Public report — basic-platform, published 5 Aug 2026.
Concrete security findings (CVE IDs, secret matches, dependency versions) are hidden in this version;
ask the repo owner for the full report.
Small · 17,348 LoC · 23 projects · rebuild ~0.2 person-years · weakest lens: Readiness (28%)
Degraded — solution could not be loaded
The C# solution could not be loaded in the analyzer (the workspace returned 0 projects), so every compiler-dependent dimension ran on nothing and the size/effort figures were estimated directly from source text. This run is Degraded — treat the grade as indicative only. See diagnostics.md for the exact cause (which solution project references resolved vs were missing, a structure map of the analyzed tree, and the solution/project files), then re-run for a reliable result.
Grounded in facts. Every number here is computed, not narrated — reproducible, tool-backed, and traceable to a line of code. How to trust this ▸
130findings with an exact file:lineof 211 — the remainder are repo-wide signals (a dimension-level measurement, not a single line); open any file:line and verify
76/118dimensions across the health lenses17348 LoC · 23 projects — wide & deep
Executive summary
Read through the Production lens — the standard calibration. *Green* means good enough to run in production. The score is absolute and comparable across repos.
e-athena/basic-platform carries serious risk (32%). Several issues below can materially affect reliability, security, or the cost of change and warrant near-term attention.
It is strongest in Event-Driven (88%) — its messaging keeps components properly decoupled. Architecture (79%) is solid too.
Most urgent: a critical security exposure was detected (see the Security & Compliance lens). Treat it as a priority regardless of the overall grade.
The area that most needs attention is Readiness (28%) — operating, monitoring and recovering the system safely is harder. Domain Modelling (30%) is the next concern — the domain model leaks and drifts, so business rules are harder to trust and change.
Leadership focus, highest impact first: CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR (CI/CD gates); unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly,… (Dependency Hygiene); readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green)… (Deployment & Rollback).
For scale: Small (~17,348 production lines); rebuilding it from scratch would take roughly ~0.2 person-years (~1 engineer). Approximate, ±~30%.
It builds on a genuinely strong Event-Driven foundation (88%); the priorities above are the highest-leverage way to bring the rest up to that level.
How the score is built — each lens's share of the headlineWidth is the lens's weight in the worst-heaviest fold (the weakest area pulls hardest); colour is that lens's own band. A lens fixes the score in proportion to its width.
~31976 LoC unreachable (394 file(s)) — that slice of this estimate buys code with zero runtime value; deleting it is the cheapest win in this report (the R7 card lists every file)
This codebase represents roughly ~0.2 person-years of build effort (about ~€23,000 to rebuild). Its weakest lens is Readiness at 28% — the part of that asset most exposed by the findings below.
How we model this: boilerplate at a scaffolding rate + logic × domain Very high (×1.8) — service/app, DDD/clean architecture, CQRS, domain model, event-driven integration × a 0.7× quality factor, at €60–95/h; indicative, ±~30% · size measured directly from source (the solution did not build in-analyzer). Indicative only — most sensitive to the hourly rate and the domain tier (both tunable in config).
Top priorities
The highest-leverage moves; the full ranked list is in the Roadmap below.
1
Resolve the 2 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Value concentrated against a weak lens · High · Value at risk
This is a Small asset (~0.2 person-years to rebuild), and its weakest lens is Readiness at 28%. The operational and business risk on an asset this size concentrates there — that's where remediation buys the most protection.
→ Direct remediation budget at Readiness first — highest risk-reduction per euro on an asset this size.
Root cause: an un-encapsulated domain · Medium · Root cause
24 findings across public setters, anemic types and primitive ids share one root cause — the domain layer doesn't protect its own invariants. Fixing the encapsulation pattern resolves them together, rather than chasing each finding.
→ Address encapsulation as one pattern (private setters + behaviour + strongly-typed ids), not 100 separate findings.
Highest-leverage move · Medium · Leverage
Of everything flagged, the best return on effort is: Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR. The rest can wait behind it.
Evidence: priority ranking: top of 5 ranked by impact/effort
→ Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Architecture — bounded-context dependency graph
Each box is a bounded context (its layer projects grouped, or a project count when large); arrows show dependencies between contexts. A shared kernel is where many arrows converge.
Architecture — module dependency matrix
101 modules, 191 dependencies — 1 dependency cycle, shown as the red cell(s) above the diagonal. Rows and columns are the same modules, ordered so that a module only depends on ones above it. A cell means the row depends on the column, and its number is how many type pairs create that dependency. Read one thing: is anything above the diagonal? A mark there is a dependency cycle. (A cycle is all this shows — an unusual but cycle-free dependency sits below the diagonal like any other.)
At a glance — Code Health · 56% · Adequate · gated by R7
Findings mapped to OWASP categories; the specific CVEs/secrets are in the Security dimension cards below and findings.md (redacted only on the public version of this report).
OWASP category
Findings
Severity
A06:2021 — Vulnerable & Outdated Components
83
High / Critical
A05:2021 — Security Misconfiguration
13
High / Critical
A02:2021 — Cryptographic Failures
3
High / Critical
Roadmap
First, establish a continuous integration workflow to build and test every change immediately. Next, clean up the project by removing unused dependencies and explicitly declaring all imports. Then, implement readiness and liveness probes with a rolling-update strategy to ensure safe deployments. After that, improve observability by extending structured logging and providing a diagnostics seam for library consumers. Finally, address the low code coverage in the specified services to improve reliability.
Ranked by impact ÷ effort. "Helps" is the estimated gain on the 0–100 health score.
Do this
Helps
Effort
Dimension
Resolve the 2 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene.
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Watchdog is a deep, periodic assessment — run each sprint, monthly, or quarterly, taking the time to go wider and deeper than a quick check and surfacing in one coherent report what you'd otherwise piece together from a dozen separate tools. It scores deterministically: the same commit yields the same score, every run. 73 of 76 evaluated dimensions are computed purely by tools and static analysis (confidence 1.0); 3 documentation/naming judgement(s) are LLM-assisted and labelled advisory. Overall confidence is 0.7 — the weighted average across measured dimensions; it falls as more of the score leans on LLM-assisted judgement and rises when it's fully tool-backed.
Every figure here is one of three kinds, and we label which: ✓ Measured — a deterministic fact (LoC, complexity, coverage); ~ Modeled — an estimate from a stated model (cost, effort, value-at-risk), always a range with its assumptions, never a precise fact; ◐ Advisory — an LLM prose judgement. We never present a modelled estimate as if it were measured. Perfect or absent scores carry their provenance too (ADR-0011): ✓ Tool-verified means the property itself was measured across the surface; ○ Nothing flagged means the probes came back clean — a claim bounded by what a repository can show; ⊘ Not evidenced means a working control (a tested restore, an automated rollback) showed no positive evidence — absence of evidence is not evidence of a control, so it's excluded from the score rather than awarded a spurious 10; ◐ Sampled · advisory marks an LLM verdict over a bounded sample — advisory, never a deterministic measurement.
What we checked — 76 dimensions across the health lenses
Each chip is a dimension scored from real signals across architecture, testing, dependencies, security & compliance, documentation, git-history and code quality — in one coherent pass. A surface report typically covers a handful.
How to trust any code-health report — three questions
Can you open the finding? Real findings cite a repo-relative file and line you can open at the cited line — never an absolute scratch path. Here, 130 of 211 do; the remainder are repo-wide signals — a dimension-level measurement, not a single line. (Every path in this report is repo-relative by construction: paths are normalized at the producer and the report is rejected if any rooted path leaks through.)
Is there a tool behind the number? Every score below names the method that produced it — Roslyn, git, a scanner, or (for a handful of documentation/naming dimensions) an LLM labelled sampled · advisory — not a narrative.
Does re-running give the same result? Run it again on the same commit and the score — and this report, byte for byte — is identical. A report whose numbers move between runs is describing the run, not the code.
This report answers yes to all three. That's the bar to hold any assessment to.
Tools & methods
The actual versions used this run (captured at analysis time) — re-run on the same commit for the identical score.
Method
Backs
Version
Evaluator
Roslyn static analysis
Complexity, cohesion, coupling, dead code, API surface, layering
What ran differently this time — a tool absent, degraded, or that fell back to an estimate. Named openly, not folded silently into the scores. A degraded run also records its exact cause in diagnostics.md.
Solution could not be loaded — run is Degraded — The C# workspace did not read this repository's production source, so every compiler-dependent dimension ran on estimated input. Treat the grade as indicative only; diagnostics.md records the exact cause.
Repo exclusion declarations: 117 pattern(s) declared (.gitattributes linguist-generated/vendored, .editorconfig generated_code) excluded 0 source file(s) from code-quality scoring. Declarations are the repo's own visible statement that a tree is machine-written or vendored — auditable in any diff, honored by GitHub the same way.
Limitations & what we did not check
Watchdog assesses the repository exactly as committed, and only the repository. By design it does not reach outside the source tree: the live cloud account, the running CI/CD pipeline, the host's branch-protection and approval rules, the production configuration, or a restore actually exercised against a backup are all out of scope. That boundary is a feature, not a gap — a repo-relative, deterministic scan re-runs identically on any commit and every finding opens at a real file and line, where a live audit can neither be reproduced nor traced. The visible consequence is that controls which leave no in-repo evidence are reported as "not evidenced" and excluded from the score rather than awarded a number a static scan cannot justify.
Per-dimension blind spots
For each dimension that was measured, what a static, repo-only scan structurally cannot see — the honest edge of the measurement, not a failure of it.
D4 Code Duplication: Duplication is token-similarity (jscpd) — it finds copy-paste, not semantic duplication expressed differently. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, protobuf/OpenAPI stubs, model snapshots) is EXCLUDED — its repetition is the tool's, not the team's — so the score reflects hand-written duplication only.
D5 Coupling: Coupling is measured between projects/assemblies — runtime coupling through DI, reflection, messaging or shared databases is invisible to a static reference graph.
D8 Code Coverage: Coverage is measured by building and running the test suite inside Watchdog's isolated image — the target repo is never modified, and nothing on your systems runs. So coverage exists only when the suite builds and runs within the inline time budget; one that needs external services, can't build, or exceeds the budget yields no coverage (D8 then degrades to not-measured, not a low score). Line coverage also says nothing about assertion quality.
D9 Test Distribution: The test-pyramid shape is inferred from project/folder naming and references, with a single test host bucketed per-file by its path tier and content signals — a suite that names tiers unconventionally and gives no per-file signal can still be mis-bucketed.
D10 Test Quality: Assertion density is structural — it cannot tell a meaningful behavioural assertion from a trivial one, only that an assertion is present.
D11 Test Reliability: Flakiness is inferred from history/markers — Watchdog runs the suite once (for coverage), not the repeated runs under varied conditions that reveal nondeterminism, so a flaky test never recorded as failing is invisible here.
D12 Dependency Hygiene: Dependency health reads manifests and lockfiles — a vulnerability in a vendored/copied dependency, or risk from how a dependency is actually used, is outside this view.
D13 Secret Scanning: Secret detection is signature- and entropy-based on the current tree — a secret that does not match a known pattern, or one already rotated, will not be flagged (a clean scan is "nothing matched", not "no secrets exist").
D14 License Compliance: License compatibility is checked against declared package metadata and a policy — mislabelled or missing license metadata, and obligations that depend on how you distribute, are not resolved here.
D15 Churn × Complexity Hotspots: Churn hotspots come from git history — a freshly imported or squashed repository has no churn signal, and recent rewrites can mask a historically risky file.
D17 Explicit Debt: Acknowledged-debt signals (TODO/FIXME, suppressions, dead code) are textual — undocumented debt that nobody marked, and debt that lives in design rather than annotations, is invisible. Committed machine-written code (scaffolded migrations, designer/codegen output, generated stubs) is excluded — it is never the team's dead code to delete.
D19 Documentation Quality: Documentation quality is judged by an LLM over a bounded sample of docs — it reads what is written, not whether the docs match the running system, and it is advisory, not a measurement.
D20 ADR Quality: ADR quality is an LLM read of the decision records present — it cannot know about decisions made and never recorded, and its verdict is sampled and advisory.
D21 Naming Consistency: Naming quality is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it assesses clarity/consistency of the names it sees, not domain-correctness, and is advisory.
D24 Comment Value: Comment value (WHY vs WHAT) is an LLM judgement over a bounded sample — it is advisory and cannot weigh a comment against the precise code change it was written to explain.
D26 Project Cohesion: Project focus is sized from members/namespaces per project — a project that is broad by deliberate design reads the same as one that has sprawled.
D28 Secrets (history): Secret-history scanning sweeps the git log for known patterns — a secret that predates the available history, or never matched a signature, is not found (clean means "nothing matched in the history we can see").
D29 Static Analysis (SAST): SAST findings are pattern-based (semgrep) — it finds classes of bug it has rules for; logic flaws, auth/authorization gaps and issues needing runtime context are out of reach (and clean means "no rule matched").
