Public report — yarp, published 5 Aug 2026. Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version; ask the repo owner for the full report.
Watchdogby Canine Development 05-08-2026 @ 12:41 UTC Public
Code Health Audit

Dotnet/yarp

63% Adequate
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
middle
Architecture 93% Exemplary Readiness 70% Adequate Security 61% Adequate Maturity 58% Adequate

Medium · 26,695 LoC · 36 projects · rebuild ~0.7 person-years · weakest lens: Maturity (58%)

Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸

26/28dimensions tool-verifieddeterministic · confidence 1.0 · 2 LLM-assisted, advisory
37findings with an exact file:lineof 51 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
28/95dimensions across the health lenses26695 LoC · 36 projects — wide & deep

Executive summary

Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.

dotnet/yarp is sound in substance but carries real gaps (63%). It is not in crisis, but the issues below raise the cost of changing it — friction its consumers ultimately inherit.

It is strongest in Architecture (93%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained.

The area that most needs attention is Maturity (58%) — onboarding is slow — key decisions and the architecture aren't written down, so contributors have to reverse-engineer the intent. Security (61%) is the next concern — exposure to security and compliance incidents is elevated.

Leadership focus, highest impact first: Record significant decisions one document per decision (Architecture documentation); 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README (Documentation (README)); 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality (ADR Quality).

For scale: Medium (~26,695 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.7 person-years (~1–2 engineers). Approximate, ±~30%.

It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (93%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.

Architecture 93% ★ Exemplary Maturity 58% Adequate · gated by D34, M2 Readiness 70% Adequate Security 61% Adequate · gated by D29, D32, D36
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Maturity 58% · 50% weightSecurity 61% · 27% weightReadiness 70% · 15% weightArchitecture 93% · 8% weight

Raise Maturity 58 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 63 → ~67.

Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 18%Plumbing 31%Tests 52%
New since the last scan (4+)

4 finding(s) are new versus the previous scan (2026-08-01) — surfaced by this scheduled scan itself, no pull request required.

  • D32 · High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log src/Kubernetes.Controller/Caching/IngressCache.cs
  • D32 · High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log src/Kubernetes.Controller/Client/V1IngressResourceStatusUpdater.cs
  • D32 · High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log src/Kubernetes.Controller/Client/V1IngressResourceStatusUpdater.cs
  • D32 · High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log src/Kubernetes.Controller/Services/Reconciler.cs

A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.

Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €35,000–€180,000
Cost to rebuild€35,000–€180,000 (0.3–1.1 person-years (583–1,875 h), ~1–2 engineers)
Domain complexityStandard — harder problems cost more per line
Quality factor0.9× (at 63% quality) — the last 20% of quality is most of the work
Size & shapeMedium · 46% boilerplate · 17% straight-line · 37% branching logic

This codebase represents roughly ~0.7 person-years of build effort (about ~€110,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Maturity at 58% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.

How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.2) — high decision density × a 0.9× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).

Top priorities

The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.

1
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.
+7.2 pts · Low effort · ADR Quality
2
Resolve the 1 Concentrated knowledge decay finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.
+4.5 pts · Low effort · Knowledge Freshness
3
Resolve the 1 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with HttpSysDelegator.cs.
+4.5 pts · Low effort · Knowledge Freshness

Diagnosis — what's actually going on

Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Medium asset (~0.7 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Maturity at 58%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Evidence: valuation: Medium, ~0.7 person-years rebuild (26,695 LoC) · weakest lens: Maturity 58%
→ Direct remediation budget at Maturity first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form). The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).

Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph

Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.

arch ctx:Controller Controller Controller ctx:ReverseProxy ReverseProxy ReverseProxy ctx:Controller->ctx:ReverseProxy ctx:TelemetryConsumption TelemetryConsumption Consumption ctx:TelemetryConsumption->ctx:ReverseProxy ctx:samples samples BasicYarpSample · HttpLoadApp · Ingress · IngressController … ctx:samples->ctx:Controller ctx:samples->ctx:ReverseProxy ctx:testassets testassets BenchmarkApp · Code · Config · Direct … ctx:testassets->ctx:ReverseProxy ctx:testassets->ctx:TelemetryConsumption __more__ +2 more contexts

At a glance — Architecture · 93% · Exemplary

The Good
D35 · Python Change Coupling 10.0 AX3 · Repo Project dependency cycles 10.0 AX4 · Repo Dependency direction 10.0 AX8 · Repo Test isolation 10.0
The Bad
D5 · Python Coupling 6.9

