Public report of duyanming/Viper, published 22 October 2026. It has the same score, grades and number of
findings as the full report. The details of security findings (where they are in the code, which known
vulnerabilities and which passwords or keys were found) are left out, so nobody can use them against the project.
Public
Executive reportMeasured under the Code Assurance Index, an open standard for code quality, using its published scoring rules (rubric version 2026.10.5). Watchdog signed this survey and filed it in the standard's public register, where anyone can look it up by its survey ID. Check this survey →
Signed and filed in the standard's public register, 22 October 2026, 01:05 UTC · Survey ID cd_c34b503f05354001a7588d2eb858f35d
duyanming/Viper
Measured 22 October 2026, 00:59 UTC, at code version f580ccc
Code coverage is not measured: No coverage collector is wired up.
Test distribution is not measured: No automated tests.
Test reliability is not measured: No test run produced results.
Bus factor is not measured: No living knowledge left to concentrate.
IL efficiency is not measured: The target did not build.
CAI scoreCritical ⚠
CriticalWeakAdequateStrongExemplary
Down 3 since the last survey
The score is built from these lenses. Each lens grades one area of the code, such as how easy it is to change or how well it is protected. The weakest lens counts most, so one weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away.
A medium codebase: 29,362 lines of product code in 26 projects, tests not counted · Estimated rebuild effort: about 0.3 person-years · Weakest lens: Production Readiness, 18
Findings by how serious they are
64 critical403 serious133 minor
6 dimensions are left out of the score. For each one, Watchdog either couldn't measure it in this code, or found no evidence of the safeguard it looks for, such as a tested backup restore. They count neither for nor against the score, and Limitations lists each one with its reason.
This survey was produced by
Watchdog
Producer
Canine Development
Analyzer
Watchdog engine 1.0.0
Measured
22 October 2026, 00:59 UTC
A measurement, not a certificate. The Code Assurance Index records a number
together with the evidence it was worked out from, so anyone can recalculate it, but it doesn't certify or guarantee
the code. The standard was written by Canine Development, which also builds Watchdog. It is open to any tool that
implements it, and today Watchdog is the only one that does.
The score is deterministic, which means the same code always gets the same score. Watchdog works it out with tools that follow published rules, and an AI model never decides it, so anyone who applies the same rules to the same code gets the same number. How it is done is explained under Methodology ▸
82of 87 dimensions measured by tools. The other 5 are advisory notes from an AI model, which explain the code but don't count towards the score.
561of 600 findings point to an exact file and line, so you can open each one in the code. The other 39 concern the repository as a whole, such as missing documentation.
87dimensions across 9 lenses, read from 29,362 lines of product code in 26 projects.
duyanming/Viper scores 25 out of 100 and is rated Critical, while six of its nine lenses score higher still: Event-Driven at 100, Domain Modelling at 97 and Architecture at 94, all rated Exemplary, Performance at 66, rated Adequate, and Code Health at 41 and Maturity at 40, both rated Weak.
The score is lower than those six because the weakest lens counts most, and here that is Production Readiness, which scores 18 and is rated Critical. Its Test Distribution dimension scores 0 out of 10, and until that reaches 4, Production Readiness can't be rated higher than Adequate. The first actions are to resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution and to resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning, and if Production Readiness rose to 70, the score would rise from 25 to about 30.
64 findings are critical: 17 in Explicit Debt, 17 in Forms & labels, 15 in Page structure, six in Static Analysis (SAST), three in Secret Scanning, three in Web-Security Posture, two in Text alternatives and one in Secrets (history).
Watchdog couldn't measure Dependency Hygiene in this code, so that dimension is left out of the score. The product code is 29,362 lines, which would take an estimated 0.3 person-years, around €50,000, to rebuild.
A lens is capped at Adequate while one of its dimensions scores below 4 out of 10, however well the rest of the lens does. That way a serious problem in one place always shows in the lens's rating.
How the score is built: what each lens counts forThe lenses don't count equally. The weakest lens counts most, the next weakest a little less, and so on, so a weak area pulls the score down instead of being averaged away. In the bar below, each part's width shows how much that lens counts and its colour shows its rating. Improving the widest part moves the score most, and as that lens improves, it counts for less, because another lens becomes the weakest.
Watchdog compares every finding with the previous survey's. A finding that has only moved to another line in the same file counts as the same finding, so only new findings appear here. Advisory notes from the AI model are left out, because the model words them afresh in every survey.
Fixed since the last survey: 8 findings
These 8 critical or serious findings were in the previous survey, on 7 October 2026, and are gone from this one.
Coupling · Off the main sequence: Anno.Plugs.ViperService
Coupling · Off the main sequence: Anno.Redis
Coupling · Off the main sequence: Anno.Plugs.MonitorService(netstandard2.0)
Coupling · Off the main sequence: Anno.Plugs.DLockService
Exception handling · Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) REDACTED
Async & latency hygiene · Awaits without ConfigureAwait(false)
Rebuild cost: about €50,000 · Estimate
Cost to rebuild
€17,000 to €84,000, for 276 to 885 hours of work, about 0.3 person-years for one engineer
Difficulty of the problem
Very high, judged from the kind of software and how it is built. Code that solves a harder problem, such as payments or medical bookings, costs more per line to write.
Quality factor
×0.7 at a score of 25. Better code takes more work to write, so the factor is ×1.0 at a score of 70, lower below it and higher above it.
Size
Medium: 29,362 lines of product code
Comment lines
The estimate prices 26,675 lines. Comment lines count towards the size of 29,362 lines but aren't priced as work.
How the estimate is made: Watchdog prices the hours a team would need to write this code again, at €60 to €95 an hour. Declarations and boilerplate are priced at a fast rate and logic at a slower one, and the logic is then multiplied by the difficulty of the problem and by the quality factor. The estimate can be about 30% off either way, and it moves most with the hourly rate and the difficulty.
Top priorities
The three actions that raise the score most for the work they take. The full ranked list is in the Roadmap.
1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED.
Raises the score by about 5 points · Low effort · Secret Scanning
3
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
Raises the score by about 3 points · Medium effort · Access Controls
Diagnosis: what the measurements show together
Each conclusion below combines several dimensions into one point that no single dimension shows, and lists the measurements it rests on.
Where the investment is most exposed · Value at risk
This code would cost about €50,000 to build again, about 0.3 person-years of work. Its weakest lens is Production Readiness, at 18 (Critical). Production Readiness is about whether the product is ready to run in production and to change without breaking. Because the weakest lens counts most in the score, work on Production Readiness also moves the score most.
Based on: the rebuild estimate · the Production Readiness grade · how much each lens counts
What to do: Start with the Production Readiness actions in Top priorities.
If you do one thing first · First action
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. Of all the actions in this report, it raises the score most for the work it takes: about 6 points for low effort, because it clears the 1 Test Distribution findings. The next survey will show the change in the score.
Based on: the ranked actions in Top priorities, by score gain and effort
What hard-to-read code costs each year · Cost
Four dimensions measure how easy the code is to work in: two measure how tangled its logic is, one how much of it is copied, and one how well each part sticks to a single job. In this codebase they average 5.4 out of 10. Code at that level is slower to change than clean code, and Watchdog estimates the extra work at 6% to 15% on every change. The history of the code shows how much it changes: about 90 lines over the last 90 days, which is about 365 lines a year. At that pace, the extra work comes to an estimated 0.1 to 0.4 engineer-days a year, and it grows as more code changes.
How this is estimated: The number of changed lines is measured from the history of the code. The rest rests on two assumptions of Watchdog's own: code scoring 8 out of 10 or more adds no extra work, and each point below 8 adds 2.5% to 5.6% to every change; and an engineer changes 150 to 400 lines in a day. The result is a range for planning, not a measurement.
Based on: Cyclomatic Complexity · Cognitive Complexity · Code Duplication · Cohesion (LCOM4) · the code's change history
What to do: Start with the files listed under Churn × Complexity Hotspots, which change often and are hard to read, because that is where the extra work is paid most often.
Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph
Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.
Architecture: which parts of the code depend on which
The code is divided into modules, groups of code that each handle one part of the product, and a module depends on another when it uses code from it. The table lists the modules both down the side and across the top, in an order where each module should only use modules listed above it. A number in a cell means the module on that row uses the module in that column, and it counts the pairs of building blocks (types) that connect them. The one thing to look for is a mark above the diagonal line. It means two or more modules use each other in a loop (a dependency cycle), so none of them can be changed, tested or released on its own.
49 modules, with 35 dependencies between them. Every module uses only modules listed above it, so there are no loops.
The table shows the 40 modules with the most connections; 9 more are left out to keep it readable.
Which modules use which. The module on each row uses the module in each column, and the number counts the pairs of types that connect them. A cell above the diagonal is part of a loop.
Anno.Domain.EventHandlers uses Anno.Domain.EventArgs, so a change to Anno.Domain.EventArgs can break Anno.Domain.EventHandlers, while a change to Anno.Domain.EventHandlers can't break Anno.Domain.EventArgs.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Domain.EventHandlers uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Domain.Function uses Anno.Domain.BaseModel, so a change to Anno.Domain.BaseModel can break Anno.Domain.Function, while a change to Anno.Domain.Function can't break Anno.Domain.BaseModel.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Domain.Function uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Domain.Member uses Anno.Domain.BaseModel, so a change to Anno.Domain.BaseModel can break Anno.Domain.Member, while a change to Anno.Domain.Member can't break Anno.Domain.BaseModel.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Domain.Member uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Domain.Member uses Anno.Domain.Dto, so a change to Anno.Domain.Dto can break Anno.Domain.Member, while a change to Anno.Domain.Member can't break Anno.Domain.Dto.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Domain.Member uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Domain.Role uses Anno.Domain.BaseModel, so a change to Anno.Domain.BaseModel can break Anno.Domain.Role, while a change to Anno.Domain.Role can't break Anno.Domain.BaseModel.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Domain.Role uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.EngineData uses Anno.ViperLog, so a change to Anno.ViperLog can break Anno.EngineData, while a change to Anno.EngineData can't break Anno.ViperLog.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.EngineData uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Model uses Anno.Model.BaseModel, so a change to Anno.Model.BaseModel can break Anno.Model, while a change to Anno.Model can't break Anno.Model.BaseModel.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Model uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.ViperLog.Imp uses Anno.ViperLog, so a change to Anno.ViperLog can break Anno.ViperLog.Imp, while a change to Anno.ViperLog.Imp can't break Anno.ViperLog.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.ViperLog.Imp uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Microsoft.AspNetCore uses Viper.GateWay, so a change to Viper.GateWay can break Microsoft.AspNetCore, while a change to Microsoft.AspNetCore can't break Viper.GateWay.
Position
Below the diagonal: Microsoft.AspNetCore uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Viper.GateWay.Hubs uses Viper.GateWay, so a change to Viper.GateWay can break Viper.GateWay.Hubs, while a change to Viper.GateWay.Hubs can't break Viper.GateWay.
Position
Below the diagonal: Viper.GateWay.Hubs uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Domain.Repository uses Anno.Domain.Function, so a change to Anno.Domain.Function can break Anno.Domain.Repository, while a change to Anno.Domain.Repository can't break Anno.Domain.Function.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Domain.Repository uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Domain.Repository uses Anno.Domain.Member, so a change to Anno.Domain.Member can break Anno.Domain.Repository, while a change to Anno.Domain.Repository can't break Anno.Domain.Member.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Domain.Repository uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Domain.Repository uses Anno.Domain.Role, so a change to Anno.Domain.Role can break Anno.Domain.Repository, while a change to Anno.Domain.Repository can't break Anno.Domain.Role.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Domain.Repository uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Plugs.TraceService uses Anno.Model, so a change to Anno.Model can break Anno.Plugs.TraceService, while a change to Anno.Plugs.TraceService can't break Anno.Model.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Plugs.TraceService uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Viper.GateWay.Hubs.Util uses Viper.GateWay.Hubs, so a change to Viper.GateWay.Hubs can break Viper.GateWay.Hubs.Util, while a change to Viper.GateWay.Hubs.Util can't break Viper.GateWay.Hubs.
Position
Below the diagonal: Viper.GateWay.Hubs.Util uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Command.Handler uses Anno.CommandBus, so a change to Anno.CommandBus can break Anno.Command.Handler, while a change to Anno.Command.Handler can't break Anno.CommandBus.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Command.Handler uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Command.Handler uses Anno.Command, so a change to Anno.Command can break Anno.Command.Handler, while a change to Anno.Command.Handler can't break Anno.Command.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Command.Handler uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Command.Handler uses Anno.Domain.Repository, so a change to Anno.Domain.Repository can break Anno.Command.Handler, while a change to Anno.Command.Handler can't break Anno.Domain.Repository.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Command.Handler uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Domain.Service uses Anno.Domain.Dto, so a change to Anno.Domain.Dto can break Anno.Domain.Service, while a change to Anno.Domain.Service can't break Anno.Domain.Dto.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Domain.Service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Domain.Service uses Anno.Domain.Member, so a change to Anno.Domain.Member can break Anno.Domain.Service, while a change to Anno.Domain.Service can't break Anno.Domain.Member.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Domain.Service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Domain.Service uses Anno.Domain.Repository, so a change to Anno.Domain.Repository can break Anno.Domain.Service, while a change to Anno.Domain.Service can't break Anno.Domain.Repository.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Domain.Service uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Repository uses Anno.Domain.Function, so a change to Anno.Domain.Function can break Anno.Repository, while a change to Anno.Repository can't break Anno.Domain.Function.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Repository uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Repository uses Anno.Domain.Member, so a change to Anno.Domain.Member can break Anno.Repository, while a change to Anno.Repository can't break Anno.Domain.Member.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Repository uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Repository uses Anno.Domain.Role, so a change to Anno.Domain.Role can break Anno.Repository, while a change to Anno.Repository can't break Anno.Domain.Role.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Repository uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Repository uses Anno.Domain.Repository, so a change to Anno.Domain.Repository can break Anno.Repository, while a change to Anno.Repository can't break Anno.Domain.Repository.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Repository uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.QueryServices.Member uses Anno.Domain.Dto, so a change to Anno.Domain.Dto can break Anno.QueryServices.Member, while a change to Anno.QueryServices.Member can't break Anno.Domain.Dto.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.QueryServices.Member uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.QueryServices.Member uses Anno.Repository, so a change to Anno.Repository can break Anno.QueryServices.Member, while a change to Anno.QueryServices.Member can't break Anno.Repository.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.QueryServices.Member uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.QueryServices.Platform uses Anno.Model, so a change to Anno.Model can break Anno.QueryServices.Platform, while a change to Anno.QueryServices.Platform can't break Anno.Model.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.QueryServices.Platform uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.QueryServices.Platform uses Anno.Repository, so a change to Anno.Repository can break Anno.QueryServices.Platform, while a change to Anno.QueryServices.Platform can't break Anno.Repository.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.QueryServices.Platform uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Plugs.LogicService uses Anno.Domain.Member, so a change to Anno.Domain.Member can break Anno.Plugs.LogicService, while a change to Anno.Plugs.LogicService can't break Anno.Domain.Member.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Plugs.LogicService uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Plugs.LogicService uses Anno.QueryServices.Member, so a change to Anno.QueryServices.Member can break Anno.Plugs.LogicService, while a change to Anno.Plugs.LogicService can't break Anno.QueryServices.Member.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Plugs.LogicService uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
Anno.Plugs.LogicService uses Anno.QueryServices.Platform, so a change to Anno.QueryServices.Platform can break Anno.Plugs.LogicService, while a change to Anno.Plugs.LogicService can't break Anno.QueryServices.Platform.
Position
Below the diagonal: Anno.Plugs.LogicService uses a module listed above it, which is the healthy direction.
At a glance — Code Health · 41% · Weak · gated by D1, D2, X1, X3, X5 ·
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A05:2025 — Injection
20
High / Critical
A07:2025 — Authentication Failures
4
High / Critical
Roadmap
Begin by resolving the missing test coverage in Test Distribution and eliminating the three leaked secrets in Secret Scanning, specifically targeting REDACTED, REDACTED, and REDACTED. Next, enforce strict access controls by applying default-deny authorization to all endpoints and secure password storage using a salted KDF with constant-time comparison in the platform query logic. Finally, establish a CI/CD pipeline to automatically build and run the test suite on every push or pull request to prevent future regressions.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
Store passwords with a salted KDF — `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.PasswordHasher<T>`, `Rfc2898DeriveBytes` (PBKDF2), or BCrypt/Argon2 — and compare with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals`. (A fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim, is not password storage.) Start in `Anno.Plugs.LogicService/Platform/PlatformQuery.cs:89`.
Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Every finding carries one of four grades. Three say how serious it is. The fourth says this
survey could not settle it — and it is a grade, not a gap.
Critical — 64
A definite problem that already costs you something and drags the score down: a
missing authorisation check, a dependency with a known exploit, a build that does not reproduce. Failure here
tends to cause failures elsewhere.
Serious — 403
Likely wrong, but not failing yet. It degrades
the codebase over a longer horizon and can cause failures elsewhere — not urgent this week, not something to
carry for two years either.
Minor — 133
Recorded, with no effect on how the codebase functions.
Present so the survey is complete, not because it needs doing.
Could not be resolved — 6
Something this survey could not settle
from the outside, and which could be critical or serious. Either a control was required and no
positive evidence of it exists in the repository — a backup job that nothing shows was ever restored from proves
nothing about restores — or our own analysis could not run over that part of the tree. This is not a clean
result. These are excluded from the score rather than awarded a pass, so the number on the cover neither
rewards nor penalises them: if you act on this survey without resolving them, you carry that risk yourself. Each
one is named under Limitations.
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 82 of 87 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 5 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.8 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 87 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 561 of 600 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
D4 Code Duplication — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 20 duplicated block group(s) on this row were found in the languages this pass could tokenize, and they do NOT cover all of this repository's production source: .js (15,731 lines, 53% of production source) went unread, because no language model this pass could load exposed a clone-unit token stream for those file kinds. Duplication in that source is UNMEASURED — its absence from the count above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that the code is free of duplication.
D11 Test Reliability — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. Test reliability NOT MEASURED: the test run produced no results for any test tier, so no test ever ran and flakiness could not be exercised. The cause could not be attributed, so it is excluded from the score rather than read as an absence of tests.
D12 Dependency Hygiene — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `dotnet list package` did not return usable output (restore or query failed); no outdated/vulnerable/deprecated data to assess. The tool said: error: The imported project "/usr/share/dotnet/sdk/10.0.400/Microsoft/VisualStudio/v18.0/WebApplications/Microsoft.WebApplication.targets" was not found. Confirm that the expression in the Import declaration "$(VSToolsPath)/WebApplications/Microsoft.WebApplication.targets", which evaluated to "/usr/….
D16 Bus Factor — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. All 38 significant source file(s) were last meaningfully changed so long ago that no living knowledge remains — nothing since has been substantial enough to re-establish ownership (a broad, mechanical sweep that touches many files shallowly does not count, and neither does no activity at all). There is no concentration to measure, so the bus factor is not scored. This is not a clean bill: nobody currently holds working knowledge of this code (see D34 Knowledge Freshness). Counted over 12 of the 126 production source files in this repository: 88 are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over, and the remaining 26 have no attributable history left to measure.
D17 Explicit Debt — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The C# workspace loaded this repository's projects but reported a load failure, and the dead-code reference search is unreliable over a graph that did not load cleanly, so it was skipped. The other debt markers on this row were read; dead symbols were not, and their absence from the score is not a finding that the code has none. First load diagnostic: Failure: Msbuild failed when processing the file 'Samples/Mvc/MvcCallAnno/MvcCallAnno.csproj' with message: 这台计算机上缺少此项目引用的 NuGet 程序包。使用“NuGet 程序包还原”可下载这些程序包。有关更多信息，请参见 http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=322105。缺少的文件是 ..\..\..\packages\Microsoft.CodeDom.Providers.DotNetCompilerPlatform.3.6.0\build\net472\Microsoft.CodeDom.Providers.DotNetComp….
D17 Explicit Debt — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. The 38 deducted marker(s) and the 1.8/KLoC density on this row were taken over this repository's .NET projects ALONE: .js (15,731 lines, 53% of production source) went unread, because every marker collector on this path is reached through a C# workspace. D17's marker collectors need a compiler we do not have for that language, so none of its nine marker kinds were read there. The debt in that source is UNMEASURED — its absence from the score above is a gap in this analyzer's language coverage, not a finding that the code carries none.
D18 Solution Shape — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. `dotnet build` reported 1 error(s), and the diagnostics it printed were: MSB4019: The imported project "/usr/share/dotnet/sdk/10.0.400/Microsoft/VisualStudio/v18.0/WebApplications/Microsoft.WebApplication.targets" was not found. Confirm that the expression in the Import declaration "$(VSToolsPath)/WebApplications/Microsoft.WebApplication.targets", which evaluated to "/usr/share/dotnet/sdk/10.0.400/Microsoft/VisualStudio/v18.0/WebApplications/Microsoft.WebApplication.targets", is correct, and that the file exists on disk.. None of them is a .NET compiler diagnostic, which is the only signal this check reads as "the code does not compile", so the failure is recorded as a build-environment gap rather than a code defect. The usual causes are a project that targets a platform this run cannot build (a Windows-only target framework on a Linux worker) or a build step that shells out to a tool the image does not carry. Solution Shape is scored on structure and is NOT capped. Semantic analysis is independent of this build and covers every project that loaded — but a project whose restore did not complete has no resolved references, so treat its results as absent rather than clean. ★ The reach of that test, stated so this classification can be checked rather than taken on trust: it reads the C# (CS), Visual Basic (BC) and F# (FS) compiler series, and treats SDK, NuGet-restore and MSBuild codes (NETSDK, NU, MSB) as evidence that the build did not run rather than that the code is broken — read the diagnostics named above and judge for yourself. You can widen what we reach: if this build is meant to run off its own platform, without host tooling we do not carry, the diagnostics named above are what stopped it. If it is deliberately platform-bound — a Windows-only desktop product, say — there is nothing to do here: the note records our reach, not a defect in your build.