D30 Dependency Vulnerabilities: CVE matching depends on accurate package/version metadata and the advisory database — a vulnerability with no published advisory, or in code not declared as a dependency, is not seen.
D31 IaC & Container Security: IaC scanning checks Dockerfiles/Terraform/Kubernetes against best-practice rules — it cannot see the live cloud account, runtime configuration, or drift between the committed config and what is actually deployed.
D33 JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities: JS/npm CVE matching reads package manifests and lockfiles — risk from how a dependency is used, and advisories not yet published, fall outside this scan.
D34 Knowledge Freshness: Freshness is decayed commit RECENCY, not comprehension — code read often but rarely committed reads as orphaned, and stable code that genuinely needs no changes is penalised the same as forgotten code; bot/squash commits distort it like the bus factor.
D35 Change Coupling: Change coupling is co-change in COMMITS — files split across separate commits, or coupled only through a shared config/build step, read as uncoupled, and a sweeping commit (rename/format) is excluded so it doesn't couple everything. It shows that files change together, not WHY: a high coupling can be a healthy cohesive pair as readily as a hidden leak.
AC1 Text alternatives: Alt-text is detected structurally — the scan sees that an alternative EXISTS, not whether it meaningfully describes the image, and decorative-vs-missing is judged by attribute shape; runtime-injected images and a non-role=img decorative svg are out of scope. This is accessibility readiness, never a WCAG conformance claim.
AC2 Forms & labels: Label association is read from static markup — a label wired up at runtime (JS-set aria-labelledby, framework-injected ids) reads as missing, a present label says nothing about whether its text is correct. A known UI-library field component (e.g. a JSX <TextField>) is now checked conservatively — flagged only when it carries NO label/aria-label/aria-labelledby/id/name — but wrapper/context-labelled libraries (Chakra/Radix FormControl+FormLabel) aren't statically visible (possible false positive) and non-JSX lowercased components are still skipped. A clean result is "no unlabelled native control found", not a labelling proof.
AC3 Page structure: Page structure is read from the static markup tree — landmarks, headings and lang injected at runtime aren't seen, heading ORDER is checked structurally (not against the rendered visual hierarchy), and lang/title/main fire only on full documents, never partials, and the data-table check sees header-cell presence (a <th> exists), not whether each header correctly associates with its cells. Static readiness, not conformance.
AC4 Keyboard semantics: Keyboard semantics are inferred from markup attributes — interactivity wired purely in script, focus managed at runtime, and component-level handlers are invisible. A clean result means "no static keyboard-trap shape", not a keyboard-operability proof.
AC6 Visual & motion safety: Contrast and motion safety are PARTIAL by construction — literal colours (hex/rgb/hsl/named) in inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS top-level declarations are read (same-rule/same-element colour+background pairs only); computed/runtime/theme colour, external-CDN stylesheets, CSS-in-JS dynamic (${…}) and nested-selector colours, cross-element pairs and image contrast stay out of reach, so a clean result is bounded by what the static CSS itself shows.
AC7 A11y enforcement: Enforcement is scored from in-repo config/CI evidence only — an a11y gate enforced in external tooling with no in-repo trace can't be credited, and a configured linter is presence, not proof the rules actually run or block a merge.
AX10 Code composition: Role is inferred from namespace/folder convention, not semantics — a domain concept living in a folder named "Services" reads as application, and the split is lines-of-code, not business value. The business-logic-share score is a SOFT, FLOORED signal: it contributes to the Architecture lens but is floored at the Critical gate, so an infrastructure-heavy design (a gateway, an ETL, a driver) is legitimately low without being nuked to zero.
AX9 CQS / query purity: Handlers are found by interface/name convention — a query handler using neither is not seen. Mutation is a resolved write/publish invocation (SaveChanges/repository/bus), so a write hidden behind a hand-rolled wrapper, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-persistence type and isn't flagged; it detects that a query writes state, not whether the write is a legitimate read-side cache update. Clean means "no resolved write/publish in a query body", not a proof of CQS purity.
DM4 Rich vs anemic model: Behaviour is detected as state mutation inside a method body — a method that enforces an invariant by validating-and-throwing without mutating reads as a query, and mutation delegated through an interface the scan can't resolve isn't credited; entities with zero public properties still drop out of the population. It detects that state changes, not whether the rule is correct.
DM6 Domain ↔ infrastructure boundary: Infrastructure reached through a hand-rolled wrapper, a domain-named facade, reflection, or a string-keyed service locator resolves to a non-infra type and isn't seen; the body scan is symbol resolution over syntax, not full dataflow. A clean result means "no resolved infra reference in a domain body", not a proof of purity.
ED5 Idempotency: Idempotency is judged from the handler body's visible writes and guards — a guard enforced by a database unique constraint, a broker's exactly-once delivery, or a domain method whose no-op-when-applied logic the scan can't follow may read as at-risk; the at-risk candidates are confirmed by a SAMPLED LLM verdict (advisory, not exhaustive) and degrade to heuristic-only when no model is configured. It flags the at-least-once double-apply SHAPE, not a runtime proof of a duplicate effect.
M4 Documentation accuracy: Onboarding quality is an LLM read of the docs/setup present — it cannot run the onboarding or measure how long a real new joiner takes; the verdict is sampled and advisory.
P4 Deployment & Rollback: Approval/branch-protection rules live in repository settings the scan cannot see — only their in-repo evidence (config files, workflows) is checked, so a control enforced purely in the host's settings reads as "not evidenced".
The LLM boundary
LLM-set scores this run (6): D19, D20, D21, D24, ED5, M4 (model: Local LLM). For these, a model reads a bounded sample and sets the numeric score (documentation, ADR quality, naming, comment value, onboarding) — D25 sets the ADR-conformance fraction over sampled code, D22 judges API accuracy over a sample. These are sampled and advisory by design: they vary at the margins between runs and are never a deterministic measurement. Every other score in this report is tool-computed at confidence 1.0.
What it measures: Copy-pasted code that should be shared instead.
Method: Code duplication via token-stream sliding windows with type-aware normalization (locals masked, type names preserved), density-scored per KLoC of production code. Deterministic.
Detailed fixes: d4_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D5 · Coupling8.3 / 10Strong✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether volatile projects sit underneath others that depend on them (so their churn ripples upward), and whether project dependencies form cycles. A widely-depended-on but stable shared/kernel project is healthy, not penalised.
Method: Dependency cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, plus Martin instability (afferent/efferent) per project. Exhaustive over the reference graph, deterministic.
Coverage: Exhaustive · type-level: afferent/efferent coupling + cycles computed over every production type — the population is all types, not a name convention.
Off the main sequence: BasicPlatform.Infrastructure · ×5
What to do
Resolve the 2 Layer violation finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Off the main sequence finding(s) in Coupling. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Coupling in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Prevented — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d5_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D8 · Code Coverage1.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: How much of the code is actually exercised by tests.
Method: Coverage from coverlet runs or committed reports (Cobertura/OpenCover/lcov), computed per-file with structured exclusions for generated, trivial, and glue code. When the suite can't be built/run in-image AND no report is committed, coverage is reported NOT-MEASURED (excluded from the score) with the precondition to make it measurable — never a LoC-ratio proxy folded in as if measured. Deterministic.
+ 2 more group(s) — more in Appendix A; the complete list is findings.md.
What to do
Resolve the 21 Low coverage finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with WebSettingQueryService.cs, WebSettingRequestHandler.cs, UserQueryService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (21 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 CRAP 56 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with ExternalPageRequestHandler.cs, UserQueryService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 2 CRAP 42 finding(s) in Code Coverage — start with DefaultDataPermissionService.cs, TenantQueryService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Code Coverage in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d8_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D9 · Test Distribution10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the test suite has a healthy mix of unit / integration / end-to-end tests.
Method: Test projects classified (Unit/Integration/BDD/E2E) from compiled metadata; test methods counted exhaustively across projects with placement-agnostic disk fallback. Deterministic.
16 test methods: 16 unit, 0 integration, 0 BDD, 0 e2e.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d9_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D10 · Test Quality10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests truly assert behaviour rather than just running the code.
Method: Per-test assertions, skips, and mock references analyzed via Roslyn; structured skip-reason tags (BUG:/ENV:) separate documented deferrals from debt. Deterministic.
0 skipped, 0 zero-assertion, no mocking-framework packages referenced (hand-written doubles or no mocking) across 16 tests.
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d10_recommendation.md.
Do you agree with this assessment?
D11 · Test Reliability10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
What it measures: Whether the tests pass reliably, with no flakiness.
Method: Suite re-run N times within tiered wall-clock budgets (unit to e2e); tests failing non-deterministically across runs flagged; guarded tests retried when #if guards detected.
What it measures: Whether dependencies are current, secure, and not bloated.
Method: Manifest scan via dotnet list package across all projects; worst-signal-per-package deduction (saturating for vulnerabilities, capped-linear for deprecation/outdated) per KLoC. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Resolve the 2 Prerelease dependency finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 warning-level).
Resolve the 1 Deprecated finding(s) in Dependency Hygiene. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 warning-level).
Stand up a CI pipeline, then gate Dependency Hygiene in it to reach Verified (currently Documented). — This repository has no CI pipeline, so there is nothing to add a gate to yet — the pipeline comes first. Hardens enforcement from Documented toward Verified — provenance only; does not change the score.
Detailed fixes: d12_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets (keys, tokens, passwords) have leaked into the code.
Method: In-process native secret scanner (entropy plus signature patterns) across all tracked files; no external tool. A clean result is a measured 10, not no-data zero. Deterministic.
What it measures: Whether the licenses of third-party packages are compatible with your policy.
Method: Third-party package licenses resolved from declared package metadata and checked against the configured policy (allow/deny/copyleft). Deterministic; clean = no incompatible license found at metadata depth.
What it measures: Files that change often and are also complex — the riskiest hotspots.
Method: Per production file churn times cyclomatic complexity over a rolling window, computed from git and Roslyn/JS/Razor analysis. Exhaustive, deterministic per commit date.
What it measures: Acknowledged debt left in the code — TODOs, dead code, suppressed warnings.
Method: Roslyn syntactic debt markers (suppressions/TODO/FIXME/HACK/empty-catch/commented-code/Obsolete) plus SymbolFinder dead-code analysis; weighted-debt-per-KLoC density deducted 2.0x per unit. Deterministic, exhaustive.
What it measures: Whether the project's documentation is clear, complete, and useful.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic doc sample (READMEs plus first 25 architecture docs), with two-pass stability filtering. Advisory, sampled.
A clear README for a .NET7 framework covering features like Ant Design Pro frontend, multi-tenancy, automatic database type detection (sqlite/mysql/sqlserver/postgresql/oracle), SqlSugar/FreeSql dual ORMs, column visibility, role-based and user-customized authorization, domain events/integration events, SignalR real-time notifications, and a detailed start guide. The README also links to an external demo site, a Docker Redis install command, and a disclaimer plus thanks section. A minor but notable gap is the absence of architecture or design documentation for the framework (the Architecture/Docs markdown files count at 0), which would help new contributors understand how different modules interact.
Improve Documentation Quality — currently 8.0/10. — A clear README for a .NET7 framework covering features like Ant Design Pro frontend, multi-tenancy, automatic database type detection (sqlite/mysql/sqlserver/postgresql/oracle), SqlSugar/FreeSql dual ORMs, column visibility, role-based and user-customized authorization, domain events/integration events, SignalR real-time notifications, and a detailed start guide. The README also links to an external demo site, a Docker Redis install command, and a disclaimer plus thanks section. A minor but notable gap is the absence of architecture or design documentation for the framework (the Architecture/Docs markdown files count at 0), which would help new contributors understand how different modules interact.
Detailed fixes: d19_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether architecture decisions are recorded well (context, decision, consequences).
Method: Per-ADR judgment by language model at low temperature with two-pass stability; confidence is share of ADRs evaluated; enforcement-field presence detected deterministically. Advisory.
What it measures: Whether names — types, methods, variables — are clear and consistent.
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on a deterministic random symbol sample (fixed size, not exhaustive), with disclosed confidence band. Advisory, sampled.
5 naming inconsistencies across 200 sampled symbols.
The root namespace for user-related domain models is inconsistent. Most user entities reside in `BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users`, but some (like `UserAppointment`, `UserAccessRecord`, `UserCustomColumn`) are nested directly under `BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users` or use a flat structure without a subfolder/model grouping, while events are in `Events`. This creates a mixed structure where some concepts are grouped by entity type and others are not.
There is an inconsistency in the naming of query models versus regular models. Some modules use the `*QueryModel` suffix for DTOs used in queries (e.g., `UserQueryModel`), while others use `*Model` (e.g., `TenantModel`, `ApplicationModel`). This creates confusion about whether a specific model is for querying or general use.
