Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
duyanming/Viper carries serious risk (31%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Event-Driven (100%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Architecture (93%) is solid too.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (24%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Accessibility (25%) is the next concern — it raises ongoing delivery and operational cost.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution (Test Distribution); CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); Run what this repository's stack ships (Security & performance tooling).
For scale: Small (~10,283 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.1 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (100%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
Code Health
51%
Adequate · gated by X5
Architecture
93% ★
Exemplary
Maturity
55%
Adequate · gated by M2
Readiness
24% ⚠
Critical · gated by D9, P1, P3
Security
30%
Weak · gated by C1, C2, S1
Event-Driven
100% ★
Exemplary
Accessibility
25%
Weak · gated by AC1, AC3, AC4
Performance
54%
Adequate
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headline
Width is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
Readiness 24% · 45% weightAccessibility 25% · 25% weightSecurity 30% · 14% weightCode Health 51% · 8% weightPerformance 54% · 4% weightMaturity 55% · 2% weightArchitecture 93% · 1% weightEvent-Driven 100% · 1% weight
Raise Readiness 24 → 70 (the Healthy floor) ⇒ headline 31 → ~36.
Code composition — where the lines go
Business logic 29%Plumbing 69%Tests 2%
New since the last scan (4+)
Rebuild cost & value ~ Modeled — €7,200–€36,000
| Cost to rebuild | €7,200–€36,000 |
| Domain complexity | Very high |
| Quality factor | 0.7× (at 31% quality) |
| Size & shape | Small · 51% boilerplate · 20% straight-line · 29% branching logic |
This codebase represents roughly ~0.1 person-years of build effort (about ~€22,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 24% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
Top priorities
1
Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution.
2
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
3
Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Diagnosis — what's actually going on
Value concentrated against a weak lens
This is a Small asset (~0.1 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 24%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
Highest-leverage move
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. The rest can wait behind it.
Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph
Architecture — module dependency matrix
At a glance — Code Health
The Good
At a glance — Architecture
The Good
D5 · .NET / C#
Coupling
7.8
D6 · .NET / C#
Cohesion (LCOM4)
8.5
D26 · .NET / C#
Project Cohesion
10.0
D27 · .NET / C#
Navigability
7.9
D35 · .NET / C#
Change Coupling
10.0
AX1 · Repo
Captive dependencies
10.0
AX10 · Repo
Code composition
8.7
AX2 · Repo
Stateful singletons
10.0
AX3 · Repo
Project dependency cycles
10.0
AX4 · Repo
Dependency direction
10.0
AX5 · Repo
Architecture & structure
10.0
AX6 · Repo
Interface segregation
9.8
At a glance — Maturity
The Good
At a glance — Readiness
The Good
The Ugly
At a glance — Security
The Ugly
At a glance — Event-Driven
The Good
At a glance — Accessibility
The Ugly
At a glance — Performance
Security & Compliance — OWASP Top-10 mapping
| OWASP category | Findings | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| A03:2021 — Injection | 2 | Medium |
Roadmap
Begin by addressing the single missing test in the distribution layer to ensure code coverage. Next, establish a continuous integration pipeline that builds the code and runs the full test suite on every push or pull request. Integrate a security scanner, such as Semgrep or CodeQL, into this workflow to fail the build on security regressions. Finally, improve observability by adding structured logging and diagnostics seams, and maintain a changelog to track each release.
