Public report — fsharp, published 20 Jul 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 20-07-2026 @ 00:57 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Dotnet/fsharp

No regression tests outside the analyzed solutionknowledge concentrated in recent work
56% Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
lower third — near Weak
Code Health 100% Exemplary Architecture 91% Exemplary Maturity 75% Strong Readiness 69% Adequate Security 34% Weak

Medium · 42,707 LoC · 40 projects · rebuild ~4.4 person-years · weakest lens: Security (34%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

20/22dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
43findings with an exact file:lineof 58 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
22/95dimensions across the health lenses42707 LoC · 40 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

dotnet/fsharp is sound in substance but carries real gaps (56%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.

It is strongest in Code Health (100%) — the code is clean and low-risk to change. Architecture (91%) is solid too.

The area that most needs attention is Security (34%) — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated. Readiness (69%) is the next concern — releases are harder to depend on — versioning, release notes and dependency hygiene are thin, so consumers can't easily tell what changed or trust an upgrade.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: 20 High finding(s) (Static Analysis (SAST)); Automate the release in CI (Deployment & Rollback); 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance &… (Supply-chain Provenance & Signing).

For scale: Medium (~42,707 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~4.4 person-years (~2–9 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Code Health foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Code Health 100% ★ Exemplary Architecture 91% ★ Exemplary Maturity 75% Strong Readiness 69% Adequate · gated by P4 Security 34% Weak · gated by D29, D36
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Security 34% · 47% weightReadiness 69% · 26% weightMaturity 75% · 14% weightArchitecture 91% · 8% weightCode Health 100% · 4% weight

Raise Security 34 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 56 → ~73.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 4%Plumbing 5%Tests 91%
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €210,000–€1,100,000
Cost to rebuild€210,000–€1,100,000 (2.1–6.7 person-years (3,551–11,312 h), ~2–9 engineers)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.8× (at 56% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeMedium · 37% boilerplate · 18% straight-line · 45% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~4.4 person-years of build effort (about ~€640,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Security at 34% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — high decision density × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 20 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with commands.yml (7), check_release_notes.yml (5), repository_lockdown_check.yml (4).
+15.3 pts · Medium effort · Static Analysis (SAST)
2
Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.
+3.9 pts · Low effort · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing
3
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.
+3.9 pts · Low effort · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~4.4 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Security at 34%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~4.4 person-years rebuild (42,707 LoC) · weakest lens: Security 34%
→ Direct remediation budget at Security first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 20 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with commands.yml (7), check_release_notes.yml (5), repository_lockdown_check.yml (4). The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Resolve the 20 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with commands.yml (7), check_release_notes.yml (5), repository_lockdown_check.yml (4).

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

arch ctx:VisualStudio.Extension VisualStudio.Extension 1 project ctx:CommonLanguageServerProtocol.Framework.Proxy CommonLanguageServerProtocol.Framework.Proxy 1 project ctx:VisualStudio.Extension->ctx:CommonLanguageServerProtocol.Framework.Proxy __more__ +4 more contexts

At a glance — Code Health · 100% · Exemplary

The Good
D4 · .NET / C# Code Duplication 10.0

At a glance — Architecture · 91% · Exemplary

The Good
D35 · .NET / C# Change Coupling 9.8 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0
The Bad
D5 · .NET / C# Coupling 6.9

At a glance — Maturity · 75% · Strong

The Good
D16 · .NET / C# Bus Factor 9.8 D19 · .NET / C# Documentation Quality 8.0 D21 · .NET / C# Naming Consistency 10.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 6.7 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 5.0
The Ugly
D20 · .NET / C# ADR Quality 0.0

At a glance — Readiness · 69% · Adequate · gated by P4

The Good
D13 · .NET / C# Secret Scanning 10.0 D14 · .NET / C# License Compliance 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 8.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 10.0
The Ugly
P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 2.0

At a glance — Security · 34% · Weak · gated by D29, D36

The Good
D28 · .NET / C# Secrets (history) 10.0
The Ugly
D29 · .NET / C# Static Analysis (SAST) 0.3 D36 · .NET / C# Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 0.0

