Public report — CAP, published 5 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
161findings with an exact file:lineof 203 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
70/97dimensions across the health lenses19500 LoC · 38 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
dotnetcore/CAP is in a workable but fragile state (58%). It is not in crisis, but it carries material risk that makes change slower and incidents harder to contain if left unaddressed.
It is strongest in Architecture (86%) — the structure is clean and changes stay contained. Maturity (77%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (52%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Code Health (58%) is the next concern — changes there are slower and more error-prone.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling); `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your… (Outbound HTTP resilience); approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection… (Deployment & Rollback).
For scale: Small (~19,500 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Architecture foundation (86%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
A full-fidelity diff against the previous run's complete recorded findings — line-move tolerant: a finding that only shifted line counts as unchanged, only genuinely new titles/files surface here.
This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€34,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 52% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Standard (×1.1) — service/app × a 0.8× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30%. Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · Medium · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 52%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Architecture — module dependency graph
Project dependencies, layered top-to-bottom; arrows show direction. Any dashed red edge points upward or sideways — a layering smell or cycle. A clean layered graph has none.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
37 modules, 102 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
19
High / Critical
A03:2021 — Injection
9
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
2
High / Critical
A04:2021 — Insecure Design
2
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, integrate a static application security testing step into the CI pipeline to ensure security regressions fail the build. Next, implement HTTP client resilience policies to prevent external dependencies from taking down the application. Then, enforce an approval gate before promoting changes to production. Finally, resolve the single deprecated dependency finding and extend structured logging and diagnostics across all projects.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 67 of 70 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 70 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 161 of 203 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
A clean run — every tool resolved and ran, and every applicable dimension was measured at full confidence. No scanner was unavailable, no analysis timed out or crashed, and nothing fell back to a degraded estimate.
When something does degrade — a missing scanner, a shallow clone, an LLM hiccup — it is named here explicitly and its exact cause recorded in diagnostics.md, never absorbed silently into the score.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D16 Bus Factor: Bus-factor is a time-decayed model of commit attribution (who has recently, repeatedly worked a file), not comprehension — pairing, review and reading-without-committing spread knowledge it can't see; bot commits and shared accounts still distort it.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR): PII/GDPR signals are heuristic pattern matches in code — they flag likely handling concerns, not legal compliance, and cannot trace where data actually flows at runtime.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
C4 Data Retention: This control is scored from in-repo evidence only — its real-world effectiveness, exercised only at runtime, is outside a static scan.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (4): D19, D21, D24, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
Resolve the 1 DiagnosticListener.OnNext (cyclomatic 44) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with DiagnosticListener.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 AmazonSQSConsumerClient.ConnectAsync (cyclomatic 18) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with AmazonSQSConsumerClient.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 AwaitableInfo.IsTypeAwaitable (cyclomatic 17) finding(s) in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with AwaitableInfo.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cyclomatic Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 5 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 1 DiagnosticListener.OnNext (cognitive 67) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with DiagnosticListener.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 AmazonSQSConsumerClient.ConnectAsync (cognitive 49) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with AmazonSQSConsumerClient.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 SubscribeInvoker.InvokeAsync (cognitive 39) finding(s) in Cognitive Complexity — start with ISubscribeInvoker.Default.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Cognitive Complexity in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
+ 5 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.
Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.
+ 4 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 31 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with AwaitableInfo.cs, CoercedAwaitableInfo.cs, ObjectMethodExecutor.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (31 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 CRAP 199 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with AwaitableInfo.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 CRAP 110 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with AzureServiceBusConsumerClient.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Code Coverage in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
65 test methods: 65 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, 1 mock references across 65 tests.
Mock framework: NSubstitute
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.
Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Enforce Dependency Hygiene in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Whether knowledge is concentrated in too few people (the "bus factor").
Method: Living knowledge per author via time-decayed commit attribution (6-month half-life, focus weighting) across largest source files. Deterministic, avoids blame's mechanical-refactor false positives.
4 source file(s) have their living knowledge concentrated in one author (≥90% of recent, decayed contribution). The largest is src/DotNetCore.CAP.Kafka/KafkaConsumerClient.cs.
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d16_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D17 · Explicit Debt7.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
Resolve the 22 NoWarnInCsproj finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with DotNetCore.CAP.Test.csproj (4), DotNetCore.CAP.csproj (4), DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams.csproj (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (22 issue-level).
Resolve the 4 EmptyCatchBlock finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with CapCache.cs (3), NATSConsumerClient.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 CommentedOutCode finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Startup.cs, Program.cs, IDataStorage.InMemory.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Enforce Explicit Debt in CI to reach Verified (currently Documented). — Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
CAP's documentation is comprehensive and well-structured across READMEs, architecture/Docs markdown files, and XML docs. The CAP logo and a GitHub Pages deploy badge on the README give immediate visibility; the content covers core features (distributed transactions via Outbox pattern, event bus), release notes for every major version, license, contact info, and detailed guides for each supported transport (RabbitMQ, Kafka, Azure Service Bus, NATS, Redis Streams, In-Memory Queue). The XML-doc coverage is low (<20% on the 16-458 package range) but the visible content is clear and complete. A strong architecture overview would have been ideal to ground readers in CAP's design before diving into transports. The documentation is comprehensive and well-structured for a CAP event-sourcing library: it includes two README files plus six architecture/design markdown docs (Azure Service Bus, Amazon SQS, SQL Server, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, In-Memory Storage) covering configuration, options tables, migration guidance, transactional publish examples, and cross-storage table-name-prefixing. XML-doc coverage is low across the 71 packages shown (0% for Sample.RabbitMQ.SqlServer, Sample.Kafka.PostgreSql), but each of the six architecture docs is fully outlined in the body and covers its named sections; this reflects a strong documentation strategy with visible gaps rather than an absence of content. The FAQ section addresses common questions about community-supported storage options, transactional consistency, and cross-database table-prefixing.