| Do this | Helps | Effort | Dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. | +5.9 pts | Low | Test Distribution |
| Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. | +5.9 pts | Medium | CI/CD gates |
| Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing. | +5.9 pts | Medium | Security & performance tooling |
| Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf. | +5.6 pts | Medium | Observability |
| Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release. | +5.4 pts | Medium | Release Hygiene |
| Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video. | +5.3 pts | Medium | Text alternatives |
| Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href. | +5.3 pts | Medium | Keyboard semantics |
| Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh. | +5.2 pts | Medium | Page structure |
File quality
| File | Score | Band | Worst signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs | 5.4 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: EmptyCatchBlock |
| Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs | 6.9 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode |
| Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs | 7.2 | Mixed | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) |
| Trace/Anno.Domain/Service/MemberService.cs | 7.3 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode |
| Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs | 7.6 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: EmptyCatchBlock |
| Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RouterModule.cs | 7.6 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: EmptyCatchBlock |
| Viper/Hubs/TaskManager.cs | 7.6 | Mixed | Explicit Debt: EmptyCatchBlock |
| Viper/Controllers/ErrorController.cs | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization |
| Viper/Controllers/HomeController.cs | 7.9 | Mixed | Static Analysis (SAST): Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization |
| Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode |
| Viper.Test/Program.cs | 8.2 | Near-clean | Explicit Debt: CommentedOutCode |
| ViperService/Program.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (35 lines × 2) |
| Anno.Plugs.TraceService/TraceModule.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Code Duplication: Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) |
| Anno.Plugs.LogicService/PlatformModule.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cohesion (LCOM4): Low cohesion: PlatformModule (LCOM4 16) |
| Trace/Anno.Domain/Member/SysMember.cs | 8.5 | Near-clean | Cohesion (LCOM4): Low cohesion: SysMember (LCOM4 4) |
Methodology & how to trust this report
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 56 of 58 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 2 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.5 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
What we checked — 58 dimensions across the health lenses
D4D5D6D9D12D13D14D15D17D18D19D20D21D26D27D28D29D34D35AC1AC2AC3AC4AC6AC7AX1AX10AX2AX3AX4AX5AX6C1C2ED1ED2ED4ED5GD1IC1M1M2M3M4P1P10P2P3P6PF1PF2PF3S1X1X2X3X4X5
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
- Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 47 of 68 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line.
- Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
- Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
Tools & methods
| Method | Backs | Version | Evaluator |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roslyn static analysis | Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering | 5.3.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| Native secret scanner | Hardcoded secrets / credentials | 1.0.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| jscpd | Code duplication | — | ✓ deterministic |
| Coverage (coverlet / dotnet-coverage) | Line & branch coverage | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| NuGet / dotnet | Outdated, vulnerable & deprecated dependencies | 10.0.302 | ✓ deterministic |
| git / LibGit2Sharp | Churn hotspots, knowledge concentration, history | 2.43.0 · 0.31.0 | ✓ deterministic |
| gitleaks · semgrep · trivy · checkov | Secrets in history, SAST, CVEs, IaC & container, PII / GDPR | 1.86.0 · 0.69.3 | ✓ deterministic |
| LLM (sampled · advisory) | Documentation quality, ADR conformance, naming — sampled over a bounded sample; advisory, never a deterministic measurement | Local LLM | ◐ LLM · sampled · advisory |
Run transparency — what happened this run
- D24 Comment Value — LLM provider failed — The model provider returned an unusable result, so this LLM-assisted dimension fell back to a measurement gap (confidence 0) rather than a penalty. Re-run with a reachable provider to score it.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
- D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
- D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
- D6 Cohesion (LCOM4): LCOM4 cohesion is syntactic — it infers connectivity from which methods touch which fields/methods by name, not from real runtime behaviour or intent.
- D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
- D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
- D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
- D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
- D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
- D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
- D18 Solution Shape: Build integrity reflects whether the solution compiled in this environment — a build that needs a private feed, a specific SDK, or a generated file absent from the repo can read as broken when it is merely unreproducible here.
- D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
- D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
- D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
- D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
- D27 Navigability: Indirection/navigability is structural — it measures hops to follow a call, not whether that indirection buys real flexibility or just ceremony.
- D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
- D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
- D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
- D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
- AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
- AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
- AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
- AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
- AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
- AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
- AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
- ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
- M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
- P6 Release Hygiene: Rollback/observability controls are inferred from repo artefacts (pipelines, dashboards-as-code) — controls configured in external tooling, with no in-repo trace, cannot be credited.
The LLM boundary
Dimensions
D4 · Code Duplication
8 duplicated block group(s) detected.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:128
Duplicated block (35 lines × 2)ViperService/Program.cs:20
Duplicated block (21 lines × 2)Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:37
Duplicated block (17 lines × 2)Anno.Plugs.TraceService/TraceModule.cs:40
Duplicated block (15 lines × 2)Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:19
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D5 · Coupling
26 projects, 0 dependency cycle(s), 0 unstable depended-on project(s).