The CRM module uses `Customer` as the primary entity name, while the rest of the `BasicPlatform` module uses `User` or `Account` for similar concepts. Additionally, `CRM.Domain.Customers.Customer` is a direct entity, but `CRM.Domain.Customers.Events.CustomerCreatedEvent` is an event. The inconsistency lies in the root namespace `CRM` vs `BasicPlatform` and the entity naming (`Customer` vs `User`).
There are two different interfaces for user querying: `IUserQueryService` in `BasicPlatform.AppService.Users` and `IUserService` in `App.Infrastructure.Services`. They seem to perform similar operations (e.g., `GetUserCustomColumnsAsync`), leading to potential confusion about which service to use.
The `IRoleQueryService` contains both query methods (`GetAsync`, `GetSelectListAsync`) and permission-related methods (`GetDataPermissionsAsync`, `GetRoleIdsByUserIdAsync`). This mixes general role queries with specific permission queries, which may be better separated.
What to do
Resolve the 1 The root namespace for user-related domain models is inconsistent. Most… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 There is an inconsistency in the naming of query models versus regular… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 The CRM module uses `Customer` as the primary entity name, while the… finding(s) in Naming Consistency. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d21_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D24 · Comment Value / 10Adequate◐ Sampled · advisory
What it measures: Whether comments are worth it — explaining WHY (valuable) rather than WHAT (redundant).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature (0.0-0.1) on deterministically sampled inline comments with surrounding code; findings verified back to sampled comments by substring match. Advisory, sampled.
Resolve the 2 redundant comment finding(s) in Comment Value — start with DefaultColumnPermissionService.cs, UserDataPermissionModel.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d24_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether any secrets were ever committed — scanned across the full git history, not just now.
Method: Git-history secret scan via gitleaks detect over full history in an isolated checkout; each match flagged High. Exhaustive; degrades cleanly when tool absent.
2 finding(s): 0 critical, 2 high, 0 medium, 0 low. Remediation for historically-committed secrets is credential rotation — they remain in history regardless of later deletion.
Secret: generic-api-key · ×2BasicPlatform.SSO/appsettings.json:7detected by gitleaks finding
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed
What to do
Resolve the 2 Secret finding(s) in Secrets (history) — start with appsettings.json (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (2 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Rotate the exposed credentials finding(s) in Secrets (history). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d28_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Real static-analysis (SAST) findings — likely security bugs in the code, any language.
Method: Polyglot static analysis via semgrep across the repo using the pinned, image-baked p/security-audit + p/owasp-top-ten rulesets (no scan-time registry fetch); severity rules (ERROR/WARNING/INFO) map to a full-band severity-weighted score. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades on parse failure.
Coverage: semgrep pattern rules over all files — exhaustive for the rule set, blind to classes of bug without a rule (clean = no rule matched).
What it measures: Whether any dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs), direct or transitive.
Method: NuGet CVE scan via dotnet list package --vulnerable including transitive; severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer. Exhaustive, deterministic; degrades when absent.
High IaC: DS-0002 · ×4Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
Medium IaC: CKV_DOCKER_3 · ×5BasicPlatform.WebAPI/Dockerfile:1detected by trivy finding
Low IaC: DS-0026 · ×4Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/Dockerfiledetected by trivy finding
What to do
Resolve the 4 High IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 issue-level).
Resolve the 5 Medium IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (5). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (5 warning-level).
Resolve the 4 Low IaC finding(s) in IaC & Container Security — start with Dockerfile (4). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (4 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d31_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether anyone still has living knowledge of each file, or it has been orphaned — last understood long ago by someone now gone quiet. The sibling of the bus factor: D16 asks who owns it, D34 asks whether anyone still knows it.
Method: File orphaning as total living-knowledge decay below one focused-commit's worth within a year, computed per-file from the D16 decay model. Exhaustive, deterministic over fixed history.
66 of 66 significant source file(s) are orphaned — their living knowledge has decayed to nothing, so no one currently understands them. The largest is BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Users/UserQueryService.cs.
Dormant codebase
Largest orphaned fileBasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Users/UserQueryService.cs
What to do
Resolve the 1 Dormant codebase finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Resolve the 1 Largest orphaned file finding(s) in Knowledge Freshness — start with UserQueryService.cs. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 recommendation-level).
Detailed fixes: d34_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
What it measures: Whether files that change together actually belong together — pairs that repeatedly co-change in git history despite having no explicit code dependency, surfacing the hidden/logical coupling (and boundaries in the wrong place) a static scan can't see.
Method: Pairwise co-occurrence over the per-commit file sets in git history (production source only — tests and generated dropped): Degree-of-Coupling = shared ÷ min individual revisions, reported above noise floors (each file ≥10 revisions, ≥5 shared commits, ≥50% strength); sweeping commits excluded. Deterministic over fixed history.
Coverage: Population: PRODUCTION source files only — test and generated files are dropped before pairing, so a class co-changing with its own test (trivially ~100%) can't drown the real production↔production coupling. Pairs ranked by Degree-of-Coupling; coupling through a build step, config, or non-source file isn't seen.
What it measures: Whether dependencies have known published vulnerabilities (CVEs) per the OSV database — read natively from whatever lockfile the repository ships (Cargo, npm, Go, Python, Maven, RubyGems, …). D33 and D30 add ecosystem-specific scanners on top for npm and .NET.
Method: Multi-ecosystem dependency-CVE scan via osv-scanner --recursive (queries the osv.dev database + parses lockfiles natively across ecosystems: npm package-lock/yarn/pnpm/bun, Go go.mod, Rust Cargo.lock, Maven/Gradle pom.xml/gradle.lockfile, PyPI requirements.txt/poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock, Composer composer.lock, RubyGems Gemfile.lock, Hex mix.lock, pub pubspec.lock, Swift Package.resolved); severity tally (Critical/High/Medium/Low) to 0-10 tight normalizer (8.0). NotApplicable only when the repo declares no supported non-.NET dependency lockfile (a NuGet-only repo stays NotApplicable — .NET CVEs are D30's domain); coverage needs a resolved lockfile. Additive to D33 (trivy fs); exhaustive + deterministic, DB kept fresh.
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×37Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] · ×12BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding
Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted]Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yamldetected by osv-scanner finding
What to do
Resolve the 37 High CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (35), Cargo.lock (2). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (37 issue-level).
Resolve the 12 Critical CVE finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml (12). — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (12 issue-level).
Resolve the 1 Critical vulnerability finding(s) in OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities — start with pnpm-lock.yaml. — One of this dimension's main actionable groups (1 issue-level).
Detailed fixes: d38_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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D39 · IL Efficiency10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Method: IL instruction count per method, read from the BUILT first-party assemblies via Mono.Cecil (the target is compiled on a deep run); scored on the fraction of methods whose emitted IL body exceeds the size threshold. Sees compiler-generated bloat source can't; not-applicable when the target fails to build. Deterministic.
1 of 694 first-party methods have an oversized IL body.
IL efficiency: 1 authored method(s) exceed the IL budgetBasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Tenants/TenantQueryService.cs:186
✓ On the Gold path — maintain.
Detailed fixes: d39_recommendation.md · top locations in Appendix A, every location in findings.md.
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Frontend & cross-cutting dimensions
R = React/JS · M = Maturity · P = Readiness.
AC1 · Text alternatives4.9 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether non-text content carries a text alternative — img/area/input[type=image] have alt, a meaningful svg has a title or aria-label, video has a captions track, and object/embed/canvas have a name or fallback content. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: every img/area/input[type=image] checked for alt, svg[role=img] for a title/aria-label, video for a captions <track>. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
An image with no alt (and no aria-label/aria-labelledby) is unreadable to assistive tech. Add alt — alt="" if it's purely decorative. (×2) — carousel.vue:10, banner.vue:9
What to do
Add a text alternative — alt on images (alt="" for purely decorative ones), a title or aria-label on meaningful svg, an aria-label or inner fallback content on canvas, and a captions <track> on video.
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AC2 · Forms & labels1.9 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether form controls have a programmatic label (an associated label, aria-label or aria-labelledby), buttons have text, links have an accessible name, fieldsets have a non-empty legend, known UI-library field components carry a label prop, and a placeholder isn't used as the only label. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: inputs/selects/textareas checked for an associated label[for]/wrapping label/aria-label/aria-labelledby (per document), buttons for accessible text, fieldsets for a legend; placeholder-only labelling flagged. Deterministic, hard fact per control.
This UI-library field component is named only by a placeholder — a placeholder is not a label (it vanishes as soon as the user types, and many assistive technologies ignore it). Give it a real name whichever way this library supports: a label prop, an aria-label, or an id on the rendered control with a <label htmlFor> pointing at it. For a group of controls, name the group itself (aria-label, or a fieldset with a legend) — labelling each item leaves the set unnamed. (×23) — RulerItem.tsx:193, RulerItem.tsx:225, RulerItem.tsx:267, …
What to do
Give every control a programmatic label (a <label for> / wrapping <label> / aria-label) and every button text — a placeholder is not a label.
Other · Accessibility — Whether pages declare a language (well-formed BCP-47) and a non-empty title, expose exactly one main landmark and a sane heading order with non-empty headings, keep zoom enabled, title their iframes, give data tables header cells, and avoid meta-refresh. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: html lang, document <title>, a main landmark and heading order on full documents only, plus zoom-disabling viewports, untitled iframes and meta-refresh anywhere. Deterministic, per structural checkpoint.
No <main> (or role="main") means no "skip to content" target and a weaker landmark map. Wrap the primary content in <main>. — index.html:2
What to do
Declare <html lang>, a document <title> and a <main> landmark, keep headings in order, leave zoom enabled, title iframes and drop meta-refresh.
Other · Accessibility — Whether interactive behaviour is keyboard-reachable — no click handler on a non-interactive element lacking a role, tabindex and key handler, no positive tabindex, no href-less anchor, no placeholder-href (#/javascript) link acting as a button. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup-model scan: click handlers on non-interactive elements lacking role+tabindex+key handler, positive tabindex values, and href-less anchors. Components skipped, spreads suppressed. Deterministic, hard fact per element.
An <a> with no href, role or tabindex isn't focusable or keyboard-activatable. Give it a real href, or use a <button> for an action. (×3) — index.tsx:159, index.tsx:403, index.tsx:161
A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabIndex={0} + a key handler. (×2) — index.tsx:20, index.tsx:21
A click handler on a plain element isn't keyboard-operable. Use a <button>, or add role + tabindex="0" + a key handler. (×3) — index.vue:2, list.vue:17, tab-item.vue:7
What to do
Make custom controls keyboard-operable (role + tabindex + key handler), drop positive tabindex, and give anchors a real href.
Other · Accessibility — Whether focus outlines aren't removed without a replacement, motion respects prefers-reduced-motion, and literal CSS colour pairs meet contrast — PARTIAL: inline styles, in-repo <style> blocks, in-repo .css files, var() tokens, Tailwind neutral utilities and CSS-in-JS literals are read (hex/rgb/hsl/named), never computed/runtime/external-CDN colour. Static markup readiness, not a WCAG conformance claim.
Method: Static markup/CSS scan: inline outline:none/0, literal inline colour/background contrast against the 4.5:1 AA floor, and <style>-block animation without a prefers-reduced-motion guard. Deterministic but PARTIAL — only inline styles and in-repo CSS literals are visible.
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AC7 · A11y enforcement4.0 / 10Weak✓ Tool-verified
Other · Accessibility — Whether accessibility is ENFORCED in the toolchain — an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set, e.g. eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y or vuejs-accessibility where the project lints JavaScript) and an automated accessibility assertion wired into tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or an equivalent) — on the Documented→Verified→Prevented ladder.
Method: Repo config/CI scan: an accessibility checker configured over the markup (an a11y lint rule set such as eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y / vuejs-accessibility where JavaScript is linted) and an automated accessibility assertion in tests or CI (axe/pa11y/Lighthouse or equivalent), graded on the Documented→Verified→Prevented rungs. Deterministic, presence/rung detection.
No accessibility enforcement found — no a11y linter (eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y) and no axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in tests or CI. Start with the linter to catch issues at author time.
What to do
Enforce accessibility in the toolchain: add eslint-plugin-jsx-a11y, then assert with jest-axe in tests, then gate axe/pa11y/Lighthouse in CI.
Other · Architecture — How the codebase splits by code ROLE — domain, application, infrastructure, test, generated. The significance map behind the knowledge/coupling weighting, and a DDD signal in its own right: a thin domain core under fat infrastructure is the anemic-domain smell, quantified.
Method: Roslyn line-count by code ROLE: every source file classified Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated by namespace + path convention (the shared CodeRoleClassifier), then significant lines summed per role. Deterministic; the advisory score is the business-logic (domain+application) share of production code.
Coverage: Population: ALL source files, each bucketed into ONE of five roles (Domain/Application/Infrastructure/Test/Generated) by namespace + path convention — a file whose layer isn't named in the convention falls to Application (the neutral default), and the split is line-count, not semantic depth or business value.