The local build/docker command is shown but there is no explanation of how to get started (installation/configuration) from the README.docs/content/index.md
What to do
Resolve the 26 Low XML-doc coverage finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with DotNetCore.CAP.csproj, DotNetCore.CAP.Kafka.csproj, DotNetCore.CAP.RabbitMQ.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (26 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 The local build/docker command is shown but there is no explanation of… finding(s) in Documentation Quality — start with index.md. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
0 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md.
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D24 · Comment Value / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with AmazonSQSConsumerClientFactory.cs, NATSConsumerClient.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
0 of 30 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.
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D27 · Navigability8.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
81 % of calls cross a namespace and 10 % go through an interface, but 99 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What to do
Improve Navigability — currently 8.9/10. — 81 % of calls cross a namespace and 10 % go through an interface, but 99 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
1 finding(s): 0 critical, 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-keysamples/Sample.Dashboard.Jwt/appsettings.json:14detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag · ×7.github/workflows/deploy-docs-and-dashboard.yml:14detected by semgrep finding
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization · ×2samples/Sample.RabbitMQ.MySql/Controllers/ValuesController.cs:11detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 7 High finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with deploy-docs-and-dashboard.yml (7). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (7 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 Medium finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with ValuesController.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
trivy and checkov found no infrastructure-as-code or container misconfigurations.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md.
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D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR)5.0 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Likely personal-data (PII / GDPR) handling concerns — logging or storing data without safeguards.
Method: Heuristic PII/GDPR pattern scan via semgrep across the repo, using Watchdog's own ruleset (personal data reaching log/console sinks, URLs and query strings, or unprotected browser storage); matches map to severity and a 0-10 wide normalizer. NotApplicable when the scan runs and detects no PII/GDPR surface (no unearned 10); reported LOUDLY as a measurement gap, never as not-applicable, if the ruleset is missing from the analyzer image. Exhaustive, advisory-leaning; degrades on parse failure.
High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log · ×2src/DotNetCore.CAP/Internal/LoggerExtensions.cs:57detected by semgrep finding
What to do
Resolve the 2 High finding(s) in Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — start with LoggerExtensions.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d32_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
2 of 96 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is src/DotNetCore.CAP.AzureServiceBus/ServiceBusProcessorFacade.cs.
Further orphaned files (smaller)
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether the build pipeline provides supply-chain integrity — generated provenance/attestation, signed artifacts (cosign/sigstore), an SBOM, and pinned build actions. Presence of the configuration, not a runtime guarantee.
Method: Supply-chain provenance/signing read deterministically from CI/build config (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines, Jenkinsfile, .circleci) + the release surface: four signals — generated provenance/attestation (SLSA/in-toto/actions-attest), artifact signing (cosign/sigstore/gitsign), an SBOM (syft/sbom-action/*.spdx.json/*.cdx.json), and SHA-pinned build actions — scored 10·present/denom. NotApplicable without a build pipeline. Detects configuration presence, not runtime enforcement.
Resolve the 1 Unpinned build actions finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Workflow token permissions not restricted finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 No build provenance finding(s) in Supply-chain Provenance & Signing. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d36_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×10src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted]src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×3src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
Low CVE: [GHSA redacted]src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.jsondetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 10 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (10). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (10 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Resolve the 3 Medium CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with package-lock.json (3). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D39 · IL Efficiency9.9 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — index.html:2
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
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AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-vuejs-accessibility, then assert with your test runner's axe binding (jest-axe, vitest-axe, cypress-axe or @axe-core/playwright) in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
What to do
The domain core is a small share of production code — check that business logic isn't leaking into the application/infrastructure layers (a thin domain is the anemic-domain smell).
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
`Bootstrapper` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_cts, _processors, _disposed; e.g. `_cts` at line 46). — IBootstrapper.Default.cs:18
`ConnectionPool` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_maxSize; e.g. `_maxSize` at line 73). — IConnectionPool.Default.cs:14
`ConnectionChannelPool` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_maxSize; e.g. `_maxSize` at line 88). — IConnectionChannelPool.Default.cs:16
`GatewayProxyAgent` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (DownstreamRequest; e.g. `DownstreamRequest` at line 95). — GatewayProxyAgent.cs:20
`ConnectionPool` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_maxSize; e.g. `_maxSize` at line 77). — IConnectionPool.Default.cs:13
`RedisStreamManager` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_redis; e.g. `_redis` at line 138). — IRedisStream.Manager.Default.cs:16
`RedisConnectionPool` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_poolAlreadyConfigured, _isDisposed; e.g. `_poolAlreadyConfigured` at line 51). — IConnectionPool.Default.cs:15
`ConnectionFactory` is a singleton (one shared instance) but mutates instance state outside any lock (_client; e.g. `_client` at line 42). — IConnectionFactory.Default.cs:14
What to do
Keep singletons stateless or back their state with thread-safe types (Concurrent*/Immutable*); otherwise concurrent callers race.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
`IDataStorage` declares 16 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IDataStorage.cs:14
What to do
Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
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C1 · Data Protection3.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.