Off the main sequence: Anno.Plugs.ViperService
What to do
- Resolve the 8 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (8 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
2 of 16 classes have LCOM4 above 3.
Low cohesion: PlatformModule (LCOM4 16) Anno.Plugs.LogicService/PlatformModule.cs:20
What to do
- Resolve the 2 Low cohesion finding(s) in Cohesion (LCOM4) — start with PlatformModule.cs, SysMember.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
- Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Cohesion (LCOM4) in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
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D9 · Test Distribution
No test suite found.
No tests found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No tests found finding(s) in Test Distribution. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D12 · Dependency Hygiene
0 outdated, 0 vulnerable, 0 deprecated packages.
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D13 · Secret Scanning
Secret scan ran and found no leaked secrets.
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D14 · License Compliance
0 of 18 packages use a banned license.
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D15 · Churn × Complexity Hotspots
No churn × complexity hotspots in the window.
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D17 · Explicit Debt
11 deducted debt markers + 0 dead symbols across 10283 LoC (0.5/KLoC) → score 9.1.
EmptyCatchBlock Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:248
CommentedOutCode Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:23
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D18 · Solution Shape
26 projects, 152 source files, 10515 hand-written lines of code (10283 production / 232 test), 54 inter-project edges (build failed).
Thin analysable surface across projects
Build did not complete in the analyzer
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D19 · Documentation Quality
Viper 的 README is a single-file documentation that describes the project as an Anno-based dashboard with features like service discovery, tracing, and a live demo at anno.liqingxi.cn. It links to the Thrift parent repo for Java implementations and shows how to run Viper locally (MySQL database setup, starting the ViperCenter registration center). The document is visually rich with screenshots of the Dashboard UI plus an outline of the full architecture covering topics like Anno EventBus, Server configuration, event data, handler configuration, middleware (cache/limiting), and InMemory bus. However it is clipped mid-sentence inside a code block ('进入项目文件夹'), so the detailed architecture sections (e.g. region RabbitMQEventBus; region InMemory EventBus) and the online demo's login credentials are not visible, leaving some structure unverifiable.
XML-doc coverage: Viper.GateWay Viper/Viper.GateWay.csproj
What to do
- Improve Documentation Quality — currently 6.0/10. — Viper 的 README is a single-file documentation that describes the project as an Anno-based dashboard with features like service discovery, tracing, and a live demo at anno.liqingxi.cn. It links to the Thrift parent repo for Java implementations and shows how to run Viper locally (MySQL database setup, starting the ViperCenter registration center). The document is visually rich with screenshots of the Dashboard UI plus an outline of the full architecture covering topics like Anno EventBus, Server configuration, event data, handler configuration, middleware (cache/limiting), and InMemory bus. However it is clipped mid-sentence inside a code block ('进入项目文件夹'), so the detailed architecture sections (e.g. region RabbitMQEventBus; region InMemory EventBus) and the online demo's login credentials are not visible, leaving some structure unverifiable.
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D20 · ADR Quality
No architecture decision records were found.
No ADRs found
What to do
- Resolve the 1 No ADRs found finding(s) in ADR Quality. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D21 · Naming Consistency
3 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
Inconsistent naming for the 'Member' entity and its related tables/DTOs. Some use 'SysMember' or 'sys_member' (e.g., `Anno.Domain.Member.SysMember`), while others use the raw table name 'sys_member' (e.g., `Anno.Model.sys_member`). Similarly, 'Role' is sometimes 'SysRole' or 'sys_roles'. The model layer mixes POCO names with database table names.
Inconsistent naming for bash command wrappers. Some are named after the command itself (e.g., `Mv`, `Cat`, `Grep`), while others use a generic `Command` or `Output`. This makes it hard to distinguish between specific command wrappers and generic utilities.
Inconsistent naming for Member and Role entities. The domain uses 'SysMember' and 'Role', while the model layer uses 'sys_member' and 'sys_roles'. This creates a disconnect between the domain model and the data model/DTOs.