Other · Architecture — Whether the project-reference graph is acyclic (cycles block independent build/deploy and signal eroding boundaries).
Method: Project reference cycles via elementary-DFS over real .csproj references, using the engine shared with D5/D7; cyclic versus acyclic. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether dependencies point inward (Domain ← Application ← Infrastructure/Web) — the clean-architecture dependency rule, checked across the project graph.
Method: Layer violations by name-segment inference (Domain/Core to Application to Infrastructure/Web) over the project-reference graph. Exhaustive over all projects, deterministic.
`BasicPlatform.Domain` is a Domain project but references `BasicPlatform.Infrastructure`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
`CRM.Domain` is a Domain project but references `App.Infrastructure`, a Infrastructure project. The clean-architecture rule is that dependencies point INWARD — the domain/application core must not depend on outer layers (infrastructure/web). Invert it: define the abstraction in the inner layer and implement it in the outer one.
Other · Architecture — Whether the codebase has a recognisable, scale-appropriate structure (a named architectural style, or modular enough for its size) rather than being an ad-hoc ball of mud.
Method: Roslyn plus csproj analysis: architecture style detection (DDD, clean, vertical-slice, CQRS) and structure fitness for repo size. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether interfaces stay focused rather than fat — the Interface-Segregation principle (SOLID 'I').
Method: Roslyn scan: public interface member counts; fat-interface threshold (over 15 members) flagged per type. Deterministic, type-level.
`IUserQueryService` declares 20 members. A wide interface forces every implementer and caller to depend on methods they don't use (the Interface-Segregation 'I' in SOLID). Split it into focused role-interfaces. — IUserQueryService.cs:11
What to do
Split fat interfaces into focused role-interfaces so clients depend only on what they use.
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AX8 · Test isolation10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Architecture — Whether production projects stay free of references to test projects — tests may depend on production, never the reverse.
Method: Csproj graph: each production project checked for references to test projects (identified by test-framework presence, not name). Zero violations is clean. Deterministic.
Other · Architecture — Whether read (query) handlers stay side-effect-free — a query that writes persistent state or raises events breaks CQS and makes reads unsafe to retry, cache, or route to a read replica.
Method: Roslyn scan: CQRS handlers classified query-vs-command by interface (IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler<TQuery,TResult>) and name convention (*Query/Get*/Find* vs *Command); each query handler's body checked for persistent-state writes (SaveChanges/repository Add-Update) or event publishes by resolved invocation. Deterministic, type-level, exhaustive over the detected handlers.
Coverage: Population: CQRS handlers identified by IQueryHandler/ICommandHandler/IRequestHandler interface + *Query/Get*/Find*/*Command NAME convention; query purity then checked exhaustively within that set — a query handler using neither convention is invisible, and mutation is a resolved persistence/publish CALL, not full dataflow.
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C1 · Data Protection2.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Other · Security — Whether sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit and keys are vaulted.
Method: Roslyn plus filesystem scan: encryption presence (EF ColumnEncryption, key-vault references, HTTPS enforcement) and key-derivation KDF detection. Deterministic.
No data-protection or encryption usage (ASP.NET Data Protection, AES, column encryption, PBKDF2) was found — sensitive data at rest may be unprotected. If TDE/KMS/vault is delegated to infrastructure, ignore.
What to do
Encrypt sensitive data at rest (ASP.NET Core Data Protection / column encryption) and manage keys in a vault. Skip if delegated to infra (Postgres TDE, KMS, etc.).
Enforce HTTPS (UseHttpsRedirection / RequireHttpsMetadata) so data in transit is always encrypted.
Other · Security — Whether access is authorized by default — a framework authorization attribute/decorator or policy, or imperative guard methods (throw-on-violation) called from handlers.
Method: Roslyn scan: [Authorize] usage and authorization policies, plus imperative throw-on-violation guard methods detected via syntax. Deterministic.
Authorization IS enforced here (via [Authorize]/guards) — this is NOT a claim that endpoints are unprotected. What's missing is NAMED policies (AddAuthorization/AddPolicy, RequireRole/RequireClaim, RequireAuthorization): the access rules are implicit rather than named and testable. Recommendation, not a defect — name the rules so they're reviewable.
[AllowAnonymous] (8) outweighs [Authorize] (7) — review whether the open surface is intended.
What to do
Add policy-based authorization — name the access rules (AddAuthorization(o => o.AddPolicy(…))) and apply them via [Authorize(Policy = …)] or RequireAuthorization.
Review the [AllowAnonymous] surface — keep anonymous endpoints deliberate and documented so the open surface stays intentional.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates reference each other by identity (id) rather than by direct object reference — the core DDD consistency-boundary rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): aggregate roots identified by convention; each aggregate field checked for direct references to other aggregates versus id-only. Deterministic, DDD-native.
Coverage: Population: aggregate roots identified by AggregateRoot/IAggregateRoot base/interface NAME convention; reference-by-identity then checked exhaustively within that set — a root not using those names is invisible.
`ExternalPage` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `CreatedUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — ExternalPage.cs:69
`ExternalPage` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `LastUpdatedUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — ExternalPage.cs:74
`Resource` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `CreatedUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Resource.cs:36
`Resource` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `LastUpdatedUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Resource.cs:41
`Application` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `CreatedUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Application.cs:71
`Application` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `LastUpdatedUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Application.cs:76
`Organization` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `Leader`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Organization.cs:56
`Organization` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `CreatedUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Organization.cs:66
`Organization` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `LastUpdatedUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Organization.cs:71
`Position` references the aggregate root `Organization` directly (via `Organization`) — hold its `OrganizationId` instead. — Position.cs:23
`Position` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `CreatedUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Position.cs:57
`Position` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `LastUpdatedUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Position.cs:68
`Role` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `CreatedUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Role.cs:46
`Role` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `LastUpdatedUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — Role.cs:51
`RoleGroup` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `CreatedUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — RoleGroup.cs:36
`RoleGroup` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `LastUpdatedUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — RoleGroup.cs:41
`User` references the aggregate root `Organization` directly (via `Organization`) — hold its `OrganizationId` instead. — User.cs:72
`User` references the aggregate root `Position` directly (via `Position`) — hold its `PositionId` instead. — User.cs:83
`UserGroup` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `CreatedUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — UserGroup.cs:34
`UserGroup` references the aggregate root `User` directly (via `LastUpdatedUser`) — hold its `UserId` instead. — UserGroup.cs:39
What to do
Reference other aggregates by their strongly-typed id, never by object reference, so each aggregate stays an independent consistency boundary.
Other · Domain Modelling — How much of the domain uses strongly-typed ids vs raw Guid/string/int — adoption curve, not all-or-nothing.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): strongly-typed id adoption on domain entities/events; raw Guid/int/string ids counted versus wrapped types. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Coverage: Population: id-like members by *Id/*Key NAME suffix; strongly-typed-ID shape then checked semantically — non-suffixed identifiers are not seen.
`ExternalPage.ParentId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — ExternalPage.cs:14
`ExternalPage.OwnerId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — ExternalPage.cs:21
`Resource.AppId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Resource.cs:14
`Resource.Key` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Resource.cs:20
`Application.ClientId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Application.cs:26
`Organization.ParentId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Organization.cs:16
`Organization.LeaderId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Organization.cs:50
`Position.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — Position.cs:17
`User.OrganizationId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — User.cs:66
`User.PositionId` is a raw `String` — give it a strongly-typed id: a dedicated single-field type wrapping the `String`, in whatever form your language spells that. — User.cs:77
What to do
Adopt strongly-typed ids across the domain — finish the migration or document the boundary; primitive ids invite transposed-argument bugs.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether cross-context integration events stay loosely coupled — no producer-owned enums/domain types leaking to consumers. Shared-kernel/contracts types are allowed.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): integration-event properties scanned for producer-domain type/enum leaks versus primitives and shared-kernel types. Deterministic, hard fact.
`ApplicationStatusChangedEvent.Status` exposes `Status`, a enum owned by the producer's domain assembly (`Athena.Infrastructure`) — carry the enum as a string/int instead. — ApplicationStatusChangedEvent.cs:11
`OrganizationCreatedEvent.Status` exposes `Status`, a enum owned by the producer's domain assembly (`Athena.Infrastructure`) — carry the enum as a string/int instead. — OrganizationCreatedEvent.cs:31
`OrganizationStatusChangedEvent.Status` exposes `Status`, a enum owned by the producer's domain assembly (`Athena.Infrastructure`) — carry the enum as a string/int instead. — OrganizationStatusChangedEvent.cs:11
`PositionCreatedEvent.Status` exposes `Status`, a enum owned by the producer's domain assembly (`Athena.Infrastructure`) — carry the enum as a string/int instead. — PositionCreatedEvent.cs:26
`PositionStatusChangedEvent.Status` exposes `Status`, a enum owned by the producer's domain assembly (`Athena.Infrastructure`) — carry the enum as a string/int instead. — PositionStatusChangedEvent.cs:11
`RoleColumnPermissionAssignedEvent.Permissions` exposes `RoleColumnPermission`, a domain type owned by the producer's domain assembly (`BasicPlatform.Domain`) — carry the id as its primitive value instead. — RoleColumnPermissionAssignedEvent.cs:11
`RoleCreatedEvent.DataScope` exposes `RoleDataScope`, a enum owned by the producer's domain assembly (`Athena.Infrastructure`) — carry the enum as a string/int instead. — RoleCreatedEvent.cs:21
`RoleDataPermissionAssignedEvent.Permissions` exposes `RoleDataPermission`, a domain type owned by the producer's domain assembly (`BasicPlatform.Domain`) — carry the id as its primitive value instead. — RoleDataPermissionAssignedEvent.cs:11
`RoleResourceAssignedEvent.Resources` exposes `RoleResource`, a domain type owned by the producer's domain assembly (`BasicPlatform.Domain`) — carry the id as its primitive value instead. — RoleResourceAssignedEvent.cs:11
`RoleStatusChangedEvent.Status` exposes `Status`, a enum owned by the producer's domain assembly (`Athena.Infrastructure`) — carry the enum as a string/int instead. — RoleStatusChangedEvent.cs:11
`RoleUpdatedEvent.DataScope` exposes `RoleDataScope`, a enum owned by the producer's domain assembly (`Athena.Infrastructure`) — carry the enum as a string/int instead. — RoleUpdatedEvent.cs:21
`TenantCreatedEvent.Status` exposes `Status`, a enum owned by the producer's domain assembly (`Athena.Infrastructure`) — carry the enum as a string/int instead. — TenantCreatedEvent.cs:58
`TenantCreatedEvent.Applications` exposes `TenantApplication`, a domain type owned by the producer's domain assembly (`BasicPlatform.Domain`) — carry the id as its primitive value instead. — TenantCreatedEvent.cs:68
`TenantResourceAssignedEvent.Resources` exposes `TenantResource`, a domain type owned by the producer's domain assembly (`BasicPlatform.Domain`) — carry the id as its primitive value instead. — TenantResourceAssignedEvent.cs:11
`TenantStatusChangedEvent.Status` exposes `Status`, a enum owned by the producer's domain assembly (`Athena.Infrastructure`) — carry the enum as a string/int instead. — TenantStatusChangedEvent.cs:11
`TenantUpdatedEvent.Applications` exposes `TenantApplication`, a domain type owned by the producer's domain assembly (`BasicPlatform.Domain`) — carry the id as its primitive value instead. — TenantUpdatedEvent.cs:63
`UserColumnPermissionAssignedEvent.Permissions` exposes `UserColumnPermission`, a domain type owned by the producer's domain assembly (`BasicPlatform.Domain`) — carry the id as its primitive value instead. — UserColumnPermissionAssignedEvent.cs:13
`UserCreatedEvent.Gender` exposes `Gender`, a enum owned by the producer's domain assembly (`Athena.Infrastructure`) — carry the enum as a string/int instead. — UserCreatedEvent.cs:22
`UserDataPermissionAssignedEvent.Permissions` exposes `UserDataPermission`, a domain type owned by the producer's domain assembly (`BasicPlatform.Domain`) — carry the id as its primitive value instead. — UserDataPermissionAssignedEvent.cs:11
`UserResourceAssignedEvent.Resources` exposes `UserResource`, a domain type owned by the producer's domain assembly (`BasicPlatform.Domain`) — carry the id as its primitive value instead. — UserResourceAssignedEvent.cs:11
`UserStatusChangedEvent.Status` exposes `Status`, a enum owned by the producer's domain assembly (`Athena.Infrastructure`) — carry the enum as a string/int instead. — UserStatusChangedEvent.cs:11
`UserUpdatedEvent.Gender` exposes `Gender`, a enum owned by the producer's domain assembly (`Athena.Infrastructure`) — carry the enum as a string/int instead. — UserUpdatedEvent.cs:27
What to do
Keep integration events to primitives + shared-contract types; never reference a producer-domain enum or type, so services evolve independently.
Do you agree with this assessment?