What to do
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
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C4 · Data Retention10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether data has a defined lifetime — retention periods, TTLs, cleanup jobs (storage limitation).
Method: Roslyn scan: retention/TTL configuration presence in schema; CascadeDelete detected but not scored as retention control. Deterministic, gated by PII presence.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
A shipped member still throws NotImplementedException — generated scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. (×4) — CircularBuffer.cs:155, CircularBuffer.cs:175, INodeDiscoveryProvider.cs:19, …
What to do
Finish or delete NotImplementedException stubs and replace placeholder literals before shipping.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
`Contains` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — CircularBuffer.cs:153
`Remove` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — CircularBuffer.cs:173
`RegisterNode` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — INodeDiscoveryProvider.cs:17
`ListServices` is a shipped member whose whole body throws NotImplementedException — scaffolding that was never completed. Implement it or remove the dead surface. — INodeDiscoveryProvider.cs:27
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×4) — CAP.MetricsEventListener.cs:78, CAP.MetricsEventListener.cs:79, CAP.MetricsEventListener.cs:80, …
What to do
Finish or delete the unfinished stubs (NotImplementedException / empty / constant-returning bodies) — they are dead surface that looks live.
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add a README to the 30 of 30 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
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P1 · CI/CD gates8.5 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
A CI pipeline exists and the word "test" appears, but no explicit test-runner invocation (your stack's test command, or a test job) was matched — so either the gate runs tests through a step this pass could not recognise, or "test" is incidental here (a path, "latest", a reporter). Check the coverage dimensions first: if this repo has no test suite yet, that is the finding and this row follows from it. If a suite does exist, make the runner step explicit so the gate is unambiguous.
What to do
Run the test suite in CI via an explicit runner step (`dotnet test` for the toolchain this pipeline already uses) and gate merges on it.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.
Only 20/25 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 25, 9 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
What to do
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Add a health-check endpoint (AddHealthChecks/MapHealthChecks) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) as a CI step.
What to do
Add a SAST step to CI running what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
What to do
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.
Method: Roslyn scan: Polly resilience markers (Retry, CircuitBreaker, Timeout) on outbound HTTP invocations. Computed per type, deterministic.
The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.
What to do
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the library protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
No benchmark suite was found. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.
Raise allocation-aware density on the hot paths — currently 100 use(s) across 20,358 production line(s) (~4.9/1k). More Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc and ValueTask on the allocation-heavy paths climbs this toward 10.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code keeps its host responsive — a library awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) (so it never captures and stalls the host's context) and avoids sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) that wastes threads and risks deadlock.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) counted everywhere, and — for a library with ≥5 awaits — the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
21 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.
What to do
Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
`RequireHttpsMetadata = false` allows the OIDC discovery doc to be fetched over plain HTTP. Safe for loopback-only fetches (Aspire / on-host); risky for any other path. — Startup.cs:57
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No CookieSecurePolicy/HttpOnly/SameSite configuration found. (−1.5 on this card; skip if the app sets no cookies.)
What to do
Set RequireHttpsMetadata = true in prod (or pin MetadataAddress to a localhost URL the API can hit directly).
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Set secure cookie flags — CookieSecurePolicy.Always, HttpOnly, and SameSite (Strict/Lax) on auth/session cookies. Skip only if the app sets no cookies.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. (×21) — ICapTransaction.Base.cs:108, ICapPublisher.Default.cs:94, ICapPublisher.Default.cs:99, …
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 69/187 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×13) — ICapTransaction.Base.cs:116, IMessageSender.Default.cs:57, IMessageSender.Default.cs:81, …
No CancellationToken parameter — the body observes an ambient token instead (a field or a context object), so the work does stop on cancellation, but a caller cannot cancel this call independently of the owner that created that token. (×12) — IBootstrapper.Default.cs:84, IConsumerRegister.Default.cs:110, IDispatcher.Default.cs:197, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. (×4) — CapCache.cs:79, CapCache.cs:248, CapCache.cs:280, …
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Logging an interpolated string (`$"..."`) collapses the event to plain text — you lose the named, queryable properties structured logging exists for. Use a message template with placeholders: `LogInformation("User {UserId} did {Action}", id, action)`. If these calls go through a logging wrapper that only accepts a pre-formatted string, give the wrapper a template+args overload that forwards to the underlying logger, then migrate call sites to it. (×24) — LoggerExtensions.cs:13, LoggerExtensions.cs:19, LoggerExtensions.cs:30, …
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
17/26 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
~3.6 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 267 suppression(s) across the 74647 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 8 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (15%; ≈16% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 47 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Not included — 27 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC1 Text alternatives — No image/media element found in the parsed markup — AC1 not applicable here.
