/components/admin/ManageUserPage.js:116 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the SHAPE of this repetition could not be determined. It is not a run of declarations, a listing, a declaration header, a type body or a slice through a construct — and it was not measured as a run of executable statements either, so this row cannot tell you whether a function can stand where these lines are. Read the two spans before acting, because the move is opposite in the two cases. Where they are statements, the ordinary answer holds: give the shared part one home and call it from each site. Where they turn out to be declarations, a literal's entries, or the cases of an enumeration, there is no call site to call anything from, and collapsing them would delete what each copy pins — a shared base type, a generated set, or one exported constant each site refers to is the move instead, and sometimes the honest answer is that there is nothing to extract at all. Reported because the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is true whichever of those they are. — client/src/components/admin/ManageUserPage.js:85
client/src/components/barista/WaitingOrdersList.js:11 · client/src/components/cashier/PendingOrdersList.js:18 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — client/src/components/barista/WaitingOrdersList.js:11
client/src/components/manager/ManagerPage.js:18 · client/src/components/waiter/WaiterPage.js:10 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — client/src/components/manager/ManagerPage.js:18
client/src/components/manager/AssignWaiterToTableForm.js:22 · client/src/components/waiter/OpenTabForm.js:22 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — client/src/components/manager/AssignWaiterToTableForm.js:22
client/src/components/manager/ManagerPage.js:41 · client/src/components/manager/ManagerPage.js:51 · client/src/components/manager/ManagerPage.js:61 — all 3 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — client/src/components/manager/ManagerPage.js:41

What to do

Act on each finding's own remediation rather than one rule: the move depends on what recurs. Where the copies are executable blocks, give the shared part one home and call it from each site; where they are declarations, a listing, a specialisation already delegating to its base, or one shape repeated per entity, there is no call site and the move is a shared type, a generated set or a factory — sometimes there is nothing to extract.

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R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.

Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.

Header has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 11; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes. — client/src/components/common/Header.js:6

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R3 · Large Files10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.

Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.

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R4 · Test Coverage0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Static test reachability (D-386): the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything.

Method: Static test reachability: the share of production files reachable from any test via the import graph — measured without running anything. Deterministic.

0% of 79 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count

What to do

Add tests that import the unreached modules (directly or through their public entry).

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R5 · Dependency Freshness8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — How outdated the npm dependencies are (a maturity signal). JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities).

Method: npm dependency staleness from manifest/registry metadata (a maturity signal; JS/npm CVEs are scored separately in D30, which answers dependency vulnerabilities for every ecosystem). Deterministic.

What to do

Bump outdated dependencies to current versions to limit upgrade debt.

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R6 · Tooling3.4 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.

Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.

test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.

What to do

Add eslint and type checking (adopt TypeScript, or type-check the existing JavaScript with `checkJs`) as package.json scripts and run them in CI.

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R7 · Dead Code9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).

Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.

Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal. (×9) — client/src/redux/actions/actionTypes.js:1, client/src/redux/actions/actionTypes.js:3, client/src/redux/actions/actionTypes.js:4, …

What to do

Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.

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R8 · Dependency Hygiene6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.

Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.

Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. — client/src/history.js:1
Declared in client/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it. (×3)

What to do

Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.

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R9 · Circular Imports10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.

Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.

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S1 · Web-Security Posture6.5 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).

Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.

None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves. (×2) — server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Program.cs:16, server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Program.cs:33
No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.) — REDACTED:161

What to do

Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy first, then Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options and a frame policy) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.

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X1 · Async correctness7.2 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.

Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. (×2) — server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Startup.cs:100, server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Startup.cs:101

What to do

Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)

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X12 · Unreachable branch10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X14 · Bypassable address classification10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X16 · Unfloored truncation loop10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X19 · Unrestored process-global state10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X2 · Cancellation propagation4.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).

Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.

Only 3/89 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×39) — server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Configuration/DatabaseConfiguration.cs:15, server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Configuration/DatabaseSeeder.cs:143, server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Configuration/DatabaseSeeder.cs:165, …

What to do

Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.

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X20 · Mistyped argument guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `ArgumentNullException` tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X21 · Side-effecting pattern guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X22 · Contradicted release guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.

Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X23 · Unguarded diagnostic materialisation10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.

Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.

Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X25 · Inert configuration knob10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.

Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X26 · Unsynchronised callback handoff10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.

Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a `foreach` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is enumerating invalidates the enumerator it is holding, so the next `MoveNext` throws `InvalidOperationException` and the remaining items are never seen.

Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X3 · Exception handling10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.

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X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X32 · Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether a plugin lookup names the type it means — searching every assembly loaded into the process for a candidate whose SIMPLE name equals a string supplied at runtime, and taking the first one found, is decided by assembly LOAD ORDER rather than by this source, so the same name can resolve to a different type on the next run.

Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every invocation of `First`/`FirstOrDefault`/`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` whose OWN expression subtree contains both a `GetAssemblies()` call and a `GetTypes()`/`GetExportedTypes()` call — a single-element pick out of every type loaded into the process. A nested selector in the same chain sees no `GetAssemblies()` in its own subtree and is outside the population, so one lookup counts once however many links its chain has. A finding additionally needs both remaining halves: the selector must be `First`/`FirstOrDefault` (`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` reports the ambiguity rather than resolving it, and is counted and never reported), and the chain must carry an `==` comparison of `<lambda parameter>.Name` against something that is not a literal. The receiver must be a plain identifier bound by one of the chain’s own lambdas, which places `assembly.GetName().Name == "X"` outside the rule by construction. One exemption: a `.Name` test joined by `&&` to a `FullName`/`AssemblyQualifiedName` test on the same identifier is spared; joined by `||` it is not. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.

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X4 · Structured logging10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.

Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.

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Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

Lens	Score	Rating	Impact
Code Health	56%	Adequate — gated by R1	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Architecture	85%	Strong	Solid.
Maturity	44%	Weak — gated by D34, M2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness	24%	Critical — gated by R4, R6, P1, P3, P8	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security	54%	Adequate — gated by D30, D43, C1	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Domain Modelling	64%	Adequate — gated by DM4	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Event-Driven	100%	Exemplary	Strongest area.
Event Sourcing	65%	Adequate — gated by ES2	Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Performance	70%	Strong	Solid.

Unscored — 2 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score

These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.

P12 CI test-gate honesty — 1 observation(s) recorded · Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Not evidenced — 5 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for

These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.

C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data (event-sourced storage — lifecycle is stream archival / event TTL, not row CASCADE) — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo

Not included — 41 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

AC1 Text alternatives — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC2 Forms & labels — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC3 Page structure — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC5 ARIA correctness — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AC7 A11y enforcement — Frontend below the scale floor (11 DOM element(s) < 25) — too little surface to assess accessibility.
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX4 Dependency direction — not applicable to a CQRS architecture (the inward-dependency rule is for layered/clean styles)
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility — docker build failed (exit 1) — DEPRECATED: The legacy builder is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Install the buildx component to build images with BuildKit: https://docs.docker.com/go/bui…; runtime evidence skipped This is a statement about this run, not a statement about your application: nothing here says the surface is inaccessible, only that it was never rendered.
D11 Test Reliability — Test runner surfaced no tests
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer repository — bus factor is not applicable
D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — small single-context codebase (6,648 production LoC in the .NET projects) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Aggregate roots were found in only one source directory (server), which is a layered codebase, not two contexts. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — The CI pipeline builds and tests but publishes no released artifact — no package publish, container push, GitHub release or deployment step. Supply-chain provenance, signing and SBOM attest RELEASED artifacts, so there is nothing to attest here. Add them to the release pipeline when this repo starts shipping artifacts (a published package, a container image, a deployed service or a tagged release). Build integrity and workflow-token hygiene are reported below: they describe what the CI runs and the token it runs with, neither of which is affected by whether the pipeline ships an artifact.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — IL not measured — the analyzer's build of the target did not succeed
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — analyzer environment
DM2 Strongly-typed ids — no id-bearing domain types detected — strongly-typed-id adoption not assessable
DM3 Integration-event coupling — no integration events detected — coupling check not applicable
ED2 Event/command shape — no command-shaped messages detected — single-handler-per-command check not applicable
ED3 Event naming — no domain or integration events detected — event-naming check not applicable
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected — no HttpClient/IHttpClientFactory/AddHttpClient in source, and no Refit/RestSharp/Flurl.Http namespace or package reference
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
X10 Duplicated predicate — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Critical — 143 finding(s)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High CVE · ×84

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+ 59 more in this group — see findings.md.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical CVE · ×33

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+ 8 more in this group — see findings.md.

DM6 · Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary · Domain depends on infrastructure · ×10

Domain depends on infrastructure: User server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Entities/User.cs:6 — `User` (domain layer) names `IdentityUser` from `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity` — a persistence type (as a base type). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it.
Domain depends on infrastructure: IUserRepository server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Repositories/IUserRepository.cs:13 — `IUserRepository` (domain layer) names `User` from `Cafe.Domain.Entities` — a persistence/infrastructure type (in a member signature). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it.
Domain depends on infrastructure: IUserRepository server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Repositories/IUserRepository.cs:15 — `IUserRepository` (domain layer) names `User` from `Cafe.Domain.Entities` — a persistence/infrastructure type (in a member signature). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it.
Domain depends on infrastructure: IUserRepository server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Repositories/IUserRepository.cs:17 — `IUserRepository` (domain layer) names `User` from `Cafe.Domain.Entities` — a persistence/infrastructure type (in a member signature). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it.
Domain depends on infrastructure: IUserRepository server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Repositories/IUserRepository.cs:19 — `IUserRepository` (domain layer) names `User` from `Cafe.Domain.Entities` — a persistence/infrastructure type (in a member signature). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it.
Domain depends on infrastructure: IUserRepository server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Repositories/IUserRepository.cs:21 — `IUserRepository` (domain layer) names `User` from `Cafe.Domain.Entities` — a persistence/infrastructure type (in a member signature). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it.
Domain depends on infrastructure: IUserRepository server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Repositories/IUserRepository.cs:23 — `IUserRepository` (domain layer) names `User` from `Cafe.Domain.Entities` — a persistence/infrastructure type (in a member signature). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it.
Domain depends on infrastructure: TabViewProjection server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Views/TabViewProjection.cs:7 — `TabViewProjection` (domain layer) names `ViewProjection` from `Marten.Events.Projections` — a persistence type (as a base type). The domain should own a port and let an infrastructure adapter implement it.
Domain depends on infrastructure: Cafe.Domain REDACTED:14 — The domain project `Cafe.Domain` references `Marten` — a persistence dependency; the domain should own a port and let an infrastructure project reference it.
Domain depends on infrastructure: Cafe.Domain REDACTED:16 — The domain project `Cafe.Domain` references `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.EntityFrameworkCore` — a persistence dependency; the domain should own a port and let an infrastructure project reference it.