DM4 · Rich vs anemic model9.5 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether aggregates/entities carry the behaviour that protects their invariants, rather than being data bags driven by external services.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): entity method BODIES classified mutator-vs-query — only methods that mutate the entity's own declared state count as invariant-protecting behaviour, so a getter/passthrough doesn't rescue an anemic class. Deterministic, exhaustive over domain-layer entities.
Coverage: Population: entities by name/base convention; rich-vs-anemic judged by classifying each method body mutator-vs-query — logic-bearing domain types outside the convention are invisible.
`Customer` is an aggregate/entity with 4 data propert(ies) but no state-changing behaviour (only data and queries) — the business logic lives in a service. — Customer.cs:8
What to do
Move business rules onto the aggregates/entities they govern so invariants are enforced at the source, not in anemic services.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether entities protect their state (private/init-only setters) instead of exposing public setters that bypass invariants. Softened when a rehydration framework (Marten/EF) is present.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): public setters on entities detected; score softened when Marten/EF rehydration frameworks present. Deterministic, framework-aware.
Coverage: Population: entities by convention; encapsulation (setter shape) checked exhaustively within the set.
Make entity setters private/init-only; change state only through methods that enforce the invariants (Marten/EF can bind via constructor or private setters).
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether the domain layer stays free of infrastructure dependencies (EF/Marten/HTTP/ASP.NET) — the clean-architecture dependency rule.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): domain-layer types scanned for infrastructure usage in member SIGNATURES and inside method/accessor BODIES — resolved calls and object-creations into EF/Marten/HTTP/Mongo/Redis/message-bus types (not just a namespace allowlist). Deterministic, symbol-resolved, exhaustive over domain-layer bodies, DDD-native.
Coverage: Domain layer identified by NAMESPACE heuristic; infrastructure then resolved by symbol in member SIGNATURES and method/accessor BODIES — rename the layer and the check evaporates.
Other · Domain Modelling — Whether clusters of primitives that travel together (a missing value object) are extracted — a low-weight suggestion, LLM-confirmed when configured.
Method: Roslyn (DDD-gated): primitive parameter clusters recurring three or more times across signatures extracted, then confirmed by language model when configured. Advisory, low-weight.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether event handlers stay asynchronous (no blocking remote HTTP/gRPC calls awaited inside a handler).
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler bodies scanned for HTTP/gRPC invocations by resolved symbol type, not substring. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether commands have a single handler (one owner of the decision) and fan-out is modelled with events.
Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): command-shaped messages identified by convention; handler count per command checked for the exactly-one rule. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether events are named in the past tense (a clarity nudge — low weight).
Method: Roslyn scan (event-driven gated): domain and integration events checked for past-tense naming (-ed/-en suffix or irregular set). Naming nudge, low-weight advisory.
`UserPasswordResetEvent` reads as an instruction, not a fact that happened. Events describe something that already occurred — name them in the past tense (e.g. `OrderPlaced`, `PaymentCaptured`) so the ubiquitous language stays clear. — UserPasswordResetEvent.cs:6
What to do
Name events in the past tense — they record facts that already happened.
Other · Event-Driven — Whether state changes and message publishes are atomic (a transactional outbox) rather than a crash-unsafe dual write.
Method: Roslyn semantic scan (event-driven gated): event-handler methods scanned for DB-save plus bus-publish without a transactional outbox reference. Deterministic, semantic-resolved.
`ArticleRequestHandler.Handle` writes to the database while `ArticleRequestHandler.Handle` publishes to the message bus in the same command-handling flow, with no outbox referenced on either path. Splitting the persist and the publish across sibling methods (or two collaborating actors) doesn't make them atomic — a crash between the two either loses the message or emits a phantom event. Use the transactional outbox pattern so the message is committed in the same transaction as the state change and dispatched afterwards. — ArticleRequestHandler.cs:51
What to do
Adopt the transactional outbox pattern so DB writes and message publishes commit atomically — no lost or phantom events on a crash.
Other · Readiness — Whether retry-prone mutations (command handlers + message/event consumers) are idempotent so an at-least-once redelivery or client retry doesn't double-apply the effect — heuristic at-risk detection confirmed by language model, advisory.
Method: Roslyn heuristic (any mutation, ungated): command handlers and message/event consumers that mutate persistent state without a visible idempotency guard (exists/dedup check, upsert, idempotency-key/inbox, conditional/versioned write, fixed-value set) flagged as at-risk; each at-risk candidate then confirmed or cleared by a language model as genuinely non-idempotent versus naturally-idempotent. Advisory without a model (heuristic-only, degraded), per-candidate judged with one.
Coverage: Population: retry-prone mutations — command handlers (CQRS write side) + message/event consumers (IConsumer/I*EventHandler) — that mutate persistent state; runs on any repo with mutations, not only event-driven ones. The at-risk subset (no obvious guard) is a HEURISTIC candidate set, each then LLM-JUDGED non-idempotent vs safe; a handler outside those conventions, or a guard the LLM can't confirm, is bounded by the sample. Degrades to heuristic-only when no model is configured.
`Articles.ArticleRequestHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (a repository write) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — ArticleRequestHandler.cs:51
`Articles.ArticleRequestHandler.Handle` mutates persistent state (an event publish) with no idempotency guard, and the model confirms a re-run would double-apply it. A retry or at-least-once redelivery means it can run twice — add an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write. — ArticleRequestHandler.cs:89
What to do
Make retry-prone mutations idempotent — guard each write with an exists/dedup check, an upsert, an idempotency-key/inbox, or a versioned write, so a re-run doesn't double-apply.
Other · Code Health — Unreviewed-generation residue: shipped members still throwing NotImplementedException, and placeholder string literals left in non-test, non-generated code. Scored as a quality signature, never as a claim about authorship.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: NotImplementedException throws and placeholder string literals in non-test, non-generated shipped code. Deterministic, code-shape signature.
Other · Code Health — Unfinished work detected by code SHAPE, not keywords: members that only throw a "not implemented" exception, methods that take inputs and return a constant, async methods that never await, dead `if (false)` / `#if false` branches, and skeleton types most of whose members are holes. A real, objective slice of technical debt.
A line of code has been commented out rather than removed — dead weight that rots and confuses. Delete it (version control remembers). (×12) — TenantQueryService.cs:67, User.cs:356, User.cs:357, …
What to do
Clear the softer debt: remove commented-out code and dead branches, re-enable or delete skipped tests, and replace blanket warning suppressions with targeted ones.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo and its projects have a README, and whether it's substantive and current.
Method: Filesystem scan: README presence, word count, and headings for depth; git history for staleness. Exhaustive across root and project dirs, deterministic.
What to do
Add a build/run (quick start) section to the root README — the first thing a newcomer needs.
Add a 'Testing' section to the root README — how to run the test suite.
Add an 'Architecture' / 'How it works' section to the root README — the high-level shape.
Add a README to the 23 of 23 project(s) that lack one — worth up to 2 pts.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether key decisions (ADRs) and the high-level shape (C4/diagrams) are written down.
Method: Filesystem scan: ADR folder/naming conventions or content, plus Mermaid/PlantUML/C4/architecture.md discovery. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No Architecture Decision Records found — no conventional ADR directory, no `NNNN-title.md` documents and nothing ADR-shaped by content. Design rationale recorded elsewhere (a design-notes tree, a mailing list, pull-request discussion) is not visible to this check and is not re-findable per decision, so a future maintainer cannot ask why one choice was made and get an answer.
No C4/PlantUML/Mermaid diagram or architecture.md — the high-level shape isn't documented.
What to do
Record significant decisions one document per decision — dated, stating the context, the decision and its consequences — and keep them together wherever your design docs already live (a conventional `docs/adr/` tree with `NNNN-title.md` names is the most discoverable form).
Add a C4 context/container diagram (Structurizr, PlantUML or Mermaid) or an architecture.md overview.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the repo is organised deliberately — src/test separation and consistent project naming.
Method: Filesystem scan: src/test folder separation and namespace-prefix consistency (majority RootNamespace agreement). Exhaustive across projects, deterministic.
Production code isn't grouped under a src/ folder — application code, tests and tooling are mixed at the repository root.
Only 9/23 projects share a common root namespace — the code's module identity is inconsistent.
What to do
Group production code under src/ (or split deliberately, e.g. backend/ + frontend/) so production and tooling code aren't mixed at the root.
Adopt a consistent root-namespace convention (a shared prefix, e.g. Acme.*); short project-file/directory names are fine as long as the RootNamespace is uniform.
Maturity · Maturity — Whether the README actually describes the code that exists (LLM-judged, advisory).
Method: Judged by language model at low temperature: README accuracy versus actual projects, within a disclosed tolerance. Advisory, not a measured number.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P1 · CI/CD gates0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether an automated pipeline builds and tests every change.
Method: Filesystem scan: CI workflow files (.github/workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, etc.) for build and test stages. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No CI workflow found (.github/workflows, azure-pipelines.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, …) — changes aren't gated by an automated build/test.
What to do
Add a CI workflow that builds and runs the test suite on every push/PR.
Do you agree with this assessment?
P2 · Observability6.9 / 10Adequate✓ Tool-verified
Readiness · Readiness — Whether the code is diagnosable in production — structured logging, tracing/metrics, health checks.
Only 5/17 service-like projects use logging (pure contract/DTO projects are excluded — they have nothing to log). Of those 17, 4 ship a process this repository operates; the rest are libraries their consumer hosts, where the logging decision belongs to the host.
What to do
Extend structured logging across the projects you operate, and give the library ones a diagnostics seam instead — an `EventSource`/`ActivitySource` the host can subscribe to, or an optional logger on your options object — rather than taking a logging dependency on your consumers' behalf.
Add a health-check endpoint (AddHealthChecks/MapHealthChecks) so orchestrators and load balancers can probe liveness/readiness.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether SAST, secret/dependency scanning and performance benchmarking are wired in (presence, not runtime).
Method: Filesystem scan: SAST configuration, dependency-update automation, secret scanning, and a benchmark harness or benchmark step — in this repository's own ecosystem. Exhaustive, deterministic.
No static application security testing detected. For this repository's stack, add CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — this repository has no CI pipeline yet, so run it locally to clear the existing findings, then make it a step of the first workflow you add so a regression fails the build.
What to do
Run what this repository's stack ships: CodeQL's javascript-typescript pack, `semgrep --config=p/typescript`, or eslint-plugin-security — — locally for now, since there is no CI pipeline here yet, and as a step of the first workflow you add so a security regression fails the build instead of landing.
Enable Dependabot/Renovate or a dependency-review gate.
Add gitleaks/trufflehog in CI to block PRs that introduce committed secrets.
Readiness · Readiness — Whether releases are automated and safely reversible (probes, rolling updates, approval gates) — from manifests/pipeline files, not the live environment.
Method: Filesystem scan: deployment manifests/IaC (K8s YAML, Helm, Terraform) for rolling updates, probes, approval gates, migration hooks. Exhaustive, deterministic.
Deployment automation exists but no readiness/liveness probes, rolling-update strategy, lifecycle hooks or migration job were evidenced — a bad release is harder to detect and reverse.
What to do
Add readiness/liveness probes and a rolling-update (or blue/green) strategy so a bad release is caught and rolled back automatically.
Add an approval/environment gate (required reviewers / protection rules) before production promotion.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R1 · Type Safety9.8 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How much of the frontend is typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript.
Method: Frontend file inventory: the share of typed TypeScript vs untyped JavaScript across the source tree. Deterministic, exhaustive over frontend files.
What to do
Migrate the remaining .js/.jsx files to TypeScript.
React / JS · Code Health — Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm over JS/TS tokens, D-386).
Method: Copy-pasted token-identical blocks across the frontend (the D4 clone algorithm run over JS/TS tokens). Deterministic.
Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/src/pages/User/Login/index.tsx:326 · BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/src/pages/User/Login/index.tsx:393 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — index.tsx:326
Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/src/components/AdvancedSearch/components/RulerItem.tsx:150 · BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/src/components/AdvancedSearch/components/RulerItem.tsx:152 · BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/src/components/DataPermission/components/QueryPolicyModal/components/RulerItem.tsx:124 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 files, and what repeats is a LIST OF ENTRIES rather than behaviour — the same names written out more than once. Extract them into one shared, exported constant and spread that constant into each site, rather than into a function the sites call: a list like this often lives in declarative metadata (a decorator's options object, a static configuration table) that a build step must be able to read statically, where a function call is not allowed. Adding an entry to one copy and not the other is the failure this prevents. — RulerItem.tsx:150
Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/src/app.tsx:109 · BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/src/app.tsx:117 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and the CITED SPAN is not a self-contained block — it runs from inside one construct into the next (the tail of a branch plus the head of the following one, a run of switch arms, the end of a declaration plus the list that follows it) rather than covering a whole unit. So do not lift these lines literally: no call can be substituted for a half-open construct. Extract the enclosing repeated UNIT instead — the whole function, component or branch these lines sit in — and where the repetition IS the construct (a run of switch arms, a stack of near-identical declarations) replace it with one table or registry looked up by key rather than a helper each arm calls. The copies still drift apart the first time only one of them is edited, which is why this is reported. — app.tsx:109
Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/src/pages/Dashboard/Workbench/components/DemoPie.tsx:12 · BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/src/pages/Dashboard/Workbench/components/DemoPie.tsx:12 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 files, and what repeats is a LIST OF ENTRIES rather than behaviour — the same names written out more than once. Extract them into one shared, exported constant and spread that constant into each site, rather than into a function the sites call: a list like this often lives in declarative metadata (a decorator's options object, a static configuration table) that a build step must be able to read statically, where a function call is not allowed. Adding an entry to one copy and not the other is the failure this prevents. — DemoPie.tsx:12
Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/src/pages/User/Settings/index.tsx:253 · BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/src/pages/User/Settings/index.tsx:253 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — index.tsx:253
Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/src/components/AdvancedSearch/index.tsx:74 · BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/src/components/AdvancedSearch/index.tsx:119 · BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/src/components/DataPermission/components/QueryPolicyModal/index.tsx:106 — the 3 copies are spread across 3 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — index.tsx:74
Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/src/components/ProTablePlus/index.tsx:272 · BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/src/components/ProTablePlus/index.tsx:286 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — index.tsx:272
Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/src/pages/User/Center/index.tsx:54 · Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/src/pages/User/Settings/index.tsx:61 — the 2 copies are spread across 2 directories, so the shared home is a decision rather than an obvious spot: check first whether one of them already owns this behaviour, and otherwise put the extracted module somewhere all of the sites already reach rather than making one of them depend on another. — index.tsx:54
What to do
Extract the duplicated blocks into shared functions/components.
React / JS · Code Health — Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from the token-level function scanner (D-386) — real branching, not a regex heuristic.
Method: Per-function cyclomatic/cognitive complexity from a token-level function scanner (real branching, not a regex heuristic), computed over every frontend function. Deterministic.
Branch-heavy code is where defects cluster — extract decisions into smaller functions. (×8) — index.tsx:89, index.tsx:85, index.vue:218, …
What to do
Break down the listed branch-heavy functions; aim P95 cyclomatic ≤ 5.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R3 · Large Files9.3 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — How many source files exceed the large-file threshold.
Method: Components/modules exceeding the large-file threshold, counted exhaustively across the frontend source tree. Deterministic.
What to do
Split each oversized file along the responsibilities already in it, into smaller focused modules in the same package.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R6 · Tooling10.0 / 10Exemplary✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Readiness — Whether the project wires up test, lint and typecheck — detected from each package.json script's COMMAND (eslint / tsc / vitest / jest / playwright), not just its name, and corroborated against CI-workflow invocations so a tool run only in CI still counts.
Method: package.json scanned for test/lint/typecheck script wiring. Deterministic presence check.
Do you agree with this assessment?
R7 · Dead Code0.0 / 10Critical✓ Tool-verified
React / JS · Code Health — Files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point, and exports nothing imports (module-graph reachability, D-386).
Method: Dead code: files unreachable from every application/tooling/test entry point plus exports nothing imports, via module-graph reachability. Deterministic, exhaustive over the import graph.
Unreachable from the 13 application, 41 tooling and 4 test entry point(s) detected in this repo. Gate removals on your build/type-check — an undetected custom entry would make these reachable.
no import path from any entry point (13 application, 41 tooling, 4 test roots considered) (×7) — index.vue, index.tsx, index.tsx, …
What to do
Delete the dead files and unused exports — every line is maintenance cost and rebuild-estimate inflation with zero runtime value.
React / JS · Readiness — npm dependency truthfulness (D-386): unused dependencies, imports not declared anywhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps.
Method: npm dependency truthfulness: unused dependencies, imports declared nowhere, and type-/test-only packages shipped as production deps — from the manifest + import graph. Deterministic.
Imported only as a TYPE and declared in no reachable package.json. The import is erased at compile time, so nothing is installed and no runtime resolution depends on it — but type-checking a clean clone will fail. Declare the typings it resolves through (or the package itself) in the owning package.json. — types.ts:6
Imported but not declared in any reachable package.json — installs work only by hoisting accident. (×2) — main.ts:15, main.ts:14
Declared in Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/package.json but never imported anywhere in that package or its workspace members — dead weight and attack surface. Verify against build tooling before removing. (×3)
What to do
Remove unused dependencies, declare unlisted imports explicitly, and demote type-/test-only packages to devDependencies.
React / JS · Architecture — Import cycles in the module graph (D-386) — files that can only be understood and changed together.
Method: Import cycles in the module graph, detected exhaustively over JS/TS imports (the same cycle detection as the .NET coupling dimension). Deterministic.
Other · Security — Transport security, security headers, secure cookies, input validation, middleware order and crypto hygiene (presence, not runtime).
No Content-Security-Policy / X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options configuration found — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them. (−2.0 on this card.)
No UseHttpsRedirection/UseHsts and no reverse-proxy signal — transport security is unverified at the app layer. (−2.0 on this card.)
What to do
Add security response headers (Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options) — defense in depth, even when a reverse proxy could set them.
Enforce HTTPS at the app layer (UseHttpsRedirection / UseHsts) — only skip this if a reverse proxy demonstrably terminates TLS.
Other · Code Health — Whether the code avoids sync-over-async (deadlock-prone blocking on tasks) and async void.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: async methods scanned for .Wait()/.GetAwaiter().GetResult() and async-void outside event handlers. Deterministic, hard fact per invocation.
Blocking on a Task with `.Wait()`/`.GetAwaiter().GetResult()` can deadlock (and wastes a thread). Prefer awaiting it: make the caller `async` and `await` instead. Where a synchronous entry point must stay — a public sync API you cannot break, or a process entry point that must not return until the work finishes — the block belongs in ONE documented bridge and never inside code that is already async; and where it already is that bridge, give the wait a TIMEOUT so a hung task fails the call instead of hanging the process. (×3) — DefaultDataPermissionService.cs:108, DefaultDataPermissionService.cs:161, DefaultDataPermissionService.cs:221
Other · Code Health — Whether async methods accept a CancellationToken so work can be cancelled (adoption curve).
Method: Roslyn scan: every async method (excluding framework-fixed overrides/Blazor handlers) checked for CancellationToken parameter presence. Deterministic, adoption percentage.
Only 78/107 async methods accept a CancellationToken, so in-flight work can't be stopped early when the caller gives up — whatever ends it in your host (shutdown signal, timeout, abandoned request, user cancel). Thread a token through the call chain and honour it at each await and loop; where a method genuinely cannot be interrupted, omitting it is a deliberate choice — judge against your hosting model.
No CancellationToken parameter — this work can't be stopped early once started. (×25) — CommonService.cs:81, OrganizationRequestHandler.cs:136, AccountController.cs:40, …
What to do
Thread a CancellationToken through async methods so work stops promptly on cancellation.
Other · Code Health — Whether exceptions are handled rather than silently swallowed or rethrown with lost stack traces.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every catch clause counted; empty catches and bare rethrows flagged. Population is all catch clauses, not estimated. Deterministic, hard fact.
Other · Code Health — Whether log calls use message templates (queryable) rather than interpolated strings.
Method: Roslyn syntax scan: every log call-site counted; interpolated-string first-argument violations flagged. Population is all log calls, not estimated. Deterministic.
Other · Code Health — Whether nullable reference types are enabled and not undermined by heavy `!` suppression.
Method: Roslyn compiler-options scan: NullableContextOptions per project; null-forgiving (!) suppression density per 1k syntax nodes. Deterministic, adoption plus suppression penalty.
~5.4 `!` suppressions per 1k syntax nodes — 286 suppression(s) across the 52573 syntax node(s) in code where nullable warnings are ENABLED, which is the only code a `!` can suppress anything in (a `!` under `#nullable disable` is inert and is not counted, and its file's nodes are not in the denominator). Each one tells the compiler to trust you about null, suppressing the very safety NRTs provide.
What to do
Enable <Nullable>enable</Nullable> across all projects and resolve warnings rather than suppressing with `!`.
Do you agree with this assessment?
WCAG coverage — what static analysis assessed
Statically assessed 15 of 55 WCAG 2.2 Level A/AA success criteria (27%; ≈30% of the 50 WCAG 2.1 AA criteria for EN 301 549). The other 40 require runtime or manual evaluation. Partial signal only (a clean result is necessary, not sufficient; static analysis fully verifies none). This is accessibility readiness, not a conformance claim — a WCAG conformance claim requires manual evaluation (WCAG-EM 1.0).
The score is the rank-weighted fold of these lenses (worst-heaviest), each including its meta-dimensions; a lens with a Critical contributor is capped at Fair (its band reads "gated by …") and is never the strongest area however high its average.
Capped at Fair by a Critical contributor — resolve it before relying on this lens.
Not included — 42 check(s) not relevant to this codebase
These checks had nothing to measure here (no tests, no git history, the codebase is small, or the architecture style doesn't apply), so they're omitted above rather than scored low.
AC5 ARIA correctness — No ARIA usage found in the parsed markup — AC5 not applicable here.
AX1 Captive dependencies — no DI registrations detected
AX2 Stateful singletons — no singleton implementations detected
AX7 Slice cohesion — not applicable — not a vertical-slice architecture
AXB2 Runtime readiness — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
C3 Audit Trail — Repo shows no audit-logging mechanism (IAuditable, an immutable audit log, an EF SaveChanges interceptor) for sensitive changes — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Record an audit trail in code (or document where it lives) so this dimension can be scored.
C4 Data Retention — Repo shows no data-retention / TTL / cleanup mechanism for personal data — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Define retention periods and a purge/cleanup job (or TTL) in code, or document where retention is enforced, so this dimension can be scored.
C5 Data-Subject Rights — Repo shows no corroborated data-subject-rights mechanism (erasure / export-portability / consent) tied to a subject id or GDPR vocabulary — absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control. Implement erasure, data export/portability and consent tracking over the subject's records.
D1 Cyclomatic Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.py, .ts, .tsx) had no cyclomatic complexity computed for it, so cyclomatic complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D16 Bus Factor — single-maintainer — knowledge-concentration (bus factor) risk
D18 Solution Shape — D18 scores the shape of a C#/VB .NET solution, but this repository's production source is mostly .py, .ts, .tsx, which the C#/VB workspace does not load — the projects that loaded are an immaterial minority, so solution shape was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D2 Cognitive Complexity — Most of this repository's production source (.py, .ts, .tsx) had no cognitive complexity computed for it, so cognitive complexity was not measured — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's complexity. Not scored: no method bodies were exposed for those file kinds by any language model this pass could load. This is a gap in the analysis run, not a finding about this repository.
D22 Internal API Consistency — No exposed public API
D23 Boundary Type-Coupling — Bounded contexts not declared
D25 ADR Conformance — no ADRs to check
D27 Navigability — Most of this repository's production source (.py, .ts, .tsx) was not read by navigability analysis, so tracing effort was not assessed — whatever else resolved (another language's projects) is not this repository's navigability. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer's reach, not a verdict about this repository.
D3 God Classes — Most of this repository's production source (.py, .ts, .tsx) was not read by god-class detection, so class size was not assessed for the languages that are the product — whatever else this pass did read is not this repository's class size. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a verdict about this repository.
D32 Data Compliance (PII/GDPR) — No PII/GDPR-handling patterns detected (p/gdpr ruleset) — no data-compliance surface to assess.
D36 Supply-chain Provenance & Signing — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
D37 Vulnerability-disclosure Policy — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
D40 Network Egress Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
D41 Kernel & Syscall Confinement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
D42 Runtime Threat Enforcement — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
D6 Cohesion (LCOM4) — Cohesion (LCOM4) is measured over a C#/VB class graph, and this repository's production source is mostly .py, .ts, .tsx, which this pass does not read, so cohesion was not assessed for this repository. Not scored — this is a gap in the analyzer, not a finding about this repository.
D7 Architectural Integrity — no checkable ADRs and no dependency cycles — architectural integrity not assessed
DM7 Repository granularity — no repository abstraction detected (e.g. uses a document session)
ES1 Event Sourcing — not scored — this repository shows none of the 3 signals this check looks for
P12 CI test-gate honesty — no CI workflow found
P5 DR & Backup — not evidenced — repo shows no backup/RTO/RPO controls; absence of evidence is not evidence of a working control
P6 Release Hygiene — not evidenced — no changelog, version stamp or semver release tag in the repo
P7 Outbound HTTP resilience — no outbound HTTP usage detected
P8 Schema migrations — no EF Core usage detected
P9 Domain vs controller coverage — coverage data present but no domain-layer files were identified (no /Domain//Aggregates/ paths)
PF1 Benchmark discipline — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF2 Allocation hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
PF3 Async & latency hygiene — Performance is assessed only for perf-relevant repos — a packaged library, one that ships benchmarks, or one already using allocation-aware APIs. This repo isn't one, so the Performance lens is not applicable and is excluded from the score.