AC2 Forms & labels — No form control/button found in the parsed markup — AC2 not applicable here.
AC4 Keyboard semantics — No interactive element found in the parsed markup — AC4 not applicable here.
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D20 ADR Quality — N/A — ADRs are expected on deployable products with a user-facing host, not consumed libraries; no ADR log is required here.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 2 value object(s); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
ED1 Event-Driven — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 4 event handler(s); a message-bus package
ED5 Idempotency — no mutating command handlers or message consumers detected — idempotency check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what the CI gate does with the test inventory rather than grading it. The findings above are its output.
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present but no domain-layer files were identified (no /Domain//Aggregates/ paths)
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
NoWarnInCsproj test/DotNetCore.CAP.Test/DotNetCore.CAP.Test.csproj:9— 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP/DotNetCore.CAP.csproj:10— 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams.csproj:12— 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP.AmazonSQS/DotNetCore.CAP.AmazonSQS.csproj:11— 1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj test/DotNetCore.CAP.Test/DotNetCore.CAP.Test.csproj:9— 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP/DotNetCore.CAP.csproj:10— 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams.csproj:12— 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP.AmazonSQS/DotNetCore.CAP.AmazonSQS.csproj:11— 1702 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj test/DotNetCore.CAP.Test/DotNetCore.CAP.Test.csproj:9— CS0067 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP.Pulsar/DotNetCore.CAP.Pulsar.csproj:7— CS0067 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj test/DotNetCore.CAP.Test/DotNetCore.CAP.Test.csproj:9— CA1822 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP/DotNetCore.CAP.csproj:10— 1705 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams.csproj:12— 1705 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP.AmazonSQS/DotNetCore.CAP.AmazonSQS.csproj:11— 1705 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP/DotNetCore.CAP.csproj:10— CS1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams.csproj:12— CS1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP.Kafka/DotNetCore.CAP.Kafka.csproj:11— CS1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP.AzureServiceBus/DotNetCore.CAP.AzureServiceBus.csproj:11— CS1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP.AmazonSQS/DotNetCore.CAP.AmazonSQS.csproj:11— CS1591 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP.Kafka/DotNetCore.CAP.Kafka.csproj:11— NU1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj src/DotNetCore.CAP.AzureServiceBus/DotNetCore.CAP.AzureServiceBus.csproj:11— NU1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
NoWarnInCsproj samples/Sample.Kafka.PostgreSql/Sample.Kafka.PostgreSql.csproj:6— NU1701 — this warning is switched off for the WHOLE project, in every file it builds, including code written years from now: nothing at the call site records that the rule was ever silenced, so the next reader has no reason to look here. Fix what the rule is reporting and drop the code from the list, or — if some occurrences really are legitimate — narrow the suppression to those sites and give each one its reason, so the rule keeps protecting the rest of the project.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×10
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.json— axios 0.28.1: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.31.1. This is 1 of 25 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against axios 0.28.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.33.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.33.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 25 advisories this scan raises against axios 0.28.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.json— brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.json— cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.json— flatted 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.3.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.3.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.json— js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 4.3.0 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.json— lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — lodash is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash to 4.18.0 with an `overrides` entry). This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.json— minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.json— postcss 8.4.38: [GHSA redacted] — postcss is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin postcss to 8.5.12 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 4 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against postcss 8.4.38, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 8.5.23 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 8.5.23 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 4 advisories this scan raises against postcss 8.4.38: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.json— rollup 2.79.1: [GHSA redacted] — rollup is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin rollup to 2.79.2 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against rollup 2.79.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.80.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.80.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against rollup 2.79.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.json— vite 3.2.10: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.4.9. This one row stands for the 15 advisories this scan raises against vite 3.2.10: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs-and-dashboard.yml:14— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs-and-dashboard.yml:18— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: dorny/paths-filter@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `dorny/paths-filter@v2`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/dorny/paths-filter/commits/v2 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs-and-dashboard.yml:36— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs-and-dashboard.yml:40— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/setup-node@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/setup-node@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/setup-node/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs-and-dashboard.yml:48— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions-js/push@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions-js/push@master`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions-js/push/commits/master --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs-and-dashboard.yml:59— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `actions/checkout@v3`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/actions/checkout/commits/v3 --jq .sha`.
High: github-actions-mutable-action-tag .github/workflows/deploy-docs-and-dashboard.yml:63— GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: mhausenblas/mkdocs-deploy-gh-pages@<40-character SHA>`. This step references `mhausenblas/mkdocs-deploy-gh-pages@master`; resolve the SHA it points at today with `gh api repos/mhausenblas/mkdocs-deploy-gh-pages/commits/master --jq .sha`.
EmptyCatchBlock src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/CapCache.cs:79— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Narrow the catch to the exception you actually expect, record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or — where swallowing really is correct, as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — write down WHY in a comment on the catch. The comment has to give the reason: a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place. Any of the three makes the decision reviewable; all three clear this row.
EmptyCatchBlock src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/CapCache.cs:248— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Narrow the catch to the exception you actually expect, record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or — where swallowing really is correct, as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — write down WHY in a comment on the catch. The comment has to give the reason: a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place. Any of the three makes the decision reviewable; all three clear this row.