D22 Internal API Consistency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The loaded project set declares no packable project and no `.Contracts` project, so there is no intentionally-exposed surface for API consistency to be judged over.
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — measured, with a gap in what it reached — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. The solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan. 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) (nuget packages.config) WERE scanned and every vulnerability they reported is included in this result; nuget was not, so this dimension's score covers less than the dependency surface this repository declares, and nothing here is evidence that nuget is free of known-vulnerable dependencies.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — not measured this run — Watchdog could not measure this here. That is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — and it is neither a defect in this repository nor evidence that the check would have passed. `Trace/Anno.Command/EnableUserCommand.cs` produced a parse error, so every rule in this engine's `gdpr.yml` was absent there. That absence is NOT a clean result: these rules detect personal data crossing a boundary into a log sink, a URL or browser storage, and a file that was never parsed cannot report any of the three. The rest of the tree analysed normally and its rows above stand; only these files are unaccounted for. You can widen what we reach: fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover it.
D39 IL Efficiency — not measured this run — This is a true statement about the repository that carries nothing for its owner to act on, so it is reported here rather than as a defect in their code. `dotnet build` exited 1 with a compiler/MSBuild diagnostic, so there were no assemblies to read IL from. The build itself is D18's row, with the ask; nothing further is charged here.
AC6 Visual & motion safety — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. 68 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 108.
IC1 Incompleteness & stubs — measured, with a gap in what it reached — Watchdog measured this, but not all of it. What it did not reach is a gap on our side — a collector, parser or image we have not built yet — so the numbers on that dimension cover less than the repository, and the part left out is not evidence that it would have passed. 14 further occurrence(s) are not listed individually; the score already reflects all 54.
Repo exclusion declarations (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code): none declared — every source file was scored.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity: Cyclomatic complexity counts branches statically — it cannot tell an essential decision tree from accidental tangle, nor see complexity that lives in data or configuration (large switch-case token tables, DSL lexers/parsers, data-as-code rule tables) rather than control flow: a tokenizer's many single-character cases read as high complexity though each branch is trivial.
D2 Cognitive Complexity: Cognitive-complexity heuristics approximate how hard code is to follow; genuine domain difficulty and well-named intent that eases reading are not captured.
D3 God Classes: "God class" is sized by members and responsibilities visible in the type — a deliberately broad facade over a coherent subsystem can read the same as an accidental grab-bag. For front-end JS the file-length check is cohesion-aware (a single-responsibility module — one class/IIFE — earns a 3× threshold), but cohesion is approximated from top-level declarations, not true dependency structure.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity — an in-process token-stream comparison over sliding windows, with type-aware normalization — so it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement. Its critique rows are drawn from a closed category vocabulary and each row means the same thing in every run, so two scans can be compared row by row; the SET that fires is still a sample, and does not repeat exactly. Measured on one frozen input, six scans at one engine SHA: 2-5 critique rows per scan, 8 distinct rows across the six, 3 of those 8 seen in only one scan. So a D19 row is evidence about the documentation, but a COUNT of D19 rows is not a quantity — never read a change in it as an improvement or a regression.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and on the advisory databases — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen. Coverage needs a RESOLVED graph: an unpinned requirements.txt, or a pom without a resolved build, yields partial coverage rather than a clean verdict. An ecosystem the analyzer cannot scan is reported as unmeasured, never as clean.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
D43 Malicious Dependencies: Only packages some vulnerability database has already NAMED as malicious are seen — a compromise published in the last hours, or never reported at all, is invisible here, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a dependency is trustworthy. There is no typosquat or dependency-confusion analysis: a package nobody has reported is simply absent from the feeds. Coverage is the dependency scan's: an ecosystem that could not be scanned is disclosed as unmeasured, never as clean.
D44 Platform End-of-Life: The support table is FROZEN, so it goes out of date by losing RECALL: a release that ended support after the table was written is missed until the table is refreshed, and this dimension reading 10 is not evidence that a platform is current. Only platforms the repository DECLARES in a place this pass reads are seen — a runtime named only in a Dockerfile (D31's subject), in a CI workflow (D29's), or in a file this pass does not parse (go.mod, a Gemfile ruby directive) is invisible here, which is why a repository declaring none of them abstains rather than scoring. Only frameworks with a PUBLISHED support policy are tracked: React, Flask and Express publish none, so their age cannot be judged and their absence from a report is not a statement that they are supported.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A click handler on a plain element is now asked for a name too (it is a control the author declared), but the subtree test that answers it is deliberately generous: any DYNAMIC text expression in the subtree counts as a name, so an icon chosen by a ternary ({cond ? <IconA/> : <IconB/>}) reads as named, and a glyph component from a library the icon-import list does not know still names its parent. A clean result is "no unlabelled control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC5 ARIA correctness: ARIA correctness is checked against the static role/attribute shape — roles/attributes set dynamically aren't seen, a valid role says nothing about whether it matches the element's real behaviour, and required-state checks are suppressed when a JSX spread could supply them. The two-branch toggle check (a control whose state is conveyed only by which of two mutually exclusive branches renders) reads CONDITIONALS THAT ARE ATTRIBUTES — Vue v-if/v-else/v-show and Alpine x-if/x-show — so the same toggle written as a Svelte {#if} block or a JSX ternary is control flow the markup model never projects as a branch and is not seen at all.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (5): D19, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score; each names its own sample and method on its card. They are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: How tangled the control flow is — methods with many branches are hard to test and change.
Method: Cyclomatic complexity per method (1 + decision points), computed exhaustively across production source; test projects separated by convention. Deterministic.
73 method(s) exceeded the cyclomatic complexity threshold of 15; the worst was (anonymous) at 117. A further 2 method(s) were over the threshold but excluded as flat dispatchers (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), the largest being handleEvent at 30 — they are counted neither in the figure above nor in this dimension's score.
+ 41 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Bring the 4 bodies over 60 down to 60 or less in Cyclomatic Complexity — start with (anonymous) (cyclomatic 117), base.liger.getEditor (cyclomatic 104), (anonymous) (cyclomatic 76). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 4 together lifts Cyclomatic Complexity from 2.0 to about 3.7/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 60; a cleaner split scores higher.
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cyclomatic Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d1_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: How hard the code is for a person to follow, beyond raw branching.
Method: Cognitive complexity per method (Sonar-style nesting-penalized score), computed exhaustively over production code, excluding test projects. Deterministic.
+ 61 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Bring the 7 bodies over 60 down to 60 or less in Cognitive Complexity — start with (anonymous) (cognitive 127), base.liger.getEditor (cognitive 125), _getTreeHTMLByData (cognitive 100). — This score is capped by its worst body, so a finding fixed alone moves it by almost nothing — the next one down takes its place. Refactoring these 7 together lifts Cognitive Complexity from 2.0 to about 3.2/10, projected with the scoring formula itself and assuming each lands exactly at 60; a cleaner split scores higher.
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cognitive Complexity in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d2_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D3 · God Classes8.4 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Over-large classes that try to do too much ("god classes").
Method: God-class detection by line and method-count thresholds per logical type (partial classes unified), filtered for generated code and registration/contract false positives. Deterministic.
4 over-large unit(s) detected — types, modules or files that carry too much.
FileTooLong: REDACTED · ×4REDACTED
What to do
Resolve the 4 FileTooLong finding(s) in God Classes — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate God Classes in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d3_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
20 duplicated block group(s) detected. A further 3 rows report members as variants of one another; they aggregate block groups already counted above and are not themselves counted. Measured on part of this repository only: .js (53% of production source) was not exposed to the token comparison, so duplication there is unmeasured and is not in this count.
+ 15 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 3 Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with RoutingInfomationDto.cs (2), AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 Members sharing a duplicated core (4 members, 50+ identical tokens) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with RoutingInfomationDto.cs, Command.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Near-duplicate member family (6 members, 25 shared lines) finding(s) in Code Duplication — start with AnnoMapper.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Duplication in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling9.4 / 10Stronggated by 2 serious findings✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Off the main sequence: Anno.Infrastructure · ×2Anno.Infrastructure/Anno.Infrastructure.csproj:1
Off the main sequence: Anno.CommonAnno.Common/Anno.Common.csproj:1
What to do
Resolve the 2 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling — start with Anno.Infrastructure.csproj, Anno.Domain.Dto.csproj. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether a class's methods are focused on a single responsibility.
Method: LCOM4 cohesion per production class with at least two methods: connected components of methods sharing state or calls, computed syntactically. Deterministic, not a proxy.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: LCOM4 cohesion computed over every production class — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Resolve the 2 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with PlatformModule.cs, SysMember.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cohesion (LCOM4) in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d6_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
Resolve the 3 Leaked secret finding(s) in Secret Scanning — start with REDACTED, REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (3 issue-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Secret Scanning in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d13_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
0 of 221 packages use a banned license. ★ DEPTH: this repository's MSBuild projects declare 18 direct `PackageReference`(s), and 180 further package(s) were reached beyond them by closing the graph over nuget.org's own nuspec dependency graph — so a banned licence pulled in only by a dependency's OWN dependencies is inside this verdict. A package whose licence nuget.org could not be asked for is not graded, and version ranges are taken at their lower bound, so this is the closure as that graph states it rather than a restored consumer's exact resolution.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
38 deducted debt markers + unmeasured dead symbols across 10283 LoC in the .NET projects (1.8/KLoC) → score 6.4. Dead code not measured: the solution did not load cleanly, so the reference search was skipped. Measured on the .NET source only: .js (53% of production source) was not read, and carries at least 0 uncounted task marker(s) in 0 file(s).
Resolve the 21 CommentedOutCode finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Context.cs (14), RedisHelper.cs (3), MemberService.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (21 warning-level).
Resolve the 15 EmptyCatchBlock finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with Entity.cs (4), AnnoMapper.cs (3), BaseDto.cs (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (15 issue-level).
Resolve the 2 WriteOnlyPrivateField finding(s) in Explicit Debt — start with PlatformModule.cs, MemberService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Explicit Debt in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d17_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether the solution is laid out in a sensible, conventional structure.
Method: Solution structure: project count, decomposition, shell-project detection, build success (confirmed failures cap the score); traced to actual .sln files and binaries. Deterministic.
26 projects, 152 source files, 10515 hand-written lines of code (10283 production / 232 test — the split is derived per file: test is what its project, its own path, or a compile-guarded region marks as test, and a file carrying no test signal counts as production), 31 inter-project edges (build NOT measured — `dotnet build` did not complete in the analyzer, so the build half of this dimension is unmeasured rather than failed: the score above rests on structure alone and is not capped. The diagnostics that stopped it are named under Limitations.)
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
The root README is a well-written project overview for Viper (a dashboard built atop the Anno microservice engine), with an online demo link and a brief description of Anno's target platforms. It also links to a Java thrift parent project and describes how to run Viper via MySQL database setup, registration center, and configuration files. The document is visually rich with dashboards and a detailed step-by-step for running Viper (1-4), plus an outline that promises many more sections but is cut by the scanner mid-run.
Improve Documentation Quality — currently 7.0/10. — The root README is a well-written project overview for Viper (a dashboard built atop the Anno microservice engine), with an online demo link and a brief description of Anno's target platforms. It also links to a Java thrift parent project and describes how to run Viper via MySQL database setup, registration center, and configuration files. The document is visually rich with dashboards and a detailed step-by-step for running Viper (1-4), plus an outline that promises many more sections but is cut by the scanner mid-run.
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D20 · ADR Quality0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
3 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
Inconsistent spelling of 'Cache' in method names within the same class. One method uses the correct spelling 'GetCacheValue', while the other uses the typo 'SetChacheValue'.
Inconsistent spelling of 'Connection' in field name. The field 'Coonstr' appears to be a typo for 'ConnStr' or 'ConnectionString', especially given the context of a Redis helper class where connection strings are standard. While 'Coonstr' is a field and 'Serialize' is a method, the field name itself is an internal inconsistency in vocabulary/spelling within the helper.
Inconsistent casing for the same conceptual property 'state' across different models. The model `SysMember` uses PascalCase `State`, while the model `sys_member` uses camelCase `state`. While these are different types, they represent the same entity concept (Member) and the same attribute (state/status), suggesting a lack of consistent naming convention between the Domain model and the Data/Model layer.
What to do
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent spelling of 'Cache' in method names within the same class.… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent spelling of 'Connection' in field name. The field 'Coonstr'… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Inconsistent casing for the same conceptual property 'state' across… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D24 · Comment ValueStrong◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
Resolve the 2 misleading comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs, Program.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
0 of 25 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d26_recommendation.md.
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D27 · Navigability7.9 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How far you must trace to follow a call — low indirection and co-located slices read easier.
Method: Call indirection (interface hops, cross-namespace calls, slice-locality scaled) over a sampled set of method invocations, size-aware baseline. Sampled; confidence discounted by symbol-resolution gaps. C# also names each pass-through layer (a class whose every public method only forwards its own parameters to one collaborator) as a located finding; the score is not affected.
Coverage: Slice locality from the first namespace segments, SAMPLED (≤400 methods) — not exhaustive.
91 % of calls cross a namespace and 14 % go through an interface, but 92 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What to do
Improve Navigability — currently 7.9/10. — 91 % of calls cross a namespace and 14 % go through an interface, but 92 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Secret scan via TWO gitleaks detect passes in an isolated checkout — the full git history, then a second --no-git pass over the working tree as it stands — merged and de-duplicated by (rule, file, line); each match flagged High. Both invocations are recorded in the audit trail. Exhaustive; when the tool is absent, or when its output cannot be parsed into the expected shape, the dimension is WITHHELD as an explicit measurement gap on our side — unscored and excluded from the lens, never a hedged middling score.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
20 finding(s): 0 critical, 6 high, 14 medium, 0 low. semgrep hit a parse error in 2 file(s) — `Trace/Anno.Command/EnableUserCommand.cs` (line 31, line 32), `Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js` — so no absence of findings in the named regions is evidence of anything; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real. Fix the syntax error (or exclude the file deliberately) and re-scan to cover them.
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
REDACTED
+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 5 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (2), REDACTED, REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED (3), REDACTED (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 REDACTED finding(s) in Static Analysis (SAST) — start with REDACTED. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d29_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any dependency has a known published vulnerability (CVE), direct or transitive, in ANY ecosystem the repository declares — Dart pub, Elixir and Erlang via Hex, Go modules, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle, JavaScript/npm, .NET/NuGet, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift.
Method: Dependency-CVE scan across every ecosystem the repository declares, scored ONCE. Three sources are unioned and deduplicated by advisory identity (rule id + alias closure, CVE<->GHSA) scoped to package+version, keeping the worst severity: `osv-scanner --recursive` over osv.dev for Dart pub, Elixir/Hex (and Erlang, whose `rebar.lock` syft first converts to a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the lock), Go, Java and Kotlin via Maven/Gradle (and Scala, whose sbt build's pinned direct declarations are written into a CycloneDX SBOM the scanner reads, with rows attributed back to the build file), npm, PHP/Composer, Python/PyPI, RubyGems, Rust/Cargo and Swift; `trivy fs --scanners vuln` for npm lockfiles; and `dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive` for NuGet (with per-advisory collapse of the project x target-framework fan-out), plus a DECLARED-dependency arm that resolves a published gem's gemspec against rubygems.org where no Gemfile.lock is committed. `SeverityScore(c,h,m,l, normalizer 8.0)`. NotApplicable only when NO ecosystem is readable; if any applicable ecosystem could not be scanned the findings are REPORTED and the score is withheld. Supersedes the npm and OSV arms, retired 2026-09-05.
No known-vulnerable dependencies in the 1 ecosystem(s) that were scanned (nuget packages.config). Partial dependency scan: 1 of 2 declared ecosystem(s) were scanned (nuget packages.config), and the findings above are real and complete for them. nuget was not scanned (nuget: the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan), so this is not the whole dependency surface and the result is reported at reduced confidence.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
38 of 38 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is Trace/Anno.Domain/Context.cs. Counted over 38 of the 126 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over.
Orphaned file · ×38Trace/Anno.Domain/Context.cs:1
Dormant codebase
What to do
Resolve the 38 Orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with Entity.cs (2), Context.cs, PlatformModule.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (38 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling. A non-source file is never a coupling PARTICIPANT either: documentation, schemas, config and data files are dropped with the rest, so a code↔docs pair — a command and the reference page that restates it — is not reported however strongly the two co-change; nor is coupling that runs THROUGH a build step or config file.
What it measures: Whether any dependency the repository declares is published as MALICIOUS rather than merely vulnerable — a package that is an attacker's work, in any ecosystem osv-scanner reads. Scored apart from D30 because the answer is binary: there is no safe version to upgrade to, and the fix is to remove the package and rotate every credential it could have read.
Method: The same dependency scan D30 reads, partitioned on the scanner's own classification rather than rescanned: a row is MALICIOUS when its id is in the `MAL-` space (the ossf/malicious-packages feed) OR its `database_specific.cwe_ids` carries `CWE-506` ("Embedded Malicious Code"). Both channels are structural; the summary text is deliberately NOT read, because a malicious-package record whose summary says only "Critical severity vulnerability" is a real shape ([GHSA redacted]) and a text matcher misses it. Scored BINARY: any surviving row is 0, whatever its severity and however many CVEs sit beside it — a hostile dependency is not a quantity. Applicability and degradation are D30's: NotApplicable only when no ecosystem is readable, and an unscannable ecosystem degrades rather than reading clean. SCORED, not informational.
What it measures: Whether anyone still ships security patches for the platform this repository RUNS ON — the runtime it pins and the framework majors its own constraints hold it to. Separate from D12 because the question differs: a current Django on an end-of-life Python is perfectly up to date and completely unsupported, and the fix is a migration rather than a version bump. What the repository says it merely SUPPORTS is never charged.
Method: End-of-life PLATFORM read from the repository's own declarations and graded against a FROZEN, dated table of vendor support dates — no network, no feed, no API, so this dimension answers identically inside a closed scan fence. Two subjects: a RUNTIME the project pins (a single or all-end-of-life TargetFramework, a .nvmrc or .python-version, a requires-python CAP) and a FRAMEWORK major a dependency constraint cannot move off (a caret, tilde or exact version; `vue@^2.7.16` pins Vue 2). A FLOOR is deliberately never charged — `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what a package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on — and a multi-target project is charged only when EVERY target is out of support. Runtime 4.0/product capped 8.0, framework 1.5 capped 4.5. The table is safe to freeze because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false: it loses recall as it ages, never precision, and a test asserts every entry predates the freeze date. Disjoint from D31 (a container image's OS layer) and D29 (the toolchain a CI workflow installs). Abstains when the repository declares no platform this pass reads — never scores it clean.
0 end-of-life runtime(s) and 0 end-of-life framework(s), read from 24 platform declaration(s) and 0 dependency declaration(s). This dimension reads what the repository says about ITSELF — a pinned target framework, a version file, a capped requires-python, a Rust toolchain pin, a framework major a constraint cannot move off. A FLOOR is deliberately never charged: `requires-python = ">=3.8"` states what the package SUPPORTS, not what it runs on, and a well-maintained library declares exactly that while running its own CI on a current release. The end-of-life facts are FROZEN and dated, so this dimension needs no network and answers identically inside a closed scan fence; as the table ages it loses recall and never precision, because a statement about support that ended in the past cannot become false. The OS layer of a container image is D31's question and the toolchain a CI workflow installs is D29's; this row is neither.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d44_recommendation.md.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Coverage: Population: image/media elements — img, area, input[type=image], svg, video, object, embed, canvas — across the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and dynamic-attribute elements are skipped. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is NOT read by any producer, so it contributes no element to this population; where such a frontend is present the card discloses it as an analyzer gap rather than scoring around it.
An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×2) — Viper/Views/Error/404.cshtml:9, Viper/Views/Error/500.cshtml:9
What to do
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels4.3 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, a click handler on a plain element names the control it declares, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
Coverage: Population: form controls, buttons, links, fieldsets and known UI-library field components in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx); components, hidden subtrees and spread/dynamic-attribute elements are skipped, so a control whose label arrives through a spread or a runtime expression is deliberately not judged. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×2) — Viper/Views/Home/Login.cshtml:61, Viper/Views/Home/Login.cshtml:65
This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id. (×2) — Viper/Views/Home/Login.cshtml:68, Viper/Views/Home/Login.cshtml:73
This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. (×9) — Viper/Views/Home/Login.cshtml:72, REDACTED:1329, REDACTED:1386, …
A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label. (×4) — REDACTED:1385, REDACTED:2932, Viper/wwwroot/js/jquery.min.js:2, …
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
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AC3 · Page structure2.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
Coverage: Population: the PARSED MARKUP documents (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx). The page-level checks — lang, title, single main landmark — fire ONCE PER FULL DOCUMENT (an <html> root) and never on a partial or component fragment, so a repo of fragments is assessed only on the per-element checks (heading order, table headers, iframe titles, meta-refresh, zoom). Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×2) — Viper/Views/Error/404.cshtml:11, Viper/Views/Error/500.cshtml:11
The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×14) — Viper/Views/Share/_Layout.cshtml:3, Viper/wwwroot/html/company/index.html:2, Viper/wwwroot/html/component.html:2, …
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×14) — Viper/Views/Share/_Layout.cshtml:3, Viper/wwwroot/html/company/index.html:2, Viper/wwwroot/html/component.html:2, …
An empty <title> gives no page name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Put descriptive text in the <title>. — Viper/wwwroot/html/welcome.html:2
A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope). — Viper/wwwroot/js/jsoneditor.min.js:31
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no element the repo's own CSS styles `cursor: pointer` without giving it any of the three, no unfocusable element whose only binding is a mouse enter/leave pair or a double-click, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
Coverage: Population: elements that pose a keyboard-semantics question, in the PARSED MARKUP files only (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) — a non-natively-interactive element carrying a click handler, a double-click or hover enter/leave binding, a pointer-only gesture on a tabindex="0" element, or `cursor: pointer` from the repo's own CSS; an href-less or placeholder-href (#, javascript:) anchor; and any element with a positive tabindex. Natively interactive elements used correctly (<button>, <a href>, form controls) are NOT in the population — there is nothing to judge — so a page of nothing but correct controls gives AC4 nothing to measure. Keyboard reachability is judged from the markup, never from a rendered page. ★ An interactive element declared in a tagged-template (html`…`) or hyperscript frontend is NOT in this population — no producer reads either — so an empty population is reported as an analyzer gap, never as "this repository has no interactive elements".