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection20High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by resolving the 20 high-priority static analysis findings, focusing first on commands.yml, check_release_notes.yml, and repository_lockdown_check.yml. Next, implement automated release and rollback capabilities in the CI pipeline to ensure deployments are repeatable and reversible. Finally, address the three supply-chain gaps by enabling artifact signing, establishing build provenance, and pinning build actions to specific versions.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 20 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with commands.yml (7), check_release_notes.yml (5), repository_lockdown_check.yml (4).+15.3 ptsMediumStatic Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+3.9 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+3.9 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing.+3.9 ptsLowSupply-chain Provenance & Signing
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.+3.0 ptsLowADR Quality
Automate the release in CI — a deploy stage for a service (Helm/Kubernetes manifests or an equivalent rollout), or a tag-triggered publish job for an artifact — so releases are repeatable and reversible.+4.6 ptsMediumDeployment & Rollback
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.+3.0 ptsMediumDocumentation (README)
Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.+3.0 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 23 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 48% mixed · 52% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/commands.yml4.4MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/check_release_notes.yml4.6MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/repository_lockdown_check.yml4.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/add_to_project.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/skill-validation.yml7.2MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
docs/fcs/filesystem.fsx7.4MixedChange Coupling: Change coupling: filesystem.fsx ↔ tokenizer.fsx
buildtools/fslex/Arg.fs7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)
buildtools/fslex/fslexdriver.fs7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (10 lines × 2)
buildtools/fslex/fslexlex.fs7.8MixedCode Duplication: Duplicated block (7 lines × 2)
vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/Hints/Hints.fs7.8MixedChange Coupling: Change coupling: Hints.fs ↔ LanguageService.fs
buildtools/fslex/Lexing.fsi8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (44 lines × 2)
buildtools/fslex/Parsing.fs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (37 lines × 2)
buildtools/fslex/Parsing.fsi8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (32 lines × 2)
buildtools/fslex/Lexing.fs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (22 lines × 2)
buildtools/fslex/Arg.fsi8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (20 lines × 2)
.github/skills/fsharp-diagnostics/server/Server.fs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (12 lines × 2)
buildtools/fsyacc/fsyaccast.fs8.5Near-cleanCode Duplication: Duplicated block (5 lines × 2)
docs/fcs/interactive.fsx8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: interactive.fsx ↔ untypedtree.fsx
vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/Diagnostics/SimplifyNameDiagnosticAnalyzer.fs8.5Near-cleanChange Coupling: Change coupling: SimplifyNameDiagnosticAnalyzer.fs ↔ UnusedDeclarationsAnalyzer.fs

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 20 of 22 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.4 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 22 dimensions across the health lenses
D4D5D13D14D16D19D20D21D28D29D35D36AX3AX4M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 43 of 58 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019f7d07-27fa-7aa3-b96b-23b265d00ba1.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — scanner not present in this environment — The backing tool was not installed where this scan ran, so this dimension was not scored. Install the tool (or run in the hosted environment, where it is always present) for a graded result.

Repo exclusion declarations: 3 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (EF migration scaffolds, *.Designer.cs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only; the generated footprint is reported separately under Solution Shape.
  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D20, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D4 · Code Duplication10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.

Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

13 duplicated block group(s) detected.

Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×2buildtools/fslex/fslexlex.fs:23
Duplicated block (44 lines × 2)buildtools/fslex/Lexing.fsi:10
Duplicated block (37 lines × 2)buildtools/fslex/Parsing.fs:412
Duplicated block (32 lines × 2)buildtools/fslex/Parsing.fsi:39
Duplicated block (22 lines × 2)buildtools/fslex/Lexing.fs:73

+ 7 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D5 · Coupling6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

40 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

What to do

  1. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D14 · License Compliance10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.

Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 of 1 packages use a banned license.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d14_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

10 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/Compiler/TypedTree/TypedTreeOps.Remap.fs.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The documentation is clear and complete for an open-source project hosting F# compiler, core library, editor tools, and related test infrastructure. The README gives a strong 'Why do we test' rationale plus goals (standardized framework, discoverable tests, cross-platform builds), and the dedicated tests/README explains testing strategy, categorization by type/test category, and justifications for xUnit over alternatives like NUnit.

The README is a single-file 'Why do we test' doc with no concrete guidance on how to contribute new tests or run existing ones.README.md

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 The README is a single-file 'Why do we test' doc with no concrete… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)0.3 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.3 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

20 finding(s): 0 critical, 20 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×20.github/workflows/add_to_project.yml:37detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 20 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with commands.yml (7), check_release_notes.yml (5), repository_lockdown_check.yml (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (20 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: filesystem.fsx↔tokenizer.fsx 70%; interactive.fsx↔untypedtree.fsx 67%; filesystem.fsx↔untypedtree.fsx 62%

Change coupling: filesystem.fsx ↔ tokenizer.fsx · ×9docs/fcs/filesystem.fsx

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 0.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

0/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
No build provenance
No artifact signing
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No artifact signing finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

M1 · Documentation (README)6.7 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
M2 · Architecture documentation5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — decisions aren't captured for future maintainers.