EmptyCatchBlock src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/CapCache.cs:280— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Narrow the catch to the exception you actually expect, record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or — where swallowing really is correct, as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — write down WHY in a comment on the catch. The comment has to give the reason: a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place. Any of the three makes the decision reviewable; all three clear this row.
EmptyCatchBlock src/DotNetCore.CAP.NATS/NATSConsumerClient.cs:76— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Narrow the catch to the exception you actually expect, record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or — where swallowing really is correct, as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — write down WHY in a comment on the catch. The comment has to give the reason: a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all and leaves this row in place. Any of the three makes the decision reviewable; all three clear this row.
High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log src/DotNetCore.CAP/Internal/LoggerExtensions.cs:57— Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
High: watchdog-sensitive-personal-data-in-log src/DotNetCore.CAP/Internal/LoggerExtensions.cs:63— Special-category or directly-identifying personal data appears to be written to a log or console sink. Logs are copied, shipped to third parties and retained far longer than the data itself is lawfully needed. Log a stable pseudonymous reference instead of the value.
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.json— form-data 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 4.0.4 with an `overrides` entry). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against form-data 4.0.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.0.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.0.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Change coupling: IConsumerClient.Redis.cs ↔ IRedisStream.Manager.Default.cs src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConsumerClient.Redis.cs— `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConsumerClient.Redis.cs` and `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IRedisStream.Manager.Default.cs` change together 77% of the time (10 of the 13 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: IConnectionPool.LazyConnection.cs ↔ IRedisStream.Manager.Default.cs src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConnectionPool.LazyConnection.cs— `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConnectionPool.LazyConnection.cs` and `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IRedisStream.Manager.Default.cs` change together 75% of the time (9 of the 12 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: IConnectionPool.LazyConnection.cs ↔ IConsumerClient.Redis.cs src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConnectionPool.LazyConnection.cs— `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConnectionPool.LazyConnection.cs` and `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConsumerClient.Redis.cs` change together 75% of the time (9 of the 12 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: IConnectionPool.LazyConnection.cs ↔ TransportMessage.Redis.cs src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConnectionPool.LazyConnection.cs— `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConnectionPool.LazyConnection.cs` and `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/TransportMessage.Redis.cs` change together 70% of the time (7 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: IRedisStream.Manager.Default.cs ↔ TransportMessage.Redis.cs src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IRedisStream.Manager.Default.cs— `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IRedisStream.Manager.Default.cs` and `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/TransportMessage.Redis.cs` change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: IConsumerClientFactory.Redis.cs ↔ TransportMessage.Redis.cs src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConsumerClientFactory.Redis.cs— `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConsumerClientFactory.Redis.cs` and `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/TransportMessage.Redis.cs` change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: IConsumerClient.Redis.cs ↔ IRedisStream.Manager.Extensions.cs src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConsumerClient.Redis.cs— `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConsumerClient.Redis.cs` and `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IRedisStream.Manager.Extensions.cs` change together 60% of the time (6 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: AzureServiceBusConsumerClient.cs ↔ ITransport.AzureServiceBus.cs src/DotNetCore.CAP.AzureServiceBus/AzureServiceBusConsumerClient.cs— `src/DotNetCore.CAP.AzureServiceBus/AzureServiceBusConsumerClient.cs` and `src/DotNetCore.CAP.AzureServiceBus/ITransport.AzureServiceBus.cs` change together 57% of the time (12 of the 21 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: IConsumerClientFactory.Redis.cs ↔ IRedisStream.Manager.Default.cs src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConsumerClientFactory.Redis.cs— `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConsumerClientFactory.Redis.cs` and `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IRedisStream.Manager.Default.cs` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
Change coupling: IConnectionPool.LazyConnection.cs ↔ IRedisStream.Manager.Extensions.cs src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConnectionPool.LazyConnection.cs— `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConnectionPool.LazyConnection.cs` and `src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IRedisStream.Manager.Extensions.cs` change together 50% of the time (5 of the 10 commits that touched whichever of the two files changed less often, counting a file under its earlier names as well). They sit in the same directory, and in this ecosystem sibling files there normally share one namespace/package — so a direct reference between them needs no import and this pass cannot see whether one exists. Read the pair before acting: if one file only DECLARES what the other consumes (a constants/types file beside its user), the co-change is definitional and the question is whether the split earns its keep; if they duplicate structure, extract the common part into a shared function or type they both call; if neither holds, the coupling is hidden and worth breaking.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×3
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.json— ajv 6.12.6: [GHSA redacted] — ajv is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin ajv to 6.14.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.json— follow-redirects 1.15.6: [GHSA redacted] — follow-redirects is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin follow-redirects to 1.16.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium CVE: [GHSA redacted] src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.json— nanoid 3.3.7: [GHSA redacted] — nanoid is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin nanoid to 3.3.8 with an `overrides` entry).