At a glance — Maturity · 58% · Adequate · gated by D34, M2

The Good
D16 · Python Bus Factor 9.8 D19 · Python Documentation Quality 7.0 D21 · Python Naming Consistency 10.0 M3 · Repo Folder & project structure 10.0 M4 · Repo Documentation accuracy 10.0
The Bad
M1 · Repo Documentation (README) 5.8
The Ugly
D20 · Python ADR Quality 0.0 D34 · Python Knowledge Freshness 3.9 M2 · Repo Architecture documentation 2.0

At a glance — Readiness · 70% · Adequate

The Good
D9 · Python Test Distribution 10.0 D10 · Python Test Quality 9.6 D12 · Python Dependency Hygiene 10.0 D13 · Python Secret Scanning 10.0 P1 · Repo CI/CD gates 10.0 P3 · Repo Security & performance tooling 7.0
The Bad
P4 · Repo Deployment & Rollback 5.0 P6 · Repo Release Hygiene 5.0

At a glance — Security · 61% · Adequate · gated by D29, D32, D36

The Good
D28 · Python Secrets (history) 9.0 D31 · Python IaC & Container Security 10.0 D37 · Python Vulnerability-disclosure Policy 10.0
The Ugly
D29 · Python Static Analysis (SAST) 2.5 D32 · Python Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) 2.5 D36 · Python Supply-chain Provenance & Signing 2.5

Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping

Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).

OWASP categoryFindingsSeverity
A03:2021 — Injection8High / Critical
A04:2021 — Insecure Design4High / Critical

Roadmap

Begin by establishing a formal architecture decision record system, documenting significant design choices and their consequences in a centralized location. Simultaneously, update the root README to include a high-level 'Architecture' or 'How it works' section for better onboarding. Finally, address critical knowledge gaps by resolving the missing architecture documentation and updating the most recently modified files, starting with HttpSysDelegator.cs, to ensure the codebase remains fresh and understandable.

Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.

Do thisHelpsEffortDimension
Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality.+7.2 ptsLowADR Quality
Resolve the 1 Concentrated knowledge decay finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness.+4.5 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Resolve the 1 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with HttpSysDelegator.cs.+4.5 ptsLowKnowledge Freshness
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).+8.1 ptsMediumArchitecture documentation
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.+8.1 ptsMediumDocumentation (README)
Resolve the 1 The 'Docs Folder' entry lists only design notes and operations docs,… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md.+3.5 ptsLowDocumentation Quality
Resolve the 8 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with docker_build.yml (6), markdownlint.yml (2).+3.0 ptsLowStatic Analysis (SAST)
Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — start with V1IngressResourceStatusUpdater.cs (2), IngressCache.cs, Reconciler.cs.+3.0 ptsLowData Compliance (PII/GDPR)

File quality

Per-file score 0–10 — a quality signature. Of 23 files carrying findings, judged against the Production bar: 0% slop · 26% mixed · 74% near-clean.

FileScoreBandWorst signal
.github/workflows/docker_build.yml4.5MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
.github/workflows/markdownlint.yml5.8MixedStatic Analysis (SAST): High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag
src/Kubernetes.Controller/Client/V1IngressResourceStatusUpdater.cs5.8MixedData Compliance (PII/GDPR): High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log
src/Kubernetes.Controller/Caching/IngressCache.cs7.2MixedData Compliance (PII/GDPR): High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log
src/Kubernetes.Controller/Services/Reconciler.cs7.2MixedData Compliance (PII/GDPR): High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log
test/Kubernetes.Tests/Rate/LimiterTests.cs7.8MixedTest Quality: Skipped test: WaitAsyncCausesPauseLikeReserve
test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Configuration/ConfigValidatorTests.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: Constructor_Works
test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Delegation/HttpSysDelegatorTests.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: ResetQueue
test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Forwarder/ReverseProxyServiceCollectionTests.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: ConfigureHttpClient_Works
test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Forwarder/ForwarderMiddlewareTests.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: Constructor_Works
test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Forwarder/ForwarderHttpClientFactoryTests.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: Constructor_Works
test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Limits/LimitsMiddlewareTests.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: Constructor_Works
test/ReverseProxy.Tests/LoadBalancing/LoadBalancerMiddlewareTests.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: Constructor_Works
test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Management/ProxyConfigManagerTests.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: Constructor_Works
test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Model/ProxyPipelineInitializerMiddlewareTests.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: Constructor_Works
test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Routing/ProxyEndpointFactoryTests.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: Constructor_Works
test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Transforms/ResponseHeadersAllowedTransformTests.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: ProxyResponseNull_DoNothing
test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Transforms/ResponseHeaderRemoveTransformTests.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: RemoveHeader_ResponseNull_DoNothing
test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Transforms/DestinationPrefixTransformTests.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: UpdateDestinationPrefix
test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Transforms/Builder/TransformBuilderTests.cs8.5Near-cleanTest Quality: No assertions: CreateBuilder_Success