An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×16) — Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-24uservisitdistribute-analyse.vue:8, Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-24uservisitdistribute-analyse.vue:15, Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-24uservisitdistribute-analyse.vue:22, …
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether ARIA is used correctly — valid non-abstract roles, the ARIA state a role requires, valid (non-misspelled) aria-* attribute names, in-enum values for token-typed aria-* attributes, and no aria-hidden on (or wrapping) a focusable element. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: role values checked against the WAI-ARIA role set (abstract/invalid flagged), required ARIA state for a role, and aria-hidden on a focusable element. Deterministic, role/attribute level.
Coverage: Population: elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx) that carry a role or an aria-* attribute; roles and token values are checked against the ARIA enums exhaustively within that set. An expression-valued (dynamic) role or aria-* value is skipped rather than guessed, and markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
Coverage: Population: styled elements in the PARSED MARKUP files (.html/.htm/.cshtml/.razor/.vue/.svelte/.jsx/.tsx), plus in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files and CSS-in-JS literals. Colour contrast is computed from LITERAL colour pairs only (hex/rgb/hsl/named, including var() tokens and Tailwind neutral utilities) — computed, runtime-themed and external-CDN colour is never resolved, so this is a partial read of contrast by construction. Markup built in script — tagged-template (html`…`) UIs and hyperscript DOM factories — is not read at all.
`.el-pagination.is-background .el-pager li:not(.disabled).active` sets color: #FFF on background-color: #409EFF — 2.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:1394
`.ui-helper-reset` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/jquery-ui.css:24
`.ui-dialog` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/jquery-ui.css:403
`.ui-menu` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/jquery-ui.css:463
`.l-text-field` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. (×5) — Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/ligerUI/skins/Tab/css/form.css:65, Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/ligerUI/skins/Silvery/css/form.css:45, Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/ligerUI/skins/Gray2014/css/form.css:77, …
`.l-box-select-add .link` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/ligerUI/skins/Aqua/css/ligerui-form.css:242
`.el-dropdown .el-dropdown-selfdefine:focus:not(.focusing)` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:12
`.el-pagination button:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:1250
`.el-dialog__headerbtn` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:1520
`.el-menu--horizontal > .el-submenu:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:1922
`.el-radio-button` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:2204
`.el-radio-button__inner` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:2218
`.el-radio-button__orig-radio` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:2254
`.el-switch__core` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:2389
`.el-select__input` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:2638
`.el-table-filter__bottom button:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:3287
`.el-date-editor .el-range-input` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:3845
`.el-picker-panel__shortcut` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:4033
`.el-picker-panel__btn` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:4054
`.el-picker-panel__icon-btn` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:4069
`.el-time-panel__btn` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:4292
`.el-message-box__headerbtn` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:4448
`.el-tabs__item:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:4997
`.el-tree-node` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:5597
`.el-carousel__arrow` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:10782
`.el-carousel__button` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:10910
`.el-collapse-item__header` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:11121
`.el-cascader__search-input` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:11795
`.el-color-dropdown__btn` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:12041
`.el-input.is-active .el-input__inner` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:12423
`.el-input-group__append:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:12584
`.el-link` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:13050
`.el-checkbox__input` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:14258
`.el-checkbox__original` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:14380
`.el-checkbox-button__inner` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:14417
`.el-radio` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible. — Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:14440
What to do
Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
Coverage: Population: the repository's own tooling configuration — lint config, test and CI files — NOT the markup. It is read for a configured accessibility checker and an automated accessibility assertion (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse, or a native-toolkit equivalent), and it credits an INVOCATION, never a mention: a licence filename, an import comment or a doc reference earns no rung. Enforcement configured entirely outside the repository leaves no evidence here and cannot be credited.
No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 40 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
Other · Architecture — Whether any singleton service captures a scoped/transient dependency — a silent lifetime/threading bug.
Method: Roslyn scan: DI registrations parsed from AddSingleton/Scoped/Transient; each singleton checked for captured shorter-lifetime dependencies. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified. How each file's role is decided, because the split is only as good as that: a generated name or a build-output tree makes it Generated, a test project makes it Test, and otherwise the file's NAMESPACE and PATH words are matched against fixed vocabularies in a fixed ORDER — domain, then infrastructure, then application — so a file whose words hit two layers is counted under the earlier one. A production file matching none of them counts as application, so that share reads 'application or unclassified' rather than a measured application layer. Roles come from naming convention, never from what the code does.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
Other · Architecture — Whether singleton services avoid mutable shared instance state that concurrent callers would race on.
Method: Roslyn scan: singleton field mutations unguarded by lock or Interlocked, per type; syntax-based guard detection. Deterministic, traceable per field.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface declared-member counts (accessors fold into their property/event); fat-interface threshold (over 15 declared members) flagged per type. Each finding also reports the distinct-OPERATION count — members counted by name, so an overload group counts once — which decides whether it states the caller-side ISP harm or the implementer-side burden of an overload set. TypeScript: exported interfaces that declare behaviour, counted over their REQUIRED operations (method signatures and function-typed properties with no `?`, once per signature) — data-shape interfaces and ambient .d.ts declarations are outside the population; JavaScript declares no interfaces and is not applicable. Deterministic, type-level.
`IPlatformQuery` declares 17 members: `GetAllUser`, `GetAllCompany`, `GetUserInfo`, `Login`, `LogOut`, `ReSetpwd`, `OnLine`, `Get_all_power`, `GetFunc`, `GetUsrFc`, `EditFunc`, `Get_rfs`, `GetcurRoles`, `SaveSurRoles`, `AddRoles`, `UpdateRoles_link`, `Identity`. Counted as the author wrote them — a property is ONE member and its get/set accessors are not counted separately, and an event counts once. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — Anno.Plugs.LogicService/Platform/IPlatformQuery.cs:9
What to do
Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
Do you agree with this assessment?
C1 · Data Protection3.5 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
What to do
Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.
`ValuesController.SayHello` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — Samples/Mvc/MvcCallAnno/Controllers/ValuesController.cs:16
`ValuesController.Subtraction` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — Samples/Mvc/MvcCallAnno/Controllers/ValuesController.cs:21
`ValuesController.BuyProduct` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — Samples/Mvc/MvcCallAnno/Controllers/ValuesController.cs:25
`ErrorController.Index` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — Viper/Controllers/ErrorController.cs:16
`HomeController.Index` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — Viper/Controllers/HomeController.cs:11
`HomeController.Login` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — Viper/Controllers/HomeController.cs:15
`HomeController.Simulation` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase. — Viper/Controllers/HomeController.cs:19
What to do
Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain9.7 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether domain types receive the time and randomness their rules depend on, rather than reading the process clock or a global random source directly — an ambient read makes the rule it feeds untestable at the instant that matters and lets two reads inside one operation disagree.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated, C#/VB only): domain-layer types scanned for ambient reads — DateTime/DateTimeOffset.Now/UtcNow/Today, Random.Shared, new Random(), Stopwatch.GetTimestamp — resolved against the semantic model, with a comment/string-stripped token fallback only where resolution fails. Body reads are scored; field/property initialisers are surfaced unscored. Apply/When folds excluded (ES1 owns them). Deterministic, symbol-resolved.
`SysMember` reads `DateTime.Now` inside `SetProfile`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`. — Trace/Anno.Domain/Member/SysMember.cs:94
What to do
Pass the instant into the domain method that needs it, or inject `TimeProvider` (BCL, .NET 8+) and read it there — then a test can choose the moment a rule is evaluated at.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.
Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.
Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.
Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: incompleteness by code shape (constant-returning methods, async-never-await, #if false branches, guards that return what the code already falls through to, tests an earlier guard already decided, comparisons against NaN, skeleton types), not keyword-gated. Deterministic, code-shape heuristic.
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×26) — Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:25, Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:26, Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:27, …
5 consecutive lines of code sit inside a `/* … */` block — a block of code switched off rather than removed, which rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×5) — Trace/Anno.Domain/Context.cs:20, Trace/Anno.Domain/Context.cs:32, Trace/Anno.Domain/Context.cs:43, …
3 consecutive lines of code sit inside a `/* … */` block — a block of code switched off rather than removed, which rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×4) — Trace/Anno.Domain/Context.cs:28, Trace/Anno.Domain/Context.cs:63, Trace/Anno.Domain/Context.cs:102, …
6 consecutive lines of code sit inside a `/* … */` block — a block of code switched off rather than removed, which rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×3) — Trace/Anno.Domain/Context.cs:54, Trace/Anno.Domain/Context.cs:67, Trace/Anno.Domain/Context.cs:106
9 consecutive lines of code sit inside a `/* … */` block — a block of code switched off rather than removed, which rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — Trace/Anno.Domain/Context.cs:79
107 consecutive lines of code sit inside a `/* … */` block — a block of code switched off rather than removed, which rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). — Trace/Anno.Domain/Context.cs:148
What to do
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Explain in the README how to run the tests. Add a section called Testing to the README in the repository's top folder, saying how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 25 of 25 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
What to do
Record your significant design decisions. Write one short document per decision, giving its date, the situation, the decision and its consequences, and keep them together with your other design documents. A docs/adr folder with each file named by number and title is the easiest place to find them.
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
What to do
Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P10 · Library API & versioning10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Readiness · Readiness — For a library: a deliberate (small) public API surface and explicit semantic versioning so consumers can depend on it safely.
Method: Roslyn scan: public API surface area and semantic-versioning markers (SemVer attributes, changelog entries) for libraries; off .NET, a library is the ecosystem's publication act (an npm package that is not private and names an entry point, a PyPI distribution with a build system, a Rust library crate, a Maven/Gradle module that publishes, a Go module with no package main, a gemspec, a Composer library, a SwiftPM library product, a pub.dev or Hex package), its surface is the share of types the language model records as public (Rust, Swift, Java, Kotlin, Go, Dart; not measured where the model records no type visibility or, as in TypeScript, only module-level export), and its version is read from the manifest, a semver CHANGELOG, release tooling or semver git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability5.3 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
What to do
Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are traceable — a maintained changelog and explicit version stamping.
Method: Filesystem scan: changelog file presence and version tags in csproj or git tags. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether outbound HTTP calls are wrapped in resilience (retry/timeout/circuit-breaker) so a failing dependency doesn't cascade.
Method: Source scan: outbound HTTP clients and what bounds them — resilience handlers (Polly, AddStandardResilienceHandler) on .NET; on Go, the JVM, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, PHP, Rust, Elixir, Swift, Dart and Erlang, a timeout, deadline, retry or breaker beside each call, or a process-wide client default (a framework-wide deadline such as Drupal core's, Laravel's or actix's awc counts). Exhaustive, deterministic.
The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.
What to do
Add `AddStandardResilienceHandler()` (or Polly policies) to your HttpClient registrations so a flaky dependency can't take the app down.
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code protects its performance with benchmarks — a benchmark suite, allocation/memory measurement, and (ideally) a CI gate. Presence is credited as a bonus, never a deduction.
Method: Repo + source scan: BenchmarkDotNet referenced (csproj/source), [Benchmark]/[MemoryDiagnoser] attribute counts, and a benchmark step in CI; off .NET, the same ladder over Go testing.B, Rust criterion/#[bench]/divan, JMH/kotlinx-benchmark, pytest-benchmark/asv/pyperf, tinybench/mitata/vitest bench/benchmark.js and Swift package-benchmark — scored as a bonus ladder (absence is neutral, never a deduction). Deterministic, presence detection.
No benchmark suite was found by the two searches this check runs. FIRST, a BenchmarkDotNet package reference in any project file — every project the workspace loaded, plus a walk of project files on disk that never loaded, because a benchmark suite is exactly the project a partial load drops. SECOND, a script harness: a file whose name contains `benchmark` and ends `.py`, `.sh`, `.ps1`, `.bash`, `.rb`, `.js` or `.mjs`, credited ONLY when this repository's CI text also mentions benchmarks — a harness no pipeline runs is read as a fixture, deliberately. Neither search can see a benchmark suite in another ecosystem's idiom (a Go `testing.B` file, a JMH or criterion project, a pytest-benchmark run), so this is 'no benchmark found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
Readiness · Performance — Whether the code is written to minimise allocations so it doesn't pressure its host's memory manager — buffer/slice views over copies, object pooling, stack or value-type allocation, and buffer writers. Reward-only: credited where present, never penalised where a simpler style is fine.
Method: Production-source scan: density (per 1k LoC) of allocation-aware APIs — in .NET Span/Memory, ArrayPool/ObjectPool, stackalloc, ValueTask, value-type structs, IBufferWriter, string.Create, SkipLocalsInit; off .NET, with comments and strings blanked, Go's sync.Pool, preallocated slices/maps, Grow, strconv.Append* and buf[:0] reuse; the JVM's NIO buffer views, MemorySegment, primitive collections, pools and literal presizes (plus Kotlin primitive arrays and value classes, Scala AnyVal and @specialized); Swift's reserveCapacity, ContiguousArray, withUnsafe* access and ~Copyable. Activated off .NET on the same floor (400 lines, and benchmarks or 8 uses); Rust and garbage-collected scripting languages are not applicable. Reward-only. Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
No Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask or buffer-writer usage was found. If this code sits on a hot path, these reduce the GC pressure it creates — a bonus, not a requirement.
What to do
On hot paths, prefer Span<T>/ReadOnlySpan<T>, ArrayPool<T>, stackalloc and ValueTask to cut the allocations those paths would otherwise make.
Readiness · Performance — Whether asynchronous code stays responsive — it avoids sync-over-async blocking (a .NET .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult(), a time.sleep or blocking HTTP call inside a Python coroutine, a *Sync call inside an async JavaScript function, block_on inside a Rust async fn, runBlocking inside a Kotlin suspend function, block() inside a Reactor publisher) that stalls a thread or event loop and risks deadlock, and, where the code is a reusable library on .NET, awaits with ConfigureAwait(false) so it never captures and stalls its caller's context.
Method: Production-source scan: sync-over-async blocking counted everywhere — .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in .NET; off .NET, read from the language model, a blocking call inside an async function (Python, TS/JS, Rust, Kotlin, Swift, Dart) or inside a Java method returning a Reactor Mono/Flux or a Scala method returning a Future or effect — and, for a .NET library with ≥5 awaits, the share of awaits using ConfigureAwait(false). Deterministic, syntax/text detection.
1 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
`.Wait()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one). — Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilJob.cs:46
What to do
Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult().
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: HSTS/security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order, weak crypto (MD5/SHA1/DES); HTTPS-metadata context-aware. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript, Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir source itself (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not) for the arms that hold whether or not the code serves HTTP: a weak hash or cipher, key material fixed in the source, a TLS client that accepts any certificate, and (JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, Scala, Rust and Elixir) an obsolete TLS version; the server controls are not assessed there, and a Dart, Ruby, Scala, Rust or Elixir repository that serves no HTTP of its own is N/A on them. Deterministic.
`m.pwd == pwd` checks a password against the stored one in plaintext, so the store holds the password itself and whoever reads it holds every account. Store a salted KDF hash (PBKDF2/scrypt/Argon2/bcrypt) and verify by deriving again. — Anno.Plugs.LogicService/Platform/PlatformQuery.cs:89
`usr.pwd == pwd` checks a password against the stored one in plaintext, so the store holds the password itself and whoever reads it holds every account. Store a salted KDF hash (PBKDF2/scrypt/Argon2/bcrypt) and verify by deriving again. — Anno.Plugs.LogicService/Platform/PlatformQuery.cs:128
`this.Pwd != oldPwd` checks a password against the stored one in plaintext, so the store holds the password itself and whoever reads it holds every account. Store a salted KDF hash (PBKDF2/scrypt/Argon2/bcrypt) and verify by deriving again. — Trace/Anno.Domain/Member/SysMember.cs:77
MD5/SHA1 is constructed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ for content integrity, or a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, a file or mutex name), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as `System.IO.Hashing.XxHash64`/`Crc32` says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. — Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:31
This type encrypts through `SymmetricAlgorithm`, whose every cipher mode (CBC/ECB/OFB/CFB/CTS) is unauthenticated, and no keyed MAC or AEAD cipher appears anywhere in it — so nothing establishes that the ciphertext it produced is the ciphertext it later reads back. Encryption alone provides confidentiality, not integrity: unauthenticated CBC is MALLEABLE, and an attacker who can modify stored or transmitted ciphertext can flip chosen plaintext bits in the following block by flipping ciphertext bits in the preceding one, without ever knowing the key. Where the decrypt path reports failure differently for a padding error than for a downstream one — a broad `catch` that returns null is the usual spelling — the same construction also answers the attacker's questions, which is the padding-oracle shape that recovers plaintext outright. Prefer an AEAD cipher: `AesGcm` or `ChaCha20Poly1305` authenticate the ciphertext as part of encrypting it, and give you an associated-data slot for the surrounding context. Where the format cannot change, MAC it with encrypt-then-MAC — HMAC-SHA256 over the IV and the ciphertext together, with a key derived separately from the encryption key — and verify that tag with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals` BEFORE decrypting anything. (×2) — Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:62, Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:134
DES / 3DES / RijndaelManaged-bare is deprecated or broken. Use AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()` with explicit key/iv sizes. (×4) — Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:56, Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:93, Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:133, …
None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves. — Viper/Program.cs:24
No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it. — Viper/Program.cs:24
No ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation signal — inbound payloads reach handlers unvalidated. (−2.0 on this card.)
`ValuesController.SayHello` binds request input and nothing in this codebase validates it — no [ApiController]/ModelState check, validator or guard. — Samples/Mvc/MvcCallAnno/Controllers/ValuesController.cs:16
`ValuesController.Subtraction` binds request input and nothing in this codebase validates it — no [ApiController]/ModelState check, validator or guard. — Samples/Mvc/MvcCallAnno/Controllers/ValuesController.cs:21
`ValuesController.BuyProduct` binds request input and nothing in this codebase validates it — no [ApiController]/ModelState check, validator or guard. — Samples/Mvc/MvcCallAnno/Controllers/ValuesController.cs:25
`ErrorController.Index` binds request input and nothing in this codebase validates it — no [ApiController]/ModelState check, validator or guard. — Viper/Controllers/ErrorController.cs:16
What to do
Store passwords with a salted KDF — `Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity.PasswordHasher<T>`, `Rfc2898DeriveBytes` (PBKDF2), or BCrypt/Argon2 — and compare with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals`. (A fast/plain hash, or a client-hashed value stored and compared verbatim, is not password storage.) Start in `Anno.Plugs.LogicService/Platform/PlatformQuery.cs:89`.
Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (`System.IO.Hashing.XxHash64`/`Crc32`) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key or a mutex name.
Authenticate ciphertext, do not just encrypt it: move to an AEAD cipher (`AesGcm`, `ChaCha20Poly1305`), or where the wire format is fixed, add encrypt-then-MAC with HMAC-SHA256 over IV+ciphertext under a separately derived key and verify the tag with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals` before decrypting. Unauthenticated CBC is malleable, and a decrypt path that distinguishes padding failures from other failures is a padding oracle. This repository constructs symmetric encryption whose ciphertext nothing authenticates at 2 sites, not one: `Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:62` (CBC or another CipherMode member), `Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:134` (CBC or another CipherMode member). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place.
Replace DES/3DES (and bare RijndaelManaged) with AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()`. This repository constructs a broken or deprecated cipher at 4 sites, not one: `Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:56` (DESCryptoServiceProvider), `Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:93` (DESCryptoServiceProvider), `Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:133` (TripleDESCryptoServiceProvider), `Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:166` (TripleDESCryptoServiceProvider). Each is a separate decision — fixing only the line this row cites leaves the others in place.
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy first, then Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options and a frame policy) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
Validate inbound models (ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation) to reduce injection and bad-data risk.
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X1 · Async correctness3.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. — Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilJob.cs:46
Reading `.Result` of a task that has not completed blocks this thread until it does — the same block as `.Wait()`: under a synchronization context (Blazor, a UI thread, classic ASP.NET) it deadlocks, and on the thread pool it parks a thread for as long as the work runs. `await` the task instead (make the caller `async`); where a synchronous entry point must stay, keep the block in ONE documented bridge with a timeout. (×4) — REDACTED:25, REDACTED:44, Anno.Plugs.LogicService/PlatformModule.cs:198, …
Other · Code Health — Whether any branch is dead by construction — a switch arm whose label can never equal a case-normalised subject, or an `else if` whose predicate the arm above has already swallowed.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: switch labels compared against the subject's own case normaliser, and if/else-if chains checked for a literal an earlier arm's containment test already swallows. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X13 · Undrained process stream10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a child process that has BOTH standard streams redirected drains both — reading one to the end while the other is never read deadlocks once the child fills the unread pipe.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: ProcessStartInfo launches with both streams redirected, checked for a drain of each stream across the enclosing type. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `spawn` imported from `child_process` whose stdout and stderr are both pipes (no options, no `stdio`, or `stdio` of `'pipe'`), bound to a local that never leaves its scope, where exactly one of the two streams is read, the other never, and the child’s `close`/`exit` (or the read stream’s end) is awaited; a shell redirect in the call’s arguments or a `kill` of the child suppresses it. The same rule reads Python’s `subprocess.Popen`, Dart’s `Process.start`, Ruby’s `Open3.popen3`, and Scala’s JDK process starts (`new ProcessBuilder(…).start()` with no `redirectErrorStream`/`redirectError`/`redirectOutput`/`inheritIO`, `Runtime.getRuntime.exec`) where one of `getInputStream`/`getErrorStream` is read and the other never while `waitFor()` is called or the read stream is read to its end. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Security — Whether a hand-rolled public/private IP check can be walked past — a method that unwraps IPv4-mapped IPv6 but returns the opposite verdict for the same host written as IPv4-compatible, 6to4 or NAT64.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and hand-roll IPv4 range carve-outs, checked for whether the IPv6 branch also accounts for the IPv4-compatible, 6to4 and NAT64 embeddings. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X15 · Unvalidated length from an untrusted reader10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether a length read out of the stream being parsed is bounded before it is allocated or read — an unchecked count taken from the input lets the input choose the allocation.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: integer lengths read from a BinaryReader and spent on a bulk read or an array allocation, checked for any comparison or bounding call on the value anywhere in the method. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a loop that shortens a string until it fits a length budget has a floor — one with none grinds the value down to the empty string, or past it into a negative-length `Substring`.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: while/do loops whose body's only effect on a string is to drop its last character, checked for whether anything — a direct comparison on the length, a body guard, a break — bounds that length below. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `while`/`do` loop whose body’s one assignment to a value is `x = x.slice(0, -1)` or `x = x.slice|substring|substr(0, x.length - 1)`, driven by a condition that reads `x.length` only as a term of a larger expression — never compared directly, never tested for truthiness, and with no other read of `x` — and whose body has no `break`, `return`, `throw` or `if` naming `x`. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Do you agree with this assessment?