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization samples/Sample.RabbitMQ.MySql/Controllers/ValuesController.cs:11— Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization samples/Sample.RabbitMQ.SqlServer/Controllers/ValuesController.cs:13— Anonymous access shouldn't be allowed unless explicit by design. Access control checks are missing and potentially can be bypassed. This finding violates the principle of least privilege or deny by default, where access should only be permitted for a specific set of roles or conforms to a custom policy or users. This is a semgrep security-AUDIT rule: it reports that a sensitive construct is present, not that it is exploitable here. Confirm whether this site handles untrusted input or is reachable across a trust boundary — and apply the change where it is; where the construct is required by the platform or protocol it calls into, and carries no untrusted data (a syscall/FFI shim, a build- or debug-gated tool, a fixed local surface), record the review and leave the code as it is.
Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) src/DotNetCore.CAP.SqlServer/IMonitoringApi.SqlServer.cs:239— src/DotNetCore.CAP.SqlServer/IMonitoringApi.SqlServer.cs:239-264 | src/DotNetCore.CAP.PostgreSql/IMonitoringApi.PostgreSql.cs:230-254 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/DotNetCore.CAP.SqlServer/IMonitoringApi.SqlServer.cs:239` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) src/DotNetCore.CAP.InMemoryStorage/IMonitoringApi.InMemory.cs:72— src/DotNetCore.CAP.InMemoryStorage/IMonitoringApi.InMemory.cs:72-96 | src/DotNetCore.CAP.InMemoryStorage/IMonitoringApi.InMemory.cs:114-139 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/DotNetCore.CAP.InMemoryStorage/IMonitoringApi.InMemory.cs:72` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) src/DotNetCore.CAP.SqlServer/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs:17— src/DotNetCore.CAP.SqlServer/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs:17-28 | src/DotNetCore.CAP.MySql/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs:17-29 | src/DotNetCore.CAP.PostgreSql/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs:17-28 — `src/DotNetCore.CAP.SqlServer/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs` and `src/DotNetCore.CAP.MySql/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 38 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) src/DotNetCore.CAP.SqlServer/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs:36— src/DotNetCore.CAP.SqlServer/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs:36-47 | src/DotNetCore.CAP.MySql/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs:37-48 | src/DotNetCore.CAP.PostgreSql/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs:36-47 — `src/DotNetCore.CAP.SqlServer/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs` and `src/DotNetCore.CAP.MySql/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 38 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own.
DiagnosticListener.OnNext (cyclomatic 44) src/DotNetCore.CAP.OpenTelemetry/DiagnosticListener.cs:33— DiagnosticListener.OnNext has cyclomatic complexity 44 (threshold 15). Of this number, 36 points are the body's own statements and 8 belong to 4 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
AmazonSQSConsumerClient.ConnectAsync (cyclomatic 18) src/DotNetCore.CAP.AmazonSQS/AmazonSQSConsumerClient.cs:161— AmazonSQSConsumerClient.ConnectAsync has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
AwaitableInfo.IsTypeAwaitable (cyclomatic 17) src/DotNetCore.CAP/Internal/ObjectMethodExecutor/AwaitableInfo.cs:41— AwaitableInfo.IsTypeAwaitable has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 6 of the 17 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 5 function literals inside it that branch (lines 79, 90, 46, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
DiagnosticListener.OnNext (cognitive 67) src/DotNetCore.CAP.OpenTelemetry/DiagnosticListener.cs:33— DiagnosticListener.OnNext has cognitive complexity 67 (threshold 15). Of this number, 55 points are the body's own statements and 12 belong to 4 function literals inside it that branch. The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
AmazonSQSConsumerClient.ConnectAsync (cognitive 49) src/DotNetCore.CAP.AmazonSQS/AmazonSQSConsumerClient.cs:161— AmazonSQSConsumerClient.ConnectAsync has cognitive complexity 49 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
SubscribeInvoker.InvokeAsync (cognitive 39) src/DotNetCore.CAP/Internal/ISubscribeInvoker.Default.cs:31— SubscribeInvoker.InvokeAsync has cognitive complexity 39 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
ConsumerServiceSelector.FindConsumersFromInterfaceTypes (cognitive 28) src/DotNetCore.CAP/Internal/IConsumerServiceSelector.Default.cs:70— ConsumerServiceSelector.FindConsumersFromInterfaceTypes has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
AzureServiceBusConsumerClient.ConnectAsync (cognitive 24) src/DotNetCore.CAP.AzureServiceBus/AzureServiceBusConsumerClient.cs:192— AzureServiceBusConsumerClient.ConnectAsync has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
GatewayProxyAgent.Invoke (cognitive 19) src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/GatewayProxy/GatewayProxyAgent.cs:48— GatewayProxyAgent.Invoke has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
RedisConsumerClient.ConsumeMessages (cognitive 19) src/DotNetCore.CAP.RedisStreams/IConsumerClient.Redis.cs:90— RedisConsumerClient.ConsumeMessages has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
ConsumerRegister.RegisterMessageProcessor (cognitive 18) src/DotNetCore.CAP/Internal/IConsumerRegister.Default.cs:168— ConsumerRegister.RegisterMessageProcessor has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 0 of the 18 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 171). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
DiagnosticObserver.OnNext (cognitive 16) src/DotNetCore.CAP.SqlServer/Diagnostics/DiagnosticObserver.cs:36— DiagnosticObserver.OnNext has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). The drivers above price the dispatch low by construction — a dispatch is charged once however many cases it lists, while each branch inside an arm is charged in full — so most of this count is what the case bodies hold, and the arms are where it can be reduced. To reduce it, keep the dispatch but shrink the arms: move each non-trivial case body into its own named function (or onto the value being matched) so the dispatch reads one line per case, and group related cases into a sub-dispatch. Keep every case explicit, and make the behaviour for cases you do not list a deliberate choice rather than an accident.