ES2 · Immutable events · Mutable event · ×5

Mutable event: TabOpened server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Events/TabOpened.cs:5 — This persisted event exposes settable member(s) (TabId, CustomerName, WaiterName, TableNumber) — an event is an immutable historical fact. A public setter lets stored history be rewritten after the fact. Use `{ get; init; }` (records) or readonly fields.
Mutable event: TabClosed server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Events/TabClosed.cs:5 — This persisted event exposes settable member(s) (TabId, AmountPaid, TipValue, OrderValue, WaiterName, TableNumber) — an event is an immutable historical fact. A public setter lets stored history be rewritten after the fact. Use `{ get; init; }` (records) or readonly fields.
Mutable event: MenuItemsOrdered server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Events/MenuItemsOrdered.cs:7 — This persisted event exposes settable member(s) (TabId, MenuItems) — an event is an immutable historical fact. A public setter lets stored history be rewritten after the fact. Use `{ get; init; }` (records) or readonly fields.
Mutable event: MenuItemsServed server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Events/MenuItemsServed.cs:7 — This persisted event exposes settable member(s) (TabId, MenuItems) — an event is an immutable historical fact. A public setter lets stored history be rewritten after the fact. Use `{ get; init; }` (records) or readonly fields.
Mutable event: MenuItemsRejected server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Events/MenuItemsRejected.cs:7 — This persisted event exposes settable member(s) (TabId, MenuItems) — an event is an immutable historical fact. A public setter lets stored history be rewritten after the fact. Use `{ get; init; }` (records) or readonly fields.

D17 · Explicit Debt · NoWarnInCsproj · ×4

NoWarnInCsproj REDACTED:7 — 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj REDACTED:7 — 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj REDACTED:7 — 1705 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj REDACTED:7 — 1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.

D31 · IaC & Container Security · High IaC · ×2

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AX3 · Project dependency cycles · Namespace dependency cycle · ×1

Namespace dependency cycle server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Events/OrderConfirmed.cs:1 — The namespaces Cafe.Domain.Entities ↔ Cafe.Domain.Events ↔ Cafe.Domain.Views depend on each other. The lightest dependency in the cycle is Cafe.Domain.Events → Cafe.Domain.Views (Cafe.Domain.Events.OrderConfirmed → Cafe.Domain.Views.ToGoOrderView, 2 type pair(s)); cut that one first, e.g. by moving the shared type to a namespace both can use or inverting it behind an interface.

D17 · Explicit Debt · WriteOnlyPrivateField · ×1

WriteOnlyPrivateField server/tests/Cafe.Tests/Api/Controllers/MenuControllerTests.cs:21 — private ToGoOrderTestsHelper _orderHelper — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Critical vulnerability · ×1

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D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · High vulnerability · ×1

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R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unlisted import 'history' · ×1

Unlisted import 'history' client/src/history.js:1 — Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident.

Serious — 133 finding(s)

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Medium CVE · ×40

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+ 15 more in this group — see findings.md.

X2 · Cancellation propagation · Async method without CancellationToken · ×39

Async method without CancellationToken: AddDefaultAdminAccountIfNoneExisting server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Configuration/DatabaseConfiguration.cs:15 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: SeedDatabase server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Configuration/DatabaseSeeder.cs:143 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: AssignWaitersToTables server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Configuration/DatabaseSeeder.cs:165 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: RegisterAccount server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Configuration/DatabaseSeeder.cs:190 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: GetCurrentUser REDACTED:28 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Login REDACTED:43 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Logout REDACTED:59 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Register REDACTED:75 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: AssignWaiterToAccount REDACTED:93 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: AssignManagerToAccount REDACTED:103 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: AssignCashierToAccount REDACTED:113 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: AssignBaristaToAccount REDACTED:123 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: HireBarista server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/BaristaController.cs:27 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: HireCashier server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/CashierController.cs:35 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: ApiHome REDACTED:23 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: HireManager server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/ManagerController.cs:34 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: AddMenuItems REDACTED:35 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: GetOrder server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/OrderController.cs:31 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: OrderToGo server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/OrderController.cs:56 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: ConfirmToGoOrder server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/OrderController.cs:66 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: CompleteToGoOrder server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/OrderController.cs:76 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: CloseTab server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/TabController.cs:28 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: GetTabView server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/TabController.cs:51 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: OpenTab server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/TabController.cs:60 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: OrderMenuItems server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/TabController.cs:69 — No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
+ 14 more in this group — see findings.md.