What to do

  • Start an ADR log (docs/adr/) recording significant decisions and their rationale.
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling8.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem/Roslyn scan: CodeQL, Dependabot, secret-scanning, and BenchmarkDotNet presence in pipelines and projects. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • <NuGetAudit>false</NuGetAudit> in MSBuild suppresses NuGet's vulnerability audit project-wide. — Directory.Build.props:4

What to do

  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No release automation was found in CI — neither a deploy stage (Helm/Kubernetes/compose manifests, an orchestrated rollout) nor a publish job that ships the built artifact. Releases appear to be run by hand, which is slower, less repeatable and harder to reverse.

What to do

  • Automate the release in CI — a deploy stage for a service (Helm/Kubernetes manifests or an equivalent rollout), or a tag-triggered publish job for an artifact — so releases are repeatable and reversible.
P6 · Release Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Code Health100%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Architecture91%ExemplarySolid.
Maturity75%StrongSolid.
Readiness69%Adequate — gated by P4Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Security34%Weak — gated by D29, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 73 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over the .NET document set and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from the .NET project graph (projects, types, namespaces) and no such graph was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over the .NET type surface and none was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — no data
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .fs, .py, .vb) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else was read (first-party JavaScript assets, a script in another language) is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: the solution failed to load, or the language model was unavailable, or it exposed no method bodies the complexity pass could read. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D10 Test Quality — ~457367 lines of test source are present (.fs, .vb, .ps1) but the test-quality collector reads C# only, so skipped/assertion-free tests couldn't be counted. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured — this repository's dependencies are not NuGet
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .cs, .fs, .py, .vb — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
  • D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
  • D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .fs, .py, .vb) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else was read (first-party JavaScript assets, a script in another language) is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: the solution failed to load, or the language model was unavailable, or it exposed no method bodies the complexity pass could read. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.cs, .fs, .py, .vb) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declare architecture.contexts (≥2) in config to assess cross-boundary type coupling.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.cs, .fs, .py, .vb) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else was read (another language's projects, first-party JavaScript assets) is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
  • D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness — knowledge concentrated in recent work — freshness signal contradicted by repo activity
  • D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is .fs, .py, which this pass does not read — so no class could be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Code Coverage not included (time budget)
  • D9 Test Distribution — Tests outside the analyzed solution
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but skipped (2/3 markers — below the conservative bar): 40 value object(s); 1 domain event(s)
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not run — 0/3 markers found
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — no C# methods found
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — no data
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads .NET source (ILogger/Serilog, OpenTelemetry, health checks) and no such source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or because the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET logging idiom is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not applicable — this isn't a service/API/worker
  • P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — commit a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference (.NET: C#, VB.NET and F# alike), lcov — `swift test --enable-code-coverage` or `xcodebuild -enableCodeCoverage YES` then `xcrun llvm-cov export -format=lcov` (Swift/Xcode), `cargo llvm-cov --lcov`, `go test -coverprofile`, `rebar3 do eunit --cover, cover` or covertool (Erlang/BEAM), `flutter test --coverage` or `dart test --coverage=coverage` then `dart run coverage:format_coverage --lcov` (Dart/Flutter), `sbt clean coverage test coverageReport` via sbt-scoverage (Scala/sbt), jest/nyc, JaCoCo/Cobertura XML, coverage.py … most ecosystems' coverage tools can emit one) anywhere in the repo, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads .NET source (allocation-aware APIs — Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc — and a BenchmarkDotNet suite) and no such source was loaded for this repository, because it is written in another language or the solution failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from C# source (attributes, middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) and no C# source was loaded for this repository — because it is written in another language, or the solution failed to load. Absence of a .NET idiom is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — no data
  • X1 Async correctness — no C# methods found
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — no C# methods found
  • X3 Exception handling — no C# methods found
  • X4 Structured logging — no C# methods found
  • X5 Nullable reference types — no NRT-eligible projects