InMemoryMonitoringApi.GetMessagesAsync (cognitive 16) src/DotNetCore.CAP.InMemoryStorage/IMonitoringApi.InMemory.cs:57— InMemoryMonitoringApi.GetMessagesAsync has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Unpinned build actions — CI references GitHub Actions by a floating ref (@main / @tag) rather than a pinned commit SHA, weakening build integrity. 7 floating ref(s) across 1 workflow file(s), 2 of them mutable BRANCH refs — pin those first. Each floating ref is itemized at file:line by the SAST (D29) lens.
Workflow token permissions not restricted — No workflow declares a `permissions:` block, so every job runs with the repository's default GITHUB_TOKEN scope (1 workflow file(s) checked). On a repository whose default is read/write, a compromised action or a malicious pull request inherits write access to code, issues, releases and packages. Declare a least-privilege `permissions:` block — `permissions: {contents: read}` at the top of each workflow, widened per job only where a job genuinely writes.
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium vulnerability · ×1
Medium vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/wwwroot/package-lock.json— esbuild 0.15.18: [GHSA redacted] — esbuild is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin esbuild to 0.25.0 with an `overrides` entry).
Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) src/DotNetCore.CAP.MongoDB/IMonitoringApi.MongoDB.cs:142— src/DotNetCore.CAP.MongoDB/IMonitoringApi.MongoDB.cs:142-163 | src/DotNetCore.CAP.MongoDB/IMonitoringApi.MongoDB.cs:181-203 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/DotNetCore.CAP.MongoDB/IMonitoringApi.MongoDB.cs:142` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/RouteActionProvider.cs:284— src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/RouteActionProvider.cs:284-300 | src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/RouteActionProvider.cs:311-328 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 3) src/DotNetCore.CAP.SqlServer/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs:64— src/DotNetCore.CAP.SqlServer/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs:64-76 | src/DotNetCore.CAP.MySql/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs:65-77 | src/DotNetCore.CAP.PostgreSql/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs:64-76 — `src/DotNetCore.CAP.SqlServer/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs` and `src/DotNetCore.CAP.MySql/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs` are the same file name in two sibling directories, so they are most likely parallel implementations of one contract rather than a copy of each other — this scan matched 3 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 38 lines. If both are selected at run time, neither can be retired in favour of the other, and the lines that DIFFER between them are the reason both exist. The move that pays here is to hoist the identical part into a shared location the whole family can reach and give what differs a parameter or a seam, so a change lands once instead of once per sibling; extracting one helper per block leaves every sibling to drift on its own. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/DotNetCore.CAP.SqlServer/IDbConnection.Extensions.cs:64` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (13 lines × 2) src/DotNetCore.CAP.MongoDB/IDataStorage.MongoDB.cs:268— src/DotNetCore.CAP.MongoDB/IDataStorage.MongoDB.cs:268-280 | src/DotNetCore.CAP.MongoDB/IDataStorage.MongoDB.cs:289-301 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/DotNetCore.CAP.MongoDB/IDataStorage.MongoDB.cs:268` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/RouteActionProvider.cs:202— src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/RouteActionProvider.cs:202-213 | src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/RouteActionProvider.cs:240-251 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/RouteActionProvider.cs:202` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/RouteActionProvider.cs:223— src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/RouteActionProvider.cs:223-233 | src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/RouteActionProvider.cs:261-271 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. The matched lines also transfer control out of the body holding them, which cannot survive a move into a called unit unchanged: have the extracted unit return that decision and let each site act on it.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 2) src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/NodeDiscovery/CAP.ConsulDiscoveryOptionsExtensions.cs:25— src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard/NodeDiscovery/CAP.ConsulDiscoveryOptionsExtensions.cs:25-34 | src/DotNetCore.CAP.Dashboard.K8s/K8sDiscoveryOptionsExtensions.cs:25-34 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (7 lines × 2) src/DotNetCore.CAP.InMemoryStorage/IDataStorage.InMemory.cs:187— src/DotNetCore.CAP.InMemoryStorage/IDataStorage.InMemory.cs:187-198 | src/DotNetCore.CAP.InMemoryStorage/IDataStorage.InMemory.cs:204-210 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `src/DotNetCore.CAP.InMemoryStorage/IDataStorage.InMemory.cs:187` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Off the main sequence: DotNetCore.CAP(net8.0) — DotNetCore.CAP(net8.0): abstractness 0.27, instability 0.00, distance 0.73 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 15 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