X17 · Uncapped recursion over a caller-supplied document10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Security — Whether a walk that recurses through a JSON/XML tree handed in by its caller bounds how deep it will go — an uncapped walk lets the document's nesting choose the stack depth, and the resulting StackOverflowException cannot be caught.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: methods that take a JSON/XML document node and call themselves with a child of it, reachable from an externally-callable member of the same type that accepts a document, checked for any depth parameter, descent counter or threaded arithmetic anywhere in the walk. On a repository with no .NET source it reads TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths and `.d.ts` not) with the same rule: a function or method with a parameter typed as a document value — `unknown`, `any`, `object`, `Record<string, unknown|any>`, a JSON alias (`JsonValue`, `JSONObject`, …) or a DOM node global the file does not rebind — that calls itself (bare, or through `this` for a method, or hands itself to a call over the value as in `value.map(walk)`) with something it took out of that value and never through an ancestor accessor such as `closest()` or `parentElement`, that is exported or reached from an exported function (a public method of the same exported class) taking such a value, and that names no depth, level, nesting, recursion, remaining or budget anywhere and threads no `+`/`-` arithmetic through a self-call. Plain JavaScript is not read: with no annotation nothing tells a parsed document from a tree the code built itself. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a type's disposal matches what it OWNS — releasing what it created, leaving alone what it was handed, and not declaring a finalizer for state that has nothing unmanaged to finalize.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: every assignment to a disposable field is read to decide whether the type CREATED the value or was handed it, and the type's disposal is checked against that answer — an injected interface it disposes, a value it constructed and never releases, a finalizer on a type holding nothing unmanaged, and a disposable local whose every reference is a plain member read. A value handed to a container that disposes its contents (a parent control's `Controls` collection, a component `IContainer`) is released by that container and is not reported; generated code is out of population. On a repository with no .NET source the same ownership questions are read in JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored, generated and minified paths not): a class declaring `dispose()`, `[Symbol.dispose]()` or `[Symbol.asyncDispose]()` that disposes a field it was handed through a constructor parameter typed as a repository interface or resolved by a dependency-injection container; that assigns a field only ever from `new X(…)` of a disposable class and neither releases it anywhere in the class nor names it in its disposal member or a method that member calls, nor hands it to anything else; and a `const`/`let` local built from literals only whose every reference opens a statement operating on a non-release member of it. A class is disposable when every repository declaration of its name declares or inherits a disposal member, or when it is a documented library disposable (`vscode` EventEmitter, CancellationTokenSource and Disposable; three.js geometries, materials, textures, render targets, renderers, controls and composers). The finalizer arm has no JavaScript counterpart: a class cannot declare one. Dart is read for the owned-and-never-released arm: a Flutter `State` (or a class declaring `dispose()`/`close()`) whose library-private field is written only with direct creations of a framework controller, `FocusNode`, `StreamController` or periodic `Timer` (or a `.listen(…)` into a field declared `StreamSubscription`), which nothing in the class or its library releases (`dispose`/`close`/`cancel`) and which is never handed on except as a named argument. Ruby is read for the owned-and-never-released arm and the abandoned-local arm: a class declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose instance variable is written only with a blockless core descriptor creation (`File.open`/`new`, `Tempfile`, `Dir.open`, `IO.popen`, the `socket` and `openssl` socket classes) that no method of the class closes and that is never handed on (passed, returned, stored, exposed by `attr_reader`, delegated) — a class whose superclass or mixin lies outside the repository is not judged — and a blockless creation read through and dropped (`File.open(path).read`) or held in a local that is never closed, returned, passed or stored (a `&:read` block-pass, an `autoclose: false` borrow and a `fileno` hand-over are not abandonment). PHP is read for the same two arms: a class (not a trait, and not one using a trait) declaring an instance `close`, `dispose`, `shutdown`, `stop`, `disconnect` or `terminate` whose `private` property (or a `final` class's `protected` one) is written only with a direct core `fopen`, `tmpfile`, `popen`, `proc_open`, `fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`/`server` or `opendir` that nothing in the class closes (`fclose`, `pclose`, `closedir`, `unset`, a reset to `null`) and that is never handed on, and a handle held in a function's local, or read through as the argument of a reader, that is never closed, returned, passed, captured or stored; a `php://` stream, `curl_init`, `SplFileObject`, `PDO` and a function the repository declares under the core name are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
`reader` is a `StreamReader`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 247). Every use of it in `ApiInvoke` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var reader = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw. — Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:247
`md5` is a `MD5`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 31). Every use of it in `Md5Encrypt` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var md5 = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw. — Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:31
`des` is a `DESCryptoServiceProvider`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 56). Every use of it in `DesEncrypt` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var des = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw. — Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:56
`des` is a `DESCryptoServiceProvider`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 93). Every use of it in `DesDecrypt` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var des = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw. — Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:93
`tripleDes` is a `TripleDESCryptoServiceProvider`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 133). Every use of it in `TripleDesEncrypting` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var tripleDes = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw. — Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:133
`cs` is a `CryptoStream`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 136). Every use of it in `TripleDesEncrypting` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var cs = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw. — Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:136
`tripleDes` is a `TripleDESCryptoServiceProvider`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 166). Every use of it in `TripleDesDecrypting` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var tripleDes = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw. — Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:166
`strd` is a `StreamReader`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 170). Every use of it in `TripleDesDecrypting` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var strd = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw. — Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:170
`sw` is a `StreamWriter`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 36). Every use of it in `Write` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var sw = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw. — Anno.Common/FileHelper.cs:36
`client` is a `SmtpClient`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 77). Every use of it in `SendMail` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var client = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw. — REDACTED:77
What to do
Each finding names the value and the span that decides who owns it — the `new` that created it, or the constructor parameter that handed it over. Confirm ownership from that span, then make the disposal match it: release what this type created, leave what it was injected with to whoever created THAT, and drop a finalizer whose type holds nothing unmanaged to release.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that temporarily changes state belonging to the whole process — the working directory, an environment variable — puts it back on EVERY path: a restore reached only when nothing throws leaks the change to the rest of the process.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: method bodies that write the process working directory or an environment variable and write it back in the same body, checked for whether that restore sits in a `finally`/`catch` or only on the straight-line path. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads production JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not): `process.chdir`, `process.env.NAME =`/`["NAME"] =` and `delete process.env.NAME`, and Deno’s `Deno.chdir`/`Deno.env.set`/`Deno.env.delete`, paired per function body (a nested function or arrow is its own body, and module top-level code is none), where the last write puts back a local the body captured from the same global or deletes a variable the first write set, with at least one statement between them; a write in a `catch`/`finally` of that body silences it. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same question: every named async function that itself makes a request an AbortSignal can cancel (global `fetch`, axios and its file-local instances, ky, ofetch) counts, and it is compliant when its parameters or body name a signal or it hands one of its own parameters to the request as options; signatures a framework fixes (JSX event handlers, route and lifecycle exports, request-first handlers, `override`, `'use server'` modules, TanStack `mutationFn`) are exempt unless they take a signal. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 0/13 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter, and the token `context.RequestAborted` carries reaches none of the calls here that take one — this work can't be stopped early once started. Pass `context.RequestAborted` on, or take a CancellationToken. (×3) — Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:86, Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:107, Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:200
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×10) — Viper/Hubs/MonitorHub.cs:46, Viper/Hubs/MonitorHub.cs:87, Viper/Hubs/SystemHub.cs:38, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether an argument guard throws the exception its own condition describes — a guard that rejects a value for being EMPTY and reports it as `ArgumentNullException` tells the caller a parameter was null when it provably was not.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(p))` statements controlled by an `if`, whose condition is read for a test that is true of a NON-null `p` — an emptiness test that dereferences it (`p.Count == 0`, `!p.Any()`) or a BCL predicate documented true of the empty value (`string.IsNullOrEmpty(p)`). Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a `when` guard is free of side effects — a guard that increments a counter or assigns while deciding whether its arm matches applies that change during PATTERN MATCHING, on an arm that may not be selected, and skips it entirely when a short-circuit to its left answers first.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `when` guards on case labels and switch-expression arms, read for a mutation (`++`/`--`/assignment) sitting in a position the guard's own `&&`/`||`/`??`/`?:`/`?.` can skip. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a method that TAKES a lock or semaphore and gives it back from a flag-guarded `finally` returns the value that flag implies — reporting success while the guard hands the primitive back admits a second caller the exclusion was there to keep out, and reporting failure while the guard keeps it leaves nothing to ever give it back.
Method: Roslyn syntax: `try` statements whose `finally` releases a synchronisation primitive under a bare local-bool guard, where the method also TOOK that same primitive before the `try`, checked for a `return` of a bool literal whose value disagrees with the flag state the method's own straight-line assignments put it in. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether the work a diagnostic log line costs is paid only when that line is wanted — C# evaluates a call's arguments BEFORE the call, so a trace/debug message joined or projected out of a collection is built in full on every pass, and then discarded by a sink the shipped configuration leaves switched off.
Method: Roslyn syntax: log calls at a diagnostic level (a `Log`-prefixed method naming Trace/Debug/Verbose, or a bare `Debug`/`Trace`/`Verbose` on a receiver named for a logger), whose argument list is read for a call whose cost scales with a sequence — a LINQ operator, a materialisation, `string.Join`, a serializer — with no enclosing level check or conditional-compilation region. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `debug`/`trace`/`verbose` call on a receiver named for a logger, or a `log`-prefixed method naming the level, whose argument calls an array operator (`map`/`filter`/`reduce`/`sort`/…), `Array.from`, `Object.keys/values/entries`, `JSON.stringify`/`util.inspect` over anything but a literal, or an array `join` — outside any arrow or function passed as an argument, which the logger calls only when the level is on — with no enclosing `if`, `&&` or `?:` whose condition names a level, a level string, or the `NODE_ENV`/`__DEV__`/`DEV` build switch. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped4.2 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether text read out of the document being converted is escaped before it is written into generated markup — a value the document's author chose, interpolated into an attribute the surrounding literal delimits, can close that attribute and open another.
Method: Roslyn semantic model over the whole compilation: a string-typed `Value`/`InnerText`/`InnerXml`/`Text` member declared inside `DocumentFormat.OpenXml` or `System.Xml` is a taint SOURCE, propagated through assignments, returns, arguments, tuple elements and string composition to its transitive closure, then read at interpolated-string holes that sit in a markup position the surrounding literal itself delimits. Escaper/encoder calls and enclosing validator conditions cut the flow. Flow- and container-insensitive by construction. A second arm needs no provenance at all and reports a type that CONTRADICTS ITSELF — the same expression escaped at one delimited markup hole and interpolated raw at another hole in the same markup position of the same type, which the type's own escaping proves is a defect without knowing where the value came from. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the token stream with the same rule: a DOM read of raw document text (`getAttribute`, `textContent`, `innerText`, `nodeValue`) is the source, propagated through local bindings and string composition, and judged at template-literal and concatenation holes in the same two delimited markup positions; escapers and validating conditions cut it, and documentation-site, test, vendored and minified scripts are not read. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
`body` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through an HTML e-mail body with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — REDACTED:73
`t.content:r.textContent=t.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1
`expando` is text this program did not author, and it is written into a quoted attribute value through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. (×2) — REDACTED:1328, REDACTED:1329
`wrap[1]+jQuery.htmlPrefilter(elem)+wrap[2]` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — REDACTED:5032
`value` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup. — REDACTED:6347
What to do
Each finding names the expression, the attribute it lands in and the line. Confirm the value's origin from the read this analyzer traced, then escape it at the sink or validate it against the shape the attribute accepts before interpolating.
Other · Code Health — Whether a value the caller is invited to supply is the value the type actually uses — a constructor parameter stored in a private field that nothing ever reads while the default it was given is spelled out a second time at the site that should have read it, a keyed lookup that falls back to a different setting than the one its key names while the same type falls back to the matching one for that same key, or a culture-sensitive parse given no format provider by a type that feeds its own settable culture to the same kind of parse elsewhere, or a number an entry point writes to standard output under the host's culture while the same entry point formats with the invariant culture elsewhere. Either way, every caller who supplies a value silently gets something else.
Method: Roslyn syntax: private instance fields of a non-partial type assigned in a constructor from one of its own parameters with a `??` fallback, checked for whether anything in the type body reads the field and whether that same fallback expression is spelled out again outside the constructor; and `??` fallbacks onto a member access from a lookup call carrying exactly one string literal, grouped by that key across the type and checked for a fallback member whose folded name disagrees with the key while a sibling site for the same key agrees with it. On a repository with no .NET source the first two arms read JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `#x`, `private` or `private` parameter-property instance field filled in the constructor from a parameter (or one member of one) through `??`/`||` or a parameter default, never read anywhere in the file by name, whose constructed default is spelled again in the class body; and `lookup("key") ?? s.member` grouped by key per class, or per module outside every class. The culture arm has no JavaScript counterpart: its parses take no locale. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether a value handed from a callback to the body that waits on it crosses on something built to be crossed — a `Queue<T>`/`List<T>`/`Dictionary<K,V>` written inside an event handler and read back outside it is mutated by two flows at once, and the semaphore or completion source beside it orders how MANY items exist while leaving the collection's own head, tail and backing array unprotected.
Method: Roslyn syntax: method, accessor, local-function and lambda bodies that declare BOTH a non-thread-safe generic collection (`Queue`/`Stack`/`List`/`Dictionary`/`HashSet`/`Sorted*`/`LinkedList`) and a synchronisation primitive (`SemaphoreSlim`/`TaskCompletionSource`/`ManualResetEvent(Slim)`/`AutoResetEvent`/`CountdownEvent`) as locals, then read for a `+=`-registered lambda that raises that primitive while the body outside every lambda waits on it — and, in that scope, a mutating call on the collection inside the lambda paired with a mention of it outside. Any `lock` in the scope abstains it. On a repository with no .NET source the same handoff is read in Java off the engine’s own token stream (test source sets, vendored and demonstration paths not): an `ArrayList`/`LinkedList`/`ArrayDeque`/`PriorityQueue`/`Hash*`/`LinkedHash*`/`Tree*` local and a `CountDownLatch`/`Semaphore`/`CompletableFuture` local, a lambda or anonymous class that raises the primitive and mutates the collection, and a wait outside it; any `synchronized` or `lock()` abstains the body. Because each of those primitives orders what the callback wrote before raising it, only a touch that provably overlaps the callback is convicted: one after the registration and before the next wait, or one in a loop registered-before, waiting on every pass and not declaring the collection. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X27 · Collection changed while being enumerated10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a `foreach` leaves the collection it is walking alone — a body that adds to or removes from the very collection the loop is enumerating invalidates the enumerator it is holding, so the next `MoveNext` throws `InvalidOperationException` and the remaining items are never seen.
Method: Roslyn syntax + semantics: `foreach` statements whose body calls a structural mutator (`Add`/`Remove`/`Clear`/`Insert`/…) on the very expression the loop is enumerating. Two arms. ARM A — the source is a concrete fragile BCL collection, or a live `Keys`/`Values` view over one, and the mutator resolves to that same collection's own member; concurrent and immutable collections and arrays are outside the population by construction, since their enumerators survive a structural change. ARM B — the source is an argument-less accessor CALL on a receiver whose body is in source: the accessor must return a stored field VERBATIM and a sibling member must structurally change that same field, both read off the implementations rather than from the members' names. A mutation the loop provably exits immediately after (`break`/`return`/`throw`/`goto`), or one written inside a nested loop or a lambda, is counted and never reported. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X28 · Index access outside its own emptiness guard10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a condition that tests a value for emptiness indexes that same value only where the test holds — an `||` written one parenthesis too far to the left leaves an index access outside the guard beside it, so the empty case the guard exists to anticipate reaches the index and throws.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: the OUTERMOST `&&`/`||` of every boolean condition, read for a symbol the condition tests for emptiness (`string.IsNullOrEmpty`/`IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, a `Length`/`Count` comparison against a literal, `Any()`, a `Length`/`Count` pattern, or a comparison against `""`) and ALSO indexes. Each `symbol[...]` access is placed by a boolean-reachability walk from the access up to the outermost connective: an access is COVERED when some enclosing step has it in the right operand and the left operand, under the truth value that step forces, proves the symbol non-empty — a recursion over `&&`/`||` whose true- and false-directions are asymmetric. A finding needs BOTH an uncovered access and a covered one on the same symbol in the same condition, which is the agreeing twin that separates a misplaced parenthesis from an unrelated length test. Bare index accesses with no emptiness test in the condition are neither counted nor reported; a non-identifier receiver and a lambda nested inside the condition are outside the population. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X29 · Per-element action decided by a fixed element10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a decision taken once per element is taken ABOUT that element — a test inside a counted loop that reads a fixed subscript of the very collection its guarded statement indexes by the loop variable applies element zero's answer to all of them, so the elements that differ from it are all handled wrongly, and in the same direction.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every `for` statement declaring exactly ONE loop variable, and every `if` inside its body that is not under a nested loop or a lambda. A site enters the population when the `if`’s condition never mentions the loop variable while the statement it guards indexes some collection by that variable ALONE (`c[i]`; `c[i + 1]` and `c[i, j]` are outside it). A finding additionally needs the AGREEING TWIN at the same-collection grain: the condition must read THAT SAME collection at a subscript that does not move — written into the condition, or reached through a local declared BEFORE the loop, so an alias bound inside the body is not followed. Both collection expressions must be simple identifiers. On a repository with no .NET source the same rule reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (tests included, bundles and vendored paths not): a `for (let|var|const x = …; …; …)` with one declarator and a braced body, an alias followed only when it is declared before the loop in a block that encloses it and never assigned inside the loop. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. (×15) — Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:37, Viper/Hubs/TaskManager.cs:79, REDACTED:140, …
`throw ex;` resets the exception's stack trace to this line, hiding where it really came from. Use a bare `throw;` to preserve the original stack. (×2) — Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:72, Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:110
`catch` does nothing with the exception it caught — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate; if one specific failure genuinely cannot matter, catch exactly that exception type and say why in a comment on the catch. — Anno.Common/StringHelper.cs:103
What to do
Swallowed exception (empty catch)
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X30 · Support guard that admits what it rejects10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a guard written as a NEGATED `||` says what its author meant — `!(a || b || x != k)` is `!a && !b && x == k` by De Morgan, so a bail-out that mixes capabilities the code needs with a fault it refuses turns inside out: it fires only where the capabilities are ABSENT, and lets every value the fault term names walk straight into the body that cannot handle it.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every logical-not whose operand is a parenthesised `||` chain of two or more disjuncts, flattened (a left-nested `a || b || c` read once would see `(a || b)` as one disjunct). A site enters the population on that shape alone. A finding additionally needs the disjuncts to DISAGREE in polarity: at least one bare boolean read — an identifier or member access, never an invocation, which is a predicate rather than a capability flag — and at least one `x != <constant>`, the only form that negates into an exact-value pin (`== null` negates into a looser requirement and is outside the fault set). Consistently-polarised disjunctions, all-fault or all-capability, are counted and never reported; a negated `&&` is outside the population entirely. No same-receiver gate: it was measured to cost a real defect and remove no false positive. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
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X32 · Type resolved by simple name across every loaded assembly10.0 / 10Exemplary○ Nothing flagged
Other · Code Health — Whether a plugin lookup names the type it means — searching every assembly loaded into the process for a candidate whose SIMPLE name equals a string supplied at runtime, and taking the first one found, is decided by assembly LOAD ORDER rather than by this source, so the same name can resolve to a different type on the next run.