What to do
- Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for the 'Member' entity and its related tables/DTOs.… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for bash command wrappers. Some are named after the… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
- Resolve the 1 Inconsistent naming for Member and Role entities. The domain uses… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
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D26 · Project Cohesion
0 of 25 projects flagged as possibly oversized/incoherent.
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D27 · Navigability
91 % of calls cross a namespace and 14 % go through an interface, but 92 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
What to do
- Improve Navigability — currently 7.9/10. — 91 % of calls cross a namespace and 14 % go through an interface, but 92 % of collaborators are co-located — so a call's collaborators sit together and tracing stays easy. Baseline: medium — clean/modular boundaries expected.
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D28 · Secrets (history)
gitleaks scanned the full history AND the current working tree and found no secrets.
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D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 0 low.
Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization Viper/Controllers/ErrorController.cs:11
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D34 · Knowledge Freshness
Every significant source file has living knowledge — recently and meaningfully worked.
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D35 · Change Coupling
No strong hidden change-coupling between production files.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
AC1 · Text alternatives
- An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×2) — 404.cshtml:9, 500.cshtml:9
What to do
- Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
Do you agree with this assessment?
AC2 · Forms & labels
- This control has only a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes on input and many AT ignore it). Add a <label for>, a wrapping <label>, or aria-label. (×2) — Login.cshtml:61, Login.cshtml:65
- This control has no associated label. Add a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label / aria-labelledby so assistive tech can name it. — Login.cshtml:72
What to do
- Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
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AC3 · Page structure
- Skipping heading levels breaks the document outline assistive tech relies on. Don't jump levels — increase by at most one. (×2) — 404.cshtml:11, 500.cshtml:11
- The page declares no language, so assistive tech can't pick the right pronunciation. Add lang (e.g. lang="en"). (×12) — _Layout.cshtml:3, index.html:2, component.html:2, …
- No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. (×11) — _Layout.cshtml:3, index.html:2, component.html:2, …
What to do
- Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
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AC4 · Keyboard semantics
- An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×16) — anno-24uservisitdistribute-analyse.vue:8, anno-24uservisitdistribute-analyse.vue:15, anno-24uservisitdistribute-analyse.vue:22, …
What to do
- Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
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AC6 · Visual & motion safety
- `.el-date-table td.disabled div` sets color: #C0C4CC on background-color: #F5F7FA — 1.6:1, below the 4.5:1 WCAG AA minimum for normal text. Darken or lighten one of them. — element-ui-index.css:3409
What to do
- Keep a visible focus style (don't remove the outline without a replacement), guard animation with prefers-reduced-motion, and raise low-contrast colour pairs to at least 4.5:1.
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AC7 · A11y enforcement
- No accessibility enforcement found — no automated accessibility check runs over the HTML your app renders. Assert the accessibility invariants over that HTML in the test suite you already have (parse the output and assert, or drive a browser), and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
What to do
- Enforce accessibility in the test suite you already have: assert the accessibility invariants over the HTML your app renders — parse the rendered output in an existing test, or drive a real browser from one — and gate that test in CI so a regression blocks the merge.
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AX1 · Captive dependencies
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AX10 · Code composition
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AX2 · Stateful singletons
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AX3 · Project dependency cycles
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AX4 · Dependency direction
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AX5 · Architecture & structure
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AX6 · Interface segregation
- `IPlatformQuery` declares 17 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IPlatformQuery.cs:9
What to do
- Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
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C1 · Data Protection
What to do
- Strengthen data-at-rest protection: vault your keys (Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS / IDataProtector key ring) and encrypt the most sensitive columns (EF HasConversion encryption or provider-native column encryption) — partial coverage still leaves gaps.
- Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.
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C2 · Access Controls
- No [Authorize]/policies and no imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) were found — endpoints may be unprotected.
What to do
- Protect endpoints by default-deny: [Authorize] + role/policy authorization, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from every handler.