CRAP 199: AwaitableInfo.IsTypeAwaitable src/DotNetCore.CAP/Internal/ObjectMethodExecutor/AwaitableInfo.cs:41— Cyclomatic 17 with 14.3% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 110: AzureServiceBusConsumerClient.ConnectAsync src/DotNetCore.CAP.AzureServiceBus/AzureServiceBusConsumerClient.cs:192— Cyclomatic 10 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 90: InMemoryMonitoringApi.GetMessagesAsync src/DotNetCore.CAP.InMemoryStorage/IMonitoringApi.InMemory.cs:57— Cyclomatic 9 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 56: AzureServiceBusConsumerClient.SubscribeAsync src/DotNetCore.CAP.AzureServiceBus/AzureServiceBusConsumerClient.cs:54— Cyclomatic 7 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 43: ConsumerRegister.WriteLog src/DotNetCore.CAP/Internal/IConsumerRegister.Default.cs:276— Cyclomatic 14 with 47.1% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 42: InMemoryMonitoringApi.GetHourlyTimelineStats src/DotNetCore.CAP.InMemoryStorage/IMonitoringApi.InMemory.cs:166— Cyclomatic 6 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 39: ObjectMethodExecutorFSharpSupport.TryPopulateFSharpValueCaches src/DotNetCore.CAP/Internal/ObjectMethodExecutor/ObjectMethodExecutorFSharpSupport.cs:92— Cyclomatic 8 with 21.1% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 34: AzureServiceBusTransport.SendAsync src/DotNetCore.CAP.AzureServiceBus/ITransport.AzureServiceBus.cs:57— Cyclomatic 8 with 26.4% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
redundant comment src/DotNetCore.CAP.AmazonSQS/AmazonSQSConsumerClientFactory.cs:1— "Copyright (c) .NET Core Community. All rights reserved." — filter - boilerplate license line restating the copyright
Off-boarding risk: anonymized user #1 — If anonymized user #1 becomes unavailable, 4 significant file(s) lose their only recent owner: src/DotNetCore.CAP.Kafka/KafkaConsumerClient.cs, src/DotNetCore.CAP.RabbitMQ/RabbitMQConsumerClient.cs, src/DotNetCore.CAP/Processor/IProcessingServer.Cap.cs, src/DotNetCore.CAP.PostgreSql/CAP.PostgreSqlOptions.cs. Pair on, review, or document these before any departure.
D19 · Documentation Quality· The local build/docker command is shown but there is no explanation of how to get started (installation/configuration) from the README. · ×1
The local build/docker command is shown but there is no explanation of how to get started (installation/configuration) from the README. docs/content/index.md— Add a brief Getting Started section or link to the README's Installation/Configuration steps so new users can begin without reading through the outline.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 20k LoC across 38 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.) Every location above sits inside a test/fixture/sample tree, so there may be no live credential to revoke — in that case the performable actions are different ones: confirm each value was never reused outside the tests (a fixture key shared with a staging or demo environment IS a live credential and must be rotated), generate this material at test time instead of committing it so the next one cannot be mistaken for a real leak, and record the deliberate exposure where a reader of the file will see it. Rotate anything that fails the first check.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Further orphaned files (smaller) · ×1
Further orphaned files (smaller) — 2 of 96 analysed file(s) have no living knowledge left — their last meaningful change has decayed away, so if one breaks, no one currently understands it (counted over production source files of roughly 100 lines or more, excluding tests, vendored, generated and example/demo trees, largest first). None is large enough to earn a read-through of its own, so this row stands in for the per-file rows rather than raising one each — largest first: src/DotNetCore.CAP.AzureServiceBus/ServiceBusProcessorFacade.cs, src/DotNetCore.CAP/Diagnostics/EventCounterSource.Cap.cs. Attach the read to the next change that touches one of them: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for, so the knowledge comes back at the cost of a change you were making anyway.
No build provenance — No SLSA provenance generation or build attestation found in CI — nothing binds a released artifact to the build that produced it, so a consumer cannot tell your artifact from a substituted one. On GitHub Actions, `actions/attest-build-provenance` (or slsa-github-generator) emits one from the job's own OIDC identity; elsewhere, run `cosign attest` over the released artifact from the release pipeline and publish the attestation beside it.
No artifact signing — No artifact signing found in CI — sign your released artifacts with whatever your ecosystem ships (a GPG/minisign detached signature — or `cosign sign-blob` — over the release archives, or over a checksum file published alongside them, Authenticode via signtool, or `dotnet nuget sign` for packages) so consumers can verify what you built.
D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing· No SBOM · ×1
No SBOM — No SBOM generation or committed SBOM found — produce one with what your ecosystem ships (`sbom-tool generate` (install it with `dotnet tool install --global Microsoft.Sbom.DotNetTool`) or `dotnet CycloneDX` over the solution, `syft` (or `anchore/sbom-action` in CI) over the source tree or released image). Publish it as a release asset (`*.spdx.json` / `*.cdx.json`) so consumers can see what they are installing.
IL efficiency: 5 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget src/DotNetCore.CAP.OpenTelemetry/DiagnosticListener.cs:35— 5 of 1229 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: DotNetCore.CAP.OpenTelemetry.DiagnosticListener.OnNext @ src/DotNetCore.CAP.OpenTelemetry/DiagnosticListener.cs:35, 851 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 9.9/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
0
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Run 019fd2c5-30de-78e4-8658-a1b4af14e257 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Issues: 48 · Warnings: 113 · Recommendations: 14 · Info: 28 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 05-08-2026 @ 16:32 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.