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 21 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×20
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/add_to_project.yml:37 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/add_to_project.yml:50 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/check_release_notes.yml:21 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/check_release_notes.yml:32 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/check_release_notes.yml:246 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/check_release_notes.yml:255 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/check_release_notes.yml:269 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/commands.yml:18 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/commands.yml:71 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/commands.yml:79 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/commands.yml:88 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/commands.yml:120 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/commands.yml:136 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/commands.yml:144 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml:18 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/repository_lockdown_check.yml:29 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/repository_lockdown_check.yml:38 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/repository_lockdown_check.yml:53 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/repository_lockdown_check.yml:68 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/skill-validation.yml:30 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
D18 · Solution Shape · Dimension evaluation failed · ×1
  • Dimension evaluation failed — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so solution shape could not be assessed
Warning — 24 finding(s)
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×9
  • Change coupling: filesystem.fsx ↔ tokenizer.fsx docs/fcs/filesystem.fsx — `docs/fcs/filesystem.fsx` and `docs/fcs/tokenizer.fsx` change together 70% of the time (7 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. They already sit in the same directory, so if they share structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: interactive.fsx ↔ untypedtree.fsx docs/fcs/interactive.fsx — `docs/fcs/interactive.fsx` and `docs/fcs/untypedtree.fsx` change together 67% of the time (8 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. They already sit in the same directory, so if they share structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: filesystem.fsx ↔ untypedtree.fsx docs/fcs/filesystem.fsx — `docs/fcs/filesystem.fsx` and `docs/fcs/untypedtree.fsx` change together 62% of the time (8 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. They already sit in the same directory, so if they share structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: filesystem.fsx ↔ interactive.fsx docs/fcs/filesystem.fsx — `docs/fcs/filesystem.fsx` and `docs/fcs/interactive.fsx` change together 58% of the time (7 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. They already sit in the same directory, so if they share structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: SimplifyNameDiagnosticAnalyzer.fs ↔ UnusedDeclarationsAnalyzer.fs vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/Diagnostics/SimplifyNameDiagnosticAnalyzer.fs — `vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/Diagnostics/SimplifyNameDiagnosticAnalyzer.fs` and `vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/Diagnostics/UnusedDeclarationsAnalyzer.fs` change together 52% of the time (11 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. They already sit in the same directory, so if they share structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: UnusedDeclarationsAnalyzer.fs ↔ UnusedOpensDiagnosticAnalyzer.fs vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/Diagnostics/UnusedDeclarationsAnalyzer.fs — `vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/Diagnostics/UnusedDeclarationsAnalyzer.fs` and `vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/Diagnostics/UnusedOpensDiagnosticAnalyzer.fs` change together 52% of the time (11 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. They already sit in the same directory, so if they share structure, extract the common part into one unit; otherwise break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: BraceMatchingService.fs ↔ FSharpProjectOptionsManager.fs vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/Formatting/BraceMatchingService.fs — `vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/Formatting/BraceMatchingService.fs` and `vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/LanguageService/FSharpProjectOptionsManager.fs` change together 50% of the time (6 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: Hints.fs ↔ LanguageService.fs vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/Hints/Hints.fs — `vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/Hints/Hints.fs` and `vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/LanguageService/LanguageService.fs` change together 50% of the time (5 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
  • Change coupling: Hints.fs ↔ EditorOptions.fs vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/Hints/Hints.fs — `vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/Hints/Hints.fs` and `vsintegration/src/FSharp.Editor/Options/EditorOptions.fs` change together 50% of the time (5 shared commits) with no explicit dependency — a hidden/logical coupling. If they belong together, co-locate them; if not, break the coupling.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) · ×2
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) buildtools/fslex/fslexlex.fs:23 — buildtools/fslex/fslexlex.fs:23-29 | buildtools/fsyacc/fsyacclex.fs:12-18
  • Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) buildtools/fslex/fslexlex.fs:344 — buildtools/fslex/fslexlex.fs:344-350 | buildtools/fsyacc/fsyacclex.fs:292-298
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity.
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (44 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (44 lines × 2) buildtools/fslex/Lexing.fsi:10 — buildtools/fslex/Lexing.fsi:10-53 | buildtools/fsyacc/Lexing.fsi:10-53
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (37 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (37 lines × 2) buildtools/fslex/Parsing.fs:412 — buildtools/fslex/Parsing.fs:412-448 | buildtools/fsyacc/Parsing.fs:412-448