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ED1 · Handler temporal coupling
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ED2 · Event/command shape
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ED4 · Outbox / dual-write
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ED5 · Idempotency
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GD1 · Unfinished & placeholder code
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IC1 · Incompleteness & stubs
- A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×30) — CryptoHelper.cs:25, CryptoHelper.cs:26, CryptoHelper.cs:27, …
What to do
- Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
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M1 · Documentation (README)
What to do
- Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
- Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
- Add a README to the 25 of 25 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
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M2 · Architecture documentation
- No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
- No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
- Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
- Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
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M3 · Folder & project structure
- Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — it's spread across several top-level directories, so there's no one place that says 'this is the product'.
What to do
- Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
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M4 · Documentation accuracy
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P1 · CI/CD gates
- No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
- Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P10 · Library API & versioning
- 170/181 types (94%) are public. For a library, every public type is a stability contract — make internal-by-default and expose only the intended API.
What to do
- Make types internal by default; expose only the deliberate public API so internals can change without breaking consumers.
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P2 · Observability
- Only 1/17 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 17, 4 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
What to do
- Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
- Consider OpenTelemetry tracing/metrics and a health-check endpoint for operability.
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P3 · Security & performance tooling
- No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package (or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language) — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.
What to do
- Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's csharp pack (it analyses VB.NET too), or a security analyzer package — or `semgrep --config=auto`, which runs on any language — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
- Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
- Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
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P6 · Release Hygiene
- No CHANGELOG/HISTORY/RELEASES file — what shipped when isn't easy to reconstruct for support or audit. (Versioning/tagging makes releases traceable, but a changelog records the what.)
What to do
- Keep a changelog (e.g. Keep-a-Changelog) recording what shipped in each release.
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PF1 · Benchmark discipline
- No benchmark suite was found. Where code is performance-sensitive, a benchmark guards against silent regressions — but it's a bonus here, not a deduction.
What to do
- Add a benchmarking harness for the hot paths and run it in CI to catch regressions (for .NET, a BenchmarkDotNet project with [MemoryDiagnoser] to track allocations).
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PF2 · Allocation hygiene
- No Span/Memory, pooling (ArrayPool/ObjectPool), stackalloc, ValueTask or buffer-writer usage was found. If this library sits on a hot path, these reduce the GC pressure it puts on its host — a bonus, not a requirement.
What to do
- On hot paths, prefer Span<T>/ReadOnlySpan<T>, ArrayPool<T>, stackalloc and ValueTask to cut allocations a consumer would otherwise inherit.
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PF3 · Async & latency hygiene
- 1 blocking call(s) on async work (.Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult()) — these waste a thread and can deadlock in a consumer with a synchronization context.
- Only 0/23 awaits use ConfigureAwait(false). A library that captures the caller's context can stall or deadlock its host — the classic way a dependency drags an app down.
What to do
- Make the call chain async end-to-end and await it — never block on a Task with .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() in library code.
- In library code, append .ConfigureAwait(false) to every await (or set <ConfigureAwait>false</ConfigureAwait> / use the analyzer CA2007) so the library never captures the host's context.
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S1 · Web-Security Posture
- MD5/SHA1 is constructed here, and both are collision-broken. If this digest protects anything — a signature, an integrity or tamper check, a credential, or any value an attacker can influence — that is a real weakness: use SHA-256+ for content integrity, or a KDF (PBKDF2/Argon2/BCrypt) for password storage. If it only derives a non-security identifier (a cache key, a file or mutex name), collision resistance carries no security consequence here; make that intent explicit instead — a non-cryptographic hash such as `System.IO.Hashing.XxHash64`/`Crc32` says it in code — since the algorithm alone cannot distinguish the two uses. — CryptoHelper.cs:31
- DES / 3DES / RijndaelManaged-bare is deprecated or broken. Use AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()` with explicit key/iv sizes. — CryptoHelper.cs:56
- No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
- No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
- No ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation signal — inbound payloads reach handlers unvalidated. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
- Review each MD5/SHA1 use by what it protects: replace it with SHA-256+ (or a KDF for passwords) where the digest is security-relevant, and switch it to a non-cryptographic hash (`System.IO.Hashing.XxHash64`/`Crc32`) where it only derives an identifier such as a cache key or a mutex name.
- Replace DES/3DES (and bare RijndaelManaged) with AES-GCM via `Aes.Create()`.
- Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
- Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
- Validate inbound models (ModelState/[ApiController]/FluentValidation) to reduce injection and bad-data risk.