D17 · Explicit Debt · TodoComment · ×9

TodoComment server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/OrderController.cs:43 — // TODO: Implement proper filters on the get all endpoints — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Hateoas/Resources/Auth/UserResource.cs:12 — // TODO: This definitely seems like a bad pattern — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Views/UserView.cs:12 — // TODO: This definitely seems like a bad pattern — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment server/src/server/Cafe.Persistance/Repositories/UserViewRepository.cs:73 — // TODO: This definitely seems like a bad pattern — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment server/src/server/Cafe.Business/AuthContext/CommandHandlers/LoginHandler.cs:65 — // TODO: This is duplicated in BaseHandler.cs — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Entities/Tab.cs:119 — // TODO: Fix fugly implementation — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Views/TabView.cs:86 — // TODO: Fix fugly implementation — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment server/tests/Cafe.Tests/Api/Hubs/TableActionsHubTests.cs:13 — // TODO: The test argument names are weird — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.
TodoComment server/tests/Cafe.Tests/Business/AuthContext/LoginHandlerTests.cs:39 — // TODO: Validate subject, claims, etc. — source code is not a task system: move the work to your tracker and leave a reference instead (e.g. `// REF: #123`), so the task is planned where tasks live and the ticket links back to the code.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED

REDACTED
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D31 · IaC & Container Security · Medium IaC · ×4

REDACTED
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PF3 · Async & latency hygiene · Sync-over-async blocking · ×3

Sync-over-async blocking — 2 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
Sync-over-async blocking server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Startup.cs:100 — `.Wait()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
Sync-over-async blocking server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Startup.cs:101 — `.Wait()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).

D3 · God Classes · FunctionTooLong · ×2

FunctionTooLong: ManageTabPage.ManageTabPage client/src/components/waiter/ManageTabPage.js:13 — FunctionTooLong — ManageTabPage runs 152 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 52 over it, 1.52× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.
FunctionTooLong: ManageUserPage.ManageUserPage client/src/components/admin/ManageUserPage.js:14 — FunctionTooLong — ManageUserPage runs 106 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded) in one body. The bar is 100 significant lines; this is 6 over it, 1.06× the bar. This is length, not branching: a long straight-line body scores low on complexity and is still read whole to change any part of it, so the complexity numbers beside this row neither confirm nor excuse it. To reduce it, extract each cohesive step of the body — the runs of statements that work on the same values and would earn the same name — into its own named unit, and have this one call them in order.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×2

Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) server/src/server/Cafe.Core/CashierContext/Commands/HireCashierValidator.cs:8 — server/src/server/Cafe.Core/CashierContext/Commands/HireCashierValidator.cs:8-12 | server/src/server/Cafe.Core/ManagerContext/Commands/HireManagerValidator.cs:8-12 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) server/src/server/Cafe.Core/TabContext/Commands/RejectMenuItemsValidator.cs:8 — server/src/server/Cafe.Core/TabContext/Commands/RejectMenuItemsValidator.cs:8-12 | server/src/server/Cafe.Core/TabContext/Commands/ServeMenuItemsValidator.cs:8-12 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory, so a shared home is within easy reach: extract the block into a single shared function the call sites can all reach — a file they already depend on, or a new one alongside them — and call it from both call sites, so a change lands once.

D43 · Malicious Dependencies · Malicious package · ×2

REDACTED
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X1 · Async correctness · Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) · ×2

Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Startup.cs:100 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Startup.cs:101 — Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.

C1 · Data Protection · No data-protection/encryption · ×1

No data-protection/encryption — No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (23 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (23 lines × 2) server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Hateoas/Resources/Tab/TabResource.cs:9 — server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Hateoas/Resources/Tab/TabResource.cs:9-31 | server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Views/TabView.cs:11-33 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.

D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1

Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Hateoas/Resources/Auth/UserResource.cs:7 — server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Hateoas/Resources/Auth/UserResource.cs:7-16 | server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Views/UserView.cs:7-16 — before extracting anything, compare `server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Hateoas/Resources/Auth/UserResource.cs` and `server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Views/UserView.cs` as WHOLE FILES: 82% of the shorter file's lines also appear in the other, so this reads as one file having been copied from the other rather than as a helper waiting to be extracted. The 1 duplicated block(s) this scan matched between them are fragments of that copy, not the extent of it — treat the file pair as the unit. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.

D44 · Platform End-of-Life · End-of-life runtime · ×1

End-of-life runtime: .NET netcoreapp2.2 REDACTED:4 — REDACTED declares .NET netcoreapp2.2 as this project's target framework, and .NET Core 2.2, support ended 2019-12-23. An unsupported runtime receives no security patches, so every vulnerability disclosed in it since 2019-12-23 is present and unfixable without moving off it. This is a migration rather than an upgrade: there is no newer release of a runtime that has ended.

DM4 · Rich vs anemic model · Anemic entity · ×1

Anemic entity: Tab server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Entities/Tab.cs:8 — `Tab` is an aggregate/entity with 8 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service.