R11 Import Boundaries — No recognizable feature-sliced/layered src layout — boundary rules not applicable.
R4 Test Coverage — 4 test file(s) reach none of 269 production file(s) via imports — exercised outside the JS import graph (integration/bundled), not import-reachable
R5 Dependency Freshness — uses a pnpm lockfile — dependency freshness not measured here; JS/npm CVEs are scored in D33 (JS/npm Dependency Vulnerabilities)
SC1 Supply-chain hygiene — Advisory — this card reports evidence and never carries a score, so there is nothing missing here.
X6 Hand-rolled structured-format parsing — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
X7 Silent fallback defaults — Reported, not scored — this card publishes what it found rather than grading it. Its content is the findings and the key metric above.
Appendix A — Findings (grouped)
The findings behind the scores, grouped by severity, then by dimension and kind. The high-severity issues are enumerated in full below; items per group are capped at 25 with any overflow stated explicitly per group, never silently truncated. The complete machine-readable list of every finding (all severities) is the companion findings.md in this report's bundle.
Issue — 69 finding(s)
D38 · OSV Dependency Vulnerabilities· High CVE · ×37
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs 7.23.3: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/plugin-transform-modules-systemjs to 7.29.4 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— @remix-run/router 1.14.0: [GHSA redacted] — @remix-run/router is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @remix-run/router to 1.23.2 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against @remix-run/router 1.14.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.23.3 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.23.3 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against @remix-run/router 1.14.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml— axios 0.24.0: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 0.31.1. This is 1 of 23 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against axios 0.24.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.33.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.33.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 23 advisories this scan raises against axios 0.24.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— axios 0.27.2: [GHSA redacted] — axios is not declared by the manifests that govern this lockfile: it is pulled in transitively here (the ^0.24.0 this repo declares for it belongs to a separate install root and does not reach this one), so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin axios to 0.31.1 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 23 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against axios 0.27.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 0.33.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 0.33.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 23 advisories this scan raises against axios 0.27.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— body-parser 1.20.1: [GHSA redacted] — body-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin body-parser to 1.20.3 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against body-parser 1.20.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.20.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.20.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against body-parser 1.20.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 1.1.16 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.1.18 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.1.18 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 1.1.11: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— brace-expansion 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted] — brace-expansion is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin brace-expansion to 2.1.2 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 5 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 5 advisories this scan raises against brace-expansion 2.0.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml— braces 2.3.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.0.3 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.3.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.3.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— braces 3.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — braces is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin braces to 3.0.3 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). (in 3 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml— cross-spawn 5.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 6.0.6 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 5.1.0, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 5.1.0; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml— cross-spawn 6.0.5: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 6.0.6 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— cross-spawn 7.0.3: [GHSA redacted] — cross-spawn is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cross-spawn to 7.0.5 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). (in 3 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— debug 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted] — debug is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 2.6.9 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 0.7.4, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 0.7.4; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against debug 0.7.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml— flatted 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.4.0 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.0.2, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.0.2; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 2.0.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 2.0.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml— flatted 3.2.7: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.2.7, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.2.7: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— flatted 3.2.9: [GHSA redacted] — flatted is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin flatted to 3.4.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against flatted 3.2.9, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.4.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.4.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against flatted 3.2.9: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml— http-cache-semantics 3.8.1: [GHSA redacted] — http-cache-semantics is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 4.1.1 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 3.8.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 3.8.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead).
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— js-cookie 2.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — js-cookie is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 3.0.7 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 2.2.1, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 2.2.1; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml)
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 3.15.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.15.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.15.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 3.14.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted] — js-yaml is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin js-yaml to 4.3.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.3.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.3.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against js-yaml 4.1.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — this repo declares lodash ^4.17.21, a range that ALREADY admits the fixed 4.18.0, so there is no manifest edit to make here. Re-resolve the lock so lodash moves onto 4.18.0 or later; if the flagged 4.17.21 comes back, a dependency is pinning it — upgrade that dependent, or pin lodash with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm) so only one copy resolves. This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— lodash-es 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted] — lodash-es is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin lodash-es to 4.18.0 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against lodash-es 4.17.21, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.18.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.18.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against lodash-es 4.17.21: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 3.1.4 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 3.1.4 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 3.1.4 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 3 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml— minimatch 6.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 6.2.2 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 6.2.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.2.2 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.2.2 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 6.2.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: [GHSA redacted] BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml— minimatch 7.4.6: [GHSA redacted] — minimatch is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin minimatch to 7.4.8 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 3 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against minimatch 7.4.6, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 7.4.8 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 7.4.8 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 3 advisories this scan raises against minimatch 7.4.6: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml— @babel/traverse 7.21.4: [GHSA redacted] — @babel/traverse is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin @babel/traverse to 7.23.2 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)).
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— cipher-base 1.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — cipher-base is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin cipher-base to 1.0.5 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml)
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml— decompress 4.2.1: [GHSA redacted] — no fixed version has been published yet. Track the advisory; decompress is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so the action is on the dependency that requires it — upgrade or replace that dependent. This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against decompress 4.2.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ArcoApp/pnpm-lock.yaml— fast-xml-parser 4.2.0: [GHSA redacted] — fast-xml-parser is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin fast-xml-parser to 4.5.4 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 7 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against fast-xml-parser 4.2.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.5.5 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.5.5 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against fast-xml-parser 4.2.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— form-data 2.3.3: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 2.5.4 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against form-data 2.3.3, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 2.5.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 2.5.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 2.3.3: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— form-data 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted] — form-data is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin form-data to 4.0.4 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against form-data 4.0.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 4.0.6 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 4.0.6 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against form-data 4.0.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— gh-pages 3.2.3: [GHSA redacted] — upgrade to 5.0.0 (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml)
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— immer 8.0.4: [GHSA redacted] — immer is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (— 9.0.6 is a MAJOR ahead of the resolved 8.0.4, so an `overrides` pin would force a breaking version under a dependent written against 8.0.4; upgrading the declaring package is the remedy, and where no patched release exists in your major line, record the exposure instead). (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against immer 8.0.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— pbkdf2 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted] — pbkdf2 is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin pbkdf2 to 3.1.3 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against pbkdf2 3.1.2: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— sha.js 2.4.11: [GHSA redacted] — sha.js is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin sha.js to 2.4.12 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml)
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— shell-quote 1.8.1: [GHSA redacted] — shell-quote is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin shell-quote to 1.8.4 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against shell-quote 1.8.1, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.9.0 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.9.0 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against shell-quote 1.8.1: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Critical CVE: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— underscore 1.7.0: [GHSA redacted] — underscore is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin underscore to 1.12.1 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 2 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against underscore 1.7.0, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 1.13.8 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 1.13.8 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 2 advisories this scan raises against underscore 1.7.0: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
High CVE: Newtonsoft.Json 12.0.2 — Newtonsoft.Json 12.0.2 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 7 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Net.Http 4.3.0 — System.Net.Http 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 22 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 — System.Text.RegularExpressions 4.3.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 22 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: MessagePack 2.1.90 — MessagePack 2.1.90 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: MessagePack 2.1.90 — MessagePack 2.1.90 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: System.Text.Json 7.0.0 — System.Text.Json 7.0.0 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.1.4 — Microsoft.Data.SqlClient 2.1.4 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: Npgsql 5.0.7 — Npgsql 5.0.7 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High CVE: SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.6 — SQLitePCLRaw.lib.e_sqlite3 2.1.6 (transitive) has a High advisory; affects 5 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
High IaC: DS-0002 Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 Apps/CRM/CRM.WebAPI/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 BasicPlatform.Gateway/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
High IaC: DS-0002 BasicPlatform.WebAPI/Dockerfile— Image user should not be 'root' A container that starts as root runs your process with root's capabilities inside the namespace, so a compromise of the process starts from there. The step: create an unprivileged account in the image (`RUN useradd -r -M app` — or whatever this base image's account tooling is, `adduser` and `useradd` are not both present everywhere`), give it ownership of the paths the process writes at runtime (`COPY --chown=` on those layers, or a `RUN chown -R`), and end the final stage with `USER app` so it is the default at start. Build stages that only compile can stay root; it is the stage that RUNS that needs the account. If the process genuinely requires root — it manages the container runtime, ptraces another process or opens raw devices — say so here rather than making a change that breaks it.
Critical vulnerability: [GHSA redacted] Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml— elliptic 6.5.4: [GHSA redacted] — elliptic is not declared in this repo's manifests: it is pulled in transitively, so upgrade the dependency that requires it (or pin elliptic to 6.6.1 with an `overrides` entry (`pnpm.overrides` for pnpm)). This is 1 of 6 advisories with a published fix this scan raises against elliptic 6.5.4, and their fixed versions do not agree — anything below 6.6.1 still leaves at least one of them open. Take this package to 6.6.1 or later: that is the floor for the package, not this row's target alone. (in 2 dependency files: Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/CMSWeb/pnpm-lock.yaml, BasicPlatform.WebAPI/ConsoleApp/pnpm-lock.yaml) This one row stands for the 7 advisories this scan raises against elliptic 6.5.4: [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted], [GHSA redacted].
Warning — 75 finding(s)
D30 · Dependency Vulnerabilities· Medium CVE · ×22
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.90 — MessagePack 2.1.90 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.90 — MessagePack 2.1.90 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.90 — MessagePack 2.1.90 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.90 — MessagePack 2.1.90 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.90 — MessagePack 2.1.90 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.90 — MessagePack 2.1.90 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.90 — MessagePack 2.1.90 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.90 — MessagePack 2.1.90 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.90 — MessagePack 2.1.90 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: MessagePack 2.1.90 — MessagePack 2.1.90 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.15.1 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.15.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Api 1.7.0-alpha.1 — OpenTelemetry.Api 1.7.0-alpha.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Zipkin 1.7.0-alpha.1 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Zipkin 1.7.0-alpha.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore 1.6.0-beta.2 — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore 1.6.0-beta.2 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http 1.6.0-beta.2 — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http 1.6.0-beta.2 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 2 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.15.1 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.15.1 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Api 1.7.0 — OpenTelemetry.Api 1.7.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Zipkin 1.7.0 — OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Zipkin 1.7.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore 1.7.0 — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.AspNetCore 1.7.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http 1.7.0 — OpenTelemetry.Instrumentation.Http 1.7.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.8.0 — Microsoft.IdentityModel.JsonWebTokens 6.8.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Medium CVE: System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.8.0 — System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt 6.8.0 (transitive) has a Medium advisory; affects 4 projects — one upgrade fixes all. https://github.com/advisories/[GHSA redacted]
Off the main sequence: BasicPlatform.Infrastructure — BasicPlatform.Infrastructure: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 6 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: CMS.Domain — CMS.Domain: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.00, distance 1.00 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 4 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: CRM.Domain — CRM.Domain: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.13, distance 0.88 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 7 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: BasicPlatform.Domain — BasicPlatform.Domain: abstractness 0.00, instability 0.17, distance 0.83 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 5 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Off the main sequence: App.Infrastructure — App.Infrastructure: abstractness 0.22, instability 0.00, distance 0.78 — zone of pain — concrete and depended on by 8 project(s), so it's rigid to change.
Prerelease dependency: Athena.All.FreeSql — Athena.All.FreeSql resolves to 7.0.4-preview.20231218.2, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
Prerelease dependency: Athena.Infrastructure.FreeSql.OTel — Athena.Infrastructure.FreeSql.OTel resolves to 7.0.0-preview.20231101.2, a prerelease build. Prerelease packages carry no support policy, may change breaking between previews and can be unlisted — pin a stable release before shipping, or record the reason this preview is required.
CRAP 56: ExternalPageRequestHandler.Handle BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/ExternalPages/ExternalPageRequestHandler.cs:30— Cyclomatic 7 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 56: UserQueryService.GetTreeChildren BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Users/UserQueryService.cs:776— Cyclomatic 7 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 42: DefaultDataPermissionService.GetUserDataScopesAsync BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Commons/DefaultDataPermissionService.cs:230— Cyclomatic 6 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 42: TenantQueryService.GetByCodeAsync BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Tenants/TenantQueryService.cs:111— Cyclomatic 6 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
Duplicated block (21 lines × 2) BasicPlatform.ProcessManager/RoleProcessManager.cs:42— BasicPlatform.ProcessManager/RoleProcessManager.cs:42-62 | BasicPlatform.ProcessManager/UserProcessManager.cs:43-63 — the copies sit in sibling files of one directory: extract the block into a single shared function in that directory and call it from each site, so a change lands once. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `BasicPlatform.ProcessManager/RoleProcessManager.cs:42` it begins part-way through the construct above it, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (14 lines × 2) BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Resources/ResourceRequestHandler.cs:108— BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Resources/ResourceRequestHandler.cs:108-121 | BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Resources/ResourceRequestHandler.cs:157-170 — both copies are in the same file, so extract the block into one function there and call it from each site — the copies drift apart the first time only one of them is edited. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Resources/ResourceRequestHandler.cs:108` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
Duplicated block (12 lines × 2) BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Organizations/OrganizationQueryService.cs:141— BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Organizations/OrganizationQueryService.cs:141-152 | BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Users/UserQueryService.cs:344-355 — the copies span different directories, so extracting a shared function means choosing where it lives: put it somewhere both call sites can already reach — a location they all depend on today, or a new shared one if there is none — and call it from each site; until then, every change has to be made twice. Read the line range as the matched WINDOW rather than a finished unit: at `BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Organizations/OrganizationQueryService.cs:141` it does not close everything it opens, so those exact lines cannot be lifted as they stand — widen the region to the smallest complete statement or declaration that contains it, and extract that.