Methodology & how to trust this report

Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 26 of 28 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.

Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.

What we checked — 28 dimensions across the health lenses
D5D9D10D12D13D16D19D20D21D28D29D31D32D34D35D36D37AX3AX4AX8M1M2M3M4P1P3P4P6

Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.

How to trust any code-health report — three questions
  1. Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 37 of 51 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
  2. Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
  3. Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.

This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.

Tools & methods

The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.

MethodBacksVersionEvaluator
Roslyn static analysisComplexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering5.3.0✓ deterministic
Native secret scannerHardcoded secrets / credentials1.0.0✓ deterministic
jscpdCode duplication—✓ deterministic
Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage)Line & branch coverage10.0.302✓ deterministic
NuGet / dotnetOutdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies10.0.302✓ deterministic
git / LibGit2SharpChurn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history2.43.0 · 0.31.0✓ deterministic
gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkovSecrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR1.86.0 · 0.69.3 · 3.2.533✓ deterministic
LLM (sampled · advisory)Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurementLocal LLM◐ LLM · sampled · advisory

Every finding is locatable in findings.md. Run 019fd1f1-bba8-7c24-9065-5007a1c538b7.

The exact command behind every deep-scan dimension — tool, version, invocation and retained raw output — is in Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail.

Run transparency — what happened this run

What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.

  • D18 Solution Shape — evaluation did not complete — Dimension evaluation failed — excluded from the score.

Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.

Limitations & what we did not check

Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.

Per-dimension blind spots

For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.

  • D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
  • D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
  • D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
  • D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
  • D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
  • D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
  • D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
  • D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
  • D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
  • D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
  • D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
  • D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR): PII/GDPR signals are heuristic pattern matches in code — they flag likely handling concerns, not legal compliance, and cannot trace where data actually flows at runtime.
  • D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
  • D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
  • M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
  • P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
  • P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.

The LLM boundary

LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D20, D21, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.

Dimensions

D5 · Coupling6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.

Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.

Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 6.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

36 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).

What to do

  1. Enforce Coupling in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.

Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md.

D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.

Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

698 test methods: 698 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.

Tests co-located / outside the solution

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D10 · Test Quality9.6 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.

Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.6 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

7 skipped (5 with a documented reason), 15 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 698 tests.

No assertions: Constructor_Works · ×15test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Configuration/ConfigValidatorTests.cs:38
Skipped test: WaitAsyncCausesPauseLikeReserve · ×2test/Kubernetes.Tests/Rate/LimiterTests.cs:114
Skipped (documented): WebSocketFallbackFromH2WS · ×5test/ReverseProxy.FunctionalTests/WebSocketTests.cs:428

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D12 · Dependency Hygiene10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.

Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md.

D13 · Secret Scanning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.

Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Prevented

Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md.

D16 · Bus Factor9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").

Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.8 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

3 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/ReverseProxy/Utilities/TlsFrameHelper.cs.

Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
Further sole-owners (lower concentration)

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D19 · Documentation Quality / 10Strong◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Strong / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

The YARP project's documentation is strong and well-organized: a welcome message, getting-started links, updates, build instructions, a samples section with a breaking-changes warning, and dedicated docs folders for design notes, operations, and telemetry. The README files are consistent across the repository (e.g., 'docs/README.md' names 'Design Notes' and 'Operations'), but there is no single comprehensive architecture or module reference document to back up claims like customizability being a primary scenario rather than requiring script or rebuild from source.

The 'Docs Folder' entry lists only design notes and operations docs, with no reference to the main architecture or module documentation that would justify claims such as customizability being a primary use case.docs/README.md

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 The 'Docs Folder' entry lists only design notes and operations docs,… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with README.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D20 · ADR Quality / 10Critical◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).

Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Critical / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

No architecture decision records were found.