P1 · CI/CD gates · CI pipeline targets a decommissioned service · ×1

CI pipeline targets a decommissioned service — The pipeline is well-formed, but the only CI definition is `.travis.yml`, and its `README.md` build badge still points at `travis-ci.org` — a service shut down in June 2021. No other CI is configured in this repository, so nothing has been building or testing changes here since that shutdown — the steps below describe a gate that is not running. Porting it is mostly mechanical: the build and test commands already written here are what a replacement pipeline would run.

P12 · CI test-gate honesty · Coverage collected but not gated · ×1

Coverage collected but not gated — CI collects a coverage report but no step enforces a minimum — coverage could halve and CI stays green. Add a step that fails the build when coverage drops below a floor (your coverage tool's minimum-threshold flag, or a coverage-gate action) so the number guards something. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: this repository's CI files AND its coverage configuration — the well-known coverage and test-runner config files, read at the repository root and inside workspace package directories two levels down, so a floor declared beside the tests rather than in the pipeline is credited — matched against the threshold settings this check knows by name. A floor set in your coverage service's web UI rather than in a committed file, or under a setting whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.

P8 · Schema migrations · Schema created with EnsureCreated() (no migration path) · ×1

Schema created with EnsureCreated() (no migration path) server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Startup.cs:95 — `EnsureCreated()` builds the schema once and can't evolve it — there's no upgrade path for an existing production database, and it bypasses the migrations history. Adopt a versioned schema-migration mechanism (with EF Core: `dotnet ef migrations add` + `Migrate()` on startup) so schema changes are versioned and applied safely.

R1 · Type Safety · Type Safety · ×1

Type Safety — 0 typed · 80 plain JS — the untyped files are client/src/api/apiClient.js, client/src/api/authService.js, client/src/api/baristaService.js, client/src/api/cashierService.js, client/src/api/managerService.js, client/src/api/menuItemsService.js (+74 more).

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplication concentrated across 6 sibling directories (9 clone groups) · ×1

Duplication concentrated across 6 sibling directories (9 clone groups) client/src/components/cashier/ToGoOrderForm.js:5 — 9 duplicated blocks under client/src/components/ have copies in at least two of the sibling directories admin, auth, barista, cashier, manager, waiter — 3 of them are reported below, and 6 are counted here but not reported individually: those copies match on shape but no longer clear R10's bar for an individually reported row — either they kept neither their own names nor their values, or what was copied is too small to stand on its own (it reports near-exact duplication only, and only of substantial extent). What this row states is the concentration, which the detector measured over all 9 and which does not depend on how exactly each block's copies still match. That concentration is one structural fact, not 9 local ones: the siblings replicate behaviour none of them owns, which is the shape of a missing shared module — a common library every sibling imports — rather than 9 separate extractions. Check first whether the siblings are deliberately standalone deliverables (scaffold templates, demo apps that must stay copy-pasteable); where they are, the duplication is the design and the per-block rows are the ones to act on.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block with local edits (82 matched lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block with local edits (82 matched lines × 2 locations) client/src/components/common/FiniteSelectableMenu.js:4 — client/src/components/common/FiniteSelectableMenu.js:4 · client/src/components/common/SelectableMenuDisplay.js:4 — the two spans are one implementation copied and then locally edited — 472 tokens are still identical, in the same order in both files, with only local edits between them. The copies have already begun to drift, which is this row's finding: an edit made to one and not the other changes behaviour silently. Diff the two spans first to learn what genuinely differs, then extract the shared core into one module both sites use, passing the differences in as parameters — or, if one copy exists only because the other could not be imported from its context, make one of them the single source the other is generated or re-exported from. If one copy is no longer reachable, delete it rather than letting it shadow the live one.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (29 lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (29 lines × 2 locations) client/src/components/admin/ManageUserPage.js:85 — client/src/components/admin/ManageUserPage.js:85 · client/src/components/admin/ManageUserPage.js:116 — all 2 copies are in the same file, and the SHAPE of this repetition could not be determined. It is not a run of declarations, a listing, a declaration header, a type body or a slice through a construct — and it was not measured as a run of executable statements either, so this row cannot tell you whether a function can stand where these lines are. Read the two spans before acting, because the move is opposite in the two cases. Where they are statements, the ordinary answer holds: give the shared part one home and call it from each site. Where they turn out to be declarations, a literal's entries, or the cases of an enumeration, there is no call site to call anything from, and collapsing them would delete what each copy pins — a shared base type, a generated set, or one exported constant each site refers to is the move instead, and sometimes the honest answer is that there is nothing to extract at all. Reported because the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is true whichever of those they are.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (19 lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (19 lines × 2 locations) client/src/components/barista/WaitingOrdersList.js:11 — client/src/components/barista/WaitingOrdersList.js:11 · client/src/components/cashier/PendingOrdersList.js:18 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (17 lines × 2 locations) client/src/components/manager/ManagerPage.js:18 — client/src/components/manager/ManagerPage.js:18 · client/src/components/waiter/WaiterPage.js:10 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (15 lines × 2 locations) client/src/components/manager/AssignWaiterToTableForm.js:22 — client/src/components/manager/AssignWaiterToTableForm.js:22 · client/src/components/waiter/OpenTabForm.js:22 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another.