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X1 · Async correctness
- Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. — UtilJob.cs:46
What to do
- Sync-over-async (deadlock risk)
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X2 · Cancellation propagation
- Only 0/12 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
- No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×12) — AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:86, AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:107, AnnoWebHostBuilderExtensions.cs:129, …
What to do
- Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
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X3 · Exception handling
- An empty catch block silently discards the error — failures vanish with no log and no rethrow. Log it, handle it, or don't catch it. (×4) — UtilService.cs:37, TaskManager.cs:79, RouterModule.cs:85, …
- `throw ex;` resets the exception's stack trace to this line, hiding where it really came from. Use a bare `throw;` to preserve the original stack. (×2) — CryptoHelper.cs:72, CryptoHelper.cs:110
What to do
- Swallowed exception (empty catch)
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X4 · Structured logging
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X5 · Nullable reference types
- 0/4 NRT-eligible project(s) enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> (projects targeting a pre-C#-8 framework are excluded — NRTs aren't available there). NRTs catch a whole class of null-deref bugs at compile time.
What to do
- Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
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WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
| Dimension | WCAG 2.2 A/AA criteria | Coverage |
|---|---|---|
| AC1 · Text alternatives | 1.1.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.5 | Partial signal |
| AC2 · Forms & labels | 1.3.1, 3.3.2, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC3 · Page structure | 1.4.4, 2.2.1, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 3.1.1, 4.1.2 | Partial signal |
| AC4 · Keyboard semantics | 2.1.1, 2.4.3 | Partial signal |
| AC6 · Visual & motion safety | 1.4.3, 2.4.7 | Partial — literal CSS only |
| AC7 · A11y enforcement | enforcement — no page criterion | Enforcement posture (process) |
Reference — by lens
| Lens | Score | Rating | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Health | 51% | Adequate — gated by X5 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Architecture | 93% | Exemplary | Solid. |
| Maturity | 55% | Adequate — gated by M2 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Readiness | 24% | Critical — gated by D9, P1, P3 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Security | 30% | Weak — gated by C1, C2, S1 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Event-Driven | 100% | Exemplary | Strongest area. |
| Accessibility | 25% | Weak — gated by AC1, AC3, AC4 | Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens. |
| Performance | 54% | Adequate | Acceptable, with room to improve. |
Not included — 42 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
- AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
- AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
- AX8 Test isolation — no test/production split to check
- AX9 CQS / query purity — no CQRS query handlers detected — query purity is not applicable to this codebase
- C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
- C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
- C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
- D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.js, .vue) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D10 Test Quality — ~232 lines of test code exist on disk but weren't loaded from the analyzed solution (excluded from the .sln, or co-located/using a test attribute not loaded here), so test quality couldn't be assessed. Include the tests in the analyzed solution to enable this check.
- D11 Test Reliability — Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results
- D16 Bus Factor — dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
- D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.js, .vue) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
- D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
- D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
- D24 Comment Value — LLM evaluation failed
- D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
- D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.js, .vue) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
- D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution
- D31 IaC & Container Security — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan.
- D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction.
- D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan.
- D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
- D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
- D38 OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain.
- D39 IL Efficiency — The target did not build, so no IL was available to measure.