No ADRs found

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d20_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D21 · Naming Consistency / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective Exemplary / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Verified

0 naming inconsistencies across 0 sampled symbols.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.

D28 · Secrets (history)9.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.

Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 9.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md.

D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.

Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.

Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

8 finding(s): 0 critical, 8 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×8.github/workflows/docker_build.yml:16detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 8 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with docker_build.yml (6), markdownlint.yml (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D31 · IaC & Container Security10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

What it measures: Whether Dockerfiles / Terraform / Kubernetes config follow security best practices.

Method: IaC/container misconfiguration scan via trivy config (Dockerfile/Terraform/K8s/Helm/CloudFormation); severity rules to 0-10 moderate normalizer. NotApplicable without manifests. Exhaustive, deterministic.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

trivy and checkov found no infrastructure-as-code or container misconfigurations.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md.

D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Likely personal-data (PII / GDPR) handling concerns — logging or storing data without safeguards.

Method: Heuristic PII/GDPR pattern scan via semgrep across the repo, using Watchdog's own ruleset (personal data reaching log/console sinks, URLs and query strings, or unprotected browser storage); matches map to severity and a 0-10 wide normalizer. NotApplicable when the scan runs and detects no PII/GDPR surface (no unearned 10); reported LOUDLY as a measurement gap, never as not-applicable, if the ruleset is missing from the analyzer image. Exhaustive, advisory-leaning; degrades on parse failure.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

4 finding(s): 0 critical, 4 high, 0 medium, 0 low.

High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log · ×4src/Kubernetes.Controller/Caching/IngressCache.cs:52detected by semgrep finding

What to do

  1. Resolve the 4 High finding(s) in Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — start with V1IngressResourceStatusUpdater.cs (2), IngressCache.cs, Reconciler.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).

Detailed fixes: d32_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D34 · Knowledge Freshness3.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.

Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 3.9 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

79 of 128 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/ReverseProxy/Delegation/HttpSysDelegator.cs.

Concentrated knowledge decay
Largest orphaned filesrc/ReverseProxy/Delegation/HttpSysDelegator.cs

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Concentrated knowledge decay finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with HttpSysDelegator.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D35 · Change Coupling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.

Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.

Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

Strongest change-coupling: ResponseHeadersAllowedTransform.cs↔ResponseTrailersAllowedTransform.cs 50%

Change coupling: ResponseHeadersAllowedTransform.cs ↔ ResponseTrailersAllowedTransform.cssrc/ReverseProxy/Transforms/ResponseHeadersAllowedTransform.cs

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d35_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing2.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.

Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 2.5 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

1/4 supply-chain integrity signals present (provenance, signing, SBOM, pinned actions).

Unpinned build actions
PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block
No build provenance
No SBOM

What to do

  1. Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  2. Resolve the 1 PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
  3. Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).

Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.

D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

What it measures: Whether the repository publishes a coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md or security.txt) with a reporting contact, so finders know how to report a vulnerability. Presence of a policy file with a contact, not whether the policy is adequate or honoured.

Method: Vulnerability-disclosure policy read deterministically from the repo: a SECURITY.md (root/.github/docs) or .well-known/security.txt / security.txt, regex-checked for a reporting contact (email / URL / mailto). Present + contact → 10; present without a contact → 4; NotApplicable when no policy file exists (it may live off-repo). Detects the policy file's presence + contact, not its adequacy.

Maturity: Documented → Verified → Prevented · effective 10.0 / 10 · rule-coverage 100% · ceiling Documented

A vulnerability-disclosure policy (SECURITY.md) is published with a reporting contact.

✓ On the Gold path — maintain.

Detailed fixes: d37_recommendation.md.

Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions

R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.

AX3 · Project dependency cycles10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).

Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.

AX4 · Dependency direction10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.

Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.

AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.

Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.

M1 · Documentation (README)5.8 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.

Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.

  • 22 code files changed in the last 6 months but the README was not touched — it may no longer reflect the system.

What to do

  • Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
  • Review the README against recent changes; refresh the parts that drifted.
M2 · Architecture documentation2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.

Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.

What to do

  • Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
M3 · Folder & project structure10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.

Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.

M4 · Documentation accuracy10.0 / 10Exemplary◐ Sampled · advisory

Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).

Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.

P1 · CI/CD gates10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged

Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.

Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.

P3 · Security & performance tooling7.0 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).

Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
P4 · Deployment & Rollback5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.

Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.