R10 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (8 lines × 3 locations) · ×1

Duplicated block (8 lines × 3 locations) client/src/components/manager/ManagerPage.js:41 — client/src/components/manager/ManagerPage.js:41 · client/src/components/manager/ManagerPage.js:51 · client/src/components/manager/ManagerPage.js:61 — all 3 copies are in the same file, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported.

R2 · Cyclomatic Complexity · Complex function Header (cyclomatic 13, cognitive 11) · ×1

Complex function Header (cyclomatic 13, cognitive 11) client/src/components/common/Header.js:6 — Header has cyclomatic complexity 13 and cognitive complexity 11; this row is raised above a cyclomatic bar of 10. The two numbers answer different questions and the gap between them is what decides whether to act: cyclomatic counts the independent arms through the body, cognitive counts what it costs to hold them in your head, so nesting and mixed boolean chains raise it while a flat run of independent arms does not. Cognitive sits below cyclomatic here, so much of the count is breadth — arms side by side rather than stacked — and splitting per arm would leave a function per arm; group the work between the checks into named steps instead. Measured by this repository's own parse of the file, so a body assembled at runtime, or generated, is counted as written rather than as it executes.

R4 · Test Coverage · Test Coverage · ×1

Test Coverage — 0% of 79 production file(s) reachable from 0 test file(s) via the import graph — 'production' here is the RESIDUE: every source file left once tests, tooling, generated output, config, declarations and declaration-only modules, fixture corpora, type fixtures, behaviour-free data modules, re-export barrels, registration/constant data modules and service workers are set aside, so the percentage is taken over a smaller denominator than the workspace's file count

R6 · Tooling · No lint or typecheck script · ×1

No lint or typecheck script — test ✓ · lint ✗ · typecheck ✗ — read from this repository's package.json scripts and corroborated against its CI workflows. A script counts when its name or command matches the step: `test` for the suite, `lint` or `prettier` for linting, `typecheck`/`type-check`/`tsc` for type checking. ✗ therefore means no script or CI step under those names was found, NOT that the step is absent from your pipeline — a task invoked by a runner this check does not read, or named something else entirely, is not seen and is worth confirming before acting on a cross. A ✓ means the wiring is DECLARED — a script or CI step under those names exists. It is not a statement that the step passes, or that it runs at all: nothing here installs a dependency or executes a suite.

R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@khanacademy/react-multi-select' · ×1

Unused dependency '@khanacademy/react-multi-select' — Declared in client/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.

R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency '@opuscapita/react-signalr' · ×1

Unused dependency '@opuscapita/react-signalr' — Declared in client/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.

R8 · Dependency Hygiene · Unused dependency 'i' · ×1

Unused dependency 'i' — Declared in client/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — no static import reaches it. Usually that is dead weight and attack surface, but two shapes are indistinguishable from source and are NOT dead: an optional or native peer that another dependency loads dynamically at runtime, and a package a build, docs or test step installs and invokes separately. Confirm which of the three this is before removing it.

SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene · NuGet dependencies are not locked · ×1

NuGet dependencies are not locked — No packages.lock.json and no central package management — restores aren't reproducible or pinned (SSDF PW.4.4). Enable <RestorePackagesWithLockFile>true</RestorePackagesWithLockFile> (commit the lockfile) or adopt Directory.Packages.props. Advisory — never scored.

Minor — 54 finding(s)

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned file · ×13

Orphaned file REDACTED:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Configuration/DatabaseSeeder.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file REDACTED:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Startup.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Entities/Tab.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/TabController.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file server/src/server/Cafe.Persistance/Repositories/UserViewRepository.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/_Base/ApiController.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Controllers/OrderController.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Views/TabView.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file server/src/server/Cafe.Business/AuthContext/CommandHandlers/LoginHandler.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Hateoas/LinkNames.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file server/src/server/Cafe.Business/TabContext/CommandHandlers/OpenTabHandler.cs:1 — No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low CVE · ×10

REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED

D19 · Documentation Quality · Documentation · ×3

Documentation: no installation or build instructions README.md — There are no installation/build/run commands in the visible text. Add a one-line install/dependencies snippet (e.g. 'Install via dotnet new crafter') and build/run steps for each tier.
Documentation: no usage examples README.md — There are no usage examples in the visible text. Add a one-line run command showing how to invoke the API (e.g. 'curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/hired-waiters') and an example request/response.
Documentation: no contributor guidance README.md — There is no guidance for contributors in the visible text. Add a short contributing doc covering PR/merge process, test expectations, and how to run tests locally.

S1 · Web-Security Posture · No security response headers detected · ×3

No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No security response headers detected server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Program.cs:16 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
No security response headers detected server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Program.cs:33 — This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.