Method: Roslyn syntax only, no semantic model: every invocation of `First`/`FirstOrDefault`/`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` whose OWN expression subtree contains both a `GetAssemblies()` call and a `GetTypes()`/`GetExportedTypes()` call — a single-element pick out of every type loaded into the process. A nested selector in the same chain sees no `GetAssemblies()` in its own subtree and is outside the population, so one lookup counts once however many links its chain has. A finding additionally needs both remaining halves: the selector must be `First`/`FirstOrDefault` (`Single`/`SingleOrDefault` reports the ambiguity rather than resolving it, and is counted and never reported), and the chain must carry an `==` comparison of `<lambda parameter>.Name` against something that is not a literal. The receiver must be a plain identifier bound by one of the chain’s own lambdas, which places `assembly.GetName().Name == "X"` outside the rule by construction. One exemption: a `.Name` test joined by `&&` to a `FullName`/`AssemblyQualifiedName` test on the same identifier is spared; joined by `||` it is not. Deterministic, provable per finding. Advisory.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. On a repository with no .NET source it reads JavaScript/TypeScript off the engine’s own token stream (test, vendored and minified paths not) with the same rule: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal`/`verbose`/`silly`/`http`/`log` call on a receiver named for a logger, in a package whose own or an enclosing `package.json` declares a logger that carries values as fields (pino, pino-http, nestjs-pino, Fastify, winston, bunyan, tslog, LogTape, roarr), whose first deciding argument is a template literal with substitutions; an object-literal fields argument is stepped over, a plain string message clears the call. Python is read the same way: a `debug`/`info`/`warning`/`error`/`exception`/`critical`/`log` call on a logger in a file that imports the standard library’s `logging` or structlog (loguru, which formats at the call, is not judged), whose message is a whole f-string with a non-constant field; a `%`-formatted, `.format()`-ed or concatenated message is not convicted, as in C#. PHP is read the same way: a PSR-3 level call (`emergency`…`debug`, `log`) on a logger (`$logger`, `$this->logger`, Laravel’s `Log::`, `logger()`, `\Drupal::logger()`) in a package whose `composer.json` requires a PSR-3 logger or a framework that hands one out (psr/log, Monolog, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal, CakePHP), or a file that imports one, whose message is a double-quoted string interpolating a variable; a single-quoted message clears the call, and `sprintf` or `.` concatenation is not convicted, as in C#. Dart is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on Sentry’s structured logger (`Sentry.logger`) whose message is a whole string literal interpolating a value (`$name`, `${…}`); the `Sentry.logger.fmt` template API clears the call. Dart that logs only through loggers with one message and no fields (package:logging, package:logger, talker, dart:developer) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Ruby is read the same way: a `trace`/`debug`/`info`/`warn`/`error`/`fatal` call on the console gem’s `Console` (declared by a Gemfile, gemspec or Gemfile.lock, or required) or, where SemanticLogger, Ougai or dry-logger is declared or required, on a receiver named for a logger (`logger`, `@logger`, `Rails.logger`, `log`), whose first deciding argument is, as the whole argument, a double-quoted string interpolating a non-constant value (`#{…}`, `#@ivar`); a plain literal clears the call, keyword arguments are the fields, and a block, `%`-format or `+` concatenation is not convicted. Ruby that logs only through the standard Logger (Rails.logger) is not applicable rather than a reach gap. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
This method contradicts itself about `taglimit`: line 415 tests it for null before doing anything with it — the author's own statement that null is an input this code expects — but that `if` scopes only the block beneath it, and line 438 then dereferences `taglimit` as `taglimit.channel` AFTER the block has closed, where the guard no longer applies. A null `taglimit` skips the guarded body and reaches that line anyway, throwing NullReferenceException on exactly the input the guard was written for. If the dereference belongs to the guarded work, move it inside the block; if `taglimit` truly cannot be null by then, the guard above is misleading and should go. — Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:438
This method contradicts itself about `sysMembe`: line 249 assigns it with `as sys_member`, which hands back null rather than throwing when the value is not a `sys_member`, but line 256 then dereferences it directly as `sysMembe.ID` with no null test between them and no guard around it. If the `as` is right, that dereference throws NullReferenceException on the input it was written for — and the NullReferenceException names neither the cast nor the type that failed. Settle it one way — test `sysMembe` once before the first use and handle the null case, or cast with `(sys_member)` so the failure is reported where it happens — rather than leaving the two readings side by side. — Anno.Plugs.LogicService/PlatformModule.cs:256
0/4 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
What to do
Where a method uses `?.` on a symbol and then dereferences it directly, settle the question once: test it before the first use and handle null, or drop the `?.`.
Where a method null-tests a symbol and then uses it after the guarded block closes, move the trailing work inside the block — the guard skips its body on null, it does not stop the method.
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). A further 2 got runtime (rendered axe-core) evidence this scan: 1.4.12, 2.4.4. The other 38 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Unscored — 4 check(s) recorded observations but carry no score
These checks ran and found something, but they do not carry a score — either by design (an advisory check reports evidence rather than grading it) or because they could not be scored here. They are excluded from the score for that reason, not because there was nothing to see.
AXH1 Runtime security headers — 11 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXR1 Runtime accessibility (rendered) — 3 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — 1 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X10 Duplicated predicate — 5 observation(s) recorded · Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score.
Not evidenced — 5 control(s) we could not find positive evidence for
These checks grade a working control, and the repository shows no evidence of one. That is deliberately not scored as a zero: a repository cannot show an ops runbook, a database TTL or an infrastructure-side audit log, so absence of evidence here is not evidence the control is missing. It is also not a statement that the check is irrelevant to this codebase — the thing it grades applies; we just could not see it. Excluded from the score either way.
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
Not included — 32 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
AXA1 Runtime unauthenticated reachability — This run crawled public routes only — it had no logged-in session, so there is no authenticated surface to compare anonymous access against and nothing was measured. This is a statement about this run, not about your application: nothing here says access control is missing, and nothing here says it is present.
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
AXS1 Runtime exposed surface — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
D10 Test Quality — ~232 lines of test code exist on disk but weren't loaded from the analyzed solution (excluded from the .sln, or co-located/using a test attribute not loaded here), so test quality couldn't be assessed. Include the tests in the analyzed solution to enable this check.
D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results
D12 Dependency Hygiene — Dependency hygiene not measured
D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D22 Internal API Consistency — No intentionally-exposed public API to evaluate for consistency.
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — small single-context codebase (10,283 production LoC in the .NET projects) — bounded contexts are not needed at this size No bounded-context organisation was detected either — neither a context-shaped layout, nor 2+ sibling source directories each declaring an aggregate root, nor 2+ projects each declaring an entity of their own. Aggregate roots were found in only one source directory (Trace), which is a layered codebase, not two contexts. Declaring this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2) would let cross-boundary type coupling be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — 1 file(s) were not parsed by semgrep — the PII/GDPR ruleset never ran over them
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D39 IL Efficiency — IL not measured — the target did not build
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
D8 Code Coverage — Coverage NOT MEASURED: `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` names a data collector that ships in the `coverlet.collector` package, and this repository wires up none — no test project references it and no runsettings declares one. The absence of coverage here is therefore not evidence about the suite or about our analyzer environment: without a collector, `--collect` produces nothing even from a suite that builds and passes. Add a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference to the test project(s) (or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI produces) and real coverage will be measured. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect.
DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (3 signals for this style, 3 needed — the count is met but a required primary signal is absent): 7 aggregate root(s) (AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer; 6 repository port(s) loading or saving an aggregate/entity; a top-level Samples/ tree: a library or framework whose examples are its consumers — these types are building blocks, not a domain
ED3 Event naming — no domain or integration events detected — event-naming check not applicable
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this lens looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) and commit it — a hosted scan measures a clone of the repository, so a report that exists only in a working tree, a CI runner's or your own, never reaches it; the artefact is commonly gitignored, so `git add -f` that one file (or un-ignore its path) and commit it alongside the code it measures, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X9 Subsumed condition operand — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
EmptyCatchBlock Anno.CommandBus/Command.cs:85— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
EmptyCatchBlock Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:84— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
EmptyCatchBlock Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:186— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
EmptyCatchBlock Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:248— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
EmptyCatchBlock Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RouterModule.cs:85— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
EmptyCatchBlock Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:79— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
EmptyCatchBlock Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:160— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
EmptyCatchBlock Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:157— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
EmptyCatchBlock Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:242— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
EmptyCatchBlock Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:158— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
EmptyCatchBlock Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:243— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
EmptyCatchBlock Trace/Anno.Repository/Dtoer.cs:78— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
EmptyCatchBlock Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:37— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
EmptyCatchBlock Viper/Hubs/TaskManager.cs:79— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
EmptyCatchBlock REDACTED:140— empty catch block — the error is discarded with nothing recorded, so a failure here leaves no trace anywhere. Record it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate. Where swallowing one specific failure really is correct — as it often is on a teardown/dispose path where throwing would mask the original failure — catch exactly that exception type and write down WHY in a comment on the catch. Both are needed: a comment on a catch-all still swallows every failure nobody anticipated, and a note that only restates the swallow ("ignored", "do nothing") is read as no explanation at all.
<html> without a lang Viper/Views/Share/_Layout.cshtml:3— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang Viper/wwwroot/html/company/index.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang Viper/wwwroot/html/component.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang Viper/wwwroot/html/component_echarts.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang Viper/wwwroot/html/fconfig.html:3— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang Viper/wwwroot/html/func_roles_config.html:3— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang Viper/wwwroot/html/mlist/index.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang Viper/wwwroot/html/service/cluster_dashboard.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang Viper/wwwroot/html/syslog/index.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang Viper/wwwroot/html/trace/detail.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang Viper/wwwroot/html/trace/indexnew.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang Viper/wwwroot/html/trace/router.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang Viper/wwwroot/html/trace/routerdetail.html:3— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
<html> without a lang Viper/wwwroot/html/welcome.html:2— The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en").
AC2 · Forms & labels· <input> without a programmatic label · ×5
<input> without a programmatic label Viper/Views/Home/Login.cshtml:61— This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label Viper/Views/Home/Login.cshtml:65— This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label.
<input> without a programmatic label Viper/Views/Home/Login.cshtml:72— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<input> without a programmatic label REDACTED:2945— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<input> without a programmatic label Viper/wwwroot/js/jquery.min.js:2— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
AC2 · Forms & labels· <select> without a programmatic label · ×4
<select> without a programmatic label REDACTED:1329— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<select> without a programmatic label REDACTED:1386— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<select> without a programmatic label REDACTED:4957— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<select> without a programmatic label Viper/wwwroot/js/jquery.min.js:2— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
AC2 · Forms & labels· Link with no accessible name · ×4
Link with no accessible name REDACTED:1385— A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label.
Link with no accessible name REDACTED:2932— A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label.
Link with no accessible name Viper/wwwroot/js/jquery.min.js:2— A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label.
Link with no accessible name Viper/wwwroot/js/vue.min.js:6— A link with no text, aria-label or labelled child (e.g. an icon-only link) has no accessible name, so assistive tech can't say where it goes. Add visible text or an aria-label.
S1 · Web-Security Posture· Password hashing without a KDF · ×3
Password hashing without a KDF Anno.Plugs.LogicService/Platform/PlatformQuery.cs:89— `m.pwd == pwd` checks a password against the stored one in plaintext, so the store holds the password itself and whoever reads it holds every account. Store a salted KDF hash (PBKDF2/scrypt/Argon2/bcrypt) and verify by deriving again.
Password hashing without a KDF Anno.Plugs.LogicService/Platform/PlatformQuery.cs:128— `usr.pwd == pwd` checks a password against the stored one in plaintext, so the store holds the password itself and whoever reads it holds every account. Store a salted KDF hash (PBKDF2/scrypt/Argon2/bcrypt) and verify by deriving again.
Password hashing without a KDF Trace/Anno.Domain/Member/SysMember.cs:77— `this.Pwd != oldPwd` checks a password against the stored one in plaintext, so the store holds the password itself and whoever reads it holds every account. Store a salted KDF hash (PBKDF2/scrypt/Argon2/bcrypt) and verify by deriving again.
AC1 · Text alternatives· <img> without a text alternative · ×2
<img> without a text alternative Viper/Views/Error/404.cshtml:9— An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative.
<img> without a text alternative Viper/Views/Error/500.cshtml:9— An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative.
AC2 · Forms & labels· <label> that labels no control · ×2
<label> that labels no control Viper/Views/Home/Login.cshtml:68— This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
<label> that labels no control Viper/Views/Home/Login.cshtml:73— This <label> has no for and wraps no form control, so it names nothing: assistive tech never announces it, and clicking the caption focuses no field. Note that an id on the label is not an association — it is the TARGET of one, so a control still has to point at it. Give the label for="<the control's id>", move the control inside the label, or point the control's aria-labelledby at this label's id.
AC2 · Forms & labels· <textarea> without a programmatic label · ×2
<textarea> without a programmatic label REDACTED:4927— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
<textarea> without a programmatic label Viper/wwwroot/js/jquery.min.js:2— This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it.
WriteOnlyPrivateField Anno.Plugs.LogicService/PlatformModule.cs:23— private IMemberService _memberService — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
WriteOnlyPrivateField Trace/Anno.Domain/Service/MemberService.cs:15— private IBaseRepository _baseRepository — assigned 1 time(s), read never — this field is written and never read anywhere its type can be reached from, so the state it keeps answers no question: every assignment to it computes a value that nothing observes, on every instance, for the lifetime of each one. It reads as a flag the code branches on, and nothing branches on it. Delete the field and its assignments — or, if the value was MEANT to be consulted, the missing read is the defect this row is pointing at, and the branch that should have depended on it is not there.
AC3 · Page structure· Document <title> is empty · ×1
Document <title> is empty Viper/wwwroot/html/welcome.html:2— An empty <title> gives no page name in the tab, history or screen-reader page list. Put descriptive text in the <title>.
AC6 · Visual & motion safety· Focus outline removed in CSS without a · ×39
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/jquery-ui.css:24— `.ui-helper-reset` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/jquery-ui.css:403— `.ui-dialog` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/jquery-ui.css:463— `.ui-menu` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/ligerUI/skins/Tab/css/form.css:65— `.l-text-field` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/ligerUI/skins/Silvery/css/form.css:45— `.l-text-field` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/ligerUI/skins/Gray2014/css/form.css:77— `.l-text-field` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/ligerUI/skins/Gray/css/form.css:62— `.l-text-field` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/ligerUI/skins/Aqua/css/ligerui-form.css:97— `.l-text-field` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/ligerUI/skins/Aqua/css/ligerui-form.css:242— `.l-box-select-add .link` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:12— `.el-dropdown .el-dropdown-selfdefine:focus:not(.focusing)` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:1250— `.el-pagination button:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:1520— `.el-dialog__headerbtn` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:1922— `.el-menu--horizontal > .el-submenu:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:2204— `.el-radio-button` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:2218— `.el-radio-button__inner` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:2254— `.el-radio-button__orig-radio` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:2389— `.el-switch__core` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:2638— `.el-select__input` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:3287— `.el-table-filter__bottom button:focus` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:3845— `.el-date-editor .el-range-input` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:4033— `.el-picker-panel__shortcut` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:4054— `.el-picker-panel__btn` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:4069— `.el-picker-panel__icon-btn` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:4292— `.el-time-panel__btn` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
Focus outline removed in CSS without a :focus replacement Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:4448— `.el-message-box__headerbtn` sets the outline to none/0 and no visible :focus / :focus-visible style for that element replaces it in this stylesheet, so a keyboard user cannot see where focus is. Draw a focus ring (outline, box-shadow or border) under :focus-visible.
(anonymous)::b (cognitive 38) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::b has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: ternaries 8 (24 pts), if/else 7 (11 pts), boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 20). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous)::tn (cognitive 36) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::tn has cognitive complexity 36 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: ternaries 22, boolean chains 14. To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
(anonymous)::handleClick (cognitive 35) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::handleClick has cognitive complexity 35 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: ternaries 6 (22 pts), if/else 6 (9 pts), boolean chains 4 (nesting depth added 19). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
(anonymous)::validate::(anonymous)::a (cognitive 35) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::validate::(anonymous)::a has cognitive complexity 35 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: ternaries 4 (11 pts), if/else 6 (10 pts), boolean chains 9, loops 2 (5 pts) (nesting depth added 14). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous)::exports (cognitive 31) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::exports has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 16, ternaries 4 (8 pts), if/else 3 (4 pts), loops 1 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
(anonymous)::Ec::fromString (cognitive 31) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::Ec::fromString has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: ternaries 5 (12 pts), if/else 8 (11 pts), boolean chains 8 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous)::value (cognitive 28) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::value has cognitive complexity 28 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (13 pts), ternaries 3 (13 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 16). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
(anonymous)::l (cognitive 27) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::l has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 13, ternaries 8 (13 pts), loops 1 (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
(anonymous)::Y (cognitive 27) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::Y has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: ternaries 18, boolean chains 9. To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
(anonymous)::value (cognitive 27) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::value has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (13 pts), ternaries 3 (13 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 16). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
(anonymous)::(anonymous)::parse (cognitive 26) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::(anonymous)::parse has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 20, if/else 3, ternaries 2, loops 1. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
(anonymous)::Tn::updateElsHeight (cognitive 26) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::Tn::updateElsHeight has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: ternaries 8 (16 pts), boolean chains 6, if/else 3 (4 pts) (nesting depth added 9). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous)::o (cognitive 24) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::o has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: ternaries 13, boolean chains 11. To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
(anonymous)::Tn::updateColumnsWidth (cognitive 23) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::Tn::updateColumnsWidth has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (17 pts), boolean chains 3, ternaries 1 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous)::setValues (cognitive 21) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::setValues has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: ternaries 7 (14 pts), boolean chains 5, if/else 2 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous)::getCellClasses (cognitive 20) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::getCellClasses has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 17, ternaries 3. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
(anonymous)::Oo::e (cognitive 20) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::Oo::e has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 14, if/else 3, ternaries 1 (2 pts), loops 1 (nesting depth added 1). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
(anonymous)::doOpen (cognitive 19) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::doOpen has cognitive complexity 19 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 13, if/else 2 (3 pts), ternaries 1 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 3). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
(anonymous)::rows::m (cognitive 18) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::rows::m has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 8, ternaries 5 (8 pts), if/else 2 (nesting depth added 3). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous)::pagers (cognitive 17) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::pagers has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: loops 4 (8 pts), boolean chains 5, if/else 4 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, break up the iteration: give each loop body a named function, and split a multi-phase loop into one function per phase so no single body carries the whole pipeline.
(anonymous)::closeModal (cognitive 17) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::closeModal has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 5 (11 pts), boolean chains 3, loops 1 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous)::updateAllSelected (cognitive 17) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::updateAllSelected has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 4 (6 pts), boolean chains 5, ternaries 1 (4 pts), loops 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous)::rows (cognitive 17) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::rows has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: ternaries 5 (10 pts), loops 2 (3 pts), boolean chains 2, if/else 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous)::range (cognitive 17) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::range has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 9, ternaries 5 (7 pts), if/else 1 (nesting depth added 2). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
(anonymous)::createPopper (cognitive 16) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::createPopper has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 15, if/else 1. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
(anonymous)::tn (cyclomatic 37) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::tn has cyclomatic complexity 37 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::Y (cyclomatic 31) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::Y has cyclomatic complexity 31 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::exports (cyclomatic 29) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::exports has cyclomatic complexity 29 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::(anonymous)::parse (cyclomatic 28) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::(anonymous)::parse has cyclomatic complexity 28 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::o (cyclomatic 27) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::o has cyclomatic complexity 27 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::l (cyclomatic 26) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::l has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::Oo::e (cyclomatic 23) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::Oo::e has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::getCellClasses (cyclomatic 22) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::getCellClasses has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::validate::(anonymous)::a (cyclomatic 22) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::validate::(anonymous)::a has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::Ec::fromString (cyclomatic 22) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::Ec::fromString has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::Tn::updateElsHeight (cyclomatic 20) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::Tn::updateElsHeight has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::l (cyclomatic 19) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::l has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::nr (cyclomatic 19) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::nr has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::range (cyclomatic 19) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::range has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::ku (cyclomatic 19) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::ku has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::b (cyclomatic 18) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::b has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::createPopper (cyclomatic 18) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::createPopper has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::doOpen (cyclomatic 17) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::doOpen has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::handleClick (cyclomatic 17) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::handleClick has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::Qs (cyclomatic 17) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::Qs has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::visible (cyclomatic 16) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::visible has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::Ai (cyclomatic 16) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::Ai has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous)::Pa (cyclomatic 16) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous)::Pa has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
AC4 · Keyboard semantics· Anchor without href · ×16
Anchor without href Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-24uservisitdistribute-analyse.vue:8— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-24uservisitdistribute-analyse.vue:15— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-24uservisitdistribute-analyse.vue:22— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-24uservisitdistribute-analyse.vue:29— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-analyse-detail.vue:8— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-analyse-detail.vue:15— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-analyse-detail.vue:22— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-analyse-detail.vue:29— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-analyse.vue:8— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-analyse.vue:15— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-analyse.vue:22— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-analyse.vue:29— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-timeinterval-analyse.vue:8— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-timeinterval-analyse.vue:15— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-timeinterval-analyse.vue:22— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Anchor without href Viper/wwwroot/component/anno-timeinterval-analyse.vue:29— An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:37— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) Viper/Hubs/TaskManager.cs:79— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) REDACTED:140— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RouterModule.cs:85— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:84— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:186— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:248— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:158— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:243— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:79— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:160— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) Trace/Anno.Repository/Dtoer.cs:78— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:157— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:242— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
Swallowed exception (empty catch) Anno.CommandBus/Command.cs:85— An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it.
AC3 · Page structure· Page without a main landmark · ×14
Page without a main landmark Viper/Views/Share/_Layout.cshtml:3— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark Viper/wwwroot/html/company/index.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark Viper/wwwroot/html/component.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark Viper/wwwroot/html/component_echarts.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark Viper/wwwroot/html/fconfig.html:3— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark Viper/wwwroot/html/func_roles_config.html:3— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark Viper/wwwroot/html/mlist/index.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark Viper/wwwroot/html/service/cluster_dashboard.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark Viper/wwwroot/html/syslog/index.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark Viper/wwwroot/html/trace/detail.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark Viper/wwwroot/html/trace/indexnew.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark Viper/wwwroot/html/trace/router.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark Viper/wwwroot/html/trace/routerdetail.html:3— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
Page without a main landmark Viper/wwwroot/html/welcome.html:2— No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>.
X2 · Cancellation propagation· Async method without CancellationToken · ×13
Async method without CancellationToken: ServiceInstanceApi Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:86— No CancellationToken parameter, and the token `context.RequestAborted` carries reaches none of the calls here that take one — this work can't be stopped early once started. Pass `context.RequestAborted` on, or take a CancellationToken.
Async method without CancellationToken: DeployServiceApi Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:107— No CancellationToken parameter, and the token `context.RequestAborted` carries reaches none of the calls here that take one — this work can't be stopped early once started. Pass `context.RequestAborted` on, or take a CancellationToken.
Async method without CancellationToken: ApiInvoke Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:200— No CancellationToken parameter, and the token `context.RequestAborted` carries reaches none of the calls here that take one — this work can't be stopped early once started. Pass `context.RequestAborted` on, or take a CancellationToken.