What to do

  • Nothing pauses a release for a human: publish as a draft release (or gate the release job on a protected tag/manual dispatch) so a bad build can be stopped before users can download it.
P6 · Release Hygiene5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified

Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.

Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.

  • No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)

What to do

  • Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.

Reference — by lens

The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.

LensScoreRatingImpact
Architecture93%ExemplaryStrongest area.
Maturity58%Adequate — gated by D34, M2Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Readiness70%AdequateAcceptable, with room to improve.
Security61%Adequate — gated by D29, D32, D36Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 67 check(s) not relevant to this codebase

These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.

  • AC1 Text alternatives — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC2 Forms & labels — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC3 Page structure — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC4 Keyboard semantics — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC5 ARIA correctness — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC6 Visual & motion safety — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AC7 A11y enforcement — No web markup found — accessibility is not applicable to this repository.
  • AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
  • AX10 Code composition — not assessed — code composition is computed by ROLE over a document set that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
  • AX5 Architecture & structure — not assessed — architecture style/structure is computed from a project graph (projects, types, module namespaces) that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX6 Interface segregation — not assessed — interface segregation is computed over a type surface that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
  • AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
  • AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • C1 Data Protection — Not assessed: these personal data controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks personal data controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C2 Access Controls — Not assessed: these authorization controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks authorization controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C3 Audit Trail — Not assessed: these audit controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks audit controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C4 Data Retention — Not assessed: these retention controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks retention controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • C5 Data-Subject Rights — Not assessed: these data-subject rights controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks data-subject rights controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not included
  • D14 License Compliance — license scan produced no result — the tool ran but its JSON output could not be parsed; the offline NuGet fallback resolved nothing
  • D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots — complexity unreadable for .cs — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured
  • D17 Explicit Debt — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so explicit-debt density could not be measured
  • D18 Solution Shape — Dimension evaluation failed
  • D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.cs) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
  • D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Production source is present (.cs, .py) but bounded contexts are resolved over the C#/VB project set, which exposed none, so context scope could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository. Declaring the codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed — see the recommendation on this dimension for where. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
  • D24 Comment Value — No inline comments to assess — comment value is not applicable here.
  • D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
  • D26 Project Cohesion — Project cohesion is assessed over the .NET project set; this target exposed no projects, so project size and spread could not be assessed. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D27 Navigability — No calls could be sampled, so navigability was not assessed — tracing effort is measured over resolved call sites and this target exposed none. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.cs) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
  • D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
  • D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
  • D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
  • D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
  • D4 Code Duplication — Most of this repository's production source (.cs) was not read by duplication detection, so code duplication was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's duplication. Not scored: no source of those file kinds was exposed to the token comparison by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
  • D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
  • D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — No production classes were analyzable, so cohesion (LCOM4) was not measured (the solution likely failed to load or has no production code).
  • D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
  • D8 Code Coverage — Code Coverage not included (time budget)
  • DM1 Domain Modelling — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED1 Event-Driven — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
  • ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
  • GD1 Unfinished & placeholder code — no source files
  • IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
  • P2 Observability — Observability was not assessed: this check reads a source model that does not carry this repository's product — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of a logging idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repo lacks structured logging (it may log through its own ecosystem's logger). This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
  • P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
  • P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — not measured — the application kind could not be determined for this repo
  • P8 Schema migrations — not assessed — schema-migration practice is read from a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
  • PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance was not assessed: this lens reads a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this lens does not yet model or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository — in particular it is NOT a statement that this repo is unpackaged or performance-careless.
  • S1 Web-Security Posture — Not assessed: these web-security controls are read from a source model (declarative annotations, request middleware, entity/column names, guard methods) that was not loaded for this repository — because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. Absence of an idiom this check recognises is NOT evidence that this repository lacks web-security controls: it may implement them entirely in its own ecosystem. This is a gap in the analyzer's language coverage, not a finding about this repository.
  • SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
  • X1 Async correctness — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X2 Cancellation propagation — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X3 Exception handling — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X4 Structured logging — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository
  • X5 Nullable reference types — not analysed — these correctness checks read a source model that was not loaded for this repository, because the repository is written in a language this check does not yet model, or because its projects failed to load. This is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository

Appendix A — Findings (grouped)

The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.