D21 · Naming Consistency · Inconsistent naming for test helper fields · ×2

Inconsistent naming for test helper fields: some use the class name as a prefix (e.g., `_apiHelper`, `_authTestsHelper`) while others use a generic `_helper` suffix, and the class names themselves vary between `ApiTestsHelper` and `AuthTestsHelper` for similar purposes. — Standardize on a consistent pattern, e.g., `<Type>Helper` for the field name and `<Type>TestsHelper` for the class, or consistently use the class name as the field prefix (e.g., `_authTestsHelper` everywhere). (symbols: Field: private ApiTestsHelper Cafe.Tests.Api.Controllers.AuthControllerTests._apiHelper, Field: private ApiTestsHelper Cafe.Tests.Api.Controllers.TabControllerTests._apiHelper, Field: private AuthTestsHelper Cafe.Tests.Api.Hubs.HiredWaitersHubTests._authTestsHelper, Field: private AuthTestsHelper Cafe.Tests.Business.AuthContext.AssignWaiterToAccountHandlerTests._helper)
Inconsistent naming for test helper fields: some use the specific helper class name as a prefix (e.g., `_apiHelper`, `_authTestsHelper`), while others use a generic `_helper` suffix (e.g., `_helper` in `AssignWaiterToAccountHandlerTests` and `OpenTabHandlerTests`), despite the helper classes having specific names (`AuthTestsHelper`, `TabTestsHelper`). — Use the specific helper class name as the field prefix consistently (e.g., `_authTestsHelper`, `_tabTestsHelper`) to match the pattern used in `AuthControllerTests` and `HiredWaitersHubTests`. (symbols: Field: private ApiTestsHelper Cafe.Tests.Api.Controllers.AuthControllerTests._apiHelper, Field: private ApiTestsHelper Cafe.Tests.Api.Controllers.TabControllerTests._apiHelper, Field: private AuthTestsHelper Cafe.Tests.Api.Hubs.HiredWaitersHubTests._authTestsHelper, Field: private AuthTestsHelper Cafe.Tests.Business.AuthContext.AssignWaiterToAccountHandlerTests._helper, Field: private TabTestsHelper Cafe.Tests.Business.TabContext.OpenTabHandlerTests._helper)

DM5 · Encapsulated state · Mutable entity · ×2

Mutable entity: Tab server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Entities/Tab.cs:8 — `Tab` exposes publicly writable state (Id, CustomerName, WaiterName, IsOpen, ServedItemsValue, TableNumber, and 2 more).
Mutable entity: MenuItem server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Entities/MenuItem.cs:5 — `MenuItem` exposes publicly writable state (Id, Number, Description, Price).

D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1

No ADRs found — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`.

D26 · Project Cohesion · Projects may be oversized for their cohesion · ×1

Projects may be oversized for their cohesion — 1 of 6 project(s) overshoot their size bounds, lowering Project Cohesion to 6.9/10. The most over is `Cafe.Api` (2652 LoC, 130 public types across 18 namespaces). Review these for cohesion — split a project that spans unrelated responsibilities.

D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities · Low vulnerability · ×1

REDACTED

D31 · IaC & Container Security · Low IaC · ×1

REDACTED

D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Orphaned files with no living knowledge · ×1

Orphaned files with no living knowledge — 13 of 13 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 2,400 bytes or more, excluding vendored, generated and example/demo trees and test files identified by path convention, largest first; 13 of the 316 production source files in this repository met that bar). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — most significant first: REDACTED, server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Entities/Tab.cs, server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Views/TabView.cs, server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Configuration/DatabaseSeeder.cs, REDACTED, server/src/server/Cafe.Business/AuthContext/CommandHandlers/LoginHandler.cs, server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Startup.cs, server/src/server/Cafe.Business/TabContext/CommandHandlers/OpenTabHandler.cs (and 5 more). Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · REDACTED · ×1

REDACTED

M2 · Architecture documentation · No ADRs · ×1

No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

M2 · Architecture documentation · No architecture diagram/doc · ×1

No architecture diagram/doc — No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.

P3 · Security & performance tooling · No SAST · ×1

No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 195 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.

P4 · Deployment & Rollback · No rollback/health safety · ×1

No rollback/health safety — Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'LOGIN_REQUEST_SUCCESS' · ×1

Unused export 'LOGIN_REQUEST_SUCCESS' client/src/redux/actions/actionTypes.js:1 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'LOAD_USERS' · ×1

Unused export 'LOAD_USERS' client/src/redux/actions/actionTypes.js:3 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'LOAD_WAITERS' · ×1

Unused export 'LOAD_WAITERS' client/src/redux/actions/actionTypes.js:4 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'LOAD_MENU_ITEMS' · ×1

Unused export 'LOAD_MENU_ITEMS' client/src/redux/actions/actionTypes.js:6 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'LOAD_MANAGERS' · ×1

Unused export 'LOAD_MANAGERS' client/src/redux/actions/actionTypes.js:8 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'LOAD_CASHIERS' · ×1

Unused export 'LOAD_CASHIERS' client/src/redux/actions/actionTypes.js:10 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'LOAD_BARISTAS' · ×1

Unused export 'LOAD_BARISTAS' client/src/redux/actions/actionTypes.js:12 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'LOAD_TABLES' · ×1

Unused export 'LOAD_TABLES' client/src/redux/actions/actionTypes.js:13 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

R7 · Dead Code · Unused export 'LOAD_ORDERS' · ×1

Unused export 'LOAD_ORDERS' client/src/redux/actions/actionTypes.js:19 — Nothing imports this binding — it is safe to review for removal.