- D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
- D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
- D8 Code Coverage — Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
- DM1 Domain Modelling — applicable but not scored (2 of 3 signals for this style — below the bar we score at): 7 aggregate root(s) (AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot); a Domain/Aggregates/ValueObjects layer
- ED3 Event naming — no domain or integration events detected — event-naming check not applicable
- ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
- P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
- P4 Deployment & Rollback — not evidenced — no deploy/rollback/approval signal in the repo; absence of evidence is not evidence of a manual release
- P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
- P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
- P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
- P9 Domain vs controller coverage — no coverage report found on disk — produce a coverage report in a standard format (Cobertura — `dotnet test --collect:"XPlat Code Coverage"` with a `coverlet.collector` PackageReference) into the repo working tree before the scan — a CI step is the usual place, since the artefact is commonly gitignored, or wire coverage collection into CI, to enable this cross-layer check
- SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
- X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
- X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
Issue — 4 finding(s)
D17 · Explicit Debt
- EmptyCatchBlock Anno.Common/AnnoMapper.cs:248
- EmptyCatchBlock Anno.Plugs.TraceService/RouterModule.cs:85
- EmptyCatchBlock Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:37
- EmptyCatchBlock Viper/Hubs/TaskManager.cs:79
Warning — 31 finding(s)
D5 · Coupling
- Off the main sequence: Anno.Plugs.ViperService
- Off the main sequence: Anno.Infrastructure
- Off the main sequence: Anno.Common
- Off the main sequence: Anno.Domain.Dto
- Off the main sequence: Anno.Redis
- Off the main sequence: Anno.Plugs.MonitorService(netstandard2.0)
- Off the main sequence: Anno.Plugs.DLockService
- Off the main sequence: Anno.Command
D17 · Explicit Debt
- CommentedOutCode Anno.Common/CryptoHelper.cs:23
- CommentedOutCode Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs:269
- CommentedOutCode Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs:247
- CommentedOutCode Trace/Anno.Domain/Service/MemberService.cs:23
- CommentedOutCode Anno.Redis/RedisHelper.cs:340
- CommentedOutCode Trace/Anno.Domain/Service/MemberService.cs:38
- CommentedOutCode Viper.Test/Program.cs:10
D29 · Static Analysis (SAST)
- Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization Viper/Controllers/ErrorController.cs:11
- Medium: missing-or-broken-authorization Viper/Controllers/HomeController.cs:9
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:128
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) Viper/Extensions/Utils/UtilService.cs:150
D6 · Cohesion (LCOM4)
- Low cohesion: PlatformModule (LCOM4 16) Anno.Plugs.LogicService/PlatformModule.cs:20
- Low cohesion: SysMember (LCOM4 4) Trace/Anno.Domain/Member/SysMember.cs:9
D11 · Test Reliability
- Test reliability not measured — no test run produced results
D16 · Bus Factor
- dormant codebase — no living knowledge left to concentrate
D24 · Comment Value
- LLM evaluation failed
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (35 lines × 2) ViperService/Program.cs:20
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:37
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (17 lines × 2) Anno.Plugs.TraceService/TraceModule.cs:40
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (15 lines × 2) Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:19
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (12 lines × 3) Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:174
D4 · Code Duplication
- Duplicated block (8 lines × 3) Trace/Anno.Model/BaseModel/Entity.cs:102
D8 · Code Coverage
- Coverage not measured — test suite did not build
Recommendation — 7 finding(s)
D18 · Solution Shape
- Thin analysable surface across projects
D20 · ADR Quality
- No ADRs found
D21 · Naming Consistency
- Inconsistent naming for the 'Member' entity and its related tables/DTOs. Some use 'SysMember' or 'sys_member' (e.g., `Anno.Domain.Member.SysMember`), while others use the raw table name 'sys_member' (e.g., `Anno.Model.sys_member`). Similarly, 'Role' is sometimes 'SysRole' or 'sys_roles'. The model layer mixes POCO names with database table names.
D21 · Naming Consistency
- Inconsistent naming for bash command wrappers. Some are named after the command itself (e.g., `Mv`, `Cat`, `Grep`), while others use a generic `Command` or `Output`. This makes it hard to distinguish between specific command wrappers and generic utilities.
D21 · Naming Consistency
- Inconsistent naming for Member and Role entities. The domain uses 'SysMember' and 'Role', while the model layer uses 'sys_member' and 'sys_roles'. This creates a disconnect between the domain model and the data model/DTOs.