Issue — 13 finding(s)
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) · High · ×8
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker_build.yml:16 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker_build.yml:19 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/setup-buildx-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/setup-buildx-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker_build.yml:23 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker_build.yml:31 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker_build.yml:39 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/docker_build.yml:47 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: docker/build-push-action@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `docker/build-push-action@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/docker/build-push-action/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/markdownlint.yml:17 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
  • High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/markdownlint.yml:19 — GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v6`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v6 --jq .sha`.
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) · High · ×4
  • High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log src/Kubernetes.Controller/Caching/IngressCache.cs:52 — Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
  • High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log src/Kubernetes.Controller/Client/V1IngressResourceStatusUpdater.cs:59 — Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
  • High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log src/Kubernetes.Controller/Client/V1IngressResourceStatusUpdater.cs:63 — Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
  • High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log src/Kubernetes.Controller/Services/Reconciler.cs:60 — Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
D18 · Solution Shape · Dimension evaluation failed · ×1
  • Dimension evaluation failed — the C# workspace loaded 0 projects, so solution shape could not be assessed
Warning — 20 finding(s)
D10 · Test Quality · No assertions · ×15
  • No assertions: Constructor_Works test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Configuration/ConfigValidatorTests.cs:38 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: ResetQueue test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Delegation/HttpSysDelegatorTests.cs:154 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: ConfigureHttpClient_Works test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Forwarder/ReverseProxyServiceCollectionTests.cs:14 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: Constructor_Works test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Forwarder/ForwarderMiddlewareTests.cs:20 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: Constructor_Works test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Forwarder/ForwarderHttpClientFactoryTests.cs:20 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: Constructor_Works test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Limits/LimitsMiddlewareTests.cs:18 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: Constructor_Works test/ReverseProxy.Tests/LoadBalancing/LoadBalancerMiddlewareTests.cs:33 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: Constructor_Works test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Management/ProxyConfigManagerTests.cs:103 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: Constructor_Works test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Model/ProxyPipelineInitializerMiddlewareTests.cs:33 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: Constructor_Works test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Routing/ProxyEndpointFactoryTests.cs:32 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: ProxyResponseNull_DoNothing test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Transforms/ResponseHeadersAllowedTransformTests.cs:126 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: RemoveHeader_ResponseNull_DoNothing test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Transforms/ResponseHeaderRemoveTransformTests.cs:61 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: UpdateDestinationPrefix test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Transforms/DestinationPrefixTransformTests.cs:11 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: CreateBuilder_Success test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Transforms/Builder/TransformBuilderTests.cs:23 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
  • No assertions: Constructor_Works test/ReverseProxy.Tests/Utilities/AtomicCounterTests.cs:11 — Test method exercises code but verifies nothing — add an assertion.
D10 · Test Quality · Skipped test · ×2
  • Skipped test: WaitAsyncCausesPauseLikeReserve test/Kubernetes.Tests/Rate/LimiterTests.cs:114 — Skipped — https://github.com/dotnet/yarp/issues/1357
  • Skipped test: ManyWaitsStackUp test/Kubernetes.Tests/Rate/LimiterTests.cs:158 — Skipped — https://github.com/dotnet/yarp/issues/1357
D35 · Change Coupling · Change coupling · ×1
  • Change coupling: ResponseHeadersAllowedTransform.cs ↔ ResponseTrailersAllowedTransform.cs src/ReverseProxy/Transforms/ResponseHeadersAllowedTransform.cs — `src/ReverseProxy/Transforms/ResponseHeadersAllowedTransform.cs` and `src/ReverseProxy/Transforms/ResponseTrailersAllowedTransform.cs` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · Unpinned build actions · ×1
  • Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 8 floating ref(s) across 2 workflow file(s). Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block · ×1
  • PR-triggered workflow without a permissions block — 1 workflow(s) triggered by pull_request declare no `permissions:` block (docker_build.yml) and so run with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope, while 1 sibling workflow in the same repository is already scoped. Pull-request runs build the least-trusted code in the repository; give each of these workflows its own least-privilege block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of the workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
Recommendation — 11 finding(s)
D11 · Test Reliability · Test reliability not included · ×1