CRAP 380: ResourceRequestHandler.Handle BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Resources/ResourceRequestHandler.cs:29— Cyclomatic 19 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 132: UserQueryService.GetByUserNameAsync BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Users/UserQueryService.cs:173— Cyclomatic 11 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 110: ExternalPageRequestHandler.Handle BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/ExternalPages/ExternalPageRequestHandler.cs:77— Cyclomatic 10 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
CRAP 90: UserQueryService.GetPagingAsync BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Users/UserQueryService.cs:41— Cyclomatic 9 with 0.0% file coverage — too complex for how untested it is (CRAP = CC²·(1−cov)³ + CC; ≥30 needs tests or simplification).
Low IaC: DS-0026 Apps/CMS/CMS.WebAPI/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 Apps/CRM/CRM.WebAPI/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 BasicPlatform.Gateway/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
Low IaC: DS-0026 BasicPlatform.WebAPI/Dockerfile— No HEALTHCHECK defined Without one the runtime only knows whether the process is alive, not whether it is serving, so a wedged container is restarted by nobody. The step: add a `HEALTHCHECK` to the image that probes the service the way a client would — this image already declares `EXPOSE 80`, so a request to `localhost:80` on the service's own health or root route, exiting non-zero when it does not answer, is the probe — and give it an `--interval`, a `--timeout` and a `--start-period` long enough to cover startup. If the image ships no HTTP client, probe with whatever the runtime already has, or declare the check in the orchestrator instead and say so here.
redundant comment BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Commons/DefaultColumnPermissionService.cs:53— "读取用户的角色列权限" — trim - the column-permissions comment already states this
redundant comment BasicPlatform.AppService/Users/Models/UserDataPermissionModel.cs:45— "<summary>" — delete - XML/annotation marker, not explanatory text
No ADRs found — No ADRs found at common paths; consider documenting architectural decisions in Docs/ADL/ or similar.
D21 · Naming Consistency· The root namespace for user-related domain models is inconsistent. Most user entities reside in `BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users`, but some (like `UserAppointment`, `UserAccessRecord`, `UserCustomColumn`) are nested directly under `BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users` or use a flat structure without a subfolder/model grouping, while events are in `Events`. This creates a mixed structure where some concepts are grouped by entity type and others are not. · ×1
The root namespace for user-related domain models is inconsistent. Most user entities reside in `BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users`, but some (like `UserAppointment`, `UserAccessRecord`, `UserCustomColumn`) are nested directly under `BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users` or use a flat structure without a subfolder/model grouping, while events are in `Events`. This creates a mixed structure where some concepts are grouped by entity type and others are not. — Ensure all user-related domain models are consistently grouped under `BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users` with a clear subfolder or naming convention (e.g., `BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users.User` vs `BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users.Appointment`). (symbols: BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users.User, BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users.UserAppointment, BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users.UserAccessRecord, BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users.UserCustomColumn, BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users.UserDataPermission, BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users.UserResource, BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users.Events.UserUpdatedEvent, BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users.Events.UserBasicUpdatedEvent, BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users.Events.UserColumnPermissionAssignedEvent, BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users.Events.UserDataPermissionAssignedEvent, BasicPlatform.Domain.Models.Users.Events.UserCreatedEvent)
D21 · Naming Consistency· There is an inconsistency in the naming of query models versus regular models. Some modules use the `*QueryModel` suffix for DTOs used in queries (e.g., `UserQueryModel`), while others use `*Model` (e.g., `TenantModel`, `ApplicationModel`). This creates confusion about whether a specific model is for querying or general use. · ×1
There is an inconsistency in the naming of query models versus regular models. Some modules use the `*QueryModel` suffix for DTOs used in queries (e.g., `UserQueryModel`), while others use `*Model` (e.g., `TenantModel`, `ApplicationModel`). This creates confusion about whether a specific model is for querying or general use. — Standardize on `*QueryModel` for all DTOs used in query requests/responses, or clearly distinguish between `*Model` (general) and `*QueryModel` (specific to queries). (symbols: BasicPlatform.AppService.Users.Models.UserQueryModel, BasicPlatform.AppService.Tenants.Models.TenantQueryModel, BasicPlatform.AppService.Applications.Models.ApplicationQueryModel, BasicPlatform.AppService.Organizations.Models.OrganizationQueryModel, BasicPlatform.AppService.Positions.Models.PositionQueryModel, BasicPlatform.AppService.Users.Models.UserModel, BasicPlatform.AppService.Tenants.Models.TenantModel, BasicPlatform.AppService.Applications.Models.ApplicationModel, BasicPlatform.AppService.Organizations.Models.OrganizationModel, BasicPlatform.AppService.Positions.Models.PositionModel)
D21 · Naming Consistency· The CRM module uses `Customer` as the primary entity name, while the rest of the `BasicPlatform` module uses `User` or `Account` for similar concepts. Additionally, `CRM.Domain.Customers.Customer` is a direct entity, but `CRM.Domain.Customers.Events.CustomerCreatedEvent` is an event. The inconsistency lies in the root namespace `CRM` vs `BasicPlatform` and the entity naming (`Customer` vs `User`). · ×1
The CRM module uses `Customer` as the primary entity name, while the rest of the `BasicPlatform` module uses `User` or `Account` for similar concepts. Additionally, `CRM.Domain.Customers.Customer` is a direct entity, but `CRM.Domain.Customers.Events.CustomerCreatedEvent` is an event. The inconsistency lies in the root namespace `CRM` vs `BasicPlatform` and the entity naming (`Customer` vs `User`). — Align the CRM module's entity naming with the rest of the platform (e.g., `User` or `Account`), or ensure the `CRM` namespace is clearly separated and consistently named. (symbols: CRM.Domain.Customers.Events.CustomerCreatedEvent, CRM.Domain.Customers.Customer, CRM.Domain.Customers.Events.CustomerCreatedEvent.CreatedUserId)
D21 · Naming Consistency· There are two different interfaces for user querying · ×1
There are two different interfaces for user querying: `IUserQueryService` in `BasicPlatform.AppService.Users` and `IUserService` in `App.Infrastructure.Services`. They seem to perform similar operations (e.g., `GetUserCustomColumnsAsync`), leading to potential confusion about which service to use. — Consolidate user querying logic into a single `IUserQueryService` or `IUserService` interface to avoid duplication and confusion. (symbols: BasicPlatform.AppService.Users.IUserQueryService, BasicPlatform.AppService.Users.IUserQueryService.GetUserCustomColumnsAsync, BasicPlatform.AppService.Users.IUserQueryService.GetUserResourceAsync, App.Infrastructure.Services.IUserService.GetUserCustomColumnsAsync, App.Infrastructure.Services.IUserService.GetUserResourceCodesAsync)
D21 · Naming Consistency· The `IRoleQueryService` contains both query methods (`GetAsync`, `GetSelectListAsync`) and permission-related methods (`GetDataPermissionsAsync`, `GetRoleIdsByUserIdAsync`). This mixes general role queries with specific permission queries, which may be better separated. · ×1
The `IRoleQueryService` contains both query methods (`GetAsync`, `GetSelectListAsync`) and permission-related methods (`GetDataPermissionsAsync`, `GetRoleIdsByUserIdAsync`). This mixes general role queries with specific permission queries, which may be better separated. — Separate role queries from permission queries into distinct interfaces or services to improve cohesion. (symbols: BasicPlatform.AppService.Roles.IRoleQueryService, BasicPlatform.AppService.Roles.IRoleQueryService.GetRoleIdsByUserIdAsync, BasicPlatform.AppService.Roles.IRoleQueryService.GetSelectListAsync, BasicPlatform.AppService.Roles.IRoleQueryService.GetAsync, BasicPlatform.AppService.Roles.IRoleQueryService.GetDataPermissionsAsync)
D23 · Boundary Type-Coupling· Bounded contexts not declared · ×1
Bounded contexts not declared — At 17k LoC across 23 projects the codebase is large and multi-module, so explicit bounded contexts are needed. Name this codebase's bounded contexts (≥2 module groups, e.g. per subsystem) so cross-boundary type coupling can be assessed. Declare them in `.codehealth/config.yaml` at the repository root (create it if absent), mapping each context name to the module-path or namespace prefixes that belong to it — e.g. `architecture:` → `contexts:` → `Billing: ["src/billing", "Acme.Billing"]`, `Catalog: ["src/catalog", "Acme.Catalog"]`.
D28 · Secrets (history)· Rotate the exposed credentials · ×1
Rotate the exposed credentials — git history can't be un-committed — Some of these secrets are in git HISTORY: deleting the file does not remove them (the commit persists on every clone, fork and backup). The remediation is to ROTATE each historically-exposed credential and treat it as compromised — not to delete the file. Rewriting history is disruptive and unreliable across existing forks. (Working-tree-only secrets — no commit — can instead be removed from the file and moved to a secret store.)
Dormant codebase — 66 of 66 significant files have no living knowledge — the codebase as a whole is dormant, not 66 separate risks. Re-engage owners or document before change.
D34 · Knowledge Freshness· Largest orphaned file · ×1
Largest orphaned file BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Users/UserQueryService.cs— One of the largest files with no living knowledge remaining — a reasonable place to start a read-through before the aggregate risk above bites.
IL efficiency: 1 authored method(s) exceed the IL budget BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Tenants/TenantQueryService.cs:186— 1 of 694 first-party methods compile to oversized IL bodies (> 250 instructions); worst: BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql.Tenants.TenantQueryService.GetAsync @ BasicPlatform.AppService.FreeSql/Tenants/TenantQueryService.cs:186, 265 IL instructions; large bodies don't JIT-inline, which pulled this dimension to 10.0/10; splitting the hottest bodies recovers the most.
D22 · Internal API Consistency· No exposed public API · ×1
No exposed public API — No intentionally-exposed types (IsPackable or .Contracts) to evaluate.
Appendix B — Reproduction & audit trail
Every external tool invocation behind a deep-scan dimension — the tool, its captured version, the exact command, how many findings it yielded, and a link to the retained raw output. To reproduce any finding: check out the same commit and run the command shown (repo-relative — never an absolute scratch path). The complete raw scanner output is retained verbatim under artifacts/raw/ (indexed in artifacts/raw/index.json); per-invocation exit codes and wall-clock durations are in sidecar.json — kept out of this table so the rendered report stays byte-identical across runs of the same commit.
provenance: not applicable — No CI/build pipeline found (.github/.forgejo/.gitea workflows, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines*.yml, .pipelines/, .vsts-ci/, Jenkinsfile, .circleci); there is no build to attest provenance for.
disclosure: not applicable — No vulnerability-disclosure policy file found (SECURITY.md/.markdown/.rst/.txt at root or under .github/.forgejo/.gitea/docs, .well-known/security.txt). A coordinated-disclosure policy may live off-repo, so this is not evidenced rather than failed.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; network egress policy is a cluster-native control that may live at the platform/firewall layer, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; seccomp/AppArmor/SELinux confinement is a workload-level control, so there is nothing to assess here.
runtime-hardening: not applicable — No Kubernetes/orchestration workloads found in the repository manifests; runtime threat-detection and admission-control policy are cluster-level controls, so there is nothing to assess here.
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Run 019fcf52-7602-7344-98de-c13eb6d4215b · every finding is also locatable in findings.md, and the complete scoring record (with exit codes + durations) in sidecar.json.
Appendix C — Personal-data map
Every field, property and record parameter whose name is conventional personal data — 34 field(s) across 2 categories, each with an exact repo-relative file:line. This is the data inventory a compliance review starts from — right-to-erasure, retention, minimisation. Detected by name with a deliberately specific classifier (the same one the GDPR dimensions use, so CardDefinition or FileName don't trip); informational — it feeds no score.
Issues: 69 · Warnings: 75 · Recommendations: 17 · Info: 50 — Appendix A · all findings · full markdown report.
Generated by Watchdog — deterministic code-health analysis. 05-08-2026 @ 00:28 UTC.
Downloadable artifacts
Machine-readable and reproducible from this commit + frozen rubric — drop them straight into a contract appendix, a CRA dossier, or a downstream SCA / VEX tool.