S1 · Web-Security Posture · Secure cookie flags not detected · ×1

Secure cookie flags not detected REDACTED:161 — No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)

X2 · Cancellation propagation · Not all async methods take a CancellationToken · ×1

Not all async methods take a CancellationToken — Only 3/89 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.

Minor — 7 finding(s)

D19 · Documentation Quality · XML-doc coverage · ×5

XML-doc coverage: Cafe.Api REDACTED — Cafe.Api: 11 % XML-doc coverage (39/358).
XML-doc coverage: Cafe.Business REDACTED — Cafe.Business: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/129).
XML-doc coverage: Cafe.Core server/src/server/Cafe.Core/Cafe.Core.csproj — Cafe.Core: 3 % XML-doc coverage (6/186).
XML-doc coverage: Cafe.Domain REDACTED — Cafe.Domain: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/193).
XML-doc coverage: Cafe.Persistance server/src/server/Cafe.Persistance/Cafe.Persistance.csproj — Cafe.Persistance: 0 % XML-doc coverage (0/83).

D10 · Test Quality · Mock framework · ×2

Mock framework: Moq — Cafe.Tests references Moq.
Mock framework: FakeItEasy — Cafe.Tests references FakeItEasy.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

Dimension	Tool	Version	Command	Findings	Raw output
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-7b003d7731294b28bbe357d44590f0fd/history.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D28 · Secrets (history)	gitleaks	—	gitleaks detect --no-git --no-banner --config /opt/gitleaks-rules/watchdog-gitleaks.toml --report-format json --report-path /tmp/watchdog-gitleaks-7b003d7731294b28bbe357d44590f0fd/tree.json --exit-code 0 --source .	0	artifacts/raw/gitleaks-tree.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)	semgrep	—	semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/watchdog-sast.yml --json --quiet --timeout 10 --timeout-threshold 3 --metrics off .	7	artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities	dotnet	—	dotnet list server/Cafe.sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --format json	170	artifacts/raw/dotnet-vulnerable.json
D31 · IaC & Container Security	trivy	—	trivy config --format json --quiet . --skip-check-update	7	artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)	semgrep	—	semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that.	0	—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy	disclosure	—	disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.	0	—
D40 · Network Egress Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement	runtime-hardening	—	runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.	0	—
D43 · Malicious Dependencies	trivy	—	trivy fs --scanners vuln --format json --quiet --severity CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM,LOW --skip-dirs /bin/ --skip-dirs /obj/ . --skip-db-update	2	artifacts/raw/trivy-fs.json

Run 01a160ee-96f0-7b63-817f-41f9af39f7c5 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 12 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by NAME, from the C# syntax tree, with a deliberately specific identifier classifier — the same one the C1–C5 compliance cards use to decide whether personal data is present, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip. Two caveats stated rather than glossed: those cards additionally require corroboration (a persistence/account signal, or two distinct PII categories) that this inventory deliberately does not, so it lists more than they gate on; and D32 Data Compliance shares nothing with it — that dimension is a separate semgrep ruleset for personal data leaking into logs, URLs and browser storage, and a clean D32 result says nothing about this list. Informational — it feeds no score.

Name — 8 field(s)

UserResource.FirstName server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Hateoas/Resources/Auth/UserResource.cs:9
UserResource.LastName server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Hateoas/Resources/Auth/UserResource.cs:10
Register.FirstName server/src/server/Cafe.Core/AuthContext/Commands/Register.cs:9
Register.LastName server/src/server/Cafe.Core/AuthContext/Commands/Register.cs:11
User.FirstName server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Entities/User.cs:8
User.LastName server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Entities/User.cs:10
UserView.FirstName server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Views/UserView.cs:9
UserView.LastName server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Views/UserView.cs:10

Email — 4 field(s)

UserResource.Email server/src/server/Cafe.Api/Hateoas/Resources/Auth/UserResource.cs:8
Login.Email server/src/server/Cafe.Core/AuthContext/Commands/Login.cs:7
Register.Email server/src/server/Cafe.Core/AuthContext/Commands/Register.cs:13
UserView.Email server/src/server/Cafe.Domain/Views/UserView.cs:8

Findings by how serious they are

This survey was produced by

Executive summary

Top priorities

Diagnosis: what the measurements show together

Architecture — module dependency graph

Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which

At a glance — Code Health · 56% · Adequate · gated by R1 ·

At a glance — Architecture · 85% · Strong ·

At a glance — Maturity · 44% · Weak · gated by D34, M2 ·

At a glance — Readiness · 24% · Critical · gated by R4, R6, P1, P3, P8 ·

At a glance — Security · 54% · Adequate · gated by D30, D43, C1 ·

At a glance — Domain Modelling · 64% · Adequate · gated by DM4 ·

At a glance — Event-Driven · 100% · Exemplary ·

At a glance — Event Sourcing · 65% · Adequate · gated by ES2 ·

At a glance — Performance · 70% · Strong ·

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Roadmap

File quality

How the grades work

Methodology & how to trust this report

Tools & methods

Run transparency — what happened this run

Limitations & what we did not check

Per-dimension blind spots

The LLM boundary

Dimensions

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

Reference — by lens

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Appendix C — Personal-data map

Downloadable artifacts