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (32 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (32 lines × 2) buildtools/fslex/Parsing.fsi:39 — buildtools/fslex/Parsing.fsi:39-70 | buildtools/fsyacc/Parsing.fsi:39-70
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) buildtools/fslex/Lexing.fs:73 — buildtools/fslex/Lexing.fs:73-94 | buildtools/fsyacc/Lexing.fs:73-94
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (20 lines × 2) buildtools/fslex/Arg.fsi:14 — buildtools/fslex/Arg.fsi:14-33 | buildtools/fsyacc/Arg.fsi:14-33
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) buildtools/fslex/Arg.fs:65 — buildtools/fslex/Arg.fs:65-81 | buildtools/fsyacc/Arg.fs:65-81
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) buildtools/fslex/Arg.fs:18 — buildtools/fslex/Arg.fs:18-32 | buildtools/fsyacc/Arg.fs:18-32
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) .github/skills/fsharp-diagnostics/server/Server.fs:135 — .github/skills/fsharp-diagnostics/server/Server.fs:135-146 | .github/skills/fsharp-diagnostics/server/Server.fs:217-228
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) buildtools/fslex/fslexdriver.fs:134 — buildtools/fslex/fslexdriver.fs:134-143 | buildtools/fslex/fslexdriver.fs:166-175
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (9 lines × 2) buildtools/fslex/fslexdriver.fs:73 — buildtools/fslex/fslexdriver.fs:73-81 | buildtools/fsyacc/fsyaccdriver.fs:21-29
D4 · Code Duplication · Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) · ×1
  • Duplicated block (5 lines × 2) buildtools/fsyacc/fsyaccast.fs:313 — buildtools/fsyacc/fsyaccast.fs:313-317 | buildtools/fsyacc/fsyaccast.fs:324-328
D9 · Test Distribution · Tests outside the analyzed solution · ×1
  • Tests outside the analyzed solution — 14 test project(s) exist on disk but aren't in the analyzed solution (e.g. FSharp.Editor.IntegrationTests.csproj), so they aren't built or gated with the production code and can't be assessed here. Add them to the solution, or point Watchdog at a solution that includes them.
Recommendation — 11 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — Test source is present (.fs, .vb, .ps1) but the built-in reliability runner did not recognise a test project it can re-run for this repository's ecosystem, so flakiness couldn't be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · complexity unreadable for .cs, .fs, .py, .vb · ×1
  • complexity unreadable for .cs, .fs, .py, .vb — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (34538 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .cs, .fs, .py, .vb, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 5 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner (largest: src/Compiler/TypedTree/TypedTreeOps.Remap.fs). Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D16 · Bus Factor · Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
  • Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 4 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (10 single-owned of 427 analysed files in total).
D19 · Documentation Quality · The README is a single-file 'Why do we test' doc with no concrete guidance on how to contribute new tests or run existing ones. · ×1
  • The README is a single-file 'Why do we test' doc with no concrete guidance on how to contribute new tests or run existing ones. README.md — Add a short Contributing section (or link to CONTRIBUTING.md) that maps the two test-type/test-category axes to actual test types and gives commands for running, filtering, or failing an individual test.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · knowledge concentrated in recent work · ×1
  • knowledge concentrated in recent work — freshness signal contradicted by repo activity — File-level freshness contradicts repo activity: 244 commits in the last 90 days, yet 332 of 481 significant files carry no living knowledge. The history shape (bulk moves/imports or broad sweep commits diluting per-file focus) is distorting the recency signal, so freshness is not scored for this run.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI (e.g. slsa-github-generator, actions/attest-build-provenance).
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No artifact signing · ×1
  • No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives or the checksum file you already publish) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found (e.g. syft / anchore/sbom-action / *.spdx.json / *.cdx.json).
D8 · Code Coverage · Code Coverage not included (time budget) · ×1
  • Code Coverage not included (time budget) — Code Coverage couldn't be assessed within its 5-minute budget on a solution this large — not included in this run.
Info — 2 finding(s)
D12 · Dependency Hygiene · Dependency hygiene not measured · ×1
  • Dependency hygiene not measured — this repository's dependencies are not NuGet — Dependency hygiene is currently assessed for .NET (NuGet) dependencies only, and this repository's production source is .fs, .py. Zero packages read is NOT a clean dependency tree, so this is NOT SCORED — a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Dependencies declared for other ecosystems (a Cargo manifest, a Go module (go.mod/go.sum), an OSGi MANIFEST.MF/target platform, a Maven POM, a Gradle version catalogue, an sbt build (build.sbt), composer.json, package.json, a Dart pubspec.yaml, a Swift Package.swift/Package.resolved, a rebar.config / erlang.mk DEPS (Hex), a Ruby Gemfile/Gemfile.lock or .gemspec (Bundler/RubyGems)) are not read yet.
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .0artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .20artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.0—
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep: not applicable — No PII/GDPR ruleset is bundled (the public p/gdpr semgrep pack was retired) — data compliance is not assessed in this scan.0—
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside bin/obj (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0—
D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policydisclosure—disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner: not applicable — No JS/npm lockfile found outside bin/obj (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); nothing for OSV to scan.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019f7d07-27fa-7aa3-b96b-23b265d00ba1 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 21 · Warnings: 24 · Recommendations: 11 · Info: 2 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 20-07-2026 @ 00:57 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md