Async method without CancellationToken: SetWatch Viper/Hubs/MonitorHub.cs:46— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: GetAndSendMonitorData Viper/Hubs/MonitorHub.cs:87— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Send Viper/Hubs/SystemHub.cs:38— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: SendToGroup Viper/Hubs/SystemHub.cs:48— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: JoinGroup Viper/Hubs/SystemHub.cs:57— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: LeaveGroup Viper/Hubs/SystemHub.cs:69— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: Echo Viper/Hubs/SystemHub.cs:81— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: SendMessage Viper/Hubs/SystemHub.cs:91— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: HttpPostAsync Anno.Common/HttpHelper.cs:24— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
Async method without CancellationToken: HttpGetAsync Anno.Common/HttpHelper.cs:53— No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started.
AXH1 · Runtime security headers· Runtime security header not set · ×11
Runtime security header not set: content-security-policy — The live app's responses did not include content-security-policy (restricts the sources a page may load — mitigates XSS/injection). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: cross-origin-embedder-policy — The live app's responses did not include cross-origin-embedder-policy (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: require-corp)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: cross-origin-opener-policy — The live app's responses did not include cross-origin-opener-policy (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: same-origin)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: cross-origin-resource-policy — The live app's responses did not include cross-origin-resource-policy (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: same-origin)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: permissions-policy — The live app's responses did not include permissions-policy (restricts powerful browser features (camera, geolocation, …)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: referrer-policy — The live app's responses did not include referrer-policy (limits referrer leakage to third parties). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: strict-transport-security — The live app's responses did not include strict-transport-security (forces HTTPS on subsequent requests — mitigates downgrade/MITM). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: x-content-type-options — The live app's responses did not include x-content-type-options (stops MIME-sniffing (expects 'nosniff')). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: x-dns-prefetch-control — The live app's responses did not include x-dns-prefetch-control (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: off)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: x-frame-options — The live app's responses did not include x-frame-options (blocks clickjacking via framing (or use CSP frame-ancestors)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
Runtime security header not set: x-permitted-cross-domain-policies — The live app's responses did not include x-permitted-cross-domain-policies (recommended by the OWASP Secure Headers Project (value: none)). Observed by booting the app in-sandbox — advisory evidence for AppSec / CRA / NIS2 runtime secure-defaults. Set it at your reverse proxy or in the app.
X18 · Disposal-pattern correctness· Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it · ×10
Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:247— `reader` is a `StreamReader`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 247). Every use of it in `ApiInvoke` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var reader = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw.
Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:31— `md5` is a `MD5`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 31). Every use of it in `Md5Encrypt` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var md5 = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw.
Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:56— `des` is a `DESCryptoServiceProvider`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 56). Every use of it in `DesEncrypt` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var des = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw.
Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:93— `des` is a `DESCryptoServiceProvider`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 93). Every use of it in `DesDecrypt` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var des = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw.
Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:133— `tripleDes` is a `TripleDESCryptoServiceProvider`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 133). Every use of it in `TripleDesEncrypting` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var tripleDes = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw.
Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:136— `cs` is a `CryptoStream`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 136). Every use of it in `TripleDesEncrypting` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var cs = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw.
Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:166— `tripleDes` is a `TripleDESCryptoServiceProvider`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 166). Every use of it in `TripleDesDecrypting` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var tripleDes = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw.
Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:170— `strd` is a `StreamReader`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 170). Every use of it in `TripleDesDecrypting` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var strd = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw.
Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it Anno.Common/FileHelper.cs:36— `sw` is a `StreamWriter`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 36). Every use of it in `Write` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var sw = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw.
Disposable created and abandoned in the method that made it REDACTED:77— `client` is a `SmtpClient`, which implements `IDisposable`, and it is created here (line 77). Every use of it in `SendMail` reads a member through it — it is never returned, never stored, never handed to anything else, and never disposed — so this method both creates the value and is the last thing that can release it, and does not. Nothing announces the leak: the object holds its resource until finalization if its type has a finalizer, and until the process ends if it does not, so the cost accumulates once per CALL rather than showing up as a failure. Declare it with `using` (`using var client = …;`), which releases it at the end of the scope on every path including a throw.
No authorization — No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.
No authorization Samples/Mvc/MvcCallAnno/Controllers/ValuesController.cs:16— `ValuesController.SayHello` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase.
No authorization Samples/Mvc/MvcCallAnno/Controllers/ValuesController.cs:21— `ValuesController.Subtraction` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase.
No authorization Samples/Mvc/MvcCallAnno/Controllers/ValuesController.cs:25— `ValuesController.BuyProduct` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase.
No authorization Viper/Controllers/ErrorController.cs:16— `ErrorController.Index` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase.
No authorization Viper/Controllers/HomeController.cs:11— `HomeController.Index` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase.
No authorization Viper/Controllers/HomeController.cs:15— `HomeController.Login` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase.
No authorization Viper/Controllers/HomeController.cs:19— `HomeController.Simulation` serves requests and nothing authorizes it: no [Authorize] or RequireAuthorization on it or its controller/group, no fallback policy, no auth-gate middleware and no imperative guard in this codebase.
X24 · Document value interpolated into markup unescaped· Untrusted text written into markup unescaped · ×6
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped REDACTED:73— `body` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through an HTML e-mail body with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— `t.content:r.textContent=t.content` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped REDACTED:1328— `expando` is text this program did not author, and it is written into a quoted attribute value through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped REDACTED:1329— `expando` is text this program did not author, and it is written into a quoted attribute value through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped REDACTED:5032— `wrap[1]+jQuery.htmlPrefilter(elem)+wrap[2]` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
Untrusted text written into markup unescaped REDACTED:6347— `value` is text this program did not author, and it is written into the text of an element through `innerHTML` with nothing encoding it for that place. Whoever controls the value controls the markup: it can close the element or attribute it sits in and open a script of its own. Encode it for HTML at this site, render it through the framework's escaping output, or sanitise it if it must stay markup.
getEditor::create (cyclomatic 35) REDACTED:937— getEditor::create has cyclomatic complexity 35 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
getEditor::getValue (cyclomatic 23) REDACTED:1056— getEditor::getValue has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
getEditor::setText (cyclomatic 18) REDACTED:1134— getEditor::setText has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
getEditor::setValue (cyclomatic 17) REDACTED:1095— getEditor::setValue has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
getEditor::create (cognitive 53) REDACTED:937— getEditor::create has cognitive complexity 53 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21 (36 pts), boolean chains 11, ternaries 3 (6 pts) (nesting depth added 18). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
getEditor::getValue (cognitive 27) REDACTED:1056— getEditor::getValue has cognitive complexity 27 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (10 pts), ternaries 3 (8 pts), boolean chains 6, loops 1 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
getEditor::setValue (cognitive 18) REDACTED:1095— getEditor::setValue has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 4 (7 pts), boolean chains 4, ternaries 1 (4 pts), loops 1 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
getEditor::setText (cognitive 16) REDACTED:1134— getEditor::setText has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 5 (8 pts), boolean chains 5, loops 1 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 5). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
FileTooLong: REDACTED REDACTED— FileTooLong — 5233 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 4733 over it, 10.47× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: REDACTED REDACTED— FileTooLong — 1324 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 824 over it, 2.65× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: REDACTED REDACTED— FileTooLong — 986 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 486 over it, 1.97× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
FileTooLong: REDACTED REDACTED— FileTooLong — 691 significant lines (blank, comment-only and punctuation-only lines excluded). The bar is 500 significant lines; this is 191 over it, 1.38× the bar. To reduce it, split the file along the responsibilities already in it: move each cohesive group of declarations into its own sibling file in the same module or package, so no one file has to be read whole to change one of them.
Weak cipher Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:56— DES / 3DES / RijndaelManaged-bare is deprecated or broken. Use AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()` with explicit key/iv sizes.
Weak cipher Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:93— DES / 3DES / RijndaelManaged-bare is deprecated or broken. Use AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()` with explicit key/iv sizes.
Weak cipher Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:133— DES / 3DES / RijndaelManaged-bare is deprecated or broken. Use AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()` with explicit key/iv sizes.
Weak cipher Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:166— DES / 3DES / RijndaelManaged-bare is deprecated or broken. Use AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()` with explicit key/iv sizes.
Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) through `.Result` REDACTED:25— Reading `.Result` of a task that has not completed blocks this thread until it does — the same block as `.Wait()`: under a synchronization context (Blazor, a UI thread, classic ASP.NET) it deadlocks, and on the thread pool it parks a thread for as long as the work runs. `await` the task instead (make the caller `async`); where a synchronous entry point must stay, keep the block in ONE documented bridge with a timeout.
Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) through `.Result` REDACTED:44— Reading `.Result` of a task that has not completed blocks this thread until it does — the same block as `.Wait()`: under a synchronization context (Blazor, a UI thread, classic ASP.NET) it deadlocks, and on the thread pool it parks a thread for as long as the work runs. `await` the task instead (make the caller `async`); where a synchronous entry point must stay, keep the block in ONE documented bridge with a timeout.
Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) through `.Result` Anno.Plugs.LogicService/PlatformModule.cs:198— Reading `.Result` of a task that has not completed blocks this thread until it does — the same block as `.Wait()`: under a synchronization context (Blazor, a UI thread, classic ASP.NET) it deadlocks, and on the thread pool it parks a thread for as long as the work runs. `await` the task instead (make the caller `async`); where a synchronous entry point must stay, keep the block in ONE documented bridge with a timeout.
Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) through `.Result` Anno.Plugs.LogicService/PlatformModule.cs:199— Reading `.Result` of a task that has not completed blocks this thread until it does — the same block as `.Wait()`: under a synchronization context (Blazor, a UI thread, classic ASP.NET) it deadlocks, and on the thread pool it parks a thread for as long as the work runs. `await` the task instead (make the caller `async`); where a synchronous entry point must stay, keep the block in ONE documented bridge with a timeout.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:93— Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:93-106 | Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:114-127 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:93` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:47— Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:47-60 | Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:127-140 — before extracting anything, compare `Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs` and `Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:47` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The `return` at the foot of the matched lines is the enclosing body's own terminal exit, not an early one: it moves with them unchanged, and each site calls the extracted unit from the position that `return` occupied — no decision has to be handed back and re-acted on.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:69— Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:69-82 | Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:149-162 — before extracting anything, compare `Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs` and `Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:69` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The `return` at the foot of the matched lines is the enclosing body's own terminal exit, not an early one: it moves with them unchanged, and each site calls the extracted unit from the position that `return` occupied — no decision has to be handed back and re-acted on.
AC3 · Page structure· Heading level jumps from h1 to h3 · ×2
Heading level jumps from h1 to h3 Viper/Views/Error/404.cshtml:11— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
Heading level jumps from h1 to h3 Viper/Views/Error/500.cshtml:11— Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one.
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 16) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 16 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to 9 function items inside it that branch (t, r, n, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 16) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 16 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to 4 function items inside it that branch (a function literal at line 1, a function literal at line 1, n, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
Entity.Mapp (cognitive 38) Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:192— Entity.Mapp has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
Entity.Mapp (cognitive 38) Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:191— Entity.Mapp has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
Entity.Mapp (cognitive 33) Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:101— Entity.Mapp has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
Entity.Mapp (cognitive 33) Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:100— Entity.Mapp has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
BaseDto.Mapp (cognitive 33) Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:22— BaseDto.Mapp has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
BaseDto.Mapp (cognitive 33) Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:113— BaseDto.Mapp has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
(anonymous) (cognitive 16) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 9, ternaries 7. Most of this is not in the body itself: 4 of the 16 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 5 function items inside it that branch (a function literal at line 1, a function literal at line 1, a, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
(anonymous) (cognitive 16) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 11, ternaries 5. None of this is in the body itself: all 16 points belong to 2 function items inside it that branch (l, getEventType). Those helpers are already separate functions, so extracting the branching again is not available. To reduce it, move them out of the body to the enclosing scope, where each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
D4 · Code Duplication· Members sharing a duplicated core (4 members, 50+ identical tokens) · ×2
Members sharing a duplicated core (4 members, 50+ identical tokens) Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:44— Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:44-60 | Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:66-82 | Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:124-140 | Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:146-162 — These 4 members share a duplicated core: a run of at least 50 identical tokens appears in every one of them. That run is NOT broken out as duplicated-block rows below — it is what admitted this row, and the blocks below cover only the part of it that clears the block floor, so they understate the correspondence. Read the members as one construct written 4 times. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Extracting the individual blocks below is not the same fix: it leaves every body in place and the next edit still has to be made 4 times.
Members sharing a duplicated core (4 members, 50+ identical tokens) Anno.CommandBus/Command.cs:35— Anno.CommandBus/Command.cs:35-92 | Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:114-167 | Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:192-249 | Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:193-250 — These 4 members share a duplicated core: a run of at least 50 identical tokens appears in every one of them. That run is NOT broken out as duplicated-block rows below — it is what admitted this row, and the blocks below cover only the part of it that clears the block floor, so they understate the correspondence. Read the members as one construct written 4 times. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Extracting the individual blocks below is not the same fix: it leaves every body in place and the next edit still has to be made 4 times.
Off the main sequence: Anno.Infrastructure Anno.Infrastructure/Anno.Infrastructure.csproj:1— Anno.Infrastructure: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: Anno.Domain.Dto Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/Anno.Domain.Dto.csproj:1— Anno.Domain.Dto: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 2 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Low cohesion: PlatformModule (LCOM4 16) Anno.Plugs.LogicService/PlatformModule.cs:20— PlatformModule's methods fall into 16 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 16 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
Low cohesion: SysMember (LCOM4 4) Trace/Anno.Domain/Member/SysMember.cs:9— SysMember's methods fall into 4 groups that share no field and call none of each other, against a bar of more than 3 for this run (LCOM4, configurable — your repository's bar is the one quoted here). Each group is a set of methods reachable from one another through shared fields or direct calls, so 4 groups means the type has that many internally-connected clusters with nothing tying them together. Types whose shape makes a high count expected — and which would otherwise dominate this list — are excluded before this row is raised, so this is a genuine split candidate rather than a metric reading. It is still a shape, not a defect: confirm the groups match responsibilities you can name before splitting.
Sync-over-async blocking — 1 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
Sync-over-async blocking Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilJob.cs:46— `.Wait()` blocks this thread until the async work completes — it wastes a thread-pool thread for as long as the work runs and can deadlock wherever a synchronization context is in play (a UI thread, or a caller that has one).
S1 · Web-Security Posture· Ciphertext is encrypted but not authenticated · ×2
Ciphertext is encrypted but not authenticated Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:62— This type encrypts through `SymmetricAlgorithm`, whose every cipher mode (CBC/ECB/OFB/CFB/CTS) is unauthenticated, and no keyed MAC or AEAD cipher appears anywhere in it — so nothing establishes that the ciphertext it produced is the ciphertext it later reads back. Encryption alone provides confidentiality, not integrity: unauthenticated CBC is MALLEABLE, and an attacker who can modify stored or transmitted ciphertext can flip chosen plaintext bits in the following block by flipping ciphertext bits in the preceding one, without ever knowing the key. Where the decrypt path reports failure differently for a padding error than for a downstream one — a broad `catch` that returns null is the usual spelling — the same construction also answers the attacker's questions, which is the padding-oracle shape that recovers plaintext outright. Prefer an AEAD cipher: `AesGcm` or `ChaCha20Poly1305` authenticate the ciphertext as part of encrypting it, and give you an associated-data slot for the surrounding context. Where the format cannot change, MAC it with encrypt-then-MAC — HMAC-SHA256 over the IV and the ciphertext together, with a key derived separately from the encryption key — and verify that tag with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals` BEFORE decrypting anything.
Ciphertext is encrypted but not authenticated Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:134— This type encrypts through `SymmetricAlgorithm`, whose every cipher mode (CBC/ECB/OFB/CFB/CTS) is unauthenticated, and no keyed MAC or AEAD cipher appears anywhere in it — so nothing establishes that the ciphertext it produced is the ciphertext it later reads back. Encryption alone provides confidentiality, not integrity: unauthenticated CBC is MALLEABLE, and an attacker who can modify stored or transmitted ciphertext can flip chosen plaintext bits in the following block by flipping ciphertext bits in the preceding one, without ever knowing the key. Where the decrypt path reports failure differently for a padding error than for a downstream one — a broad `catch` that returns null is the usual spelling — the same construction also answers the attacker's questions, which is the padding-oracle shape that recovers plaintext outright. Prefer an AEAD cipher: `AesGcm` or `ChaCha20Poly1305` authenticate the ciphertext as part of encrypting it, and give you an associated-data slot for the surrounding context. Where the format cannot change, MAC it with encrypt-then-MAC — HMAC-SHA256 over the IV and the ciphertext together, with a key derived separately from the encryption key — and verify that tag with `CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals` BEFORE decrypting anything.
Rethrow loses stack trace (`throw ex;`) Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:72— `throw ex;` resets the exception's stack trace to this line, hiding where it really came from. Use a bare `throw;` to preserve the original stack.
Rethrow loses stack trace (`throw ex;`) Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:110— `throw ex;` resets the exception's stack trace to this line, hiding where it really came from. Use a bare `throw;` to preserve the original stack.
AC3 · Page structure· Data table has no header cells · ×1
Data table has no header cells Viper/wwwroot/js/jsoneditor.min.js:31— A <table> with data cells but no <th> gives assistive technology no way to associate cells with their headers. Mark the header row/column cells as <th> (with a scope).
Low contrast colour pair in CSS (2.8:1) Viper/wwwroot/css/element-ui-index.css:1394— `.el-pagination.is-background .el-pager li:not(.disabled).active` sets color: #FFF on background-color: #409EFF — 2.8:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them.
AC7 · A11y enforcement· Accessibility enforcement below the top rung · ×1
Accessibility enforcement below the top rung — No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 40 markup file(s) this pass actually assessed, the linter configuration checked in beside them, and this repository's test and CI files — matched by name against the accessibility checkers this dimension carries. An audit run outside the repository, a hosted scanner, or a check whose name is not one of those, is not seen here.
AXR1 · Runtime accessibility (rendered)· WCAG 1.4.3 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface · ×1
WCAG 1.4.3 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface — axe-core rule(s) color-contrast failed on: .ld-d3-s1 > label, .ld-d3-s2 > a, .ld-d4-s1, a[href="#"]:nth-child(1), a[href="#"]:nth-child(2). Runtime evidence (advisory — not scored); fix and re-scan to verify it clears.
AXR1 · Runtime accessibility (rendered)· WCAG 3.1.1 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface · ×1
WCAG 3.1.1 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface — axe-core rule(s) html-has-lang failed on: html. Runtime evidence (advisory — not scored); fix and re-scan to verify it clears.
AXR1 · Runtime accessibility (rendered)· WCAG 4.1.2 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface · ×1
WCAG 4.1.2 reproducibly failed in a rendered surface — axe-core rule(s) aria-hidden-body, input-button-name, label, link-name, nested-interactive failed on: input[type="checkbox"]. Runtime evidence (advisory — not scored); fix and re-scan to verify it clears.
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 117) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 117 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 3 of the 117 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 51 function items inside it that branch (n::arrow, n::parse, n::u, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
base.liger.getEditor (cyclomatic 104) REDACTED:930— base.liger.getEditor has cyclomatic complexity 104 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 4 of the 104 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 10 function literals inside it that branch (lines 937, 1056, 1134, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 76) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 76 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 76 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to 66 function items inside it that branch (a function literal at line 1, (anonymous)::v, (anonymous)::x::unobserve, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 72) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 72 (threshold 15). Of this number, 17 points are the body's own statements and 55 belong to 24 function items inside it that branch. To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 52) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 52 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
jquery.defaultPrefilter (cyclomatic 45) REDACTED:7324— jquery.defaultPrefilter has cyclomatic complexity 45 (threshold 15). Of this number, 41 points are the body's own statements and 4 belong to 3 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
_getTreeHTMLByData (cyclomatic 41) REDACTED:930— _getTreeHTMLByData has cyclomatic complexity 41 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
_key (cyclomatic 35) REDACTED:1463— _key has cyclomatic complexity 35 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
_move (cyclomatic 34) REDACTED:468— _move has cyclomatic complexity 34 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
jquery.jQuery.Callbacks (cyclomatic 31) REDACTED:3453— jquery.jQuery.Callbacks has cyclomatic complexity 31 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 2 of the 31 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 8 function items inside it that branch (fire, a function literal at line 3541, a function literal at line 3531, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 31) REDACTED:10— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 31 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 3 of the 31 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 21 function items inside it that branch (momentum, a function literal at line 107, fn, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
refresh (cyclomatic 31) REDACTED:1900— refresh has cyclomatic complexity 31 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity· run (cyclomatic 31) · ×1
run (cyclomatic 31) REDACTED:147— run has cyclomatic complexity 31 (threshold 15). Of this number, 21 points are the body's own statements and 10 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
json2.str (cyclomatic 29) REDACTED:223— json2.str has cyclomatic complexity 29 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
_end (cyclomatic 28) REDACTED:565— _end has cyclomatic complexity 28 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This is NOT this file's highest cyclomatic complexity: handleEvent (cyclomatic 30) is higher and carries no row of its own — it was excluded as a flat dispatcher (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), which this dimension does not treat as a refactor obligation. It is named here so the ranking you see in this file is not mistaken for the whole of it; the excluded method is counted neither in this dimension's figures nor in its score.
jquery.jQuery.ajaxTransport() (cyclomatic 27) REDACTED:9977— jquery.jQuery.ajaxTransport() has cyclomatic complexity 27 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 4 of the 27 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 5 function literals inside it that branch (lines 9983, 10023, 10075, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
jquery.domManip (cyclomatic 26) REDACTED:6047— jquery.domManip has cyclomatic complexity 26 (threshold 15). Of this number, 25 points are the body's own statements and 1 belongs to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
jquery.ajaxConvert (cyclomatic 25) REDACTED:9180— jquery.ajaxConvert has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
_wheel (cyclomatic 25) REDACTED:1085— _wheel has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). Of this number, 24 points are the body's own statements and 1 belongs to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages. This is NOT this file's highest cyclomatic complexity: handleEvent (cyclomatic 30) is higher and carries no row of its own — it was excluded as a flat dispatcher (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), which this dimension does not treat as a refactor obligation. It is named here so the ranking you see in this file is not mistaken for the whole of it; the excluded method is counted neither in this dimension's figures nor in its score.