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling
- Bounded contexts not declared
D9 · Test Distribution
- No tests found
Info — 26 finding(s)
D19 · Documentation Quality
- XML-doc coverage: Viper.GateWay Viper/Viper.GateWay.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: ViperCenter ViperCenter/ViperCenter.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: ViperService ViperService/ViperService.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.Plugs.ViperService Anno.Plugs.ViperService/Anno.Plugs.ViperService.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.Plugs.TraceService Anno.Plugs.TraceService/Anno.Plugs.TraceService.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.Infrastructure Anno.Infrastructure/Anno.Infrastructure.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.Common Anno.Common/Anno.Common.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.Plugs.LogicService Anno.Plugs.LogicService/Anno.Plugs.LogicService.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.Model Trace/Anno.Model/Anno.Model.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.Domain.Dto Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/Anno.Domain.Dto.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.Repository Trace/Anno.Repository/Anno.Repository.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.Domain Trace/Anno.Domain/Anno.Domain.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.Command.Handler Trace/Anno.Command.Handler/Anno.Command.Handler.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.Command Trace/Anno.Command/Anno.Command.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.CommandBus Anno.CommandBus/Anno.CommandBus.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.Redis Anno.Redis/Anno.Redis.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.Plugs.MonitorService(netstandard2.0) Anno.Plugs.MonitorService/Anno.Plugs.MonitorService.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.Plugs.DLockService Anno.Plugs.DLockService/Anno.Plugs.DLockService.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: HelloWorldService Samples/HelloWorldService/HelloWorldService.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.Plugs.HelloWorldService Samples/Plugs/Anno.Plugs.HelloWorldService/Anno.Plugs.HelloWorldService.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.Plugs.SoEasyService Samples/Plugs/Anno.Plugs.SoEasyService/Anno.Plugs.SoEasyService.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: HelloWorldDto Samples/HelloWorldDto/HelloWorldDto.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: MvcCallAnno Samples/Mvc/MvcCallAnno/MvcCallAnno.csproj
- XML-doc coverage: Anno.ViperLog Anno.ViperLog/Anno.ViperLog.csproj
D18 · Solution Shape
- Build did not complete in the analyzer
D22 · Internal API Consistency
- No exposed public API
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
| Dimension | Tool | Version | Command | Findings | Raw output |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D28 · Secrets (history) | gitleaks | — | gitleaks detect --no-banner --report-format json --report-path /dev/stdout --exit-code 0 --source . | 0 | artifacts/raw/gitleaks-history.json |
| D29 · Static Analysis (SAST) | semgrep | — | semgrep --config /opt/semgrep-rules/security-audit.yml --config /opt/semgrep-rules/owasp-top-ten.yml --json --quiet --timeout 0 --metrics off . | 2 | artifacts/raw/semgrep.json |
| D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities | dotnet | — | dotnet: not applicable — the solution did not restore on the analyzer's .NET SDK (an SDK/target-framework/restore mismatch, common for an older codebase), so there was no restored dependency graph to scan for NuGet CVEs — excluded rather than scored; re-run on an SDK that can restore this solution | 0 | — |
| D31 · IaC & Container Security | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No Infrastructure-as-Code or container manifests found (Dockerfile, Terraform, Kubernetes/Helm, CloudFormation); nothing to scan. | 0 | — |
| D32 · Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) | semgrep | — | semgrep: not applicable — Data compliance (PII/GDPR) was not assessed in this scan — no ruleset is currently available for it. This says nothing about how this repository handles personal data, in either direction. | 0 | — |
| D33 · JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities | trivy | — | trivy: not applicable — No JS/npm manifest or lockfile found outside build output (package.json, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, bun.lockb); no JS dependencies to scan. | 0 | — |
| D36 · Supply-chain Provenance & Signing | provenance | — | provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for. | 0 | — |
| D37 · Vulnerability-disclosure Policy | disclosure | — | disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed. | 0 | — |
| D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities | osv-scanner | — | osv-scanner: not applicable — No supported non-.NET dependency lockfile found outside build output (npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven pom.xml, Gradle lockfiles, Python requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/pdm.lock, PHP composer.lock, Ruby Gemfile.lock, Elixir mix.lock, Dart pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); nothing for OSV to scan. A NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain. | 0 | — |
| D40 · Network Egress Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D41 · Kernel & Syscall Confinement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
| D42 · Runtime Threat Enforcement | runtime-hardening | — | runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here. | 0 | — |
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Email — 2 field(s)
- GetMemberModelOutputDto.CEmail Trace/Anno.Domain.Dto/GetMemberModelOutputDto.cs:18
- bif_company.email Trace/Anno.Model/bif_company.cs:42