  • Test reliability not included — No test suite was found, so reliability couldn't be assessed.
D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots · complexity unreadable for .cs · ×1
  • complexity unreadable for .cs — churn × complexity hotspots could not be measured — A hotspot is churn × complexity. Churn was measured (2044 line(s) across the 90-day window), but no complexity could be computed for .cs, which is most of this repository's production code — so every churned file would score as complexity 0 and the hotspot list would be empty no matter how tangled the code is. Not scored — this is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D16 · Bus Factor · Off-boarding risk · ×1
  • Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 1 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: testassets/ReverseProxy.Direct/TlsFilter.cs. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D16 · Bus Factor · Further sole-owners (lower concentration) · ×1
  • Further sole-owners (lower concentration) — 1 other contributor(s) are each the sole owner of a small amount of code below the off-boarding threshold — folded into the bus-factor score and metrics (3 single-owned of 128 analysed files in total, counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). They are anonymized user #2 (1 file(s)) — spread or document their files in the same way, at lower priority than the named off-boarding risks above.
D19 · Documentation Quality · The 'Docs Folder' entry lists only design notes and operations docs, with no reference to the main architecture or module documentation that would justify claims such as customizability being a primary use case. · ×1
  • The 'Docs Folder' entry lists only design notes and operations docs, with no reference to the main architecture or module documentation that would justify claims such as customizability being a primary use case. docs/README.md — Add a link to an architecture or modules doc (e.g. /docs/Architecture.md) so readers can verify the claim about customization versus script/build.
D20 · ADR Quality · No ADRs found · ×1
  • No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Concentrated knowledge decay · ×1
  • Concentrated knowledge decay — 79 of 128 significant files have no living knowledge, while the repository is still being changed at a low rate (12 commit(s) in the last 90 days) — so this is one repo-wide knowledge-decay state, not 79 separate risks. The code moved on without the people who understood these files: document them or schedule a read-through before the next change lands in them.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness · Largest orphaned file · ×1
  • Largest orphaned file src/ReverseProxy/Delegation/HttpSysDelegator.cs — One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No build provenance · ×1
  • No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing · No SBOM · ×1
  • No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
D8 · Code Coverage · Code Coverage not included (time budget) · ×1
  • Code Coverage not included (time budget) — Code Coverage couldn't be assessed within its 5-minute budget on a solution this large — not included in this run.
Info — 7 finding(s)
D10 · Test Quality · Skipped (documented) · ×5
  • Skipped (documented): WebSocketFallbackFromH2WS test/ReverseProxy.FunctionalTests/WebSocketTests.cs:428 — Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Manual test only, the CI doesn't always have the IIS Express test cert installed.
  • Skipped (documented): ServerSendsHttp2Reset_ReadToClientIsCanceled test/ReverseProxy.FunctionalTests/HttpForwarderCancellationTests.cs:25 — Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Condition not met
  • Skipped (documented): PostExpect100_BodyNotUploadedIfFailed test/ReverseProxy.FunctionalTests/Expect100ContinueTests.cs:27 — Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Condition not met
  • Skipped (documented): PostExpect100_ResponseWithPayload test/ReverseProxy.FunctionalTests/Expect100ContinueTests.cs:112 — Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Condition not met
  • Skipped (documented): PostExpect100_SkipRequestBodyWithUnsuccessfulResponseCode test/ReverseProxy.FunctionalTests/Expect100ContinueTests.cs:189 — Skipped with a documented reason — a deferral, not lazy debt: Condition not met
D22 · Internal API Consistency · No exposed public API · ×1
  • No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
D9 · Test Distribution · Tests co-located / outside the solution · ×1
  • Tests co-located / outside the solution — 698 test method(s) were found on disk (co-located in feature projects, or outside the analyzed solution) rather than in dedicated test projects, so the unit/integration/E2E pyramid can't be classified — they're counted as one undifferentiated suite.

Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail

Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.

DimensionToolVersionCommandFindingsRaw output
D28 · Secrets (history)gitleaks—gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source .1artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .8artifacts/raw/semgrep.json
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilitiesdotnet—dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution0—
D31 · IaC & Container Securitytrivy—trivy config --format json --quiet .0artifacts/raw/trivy-config.json
D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)semgrep—semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/gdpr.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off .4artifacts/raw/semgrep-gdpr.json
D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilitiestrivy—trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.0—
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilitiesosv-scanner—osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.0—
D40 · Network Egress Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.0—
D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcementruntime-hardening—runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.0—

Run 019fd1f1-bba8-7c24-9065-5007a1c538b7 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.

Issues: 13 · Warnings: 20 · Recommendations: 11 · Info: 7 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 05-08-2026 @ 12:41 UTC.

Downloadable artifacts

Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.

⬇ Findings, MITRE CWE-tagged .sarif⬇ Health changelog .md