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 25) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 25 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 5 of the 25 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 13 function items inside it that branch (s, o, a function literal at line 1, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
_setTreeEven::onDrag (cyclomatic 23) REDACTED:1427— _setTreeEven::onDrag has cyclomatic complexity 23 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
AnnoSetupFilter.MatchTag (cyclomatic 22) Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:510— AnnoSetupFilter.MatchTag has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). Of this number, 18 points are the body's own statements and 4 belong to 4 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
RmbHelper.ToRmb (cyclomatic 22) Anno.Common/RmbHelper.cs:12— RmbHelper.ToRmb has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
jquery.adjustCSS (cyclomatic 22) REDACTED:4738— jquery.adjustCSS has cyclomatic complexity 22 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
iscroll.IScroll (cyclomatic 21) REDACTED:273— iscroll.IScroll has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
getOptions (cyclomatic 21) REDACTED:167— getOptions has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
_init (cyclomatic 21) REDACTED:469— _init has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). Of this number, 14 points are the body's own statements and 7 belong to one function item inside it that branches. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
stringify (cyclomatic 21) REDACTED:854— stringify has cyclomatic complexity 21 (threshold 15). Of this number, 18 points are the body's own statements and 3 belong to 3 function items inside it that branch. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
AnnoSetupFilter.ApiInvoke (cyclomatic 20) Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:200— AnnoSetupFilter.ApiInvoke has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
jquery.buildFragment (cyclomatic 20) REDACTED:5002— jquery.buildFragment has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
_initSnap (cyclomatic 20) REDACTED:1180— _initSnap has cyclomatic complexity 20 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 2 of the 20 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 2 function literals inside it that branch (lines 1187, 1275). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest. This is NOT this file's highest cyclomatic complexity: handleEvent (cyclomatic 30) is higher and carries no row of its own — it was excluded as a flat dispatcher (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), which this dimension does not treat as a refactor obligation. It is named here so the ranking you see in this file is not mistaken for the whole of it; the excluded method is counted neither in this dimension's figures nor in its score.
updatePosition (cyclomatic 19) REDACTED:1985— updatePosition has cyclomatic complexity 19 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This is NOT this file's highest cyclomatic complexity: handleEvent (cyclomatic 30) is higher and carries no row of its own — it was excluded as a flat dispatcher (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), which this dimension does not treat as a refactor obligation. It is named here so the ranking you see in this file is not mistaken for the whole of it; the excluded method is counted neither in this dimension's figures nor in its score.
jquery.Animation (cyclomatic 18) REDACTED:7533— jquery.Animation has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 6 of the 18 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 3 function items inside it that branch (tick, a function literal at line 7595, a function literal at line 7589). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
jquery.jQuery.speed (cyclomatic 18) REDACTED:7698— jquery.jQuery.speed has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). Of this number, 16 points are the body's own statements and 2 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
jquery.jQuery.ajaxPrefilter("json jsonp") (cyclomatic 18) REDACTED:10203— jquery.jQuery.ajaxPrefilter("json jsonp") has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). Of this number, 13 points are the body's own statements and 5 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
_nearestSnap (cyclomatic 18) REDACTED:1290— _nearestSnap has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: these branches sit side by side rather than nested inside one another, so extracting each one on its own would leave a function per branch. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages. This is NOT this file's highest cyclomatic complexity: handleEvent (cyclomatic 30) is higher and carries no row of its own — it was excluded as a flat dispatcher (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), which this dimension does not treat as a refactor obligation. It is named here so the ranking you see in this file is not mistaken for the whole of it; the excluded method is counted neither in this dimension's figures nor in its score.
append (cyclomatic 18) REDACTED:544— append has cyclomatic complexity 18 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
jquery.getWidthOrHeight (cyclomatic 17) REDACTED:6770— jquery.getWidthOrHeight has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
_start (cyclomatic 17) REDACTED:407— _start has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top. This is NOT this file's highest cyclomatic complexity: handleEvent (cyclomatic 30) is higher and carries no row of its own — it was excluded as a flat dispatcher (a long switch/match over independent cases: many branches, almost no nesting), which this dimension does not treat as a refactor obligation. It is named here so the ranking you see in this file is not mistaken for the whole of it; the excluded method is counted neither in this dimension's figures nor in its score.
(anonymous) (cyclomatic 17) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). Most of this is not in the body itself: 5 of the 17 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 5 function items inside it that branch (a function literal at line 1, a function literal at line 1, a, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest. This file is where this pass's cyclomatic complexity CONCENTRATES: Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js holds 31 of the 72 methods over the threshold — including the worst — and 424 of the 870 points over it (49%), 3.9× the next-largest file (REDACTED at 108). No single row can show this, because each is measured only against the threshold: reducing this one file moves this dimension further than any other file in the repository.
D1 · Cyclomatic Complexity· set (cyclomatic 17) · ×1
set (cyclomatic 17) REDACTED:296— set has cyclomatic complexity 17 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
AnnoSetupFilter.RateLimit (cyclomatic 16) Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:351— AnnoSetupFilter.RateLimit has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
jquery.ajaxHandleResponses (cyclomatic 16) REDACTED:9122— jquery.ajaxHandleResponses has cyclomatic complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, separate the cases: extract each independent branch into its own named function, and where the body has guards that only reject input, fold those into early returns at the top.
(anonymous) (cognitive 127) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 127 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 50, ternaries 37 (47 pts), if/else 20 (24 pts), loops 4 (6 pts) (nesting depth added 16). Most of this is not in the body itself: 2 of the 127 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 51 function items inside it that branch (n::parse, n::_getBoundaries, n::arrow, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
base.liger.getEditor (cognitive 125) REDACTED:930— base.liger.getEditor has cognitive complexity 125 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 48 (76 pts), boolean chains 28, ternaries 5 (12 pts), loops 3 (9 pts) (nesting depth added 41). Most of this is not in the body itself: 3 of the 125 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 10 function literals inside it that branch (lines 937, 1056, 1095, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
_getTreeHTMLByData (cognitive 100) REDACTED:930— _getTreeHTMLByData has cognitive complexity 100 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 35 (76 pts), loops 5 (10 pts), boolean chains 8, ternaries 2 (6 pts) (nesting depth added 50). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
jquery.defaultPrefilter (cognitive 81) REDACTED:7324— jquery.defaultPrefilter has cognitive complexity 81 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 27 (64 pts), boolean chains 12, loops 3 (5 pts) (nesting depth added 39). Of this number, 73 points are the body's own statements and 8 belong to 3 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
(anonymous) (cognitive 77) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 77 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 41, if/else 16 (19 pts), ternaries 13, loops 4 (nesting depth added 3). None of this is in the body itself: all 77 points belong to 66 function items inside it that branch (a function literal at line 1, (anonymous)::v, (anonymous)::x::unobserve, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
jquery.ajaxConvert (cognitive 73) REDACTED:9180— jquery.ajaxConvert has cognitive complexity 73 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14 (47 pts), loops 3 (8 pts), ternaries 1 (7 pts), error handling 1 (6 pts), boolean chains 5 (nesting depth added 49). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
(anonymous) (cognitive 71) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 71 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 42, if/else 6 (10 pts), ternaries 8 (10 pts), loops 8 (9 pts) (nesting depth added 7). Most of this is not in the body itself: 14 of the 71 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 24 function items inside it that branch (U, X, Z, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
jquery.domManip (cognitive 55) REDACTED:6047— jquery.domManip has cognitive complexity 55 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12 (39 pts), boolean chains 9, loops 2 (7 pts) (nesting depth added 32). Of this number, 53 points are the body's own statements and 2 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, flatten the nesting: this score is depth rather than breadth — most of its points come from checks stacked inside one another, so the work sits several levels in. Invert each enclosing check into an early exit (a return, or the language's equivalent) so the happy path stays at one level, and where a level cannot be exited early, lift the block it encloses into its own named function.
refresh (cognitive 51) REDACTED:1900— refresh has cognitive complexity 51 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21 (31 pts), boolean chains 14, ternaries 3 (6 pts) (nesting depth added 13). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous) (cognitive 50) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 50 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 2738, ternaries 1309 (1670 pts), if/else 680 (920 pts), loops 151 (221 pts), match/switch 20 (28 pts), error handling 11 (19 pts) (nesting depth added 687). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
RmbHelper.ToRmb (cognitive 48) Anno.Common/RmbHelper.cs:12— RmbHelper.ToRmb has cognitive complexity 48 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
AnnoMapper.Mapper (cognitive 47) Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:23— AnnoMapper.Mapper has cognitive complexity 47 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
Dtoer.Mapper (cognitive 47) Trace/Anno.Repository/Dtoer.cs:17— Dtoer.Mapper has cognitive complexity 47 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
_key (cognitive 45) REDACTED:1463— _key has cognitive complexity 45 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: ternaries 13 (27 pts), if/else 11 (13 pts), boolean chains 4, match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 16). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
AnnoSetupFilter.RateLimit (cognitive 42) Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:351— AnnoSetupFilter.RateLimit has cognitive complexity 42 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
json2.str (cognitive 42) REDACTED:223— json2.str has cognitive complexity 42 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 10 (27 pts), loops 3 (9 pts), boolean chains 3, ternaries 1 (2 pts), match/switch 1 (nesting depth added 24). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity· run (cognitive 41) · ×1
run (cognitive 41) REDACTED:147— run has cognitive complexity 41 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 21 (29 pts), boolean chains 9, ternaries 2 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 9). Of this number, 29 points are the body's own statements and 12 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
_move (cognitive 40) REDACTED:468— _move has cognitive complexity 40 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 17 (20 pts), ternaries 11 (15 pts), boolean chains 5 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
jquery.jQuery.Callbacks (cognitive 39) REDACTED:3453— jquery.jQuery.Callbacks has cognitive complexity 39 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16 (26 pts), boolean chains 8, loops 3 (4 pts), ternaries 1 (nesting depth added 11). None of this is in the body itself: all 39 points belong to 8 function items inside it that branch (fire, a function literal at line 3531, a function literal at line 3541, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
jquery.buildFragment (cognitive 39) REDACTED:5002— jquery.buildFragment has cognitive complexity 39 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (20 pts), loops 4 (9 pts), boolean chains 6, ternaries 1 (4 pts) (nesting depth added 19). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
Command.Mapp (cognitive 38) Anno.CommandBus/Command.cs:34— Command.Mapp has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
(anonymous) (cognitive 38) REDACTED:10— (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 38 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 19 (22 pts), ternaries 5 (7 pts), boolean chains 5, loops 4 (nesting depth added 5). Most of this is not in the body itself: 2 of the 38 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 21 function items inside it that branch (momentum, a function literal at line 107, fn, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
getOptions (cognitive 37) REDACTED:167— getOptions has cognitive complexity 37 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 16 (31 pts), boolean chains 5, loops 1 (nesting depth added 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
AnnoMapper.Mapp (cognitive 33) Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:126— AnnoMapper.Mapp has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15). To reduce it, flatten the nesting: invert conditions into early returns or guard clauses so the happy path stays at one level, and lift the deepest nested block into its own named function.
stringify (cognitive 33) REDACTED:854— stringify has cognitive complexity 33 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12 (19 pts), ternaries 4 (6 pts), loops 2 (5 pts), boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 12). Of this number, 30 points are the body's own statements and 3 belong to 3 function items inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
AnnoSetupFilter.MatchTag (cognitive 31) Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:510— AnnoSetupFilter.MatchTag has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Of this number, 27 points are the body's own statements and 4 belong to 4 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
jquery.jQuery.ajaxTransport() (cognitive 31) REDACTED:9977— jquery.jQuery.ajaxTransport() has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (15 pts), boolean chains 9, loops 2 (5 pts), error handling 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 11). Most of this is not in the body itself: 3 of the 31 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 5 function literals inside it that branch (lines 9983, 10109, 10023, …). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
_end (cognitive 31) REDACTED:565— _end has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (14 pts), ternaries 5 (9 pts), boolean chains 8 (nesting depth added 7). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
_initSnap (cognitive 31) REDACTED:1180— _initSnap has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (15 pts), boolean chains 9, loops 3 (7 pts) (nesting depth added 10). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 31 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to 2 function literals inside it that branch (lines 1187, 1275). The decisions are inside those literals, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literals' work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have each literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
updatePosition (cognitive 31) REDACTED:1985— updatePosition has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 15 (25 pts), boolean chains 6 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
D2 · Cognitive Complexity· set (cognitive 31) · ×1
set (cognitive 31) REDACTED:296— set has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13 (23 pts), loops 2 (6 pts), boolean chains 2 (nesting depth added 14). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
_init (cognitive 31) REDACTED:469— _init has cognitive complexity 31 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 13 (20 pts), boolean chains 6, loops 2 (3 pts), error handling 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 9). Of this number, 20 points are the body's own statements and 11 belong to one function item inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
AnnoSetupFilter.ApiInvoke (cognitive 30) Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:200— AnnoSetupFilter.ApiInvoke has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
_setTreeEven::onDrag (cognitive 30) REDACTED:1427— _setTreeEven::onDrag has cognitive complexity 30 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (19 pts), ternaries 3 (6 pts), boolean chains 4, loops 1 (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
jquery.cookie.jQuery.cookie (cognitive 29) Viper/wwwroot/js/lib/jquery.cookie.js:55— jquery.cookie.jQuery.cookie has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (16 pts), ternaries 3 (6 pts), boolean chains 4, loops 1 (3 pts) (nesting depth added 13). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
_wheel (cognitive 29) REDACTED:1085— _wheel has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 20 (23 pts), ternaries 6 (nesting depth added 3). Of this number, 28 points are the body's own statements and 1 belongs to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
append (cognitive 29) REDACTED:544— append has cognitive complexity 29 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 12 (16 pts), ternaries 4 (10 pts), boolean chains 2, loops 1 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
jquery.ajaxHandleResponses (cognitive 26) REDACTED:9122— jquery.ajaxHandleResponses has cognitive complexity 26 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (17 pts), loops 3 (5 pts), boolean chains 4 (nesting depth added 10). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
jquery.access (cognitive 24) REDACTED:4143— jquery.access has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (14 pts), loops 2 (5 pts), ternaries 2 (5 pts) (nesting depth added 11). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
jquery.showHide (cognitive 24) REDACTED:4829— jquery.showHide has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (20 pts), boolean chains 2, loops 2 (nesting depth added 12). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous) (cognitive 24) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 24 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 11, ternaries 8 (9 pts), loops 2 (3 pts), if/else 1 (nesting depth added 2). Most of this is not in the body itself: 6 of the 24 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 13 function items inside it that branch (o, s, a function literal at line 1, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
(anonymous) (cognitive 23) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 23 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (9 pts), boolean chains 7, loops 3 (7 pts) (nesting depth added 7). None of this is in the body itself: all 23 points belong to 4 function items inside it that branch (a function literal at line 1, a function literal at line 1, n, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
_start (cognitive 22) REDACTED:407— _start has cognitive complexity 22 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 8 (10 pts), ternaries 3 (7 pts), boolean chains 5 (nesting depth added 6). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
jquery.adjustCSS (cognitive 21) REDACTED:4738— jquery.adjustCSS has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: boolean chains 11, if/else 4 (7 pts), loops 1 (2 pts), ternaries 1 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, name the conditions: bind each compound test to a well-named local or a small predicate function, so the body reads as a sequence of named decisions rather than a chain of operators.
jquery.boxModelAdjustment (cognitive 21) REDACTED:6702— jquery.boxModelAdjustment has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (17 pts), boolean chains 2, loops 1, ternaries 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
jquery.Animation (cognitive 21) REDACTED:7533— jquery.Animation has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (12 pts), boolean chains 5, loops 3, ternaries 1 (nesting depth added 3). Most of this is not in the body itself: 8 of the 21 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to 3 function items inside it that branch (tick, a function literal at line 7595, a function literal at line 7589). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
_nearestSnap (cognitive 21) REDACTED:1290— _nearestSnap has cognitive complexity 21 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 14 (18 pts), loops 2, boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 4). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition.
IScroll (cognitive 20) REDACTED:273— IScroll has cognitive complexity 20 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: ternaries 9, boolean chains 8, if/else 2, loops 1. To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
jquery.leverageNative (cognitive 18) REDACTED:5612— jquery.leverageNative has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (15 pts), boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 6). Most of this is not in the body itself: 3 of the 18 points are its own statements and the rest belongs to one function literal inside it that branches (line 5626). The decisions are inside the literal, which nothing outside this body can call, review or test on its own, so splitting the enclosing body is not the move available here. To reduce it, lift the literal's work into a named function or method at the enclosing scope and have the literal call it, then reduce whichever part then reads as the largest.
jquery.jQuery.speed (cognitive 18) REDACTED:7698— jquery.jQuery.speed has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 6 (9 pts), boolean chains 8, ternaries 1 (nesting depth added 3). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous) (cognitive 18) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 18 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (11 pts), ternaries 2 (4 pts), boolean chains 3 (nesting depth added 6). Most of this is not in the body itself: 1 of the 18 points is its own statement and the rest belongs to 6 function items inside it that branch (fastKey, getWeak, onFreeze, …). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
Indicator (cognitive 17) REDACTED:1674— Indicator has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (13 pts), ternaries 2 (3 pts), loops 1 (nesting depth added 7). Of this number, 14 points are the body's own statements and 3 belong to one function literal inside it that branches. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
(anonymous) (cognitive 17) Viper/wwwroot/js/element-ui-index.js:1— (anonymous) has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 4 (8 pts), boolean chains 5, loops 2 (4 pts) (nesting depth added 6). None of this is in the body itself: all 17 points belong to 2 function items inside it that branch (a function literal at line 1, exports). The named helpers are already separate functions; the literals' work cannot be called, reviewed or tested from outside this body. To reduce it, move the named helpers out of the body to the enclosing scope and lift each literal's work into a named function there, so each is measured, reviewed and tested on its own, and reduce whichever one then reads as the largest.
selectNode (cognitive 17) REDACTED:647— selectNode has cognitive complexity 17 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 11 (16 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 5). Of this number, 10 points are the body's own statements and 7 belong to 2 function items inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
RSAHelper.CreateRsaProviderFromPublicKey (cognitive 16) Anno.Common/RSAHelper.cs:159— RSAHelper.CreateRsaProviderFromPublicKey has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
HashEntryExtension.ToObjFromRedis (cognitive 16) Anno.Redis/Extension/HashEntryExtension.cs:29— HashEntryExtension.ToObjFromRedis has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
jquery.on (cognitive 16) REDACTED:5124— jquery.on has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 9 (11 pts), boolean chains 3, loops 1 (2 pts) (nesting depth added 3). To reduce it, split the body: most of this score is breadth rather than depth — checks laid out side by side rather than stacked — so group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function. Some of it IS depth: where a check sits inside another whose only job is to reach it, merge the two into one condition, and where an else follows a branch that already returns, drop the trailing else and let the rest of the body continue at one level.
jquery.propFilter (cognitive 16) REDACTED:7496— jquery.propFilter has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 5 (11 pts), loops 2 (4 pts), boolean chains 1 (nesting depth added 8). To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
jquery.jQuery.ajaxPrefilter("json jsonp") (cognitive 16) REDACTED:10203— jquery.jQuery.ajaxPrefilter("json jsonp") has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 7 (11 pts), boolean chains 5 (nesting depth added 4). Of this number, 8 points are the body's own statements and 8 belong to 2 function literals inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body into named stages: move each independent step or branch into its own named function so the body reads as a short sequence of named calls rather than one long body.
loadData (cognitive 16) REDACTED:361— loadData has cognitive complexity 16 (threshold 15). Drivers by points: if/else 5, ternaries 3 (5 pts), boolean chains 3, loops 1 (2 pts), error handling 1 (nesting depth added 3). Of this number, 12 points are the body's own statements and 4 belong to 7 function items inside it that branch. To reduce it, split the body: this score is breadth rather than depth — many checks laid out side by side rather than nested inside one another, so inverting conditions into early returns has nothing left to flatten. Group the statements between the checks into named steps and move each step into its own function, so the body reads as a short sequence of named stages.
D4 · Code Duplication· Near-duplicate member family (6 members, 25 shared lines) · ×1
Near-duplicate member family (6 members, 25 shared lines) Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:24— Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:24-92 | Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:129-193 | Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:23-86 | Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:101-164 | Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:102-165 | Trace/Anno.Repository/Dtoer.cs:18-87 — These 6 members are variants of one another: a block of 25 lines reported below appears in every one of them, and the pairwise near-duplicate rows they would otherwise produce are collapsed into this row. Read them as one construct written 6 times. The repair is at the members' grain — factor the shared implementation out once and have all of them call it with their differences as parameters or as an injected step, or, where the difference is systematic, generate them from one template. Extracting the individual blocks below is not the same fix: it leaves every body in place and the next edit still has to be made 6 times.
Duplicated block (63 lines × 3) Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:24— Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:24-86 | Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:102-164 | Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:103-165 — before extracting anything, compare `Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs` and `Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 6 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 180 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.
Duplicated block (43 lines × 4) Anno.CommandBus/Command.cs:50— Anno.CommandBus/Command.cs:50-92 | Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:125-167 | Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:207-249 | Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:208-250 — before extracting anything, compare `Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs` and `Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 6 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 180 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Anno.CommandBus/Command.cs:50` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. ★ These copies have DRIFTED, and that is worth reading before extracting anything: just after the matched lines, `Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:251` calls `Clone`, `MemberwiseClone` and `Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:169` does not — after which the two agree again for 2 more lines. One of those two behaviours is the intended one and the other is what a copy-paste left behind, so decide which BEFORE unifying them: extracting the shared part will silently settle it, and if the copy that skips the call is the wrong one, that bug is already live.
Duplicated block (37 lines × 2) Samples/HelloWorldService/Program.cs:20— Samples/HelloWorldService/Program.cs:20-56 | ViperService/Program.cs:20-56 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice.
Duplicated block (33 lines × 2) Trace/Anno.Command/AddUserCommand.cs:16— Trace/Anno.Command/AddUserCommand.cs:16-48 | Trace/Anno.Model/sys_member.cs:14-46 — before extracting anything, compare `Trace/Anno.Command/AddUserCommand.cs` and `Trace/Anno.Model/sys_member.cs` as WHOLE FILES: 85% of the shorter file's lines also appear in the other, so this reads as one file having been copied from the other rather than as a helper waiting to be extracted. The 1 duplicated block(s) this scan matched between them are fragments of that copy, not the extent of it — treat the file pair as the unit. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (28 lines × 2) Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:36— Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:36-63 | Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:37-64 — before extracting anything, compare `Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs` and `Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 8 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 223 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.
Duplicated block (27 lines × 4) Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:167— Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:167-193 | Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:60-86 | Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:138-164 | Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:139-165 — before extracting anything, compare `Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs` and `Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 6 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 180 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:167` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it — the window is that declaration's tail, not a fragment that begins part-way through something, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that. The `return` at the foot of the matched lines is the enclosing body's own terminal exit, not an early one: it moves with them unchanged, and each site calls the extracted unit from the position that `return` occupied — no decision has to be handed back and re-acted on.
Duplicated block (25 lines × 6) Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:49— Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:49-73 | Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:155-179 | Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:48-72 | Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:126-150 | Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:127-151 | Trace/Anno.Repository/Dtoer.cs:43-67 — before extracting anything, compare `Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs` and `Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 6 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 180 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:49` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (26 lines × 2) Anno.Plugs.TraceService/ServiceInformation.cs:13— Anno.Plugs.TraceService/ServiceInformation.cs:13-38 | Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:66-91 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Anno.Plugs.TraceService/ServiceInformation.cs:13` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (25 lines × 2) Trace/Anno.Command/SysFuncCommand.cs:16— Trace/Anno.Command/SysFuncCommand.cs:16-40 | Trace/Anno.Domain/Function/SysFunc.cs:23-47 — before extracting anything, compare `Trace/Anno.Command/SysFuncCommand.cs` and `Trace/Anno.Domain/Function/SysFunc.cs` as WHOLE FILES: 84% of the shorter file's lines also appear in the other, so this reads as one file having been copied from the other rather than as a helper waiting to be extracted. The 1 duplicated block(s) this scan matched between them are fragments of that copy, not the extent of it — treat the file pair as the unit. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place.
Duplicated block (22 lines × 2) Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RouterModule.cs:64— Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RouterModule.cs:64-85 | Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:16-37 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RouterModule.cs:64` it runs out through the closing brace of the declaration holding it and carries on into the declaration that follows — the window is the tail of one member plus the head of the next, so no call can be substituted for those exact lines, and the smallest declaration that contains all of them is the type they sit in. The repeated unit is the member each site sits in: where those members' bodies are the same, move one whole member to the shared location and have the others delegate to it; where the copies are a run of near-identical overloads or wrappers that differ only in their signatures, the repetition IS the run — a one-line delegation has no helper inside it to lift — so generate the run from the set it enumerates, or accept it and keep each member's own documentation with it.
Duplicated block (19 lines × 2) Anno.Plugs.TraceService/TraceModule.cs:41— Anno.Plugs.TraceService/TraceModule.cs:41-59 | Anno.Plugs.TraceService/TraceModule.cs:112-130 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited.
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:18— Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:18-32 | Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:19-33 — before extracting anything, compare `Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs` and `Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 8 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 223 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:96— Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:96-107 | Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:174-185 | Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:175-186 — before extracting anything, compare `Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs` and `Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 6 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 180 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.
Duplicated block (9 lines × 4) Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:46— Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:46-54 | Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:68-76 | Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:126-134 | Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:148-156 — before extracting anything, compare `Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs` and `Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:46` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (10 lines × 4) Anno.CommandBus/Command.cs:36— Anno.CommandBus/Command.cs:36-45 | Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:115-124 | Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:193-202 | Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:194-203 — before extracting anything, compare `Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs` and `Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 6 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 180 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `Anno.CommandBus/Command.cs:36` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (11 lines × 2) Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:89— Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:89-99 | Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:169-179 — before extracting anything, compare `Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs` and `Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.
Duplicated block (6 lines × 2) Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:121— Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs:121-126 | Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:202-207 — before extracting anything, compare `Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RoutingInfomationDto.cs` and `Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs` as WHOLE FILES: this scan already matched 5 separate duplicated blocks between them, totalling at least 54 lines, which is the signature of one file having been copied from the other rather than of a helper waiting to be extracted. The two sit in different directories, so one cannot simply be deleted in favour of the other while both are reached separately: hoist the shared part into a location both already depend on and have each file call it, and retire whichever file turns out to have no caller of its own left. Extracting one helper per block leaves the fork in place. Each matched range is the entire body of the declaration above it, so the region is already a complete unit: move that whole declaration to the shared location and have each site call it, rather than lifting the lines out of their bodies. Any `return` inside it is the body's own exit and keeps its meaning in the moved unit.
Coverage not measured — no coverage collector is wired up — Coverage NOT MEASURED: `--collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` names a data collector that ships in the `coverlet.collector` package, and this repository wires up none — no test project references it and no runsettings declares one. The absence of coverage here is therefore not evidence about the suite or about our analyzer environment: without a collector, `--collect` produces nothing even from a suite that builds and passes. Add a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference to the test project(s) (or commit the Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov report your CI produces) and real coverage will be measured. It is excluded from the score rather than counted as a near-zero defect.
DM12 · Ambient inputs in the domain· Domain type reads the wall clock · ×1
Domain type reads the wall clock: SysMember Trace/Anno.Domain/Member/SysMember.cs:94— `SysMember` reads `DateTime.Now` inside `SetProfile`. The rule this feeds is not a function of its inputs: it cannot be tested at the instant that matters without moving the machine clock, and two reads inside one operation can observe different times. Pass the instant in as a parameter, or inject `TimeProvider`.
Outbound HTTP without resilience — The app makes outbound HTTP calls but no resilience handler was detected (Polly / AddStandardResilienceHandler / circuit-breaker). A slow or failing dependency will cascade — add timeouts, retries with back-off, and a circuit breaker.
Weak hash algorithm Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:31— MD5/SHA1 is constructed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ for content integrity, or a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, a file or mutex name), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as `System.IO.Hashing.XxHash64`/`Crc32` says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses.
SC1 · Supply-chain hygiene· NuGet dependencies are not locked · ×1
NuGet dependencies are not locked — No packages.lock.json and no central package management — restores aren't reproducible or pinned (SSDF PW.4.4). Enable <RestorePackagesWithLockFile>true</RestorePackagesWithLockFile> (commit the lockfile) or adopt Directory.Packages.props. Advisory — never scored.
Sync-over-async (deadlock risk) Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilJob.cs:46— Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process.
Swallowed exception (caught, then discarded) Anno.Common/StringHelper.cs:103— `catch` does nothing with the exception it caught — the body neither logs it, rethrows it, nor even names it, so the failure is discarded as completely as by an empty catch. Log it through whatever this codebase already uses to report problems, or let it propagate; if one specific failure genuinely cannot matter, catch exactly that exception type and say why in a comment on the catch.
X5 · Nullable reference types· Null guard scopes only part of the work it protects · ×1
Null guard scopes only part of the work it protects Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:438— This method contradicts itself about `taglimit`: line 415 tests it for null before doing anything with it — the author's own statement that null is an input this code expects — but that `if` scopes only the block beneath it, and line 438 then dereferences `taglimit` as `taglimit.channel` AFTER the block has closed, where the guard no longer applies. A null `taglimit` skips the guarded body and reaches that line anyway, throwing NullReferenceException on exactly the input the guard was written for. If the dereference belongs to the guarded work, move it inside the block; if `taglimit` truly cannot be null by then, the guard above is misleading and should go.
X5 · Nullable reference types· Symbol treated as nullable, then dereferenced unguarded · ×1
Symbol treated as nullable, then dereferenced unguarded Anno.Plugs.LogicService/PlatformModule.cs:256— This method contradicts itself about `sysMembe`: line 249 assigns it with `as sys_member`, which hands back null rather than throwing when the value is not a `sys_member`, but line 256 then dereferences it directly as `sysMembe.ID` with no null test between them and no guard around it. If the `as` is right, that dereference throws NullReferenceException on the input it was written for — and the NullReferenceException names neither the cast nor the type that failed. Settle it one way — test `sysMembe` once before the first use and handle the null case, or cast with `(sys_member)` so the failure is reported where it happens — rather than leaving the two readings side by side.
Commented-out code Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:25— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:26— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:27— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Common/HttpHelper.cs:42— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Common/HttpHelper.cs:70— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Plugs.DLockService/DLockBootstrap.cs:28— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Plugs.LogicService/LogicBootstrap.cs:17— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Plugs.LogicService/LogicBootstrap.cs:22— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Plugs.LogicService/PlatformModule.cs:253— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs:49— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs:247— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs:250— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs:251— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs:252— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs:269— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs:272— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs:273— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs:342— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs:346— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs:368— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs:383— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Trace/Anno.Command.Handler/Bootstrap.cs:13— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Trace/Anno.Command.Handler/Bootstrap.cs:18— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Trace/Anno.Command.Handler/ChangePwdHandler.cs:89— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Commented-out code Trace/Anno.Domain/Bootstrap.cs:12— A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers).
Orphaned file Trace/Anno.Domain/Context.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Anno.Plugs.LogicService/PlatformModule.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Anno.Plugs.LogicService/Platform/PlatformQuery.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file REDACTED:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Anno.Common/RSAHelper.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Anno.Common/StringHelper.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Anno.Plugs.TraceService/TraceModule.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Trace/Anno.Domain/Member/SysMember.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file REDACTED:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Anno.Common/RmbHelper.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Trace/Anno.Repository/MemoryCacheService.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Anno.CommandBus/Command.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Anno.Common/IdWorker.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Trace/Anno.Command.Handler/ChangePwdHandler.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Viper/Extensions/ViperConfig.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Viper/Hubs/TaskManager.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Trace/Anno.Repository/RoleRepository.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Trace/Anno.Repository/MemberRepository.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
Orphaned file Trace/Anno.Repository/Dtoer.cs:1— No one still active in this repository holds living knowledge of this file: everyone who made a meaningful change to it has gone quiet, or what the current team did to it (moves, reformatting, log-level or import edits, renames) never needed understanding it. If it breaks, no one currently understands it. Attach the read to the next change that touches it: have a second person review that change, and leave behind a short comment or test recording what the file is for.
+ 13 more in this group — see findings.md.
S1 · Web-Security Posture· No inbound model validation detected · ×5
No inbound model validation detected — No ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation signal — inbound payloads reach handlers unvalidated. (−2.0 on this card.)
No inbound model validation detected Samples/Mvc/MvcCallAnno/Controllers/ValuesController.cs:16— `ValuesController.SayHello` binds request input and nothing in this codebase validates it — no [ApiController]/ModelState check, validator or guard.
No inbound model validation detected Samples/Mvc/MvcCallAnno/Controllers/ValuesController.cs:21— `ValuesController.Subtraction` binds request input and nothing in this codebase validates it — no [ApiController]/ModelState check, validator or guard.
No inbound model validation detected Samples/Mvc/MvcCallAnno/Controllers/ValuesController.cs:25— `ValuesController.BuyProduct` binds request input and nothing in this codebase validates it — no [ApiController]/ModelState check, validator or guard.
No inbound model validation detected Viper/Controllers/ErrorController.cs:16— `ErrorController.Index` binds request input and nothing in this codebase validates it — no [ApiController]/ModelState check, validator or guard.
Duplicated predicate Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:58— `!typeOfThis.GetTypeInfo().IsAssignableFrom(typeOfOther) && !typeOfOther.GetTypeInfo().IsAssignableFrom(typeOfThis)` appears character-identically in 2 files — Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs, Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:20— `it.Host == service.Mi.Ip && it.Port == service.Mi.Port` appears character-identically in 2 files — Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RouterModule.cs, Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate Viper/wwwroot/html/company/index.js:62— `pagesize !== null && pagesize !== undefined` appears character-identically in 3 files — Viper/wwwroot/html/company/index.js, Viper/wwwroot/html/mlist/index.js, Viper/wwwroot/html/syslog/index.js. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:37— `obj == null || !(obj is Entity<TPrimaryKey>)` appears character-identically in 2 files — Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs, Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
Duplicated predicate Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:110— `targetProps != null && targetProps.Count > 0` appears character-identically in 4 files — Anno.CommandBus/Command.cs, Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/BaseDto.cs, Trace/Anno.Domain/BaseModel/Entity.cs, Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs. It is one line, so the duplication detector's token window never sees it; the copies drift when only one is corrected. Give the condition a name and one home.
misleading comment Viper/Extensions/Middleware/AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:373— "白名单不限流" — fix - the comment restates IsWhiteRateLimit(ip) which is a rate-limit check; it must match the code
misleading comment Samples/HelloWorldService/Program.cs:38— "Anno.Const.SettingService.TraceOnOff = true;" — fix - the comment is a magic-number annotation; remove it and link to where TraceOnOff is set
No security response headers detected — None of the 11 security response headers the OWASP Secure Headers Project recommends (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, …) is configured — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No security response headers detected Viper/Program.cs:24— This web host's pipeline is composed here and adds no security response header (Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Content-Type-Options, a frame policy) to what it serves.
No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected — No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
No app-layer HTTPS enforcement detected Viper/Program.cs:24— This web host's pipeline is composed here with no UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts, and nothing says a reverse proxy terminates TLS in front of it.
Fat interface: IPlatformQuery (17 members) Anno.Plugs.LogicService/Platform/IPlatformQuery.cs:9— `IPlatformQuery` declares 17 members: `GetAllUser`, `GetAllCompany`, `GetUserInfo`, `Login`, `LogOut`, `ReSetpwd`, `OnLine`, `Get_all_power`, `GetFunc`, `GetUsrFc`, `EditFunc`, `Get_rfs`, `GetcurRoles`, `SaveSurRoles`, `AddRoles`, `UpdateRoles_link`, `Identity`. Counted as the author wrote them — a property is ONE member and its get/set accessors are not counted separately, and an event counts once. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces.
No ADRs found — No ADRs found. No recognised ADR directory (`docs/adr/`, `docs/decisions/`, `adr/`, `docs/rfcs/`, an `ADR0001/` folder, or their siblings) exists anywhere in this tree. What was searched, so you can tell an empty log from a search that missed one: every directory under the tree (build output, dependencies and VCS metadata excepted), for a document that is either any non-index page inside a recognised ADR directory, whatever its name and however deeply nested (`docs/adr/use-postgres.md`, `docs/adr/2024/0001-x.md`); or a file anywhere whose name is ADR-shaped (`0001-use-postgres.md`, `adr-012-caching.md`); or, when neither turned anything up, a document carrying the decision-record signature (an "Architecture Decision Record" heading, or Status / Context / Decision / Consequences as section headings). A decision log that clears none of these — unnumbered files outside any recognised directory, without those headings — is not seen by this check and this row is then wrong. If that is your case, say so rather than renaming anything; otherwise, consider recording architectural decisions in `docs/adr/`.
D21 · Naming Consistency· Inconsistent spelling of 'Cache' in method names within the same class. One method uses the correct spelling 'GetCacheValue', while the other uses the typo 'SetChacheValue'. · ×1
Inconsistent spelling of 'Cache' in method names within the same class. One method uses the correct spelling 'GetCacheValue', while the other uses the typo 'SetChacheValue'. — Rename 'SetChacheValue' to 'SetCacheValue' to match the spelling in 'GetCacheValue' and standard English. (symbols: Anno.Repository.MemoryCacheGlobalService.GetCacheValue(string), Anno.Repository.MemoryCacheGlobalService.SetChacheValue(string, object, System.TimeSpan))
D21 · Naming Consistency· Inconsistent spelling of 'Connection' in field name. The field 'Coonstr' appears to be a typo for 'ConnStr' or 'ConnectionString', especially given the context of a Redis helper class where connection strings are standard. While 'Coonstr' is a field and 'Serialize' is a method, the field name itself is an internal inconsistency in vocabulary/spelling within the helper. · ×1
Inconsistent spelling of 'Connection' in field name. The field 'Coonstr' appears to be a typo for 'ConnStr' or 'ConnectionString', especially given the context of a Redis helper class where connection strings are standard. While 'Coonstr' is a field and 'Serialize' is a method, the field name itself is an internal inconsistency in vocabulary/spelling within the helper. — Rename 'Coonstr' to 'ConnStr' or 'ConnectionString'. (symbols: Anno.Redis.RedisHelper.Coonstr, Anno.Redis.RedisHelper.Serialize(object))
D21 · Naming Consistency· Inconsistent casing for the same conceptual property 'state' across different models. The model `SysMember` uses PascalCase `State`, while the model `sys_member` uses camelCase `state`. While these are different types, they represent the same entity concept (Member) and the same attribute (state/status), suggesting a lack of consistent naming convention between the Domain model and the Data/Model layer. · ×1
Inconsistent casing for the same conceptual property 'state' across different models. The model `SysMember` uses PascalCase `State`, while the model `sys_member` uses camelCase `state`. While these are different types, they represent the same entity concept (Member) and the same attribute (state/status), suggesting a lack of consistent naming convention between the Domain model and the Data/Model layer. — Standardize on PascalCase for properties in both models (e.g., `State`) or camelCase if that is the strict convention for the entire codebase, but currently they are mixed. (symbols: Anno.Model.sys_member.state, Anno.Domain.Member.SysMember.State)
Dormant codebase — 38 of 38 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 38 separate risks. Counted over 38 of the 126 production source files in this repository: the rest are under the ~2,400-byte size floor this dimension measures over. Re-engage owners or document before change.
No tests found — No test suite could be collected — no discoverable tests to count. If this repository does test, wiring the suite to a framework a runner can collect (xUnit, NUnit or MSTest) is what makes it countable here; a pipeline step that invokes a runner is not evidence on its own, because a runner over an empty suite passes. Tests written as plain executables or shell/PowerShell harnesses are not collectible this way and are not scored here.
No ADRs — No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no numbered `NNNN-title` documents in any markup this check reads, and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
M2 · Architecture documentation· No architecture diagram/doc · ×1
No architecture diagram/doc — No C4/Structurizr/PlantUML/Mermaid/Graphviz/D2 diagram, no drawn diagram named for the architecture, no file named `architecture` or `design` in any markup this check reads, and nothing in the README, docs or contributor guides that announces the shape — no `## Architecture` heading, no "architecture overview"/"high-level design" phrasing, no "the architecture is …" introduction, no guided code tour. A shape laid out in prose that never names itself as the architecture is not visible to this check, and neither is one kept outside the repository, so this row reports the absence of a re-findable shape document — not evidence that nobody wrote the shape down.
No src/ separation — Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
No SAST — No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack, or a .NET security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build. What was searched, so you can tell an absence from a miss: the 0 CI workflow file(s) in this repository, and the scanner and linter configuration checked in beside them. A scan that runs outside CI, one configured in your forge's web UI rather than in a committed file, or a tool whose name is none of those this check carries, is not seen — if that is your case the row is wrong, and saying so is more useful than adding a second scanner.
No changelog — No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
PF1 · Benchmark discipline· No performance benchmarks · ×1
No performance benchmarks — No benchmark suite was found by the two searches this check runs. FIRST, a BenchmarkDotNet package reference in any project file — every project the workspace loaded, plus a walk of project files on disk that never loaded, because a benchmark suite is exactly the project a partial load drops. SECOND, a script harness: a file whose name contains `benchmark` and ends `.py`, `.sh`, `.ps1`, `.bash`, `.rb`, `.js` or `.mjs`, credited ONLY when this repository's CI text also mentions benchmarks — a harness no pipeline runs is read as a fixture, deliberately. Neither search can see a benchmark suite in another ecosystem's idiom (a Go `testing.B` file, a JMH or criterion project, a pytest-benchmark run), so this is 'no benchmark found by those two searches', not a verdict that the repository has none. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
PF2 · Allocation hygiene· No allocation-aware APIs detected · ×1
No allocation-aware APIs detected — No Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask or buffer-writer usage was found. If this code sits on a hot path, these reduce the GC pressure it creates — a bonus, not a requirement.
X2 · Cancellation propagation· Not all async methods take a CancellationToken · ×1
Not all async methods take a CancellationToken — Only 0/13 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
Nullable reference types not enabled everywhere — 0/4 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
Off the main sequence: Anno.Common Anno.Common/Anno.Common.csproj:1— Anno.Common: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — the shape a shared-kernel / building-block library has BY DESIGN — concrete and widely depended-on is what makes it useful, and this dimension does not penalise it (the distance is reported for completeness, not as a defect). Worth a look only if it has grown past one coherent kernel into an everything-bucket.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
nuget: not applicable — nuget: the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan
trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Docker Compose, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation, ARM, Bicep, Ansible); nothing to scan.
semgrep: not applicable — No personal data was found crossing a boundary the PII/GDPR ruleset checks — nothing written to a log or console sink, placed in a URL or query string, or persisted to browser storage. That is a clean result for the LEAK surface only: this ruleset detects personal data escaping, it does not inventory the personal data a repository holds, so it is not evidence that this repository has no personal-data surface. The personal-data map (Appendix C) and the C1-C5 compliance cards are what speak to that. semgrep could not parse 1 file(s) — `Trace/Anno.Command/EnableUserCommand.cs` — so the PII/GDPR sweep did not cover the unparsed regions of them; rows reported elsewhere in those files are real.
provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .circleci, .buildkite, .woodpecker, .teamcity, .gitlab-ci.yml, .travis.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .drone.yml, .cirrus.yml, .woodpecker.yml, appveyor.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, .azuredevops/, Jenkinsfile); there is no build to attest provenance for.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
Run 01a1611f-341c-7b6c-aa98-7fa448507061 · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 2 field(s) across 1 category, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by NAME, from the C# syntax tree, with a deliberately specific identifier classifier — the same one the C1–C5 compliance cards use to decide whether personal data is present, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip. Two caveats stated rather than glossed: those cards additionally require corroboration (a persistence/account signal, or two distinct PII categories) that this inventory deliberately does not, so it lists more than they gate on; and D32 Data Compliance shares nothing with it — that dimension is a separate semgrep ruleset for personal data leaking into logs, URLs and browser storage, and a clean D32 result says nothing about this list. Informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 64 · Warnings: 403 · Recommendations: 110 · Info: 23 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 22-10-2026 @ 00:59 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.